

Volume III, No. 1]

[December, 1930

417

JOURNAL
OF THE
MADRAS UNIVERSITY

Editorial Board

P. J. THOMAS, M.A., B.LITT., Ph.D., *Editor*

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1. DR. A. G. HOGG, M.A., D.LITT. | 5. MR. V. K. AIYAPPAN PILLAI,
M.A. |
| 2. MR. W. E. SMITH, M.A. | 6. MR. C. J. VARKEY, M.A. |
| 3. MR. M. S. SABHESAN, M.A. | 7. MR. S. VAIYAPURI PILLAI,
B.A., B.L. |
| 4. MR. K.A. NILAKANTA SASTRI,
M.A. | |



PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY

MADRAS

PRINTED AT THE DIOCESAN PRESS, VEPEERY

1930

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION A.—LETTERS

	PAGE
1. THE POLITICAL THEORY OF IMPERIALISM. By Professor K. Zachariah, M.A. (Oxon.), I.E.S. ...	1
2. THE STUDY OF SOUTH INDIAN HISTORY ⁵ By Professor K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, M.A. ...	23
3. NON-ECONOMIC CRITERIA IN THE STUDY OF ECONOMICS. By Miss L. C. M. OUWERKERK, B.A. (Cantab.)	39
4. A LITTLE-KNOWN ADVAITIN. By Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, M.A. (Madras), B.Sc. (Oxon.)	48
5. THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY. By Mr. C. S. SRINIVASACHARI, M.A.	61
6. SHAKESPEARE CRITICISM. PART I, By Professor V. K. Aiyappan Pillai, M.A. (Oxon.) ...	77

SECTION B.—SCIENCE

7. THE PLACE OF PADDY IN OUR RURAL ECONOMY. By Mr. G. R. HILSON, B.Sc. (Cantab.)	109
8. A NOTE ON THE OCCURRENCE AND THE METAMORPHOSIS OF POLYGORDIUS SP. OBTAINED IN MADRAS-TOWN WATER (2 PLATES) By Mr. R. Gopala Aiyar, M.A., M.Sc.	114
9. NOTES ON BRYOLOGICAL GEOGRAPHY (1 PLATE) (concluded.) By Rev. G. Foreau, S.J.	118

SECTION C.—UNIVERSITY

10. UNIVERSITY NOTES ...	129
11. CONVOCATION ADDRESS, 1930. By Dr. P. Subbarayan, LL.D., Bar-at-Law ...	133

SECTION D.—MISCELLANEOUS

12. REVIEWS 'The Theory of the Cost Price System'. By Mr. W. McLean, M.A., B.L.	147
13. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ...	153
14. LEAGUE OF NATIONS Interim Report of the Gold Delegation	155

SECTION A.

JOURNAL

OF THE

MADRAS UNIVERSITY

VOL. III

DECEMBER, 1930

No. 1

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF IMPERIALISM.¹

BY

PROF. K. ZACHARIAH, M.A. (OXON), I.E.S.,
Presidency College, Calcutta

I must begin with an acknowledgement and an apology. It is a real pleasure to me to come back, if only for an evening, to my old University and it is an honour to come back in this capacity, to lecture on a Foundation associated with the name of one who, perhaps more than any other living Indian, has upheld, in his life and his teaching, true principles of politics and public duty. I must thank the University for this opportunity and this honour.

I must apologize for a subject which, to a certain extent, overlaps last year's. I had chosen my subject and written out the greater part of my lecture before I obtained a copy of last year's lecture; and then it was too late to change. I have been compelled to content myself with enlarging the historical part of my treatment and curtailing the special application to India. This is the explanation of a certain disproportion of which I am conscious; for that and for the overlapping I express my regrets.

The rôle of political philosophy has generally been to justify the accomplished fact, to prop up existing institutions with the buttresses of reason. States, like individuals, are often moved primarily by material interests and the hope of material rewards. But the moral sense generally asserts itself; and they are uneasy till they can convince themselves that ethical principles sanction,

¹ The Rt. Hon'ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri, Lecture delivered at the Senate House on Feb. 21, 1930.

or at any rate are not violated by, their activities. Nor is this difficult, for there are few actions and few institutions for which the human intellect is not ingenious enough to devise a justification which the human conscience is not elastic enough to accept. From slavery to anarchy, there is nothing which has not had, at one time or another, its advocates or defenders.

The purpose of these lectures is to trace and analyse some of the arguments that have been put forward in defence of conquest and empire. The inquiry cannot be exhaustive, but it is possible, even within the narrow limits of time at my command, to indicate the principal grounds for the political philosophy of empire. Modern writers, as a rule, have paid little attention to the subject, for the basic assumption of modern political theory is the conception of the state as expressing the general will and commanding the good will and active co-operation of its members—an assumption generally incompatible with imperialism. But there have always been some, who, with more candour or more realism, have faced the problem of the conquering state. After all, empires are one of the recurring facts of history and have often been justified by their results, even if not just in their origin. No survey of political institutions can afford to neglect them.

The first Western people who moralized over history were the ancient Greeks; and we may well begin our study with them, not for that reason alone, but because in Greece we can see the problem in its simplest form, without the complication of disturbing or irrelevant factors. For the Greek theory of empire, however, we have to turn to others than Aristotle and Plato. Writing at a time when the city state was already beginning to break down, they still regarded it as the only true political unit. It is in Thucydides that we find both an analysis and a theory of imperialism.

The general character of the Athenian Empire is well known. Starting as a *symmachia*, a confederacy of equal states, it was rapidly transformed into an *arche* or empire under the domination of Athens. Even in discreet official documents, the allies were sometimes described as 'states over which the Athenians rule'. After an unsuccessful revolt the oath of allegiance was sworn to the men of Athens alone. Nor did Athenian statesmen make any attempt to veil the real character of her government. Cleon told the ecclesia: 'Your empire is a despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators, whose obedience is ensured not by your suicidal concessions, but by the superiority given you by your own strength and not by their loyalty.'¹ Even Pericles held very

similar language : ' What you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny.'¹ The desire for autonomy was particularly strong in Greece and the loss of liberty was felt as an intolerable grievance. Many cities, which had joined the League to secure their own and their neighbours' freedom, now found themselves through that very alliance reduced to the status of subjects. They might well be indignant. The Mitylenean envoys at Sparta voiced the general feeling : ' We did not become allies of the Athenians for the subjugation of the Greeks, but allies of the Greeks for their liberation from the Mede.'² Trust in Athens, they added, we can no longer feel. This distrust of the imperialism of Athens was universal and was shown very markedly by neutrals in the Peloponnesian War. They rightly suspected that, if they gave the Athenians an inch, they would presently take an ell, and were prepared to make peace with their enemies rather than accept help from Athens.

But the Athenians did not let the case go against them by default. They have plenty to say for themselves ; and nearly all the arguments that have ever justified empire may be found, stated with admirable conciseness, in the speeches in Thucydides. There was sometimes an uneasy feeling that, in its origin, the empire was difficult to justify. ' To take it,' admitted Pericles, ' was perhaps wrong.'³ But these qualms were transient. The Athenian speakers at the Congress at Lacedæmon pointed out that the empire had been almost thrust upon Athens nor had it created a new precedent, ' for it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger'.⁴ When Athenian character had deteriorated through years of war and tyranny, the principle that Might is Right is put forward naked and unashamed. ' You know as well as we do,' say the Athenian envoys in the Melian conference, ' that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must'.⁵ And again, ' it is not as if we were the first to make this law or to act upon it when made : we found it existing before us and shall leave it to exist for ever after us ; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do'.⁶ It would be impossible to state more clearly an argument for imperialism that is a hardy perennial and constantly reappears. The possession of Might confers a right to empire, almost imposes an obligation.

But this is not the only ground on which Athens defended her

¹ *Thucydides*, ii. 63.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 63.

³ *Ibid.*, v. 89.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iii. 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, i. 76.

⁶ *Ibid.*, v. 105.

empire; an even stronger one was the plea of self-interest. A state may be strong and yet not use its strength for aggrandizement; but few states can be expected to refrain from using all their resources when their power or prosperity is threatened. Pericles, when he confessed that to take the empire was perhaps wrong, added, 'but to let it go is unsafe'.¹ The same view was expressed, in greater detail, by the Athenian speakers at the Peloponnesian congress. 'At last, when almost all hated us, when some had already revolted and been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends you once were and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire, especially as all who left us would fall to you. And no one can quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can for its interest.'² 'Fear, honour and interest,' they said, combined to forbid any surrender of the empire. It was to the empire that Athens owed her position, as the leading Greek state of the time; her pride was engaged in its maintenance. To abandon the empire would be to relegate herself to the level of a second-rate state. Indeed, her very independence would be threatened. The dualism in Greece, which made neutrality almost impossible, compelled Athens to employ every possible means to strengthen and extend her position. What was lost by one side will be gained by the other. Was it reasonable to demand that the city should commit political suicide? Unsought, the headship of the confederacy had devolved on Athens; thenceforward, every advance was dictated by an inexorable process of evolution. Once the empire was in being and the political and economic fabric of the city adjusted to the new framework, it was impossible to retreat or retract without the certainty of dislocation. It was dangerous even to stand still, to be content with what had been achieved and decline all further acquisitions. As Alcibiades put it, 'We cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves.'³

This resistless inner impulse in empires which urges them to continual conquests finds abundant illustration in history; there is scarcely one empire of which it is not true. Nor is there any need to ascribe this to an insatiable lust of conquest, the appetite growing with food, though this seems true to some extent of the great conquerors, like Alexander and Napoleon. But states, whose imperial expansion is slow and gradual, are driven onward by

¹ *Thucydides*, ii. 63.

² *Ibid.*, i. 75.

Ibid., vi. 18.

other forces than a mere passion for power. The history of Roman imperialism is too well known to need detailed exposition. Just as the Athenian empire was the alternative to Persian domination over the Aegean, so the Roman conquest of Sicily—the first step in its victorious march to world power—was the alternative to a Carthaginian conquest. Once started, the pace might be slowed or quickened, but there could be no halt till some defensible frontier was reached, desert or sea or mountain range. In vain did men like Cato strive to stem the tide; the quest of the natural frontier opens up an almost boundless perspective.

The same tendency is illustrated by the growth of British dominion in India and, on a smaller scale, by the history of Venice in the later Middle Ages. Defended by her lagoons from Goth and Lombard, the island republic had become a great maritime and commercial power concentrating her energies on the Eastern trade. But the states on the mainland, which controlled the outlets for Venetian commerce, the rivers of Lombardy and the passes over the Alps, imposed heavy duties on her merchandise. To protect herself against this rapacity, Venice was compelled to acquire possessions on the mainland and to become a continental and imperial power. But once this policy was adopted, it could not easily be abandoned. There are no natural frontiers in Lombardy to the west or north till the Alps are reached. The Venetian boundary was gradually pushed to the Adige, from the Adige to the Mincio, from the Mincio to the Oglio, from the Oglio to the Adda and Venice found herself committed to a task which was beyond her powers. And although, as with other imperial powers, the first step was dictated by the principle of self-preservation and the succeeding steps seemed to follow by a sort of logical necessity, this persistent advance awoke the alarm and resentment of all the neighbouring states and earned for Venice a reputation for greed and lust for territory. 'Everyone,' said Galeazzo Sforza, lord of Milan, to the Venetians, 'everyone says you want to eat up all Italy'; and a few years later, the League of Cambray protested against 'the insatiable cupidity of the Venetians and their thirst for dominion.'

Everything depends on the point of view. Interests clash; and the expansion of one state, even when it is not wanton, but the necessary means of or corollary to self-preservation, spells peril or annihilation to other states. Athens sought empire because it guaranteed her independence and prosperity and the other Greek cities hated Athens because her imperialism threatened their independence. But the Athenian statesmen did not justify the empire solely on the plea that *Might is Right* or that *Necessity knows no Law*. The best of them realised that the advantage of

the conqueror was an argument too one-sided to win the moral approval of mankind. But, if to it they could add the advantage of the conquered, then indeed their title would be tremendously strengthened. The trouble was that the subjects were not as sensible of the benefits conferred on them as the rulers and preferred autonomy and isolation to the gains they derived from their association with Athens. Athens maintained that this was due to the very mildness of its rule. If its government were more despotic, there would be fewer complaints. It was precisely because it always acted in accordance with law and justice that the allies were emboldened to complain. Nor is this paradoxical claim as absurd as it might appear. Revolutions are the result, not so much of unmitigated oppression as of that consciousness of oppression which is aroused only with the dawn of liberty and material prosperity. The lot of the Greek cities was far more tolerable under Athens than under Persia or even under Sparta. Not without truth did Isocrates say: 'If they recall the trials which were held for the allies at Athens, who is so witless that it will not occur to him to reply to this that the Lacedæmonians put to death without trial more of the Greeks than all those who have come up for trial and judgment with us during all the time that we have governed the city.'¹

It is difficult to deny that culture and civilisation gained by the existence of the Athenian empire. When the tribute was no longer needed for the war against Persia, the money was used largely for the adornment of the city and the glory of the gods. Empire was apparently the historic condition of the brilliant artistic achievements of Athens during the Periclean age and these in turn seemed to justify the empire. In the words of Pericles, Athens became the school of Hellas: she charged high fees, but provided a first class education. If the allies paid her tribute, she gave them something that often cannot be bought with money, she gave them civilisation. They had to pay, but they got their money's worth. She taught them not only through her art and literature but through her law, her wide outlook, her institutions of liberty and self-government. Some of the best of them made their home in Athens and drew from it their spiritual inspiration: so did Polygnotus of Thasos, Hippocrates of Cos, Herodotus of Halicarnassus. To some extent Athens led the Greeks from the old, narrow ideal of the city state to the possibilities of a larger political unity; and many of the allies were freed from the burden of oppressive oligarchies. Pericles could with some justice say that 'Athens alone of her contempo-

¹ *Isocr. Panath.* 66.

aries is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title by merit to rule.'¹

I have dwelt at some length on Athenian imperialism because it was the first self-conscious imperialism that attempted to defend itself by reason and because the arguments it used are those which, allowing for changes in circumstances, have reappeared from age to age. The empire arose without deliberate intention on our part and almost in spite of us. The loss of it now would involve the loss of our power and prosperity and perhaps of our independence. It is a natural law of history that the weak should be ruled by the strong and we cannot be blamed for being strong. Our rule confers benefits on our subjects otherwise far beyond their reach, benefits conferred—as Pericles puts it—not from calculations of expediency, but in the confidence of liberality, fearless of consequences.

Such was the Athenian defence of empire. But these arguments commended themselves neither to the other Greek states nor to the mature reflection of the great Greek thinkers. But it was not so much the principle of domination that Plato and Aristotle condemned as the practice of domination over fellow Greeks; and in their philosophy, which was built round the theory of the city as the ideal unit, there could be no place for any extension of territory which would impair its self-sufficiency and react on its institutions. But they supplied a fresh and potent argument for empire. The distinction, which Aristotle in particular drew, between those who are freemen and those who are slaves by nature, supplied a basis for empire grounded on justice and right. He maintains that what is best for the individual is best for the state. 'That the unequal should be given to equals and the unlike to those who are like is contrary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to nature is good.'² But nature itself is responsible for an innate natural inequality between men: some are born to command and others to serve, not by virtue of descent, but of the character indelibly engraved on them. And it is just and natural that men and states which possess such a superiority should rule over those which do not. The whole argument is thus summed up: 'Men should not study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved; but first of all they should provide against their own enslavement, and in the second place obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not for the sake of exercising a general

¹ *Thuc.* ii. 41.

Aristotle, *Politics*, vii. 3, 6.

despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be masters only over those who deserve to be slaves.'¹ The rule of Greek over Greek is intolerable; but the rule of Greek over barbarian is sanctioned by the laws of nature. Let us remember that Aristotle was tutor to Alexander of Macedon.

Rome did not contribute much that was new to the theory of empire, although it is worth while noting that nearly all the terms we use in this connexion are Latin terms. 'Colony, dependency, plantation, province, state, possession, dominion, empire, all directly or indirectly come from the Romans.'² The Roman empire developed some peculiar features, which distinguish it from earlier eastern Empires like the Assyrian or Persian and from modern empires like the British; but few of the Romans were troubled about its justice, though some of them questioned its wisdom. The empire was such a large and imposing fact, so universal in its scope that to question it would have seemed almost like questioning the ordinances of nature. Neither against other states nor against the public opinion of mankind did it have to defend itself by words. Only in the later Middle Ages was such a justification felt to be necessary. By that time the mediaeval empire had ceased to exercise any oecumenical authority; and it struggled to defend itself, not against the independent nation states fast rising to power, but against the militant and aggressive Papacy.

Dante is the best known of mediaeval imperialists. To Dante, as to many others of the time, the mediaeval empire was the heir and successor of the old Roman empire and to vindicate the authority of the former it was necessary to establish the right of the latter to universal dominion. In the second book of the *De Monarchia* Dante addresses himself to this task and, during the course of his arguments, produces reasons, some of which are characteristic of mediaeval thinking but alien to the mind and temper of the Greeks.

'Whatever God wills' says Dante, 'in the society of men is to be regarded as true and pure right'.³ But the will of God in itself is invisible and has to be understood by outward and visible signs. The Romans were the noblest of all peoples; it was meet that they should be rewarded with the honour of empire. The public spirit they exhibited and their sincere desire for the good of the commonwealth is another proof that they had right on their side. 'The Roman Empire'—Dante quotes a saying current at the time—'springs from the fount of compassion'.⁴ Miracles, moreover

¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, vii. 14, 21.

² Lucas, *Greater Rome and Greater Britain*, 1.

³ Dante *De Monarchia*, ii. 2.

Ibid., ii 5.

is derived from a severe necessity; to base it on glory or utility is to open the door to rivers of blood.¹ The right of conquest proceeds from and is the consequence of the right of war; and it should be governed by the same principles. The right of the conqueror over subjects follows four kinds of laws: the law of nature which ordains that everything should be directed to the conservation of the species; the law of natural enlightenment, that we should do unto others what we would that they should do unto us; the law of the formation of political societies, which are such that nature has not limited their duration, and the law flowing from the nature of the act itself—for a conquest is an acquisition and the spirit of acquisition carries with it the spirit of conservation and use, not the spirit of destruction.² The object of conquest is conservation, not enslavement. Enslavement may sometimes be the necessary means of conservation, but it is only a means and not the end, only an intermediate step to eventual freedom and mild government. ‘I define,’ says Montesquieu, ‘the right of conquest thus: it is a necessary, legitimate and unhappy right, which must fulfil an enormous obligation before it can pay its debt to human nature.’³ Nor is it difficult to discharge this obligation; for a country which is conquered is presumably in a decadent condition, with a corrupt, oppressive or inefficient government. Subjection to and association with a virile state may revitalise it and rid it of the burden of unequal laws or selfish oligarchies.⁴ It is only in so far as it confers such benefits and prepares its subjects for freedom that imperialism can be vindicated.

There is another strain in Montesquieu's thought which is of interest in this connection. One of his dominant ideas, it is well known, is the influence of geographical factors on historical and political development. Climate and geographical formation fit Europe for liberty, and Asia for slavery. Asia, he reckons, has been subdued thirteen times, while Europe has undergone only four great cataclysms. The results of conquest, again, are different. ‘The Tartars, in destroying the Greek Empire, established in the conquered lands slavery and despotism; the Goths, in destroying the Roman Empire, everywhere founded monarchy and liberty.’⁵ Rousseau, who asserted that ‘man is born free’ and denied any foundation for conquest except the law of the strongest which can confer no moral right, quotes this theory of Montesquieu's with approval. ‘Liberty’, he says, ‘not being a fruit of all climates, is not within the reach of all peoples. The more we consider this

¹ Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Loix*, x. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, x. 4.

² *Ibid.*, x. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, x. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, xvii, 5.

principle established by Montesquieu, the more do we perceive its truth.'¹

Both these lines of thought, which Montesquieu was careful to safeguard with restrictions and limitations, have been followed to their logical end by later writers. For instance, Treitschke regards war and conquest, not as a necessary evil, but as the very essence of the state, to be welcomed rather than deplored. 'Without war no state could be. . . . The laws of human thought and of human nature forbid any alternative, neither is one to be wished for.'² 'We learn from history that nothing knits a nation more closely together than war. It makes it worthy of the name of nation as nothing else can, and the extension of existent states is generally achieved by conquest. . . . War and conquest are the most important factors in state construction.'³ 'The power of the conqueror is morally justified by its protective and consequently beneficial action.'⁴ 'All great nations in the fulness of their strength have desired to set their mark upon barbarian lands. . . . Those who take no share in this great rivalry will play a pitiable part in time to come.'⁵

On the other hand, differences of race have been added to those of territory and climate to justify domination and empire. In illustration, we may take the very frank statement of Dr. Burgess. 'The teutonic nations can never regard the exercise of political power as a right of man. - With them this power must be based upon capacity to discharge political duty, and they themselves are the best organs which have as yet appeared to determine when and where this capacity exists. . . . They are called to carry the political civilisation of the modern world into those parts of the world inhabited by unpolitical and barbaric races, i.e., they must have a colonial policy.'⁶

By the time Montesquieu wrote, the character of political expansion and empire had changed. The opportunities for aggrandizement in Europe were now scarce, but the opportunities elsewhere were abundant. Large unpeopled or thinly peopled lands were open for colonisation and countries occupied by peoples in a low stage of civilisation offered a tempting field for exploitation. Empires grew, larger in area than any the world had seen before, but consisting almost entirely of dependent colonies settled by emigrants from the mother country and of conquered lands inhabited by barbarous or semi-barbarous tribes. These changed

¹ Rousseau, *Contrat Social*, iii. 8.

² Treitschke, *Politics* (trans. by Dugdale & De Bille), i. 65.

³ *Ibid.*, i. 108.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, i. 115, 6.

⁶ Burgess, *Political Power and Constitutional Law*, i. 45.

conditions produced a corresponding change in emphasis in the political theory of imperialism.

-Colonies proper were usually endowed with institutions similar to those of the mother country; and the revolt of the American Colonies made it clear that loyalty could be preserved only by the grant of a large measure of autonomy a lesson that was only slowly learnt. With this phase of the development we are not primarily concerned. Empire is the dominion over communities politically subject and the theory of imperialism is the analysis and justification of such dominion.

The fact that such an empire is generally exercised in modern times by civilised states over comparatively uncivilised communities has provided its apologists with a line of argument that is distinctively modern; and most writers on the subject follow it temperately or to its logical conclusion. A characteristically moderate statement is that of Sidgwick. Where the conquered are markedly inferior in civilisation, he says, 'if the war that led to the conquest can be justified by obstinate violation of international duty on the part of the conquered, the result would generally be regarded with toleration by impartial persons; and even, perhaps, with approval, if the government of the conquerors was shown by experience to be not designedly oppressive or unjust; since the benefits of completer internal peace and order, improved industry, enlarged opportunities of learning a better religion and a truer science would be taken—and, on the whole, I think, rightly taken—to compensate for the probable sacrifice of the interests of the conquered to those of the conquerors, whenever the two came into collision.'¹ And again, 'there are sentimental satisfactions, derived from justifiable conquests, which must be taken into account. . . . Such are the justifiable pride which the cultivated members of a civilised community feel in the beneficent exercise of dominion, and in the performance by their nation of the noble task of spreading the highest kind of civilisation; and a more intense though less elevated satisfaction. . . in the spread of the special type of civilisation distinctive of their nation.'²

Rather more decisive is the historian of modern colonisation, Leroy-Beaulieu. 'It is neither natural nor just,' he concludes, 'that the civilised peoples of the west should be limited indefinitely to the restricted spaces which were their first home. . . and that they should leave perhaps half the world to small groups of ignorant men, resourceless, truly helpless children, scattered thinly over an immense area or to decrepit populations, without energy or

¹ Sidgwick : *Elements of Politics*, 31F.

² *Ibid.*, 313.

direction, truly old men incapable of all effort or corporate and far-sighted activity. The intervention of civilised peoples in the affairs of peoples belonging to these two categories is justified as an education or as a guardianship . . . The role of teachers and guides, which devolves on civilised peoples, is laid down by the very nature of things, especially as far as the vast territories occupied by small savage or barbarous tribes is concerned. There are countries where it seems that civilisation—the domination of man over himself and over matter, the spirit of enterprise and discipline, the sense of capitalisation and the aptitude to invention—cannot develop spontaneously.¹

Burgess uses even more definite language, 'The civilised states have a claim upon the uncivilised populations, as well as a duty towards them, and that claim is that they shall become civilised; and if they cannot accomplish their own civilisation, then must they submit to the powers that can do it for them. The civilised state may righteously go still further than the exercise of force in imposing organisation. If the barbaric populations resist the same, *à l'outrance*, the civilised state may clear the territory of their presence and make it the abode of civilised man. . . . It violates thereby no rights of these populations which are not petty and trifling in comparison with its transcendent right and duty to establish political and legal order everywhere . . . There is a great deal of weak sentimentality abroad in the world concerning this subject Interference in the affairs of populations not wholly barbaric, which have made some progress in state organisation, but which manifest incapacity to solve the problem of a political civilisation with any degree of completeness, is a justifiable policy The civilised states themselves are the best organs which have yet appeared in the history of the world for determining the proper time and occasion for intervening in the affairs of unorganised or insufficiently organised populations for the execution of their great world-duty.'²

This reasoning is clear, whether or not it is cogent. It does more than merely justify empire; it asserts it to be a solemn obligation. Not conquest, but the refusal to conquer needs apology. Civilised nations have the mission of spreading civilisation and establishing order all over the world. Where they do not exist, they have to be introduced—and they cannot, as a rule, be introduced except by force. Imperialism thus becomes a service to humanity and that is its vindication.

This modern theory of duty is the result, in part of the changed

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes*, ii. 686.

² Burgess, *sup. cit.*, i. 46.

uniformity in the incidence of that government, the differences in the degree of control that it exercises, that creates one of the problems of modern India, the position of the Native States.

Fitness for self-government, then, there must be, though perhaps not of the kind that is usually postulated. But it follows, almost as an axiom, that both communities should have a voice in deciding whether, at any given time, the requisite degree or quality of fitness has been attained. Self-government cannot be given until it is taken. The demand for self-government by a community is evidence in itself, up to a point, that the community is fit for self-government; for one of the conditions of self-government is self-consciousness, and the demand is proof of the self-consciousness. Other conditions, however, may still be lacking. But a demand, continually made and continually resisted, creates a psychosis in both parties that is not favourable to any rational determination of the problem.

I have attempted to sketch, in this short survey, the salient features in the evolution of the political theory of imperialism. Some elements of the theory are remarkably persistent, reappearing from age to age in different disguises—the doctrine, for instance, that the possession of superior power confers a right to empire or that state necessity, its right to security, justifies all things. Other arguments are devised to suit the facts of the time. Sometimes, a claim to conquest is made in the name of nationalism. To an age or people dominated by religious ideas, like the ancient Hebrews or the Middle Ages, empire becomes the will or command of God. In a colonising period, it is justified by differences in civilisation or national character. But generally speaking, the emphasis has been gradually shifted from the interest of the conquering state to the interest of the conquered, at least in theory. The interest of the conquered has been further equated to their training for eventual self-government. The ‘When’ becomes the crucial problem, which has to be solved together. This is no easy task, for, even if the dominant state accepts with a single mind, the view that the dependency should be administered for the purpose of making it fit for freedom, it is inevitable that it should be reluctant to relinquish a control of long duration and should approach the question from the angle of order and security rather than of responsibility and freedom. It is always easier to regard politics as a study in statics rather than in dynamics, but it is fatal. All life and growth implies and depends on adaptation and where two are concerned, the adaptation is much more difficult. The reconciliation between liberty and order is the ultimate problem of all government and no easy formula exists for its solution. That must be the result of

experiment, of delicate compromises, of that perpetual movement, which, as in a bicycle, maintains equilibrium.

But the modern theory of empire has advanced yet another step. Empire is not a matter for the rulers alone, or even for conquerors and conquered together; there are already the outlines at least of a world order.¹ The mandatory system is the first fruits of the impact of the world order on the theory and practice of imperialism. This offers a line of approach that is full of promise. It is not difficult for the dominant state to vindicate its rule to itself. To vindicate it to the satisfaction of its subjects is so difficult as to seem impossible. But the common sense and the common conscience of mankind are now available to help in the fulfilment of this task; and we move at once into a more serene and impartial atmosphere in which national pride, greed and hatred may gradually be replaced by a spirit of mutual respect and helpfulness.

Nothing that I have said is new and perhaps not all of it is true. But at this moment of our country's fortunes it seemed worth while to draw attention to the principles that fashion our destiny, not from the narrow and misleading point of view of the day, but from the wider point of view of historical development. I must apologise for my shortcomings and thank you for your patience and courtesy.

See e.g. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, iv. 4.

THE STUDY OF SOUTH INDIAN HISTORY

BY

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI, M.A.,
Professor of Indian History and Archaeology.

I

The duties attached to the chair of Indian History and Archaeology in this university are so varied and complex that it is with diffidence that I face the task before me. The material to be considered comprises the literatures of many languages, indigenous and foreign, varying in accuracy from mere poetry to minute itineraries; documents varying in authenticity from the wildest legends to the most exact grants and deeds; inscriptions, coins and monuments, of many periods and provinces, of which thousands have been unearthed and more are yet to see the light of day; and the mass of modern records preserved in private and public collections. In the treatment of this material the historian has to follow, as occasion demands, the various methods of anthropology, philology, archaeology, jurisprudence and the other sciences. Apart, however, from the inherent magnitude and complexity of my task, when I recall the achievement of the first Professor who held this chair for three successive terms after its foundation and the high standard of excellence secured by him not only in his own work but in all work carried out under his guidance, I confess that I do not find my apprehensions diminishing.

With the recent reorganization² of the Department of Indian History in this University we have realized some of the conditions that render possible the direction of research towards definite ends. It is therefore desirable that we should now consider with some care the state of historical studies in South India, the methods followed and the results obtained, and indicate the ways in which our Department of Indian History can further these studies.

II

Not only here in India but elsewhere we have indications of a growing impatience with the manner of writing of many modern

¹ Inaugural Lecture.

² The Professorship of Indian History was established in 1914. It was only in 1928 that a Reader and a Lecturer were added to the permanent staff of the Department and Fellowships were instituted in addition to the studentships that were in existence before.

Historical works : 'There was a time not long ago when History was written in English ; now it is made in Germany and translated.' The age of great historical writing is apparently over and the monograph has begun to replace the history. The change is partly due to a natural reaction from picturesque narration which at one time almost obliterated the distinction between history and romance. Vivid and eloquent writing such as that of Grote, Froude, Macaulay and Mommsen gave currency to facile errors based on no evidence other than the predilections of the writers themselves. It was inevitable that by the successors of these literary historians the distinction between fact and opinion in works of history should be strenuously pursued. Moreover History has tended to adopt, under the influence of the exact sciences, the most rigorous standards of evidence and proof for every proposition that is advanced. The necessity for minute documentation seems somehow to act as an impediment to picturesque and eloquent writing. 'We dare not deplore Gibbon's limitations, for,' as Bury says, 'they were the conditions of his great achievement.'

Indian History has not yet found, and it will be many years before it finds, its Gibbon. But the works of Mill (1818) and Elphinstone (1839) are not unworthy of the period of great histories and despite the great advance in our knowledge since they wrote, they will continue to be read. In point of literary merit there can of course be no comparison between these historians on the one hand and Gibbon on the other. Moreover Gibbon's great work was reared on foundations laid by many generations of scholars from the Renaissance to his day ; the Histories of Mill and Elphinstone, however, were solitary efforts to interpret the story of an alien race with the aid of slight material that was often only half understood. Almost all that was then known of ancient India had to be drawn from the translation, for administrative purposes, of a few ancient law books and their commentaries.¹ In fact the systematic study of Indian Antiquities did not begin till late in the 19th century. Mackenzie's mass attack on the antiquities of South India led to no immediate results ; he died before he could use his material. Colebrooke and Wilson elucidated portions of Sanskrit literature ; and Sir James Prinsep (in 1836-8) found the key to the oldest epigraphy of the country by deciphering the bilingual inscriptions

¹ The mis-interpretation of some of these texts due to ignorance of their back-ground led to facile generalizations on Indian society and culture which some still cherish. See, for example, report of Sir Basil Blackett's speech to a meeting of the *Society of Arts* in London in January 1930. 'The fundamental reason for India's peculiar economic conditions is to be found in the Hindu social system, the doctrine of Karma, the absence of effort for material progress' etc. *The Hindu*, January 10, 1930.

on the coins of Surashtra. Still, as late as 1861, Colonel (afterwards Sir) Alexander Cunningham could write: 'During the hundred years of British dominion in India, the government has done little or nothing towards the preservation of its ancient monuments which in the almost total absence of any written history form the only reliable sources of information as to the early condition of the country.' Tempting as the subject is, I must not now try to tell the story of the growth of Indian Antiquarian studies from small and uncertain beginnings into a complex science of Indology valued as an important subject of study in many universities and other learned societies of Europe and America.

III¹

The earliest work in India on Indian Antiquities was done by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Some decades later (1841) the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society started a journal of their own, which was followed by the founding, in 1872, of the *Indian Antiquary*. Even the invaluable reports of Cunningham, the first Director-General of Archaeology, failed to convince Government for many years that the study of Ancient Indian History and culture was a far more extensive work than could be completed by a temporary department of Government. At last, it came to be realized that the work demanded not only the permanent continuance of a Department of Archaeology, but substantial aid to universities and learned societies engaged in this work. How far-flung the empire of Indian culture was in ancient times we are just beginning to see from the striking discoveries in Central Asia and the researches of French and Dutch scholars on Indian influence in Further Asia. The prehistoric discoveries in Sindh and the Punjab are equally impressive though their significance is still far from clear. But thanks to these recent additions to our knowledge, the old dogmas of the isolation of India and her disdain for the good things of this world have been finally exploded.

After Mackenzie's heroic, but for the time fruitless, effort in the early nineteenth century, Southern India was for two generations more or less completely ignored by students of Indian Antiquities. One reason for this neglect was that Indian Antiquarian studies properly began with Sanskrit and Pali and for a long time were chiefly occupied with these languages²; for in historical times the

¹ A detailed account of the progress of *Indian Archaeology* in its early stages is furnished by Cunningham in the introduction to the re-issue (1871) of his first four reports (1862-65) and the later history by Sir John Marshall in his introduction to the Director-General's Annual Report for 1902-3.

² 'Dans l'Inde on s'est occupé surtout des livres Vediques et du Budhisme', G. Jouveau-Dubreuil.

culture and civilization of the whole country, with the exception of the extreme South, was Sanskritic in origin and development. Another reason might be the peculiar difficulties of script, structure and idiom which the Dravidian languages would present to the foreign scholars who initiated the critical study of Indian Antiquities. Though the modern study of Dravidian Languages had begun in the days of the Company,¹ the motive underlying these early efforts was furnished either by the zeal of the European missionary for the christianization of the country or the desire of the Company to provide cheap methods of enabling junior civilians to gain a working knowledge of the languages of South India. But like the progressive Aryanization of Ancient India, Oriental scholarship of the disinterested kind extended in course of time to the farthest South. Brown, Gundert, Kittel, Winslow, Caldwell and Pope carried forward the critical study of the languages of the land. In 1874 the archaeological survey of the Madras Presidency was begun. Burgess and S. M. Natesa Sastri brought out (1886) a volume of Tamil and Sanskrit Inscriptions; Sir Walter Elliot gave the first, (and still the most illuminating), account of South Indian coins. About the same time (1882) the late Robert Sewell made a comprehensive list of the Antiquities of the Province. The appointment (in 1886) of Hultzsch as Epigraphist marks the beginning of a new epoch in the study of South Indian Archaeology. Fourteen years later Madras became a separate circle of the Archaeological Survey.

IV

At the present moment the Archaeological Department of the Government of India, though in many ways the most important, is not the only agency concerned with these studies. Owing mainly to the excellent results produced by this department and the stimulus and direction given to Indian Archaeology by Lord Curzon, there has sprung up a vivid realization of our duty to the memorials of the past. Mysore, Travancore, Hyderabad and Cochin have archaeological departments of their own which are doing good work each in its sphere. Pudukottah, on the border-land of the ancient Cola and Pandyan kingdoms, furnishes in its epigraphs a fair epitome of South Indian history. The texts of all these inscriptions have been published by the State together with a chronological summary of their contents. The authorities of the Tirupati Devasthanam, of whose obstructiveness Hultzsch had to

¹ See Mr. C. S. Srinivasachari's paper on 'The promotion of Dravidian Linguistic Studies in the Company's days' read before the Indian Historical Records Commission (Lahore Session, November, 1925).

complain¹ to Government in 1889, have been employing an archaeologist with a view to publishing at an early date a full report on the inscriptions in the temples and mantapas under their charge. The Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society, the Journal of Indian History and the Journal of Oriental Research are doing active work in promoting and popularizing research. Grateful mention must here be made of the pioneer service rendered by the late Mr. C. W. Damodaram Pillai and by Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit V. Swaminatha Ayyar and others by the publication of important Tamil classics, and of the valuable work, literary and historical, brought out in the monthly organ of the Madura Tamil Sangam. Lastly, let us add with due modesty the contribution made by our own University Department of Indian History and the more recent Institute of Oriental Studies to our growing knowledge of Indian historical subjects. We are thus on the whole well equipped for our task; and though much useful work has been done in the past, there is still so much to be attempted that the most careful direction is required in the employment of our resources.

V

The oldest historical records and monuments of South India do not carry us beyond the third century B.C. The intricate problems, racial, linguistic and cultural, of pre-historic South India call for the most cautious handling in the light of the evidence furnished by pre-historic archaeology and philology. This warning is not unnecessary. South India has been claimed as the original home of Man and as the land in which gold was first discovered; the distinction between the Dravidian group and the Gaurdian or North Indian group of languages has been denied. These are examples of propositions which, however striking, have been put forward with undue haste and without due regard to evidence. It is too soon to decide the exact inter-rélations between 'the Indus Valley culture', the Sumerian and Indo-European civilizations and the civilization of pre-Aryan India including pre-Aryan Dravida. The resemblances between the Sumerian and Indo-European languages and cultures are too profound to be the result of chance.² The identity of numerous terms bearing on agricultural, economic, technical and even military life; the astonishing concord in a

¹ G. O. No. 365, Pub. April 5, 1889.

² 'Or, la présence, la fortune en indo-européan oriental et ancien de notions doctrinales importantes, dont la plus ancienne expression actuellement connue se trouve en Sumer, fait un devoir à l'indo-européaniste de présumer ici quelque rapport inconnu. Quant à l'étendue, à la véritable nature de ce rapport, il est indispensable qu'il sache s'imposer une prudente réserve.'—C. Autran : Sumerian et Indo Européan, p. viii. Also ch. iv. See also A. K. Coomaraswamy : *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, pp. 3-5,

number of definite cosmo-theological and religious conceptions, such as those relating to the plant of immortality, the fire celestial and terrestrial, the role of Sirius and so on, that have been traced between the Sumerian world and the most ancient Indo-European—these are clearly more significant than the fortuitous resemblances that are always to be traced between two great cultures. But the paucity of documents concerning a great part of Indo-European pre-history and the large gaps in Sumerian scholarship that still remain to be filled impose a prudent reserve on statements regarding the exact nature and extent of the relation between them. Not less elusive is the task of determining the proper place of the Indus valley culture in the evolution of Indian civilization and deciding how the earliest culture of South India was related to that of the Indus valley. The evidence already available is sufficient, however, to furnish conclusive proof of the origin and development of an independent Tamil culture which flourished for centuries before it was touched by extraneous influences. However difficult it may now be to define, in a scientific manner, the content of that culture, to deny its existence altogether can only be the result of ignorance or prejudice. It is equally certain that, at a time before recorded history begins, this indigenous Tamil culture came under strong influences from Northern India which, for the sake of convenience and without any implications of race, may well continue to be called Aryan. It seems not unlikely that the literary dialect of Tamil was born and grew under Aryan influences; in any event there can be no question that that dialect was enriched and vivified by these influences.

The Literature of the Sangam Age forms the earliest body of Tamil literature that has come down to us. Notwithstanding all that has been urged to the contrary, the most satisfactory chronology of this literature appears to be that established by Mr. Kanakasabhai Pillai and, I must perhaps add Mr. Seshagiri Sastri. The attempt to dissolve the Sangam into thin air, by interpreting the word Sangam as an anthology, is misdirected; the evidence cited is too shadowy to prove anything and weighs as nothing against the overwhelming testimony of literary tradition.¹ But even

¹ See J. Or. Res. vol. II (1928) p. 149 ff. Mr. V. Narayanan in this paper appears to have overlooked the force of Dañḍi's phrase *Sarga-bandhamsabhūtatvāt*. Further, the *Drāvidasāṅghāta* of Taruṇavācaspati, like its companion *Sarat-sāṅghāta*, must have been a well-known collection of verses on a single specific topic. It may be added that the *Tokai* of the Dañḍiyalankāram comprises not only the Sanghāta but the *Kōsa* as well of the *Kāvyaḍarsa*. The phrase *mūvagaiccamam* of Pērasiriyaṅ and Naccinārkkiniyaṅ and the scholium on *Takkayāgapparani* 714 are of no probative value. *Contra* Mr. T. G. Āravamudan in the *Hindu*, April 16, 1930. The practice of assemblies listening to new works and appraising them receives epigraphical confirmation from 198 of 1919

if we concede that the Sangam had no existence as a college of poets, the Sangam Age and its problems would still remain with us. The social, economic and political conditions reflected in this collection of works, and the linguistic and literary peculiarities that distinguish it raise important issues which have little to do with the historicity of the Sangam. The class of questions thus raised resemble those that have long been familiar to students of the R̥gveda. The Sangam literature, like the R̥gvedic, consists of separate poems composed on various occasions by different poets and grouped together in a schematic manner by later anthologists. The language and culture enshrined in either collection are unmistakably at the root of the later literature and civilization of historical times, but still differ from them sufficiently to be assigned to an earlier epoch and to merit separate study. The suggestion may therefore be ventured that the philological and linguistic line of approach which has proved so fruitful in Vedic studies will yield in competent hands results equally valuable in the history of Ancient Tamil Culture.

VI

Once we leave this early period of Tamil History, epigraphy comes to our aid, and as we advance through the centuries, we suffer not so much from a dearth as from a deluge of authentic material to work with. Hundreds of inscriptions have been copied annually for the last fifty years by the epigraphical department and more are being copied every year. It is extremely unfortunate that the texts of only a small proportion of them should be available for general study. It is admitted¹ that already the copies of several inscriptions have irredeemably decayed while of some the originals themselves have disappeared. At the present rate of publication it is clear that the arrears cannot be overtaken for the next half a century. It is imperative that this reproach to South Indian Epigraphy should be removed within a reasonable time, for unless an earnest effort is made by the Government to secure the early publication of the texts of these thousands of records, the loss to critical scholarship will be certainly incalculable. It is further necessary that Government should make it a rule that, in future, the inscriptions copied every year are published in full, as they are in Mysore, together with each annual report. Such publication may involve a

(inscription from Tribhuvani Pondicheri). Surely only an academy or college can be meant by மதுராபுரிச்சங்கம் வைத்தும் (II. 102-3) of the Larger Sinnamanūr plates, S.I.I. iii, p. 454.

¹ See Mr. Krishna Sastri's preface to vol. iv, South Indian Inscriptions (Texts) and under Nos. 1336 and 1340 in the same volume. Also *Annual Report on Epigraphy* for 1918-19 part I paragraphs 3 and 4.

greater liability to error in the first issue; but the example of the *Epigraphia Carnatica* goes to show that such errors are less serious than the inaccuracies and contradictions which are found scattered in the departmental reports on inscriptions whose originals are not available to the public. It is also necessary that the Topographical list of Inscriptions of the Presidency, a useful work of reference, should be revised and rearranged chronologically and provided with more copious indexes and kept up-to-date by periodical supplements. In this and similar work the Universities of the province should be willing to co-operate with the Archaeological Department.

In the inscriptions of South India are to be found many technical terms bearing on social, economic, military and administrative matters. A correct understanding of these terms is an essential preliminary to the reconstruction of the social life of the period. It is obviously within the province of the Tamil Lexicon to take up the systematic study of such terms and the omission to do this has caused some disappointment.¹ It may be hoped however that the Lexicon authorities will make arrangements for the issue of a supplement in the preparation of which the Oriental Research Institute and the Department of Indian History may furnish useful assistance. A Research Fellow of our university has studied the Economic condition of Southern India from A.D. 1000—A.D. 1500; and despite the difficulties of a pioneer undertaking, he has brought together much useful and authentic information which can serve as a good basis for further work.

The study of South Indian monuments is in no better case than that of our epigraphs. There is still ample scope for making excavations in selected sites in various parts of the presidency.²

¹ Prof. Jules Bloch, for example, wrote to me under date Oct. 8, 1929 the following: 'The Madras dictionary does not help me to explain *kōnērīn-maikōṇḍān*. By the way, it is a pity that the compilers of that dictionary neglected so much the inscriptions. Perhaps it would be time now to compile a vocabulary of the technical terms and of the archaisms generally contained in old inscriptions—perhaps also a list of the proper names of persons and places.'

² 'Although a considerable amount of excavation has been conducted in Southern India by this department in the past, many interesting and ancient sites still await investigation. The importance of this branch of archaeology in tracing the early history and development of the arts in South India cannot be over-estimated, and in all probability, it will be found that no fresh discoveries of antiquarian importance will come to light so long as this work remains neglected.' (*Annual Report, Arch. Dept., Madras, 1912-3, part i, para 10.*)

'The Director-General of Archaeology. . . proposed (June 1915) that no further excavation works should be undertaken in this Presidency for the present so as to leave more time for the preservation of existing monuments. However, unless this branch of Archaeology receives attention, there is no hope of recovering and reconstructing the Pre-historic or early history of Southern India and we shall continue to remain as profoundly ignorant of this period as we are at present.' (Same series—*Report 1915-16, part i, para 8.*)

Ancient Madura, Uraiyur and the neighbourhood of Kancipuram, to mention only a few of these sites, hold, in all probability, hidden treasures of great value to the historian. The vexed question of the site of Vanji has hitherto been discussed entirely on the basis of literary evidence of an inconclusive nature; and it may not be a vain hope that, as in Kushan chronology, scientific excavation of the alternative sites of the ancient Cera capital might lead to more decisive results. There is also a great need for a systematic survey, excavation and description of pre-historic sites; only a few of these, like Adiccanallur and Perumbair, have so far been scientifically studied.

The literature of any country is an invaluable aid to the interpretation of its monuments and epigraphs and there is an abundance of ancient South Indian literature that awaits critical study. I shall leave out of account works that have become accessible through printed editions, though these are not all of the same degree of accuracy. But the wealth of manuscript material in the Madras¹ and Tanjore libraries deserves the most careful attention. Far and away the most interesting section of the Madras Library from our point of view is that comprising the Mackenzie Manuscripts and Browne's Local Records. The Mackenzie collection in Madras comprises what has survived of 'the books and tracts in the scripts and in the languages of the South of India' that were transmitted to Madras (1828) after 'a considerable portion of the collection' had been sent off to England or otherwise disposed of. Sir Walter Elliot pressed upon the Government (1855) the urgent need for Mr. Taylor being encouraged to collate, translate and publish this 'collection of unrivalled value and extent.' The company's government was unwilling to accept the scheme and after the lapse of three quarters of a century, the question how this great collection can be used to the best advantage still remains unsolved. For though catalogued twice by Wilson and Taylor, the Mackenzie collection is still much of a mystery. The Browne collection has also been included in the voluminous but ill-arranged catalogues of Taylor. Mythology and sthalapuranas, kafiyats or local chronicles, ballads and songs, and

Since, under the Reforms of 1921, Archaeology became a central subject, Archaeological excavation in the Southern Circle has come to be in a worse plight. As in Mughal days, Delhi is still distant.

Our debt to French scholarship in this sphere must be acknowledged with gratitude. As early as 1821 Langles included an accurate description of many South Indian monuments in his '*Monuments de l'Hindustan*.' The penetrating study of M. G. Jouveau-Dubreuil in his '*Archaeologie du Sud de l'Inde*' (1914) is the most important contribution of recent years to a critical interpretation of the architecture and iconography of South India.

¹ By the Madras Library I mean the Government Oriental MSS. Library. There is another excellent Manuscripts Library in Adyar. But it seems to contain few MSS. of an historical character.

eye-copies of inscriptions are scattered pell-mell in the manuscripts. They have been occasionally drawn upon by students of South Indian History.¹ But a proper use of such material in the scientific reconstruction of the history of the land continues to be impossible in the absence of an accurate catalogue with copious indexes and cross references. Some parts of the collection may be found, on a survey, to deserve more thorough treatment than the rest and some manuscripts may be so valuable as to call for publication *in extenso*. It is hoped that systematic work on this section of the manuscripts library, which has been lying practically idle for over a century, will soon begin and that as a first step an accurate descriptive catalogue will be prepared.

VII

The scientific study and interpretation of the sources of South Indian history has not advanced far beyond the elementary stages. The temptation is very strong to forge ahead with sweeping conclusions drawn from stray facts without waiting for the chain of evidence to be completed. But this temptation must be resisted. A few random examples will make my meaning clear. In the 7th regnal year (A.D. 1152) of Rajaraja II the sabha of Urumur (Chidambaram Tq., S. Arcot) borrowed 60 kasu from the local temple owing to 'bad time' and 'akkam' (scarcity of grain or money). In the 27th regnal year (A.D. 1204-5) of Kulottunga III a temple was built in Tadavur (Attur Tq., Salem) by selling some of the jewels belonging to the temple. These two facts are taken together² to support the conclusion that there was a continuous famine in the whole area which included the two villages, about fifty miles apart, for the entire intervening period of over fifty years. My next example is also from the reign of Kulottunga III. In the 13th year of the king, two local chieftains of Aragalur (Salem) and Trikkovalur (S. Arcot) come to an agreement about 'the extent of the country belonging to each' and undertake to aid each other and to act together in the service of the king. Four years later, an endowment of 1,100 kasu is made for a charitable purpose in Chidambaram and a condition is stipulated that the principal of the endowment should be produced by the trustees once in five years before the authorities of the temple (the *mūlaparusaīyār*, the *shhanikas* and the managers). In the 35th year of the king a chieftain agrees to be

¹ Wilks, *Historical Sketches*, vol. i (1810), p. xv; Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship* (1868); Heras, *The Aravindu Dynasty*; Dr. N. Venkatramanayya, *Karikala and Trilochana Pallava*; and others.

² Inscriptions Nos. 397 and 458 of 1913 as also the *Annual Report on Epigraphy, Madras*, 1914, part ii, para 17. The texts of the inscriptions mentioned in this and in the next note have not been published.

friendly with three others who in their turn promise not to set up people against him. These three facts¹ are said to point to an unsettled state of government and the decline of the power of the Colas. Again sometime in 1907-8 the Archaeological Department of Burma came across two octagonal granite pillars near Pegu and for no apparent reason announced that their find was no other than the pillars of victory set up by Rajendra Cola after his conquest of the country in the eleventh century. As a matter of fact Rajendra never conquered the kingdom of Pegu. It must be added that the mistake was acknowledged and the pillars removed from the list of Ancient Monuments as early as 1922. But only the other day an illustration of one of these pillars appeared in a leading Indian weekly and was there described as Rajendra's pillar of victory². These are solemn warnings against hasty inferences and prove the great need for caution in interpreting the silent monuments and 'obscure epigraphs of other times than ours.

Some amongst us are apt to grudge what they consider to be the undue amount of attention devoted to political history.³ They say that the names of kings and their monotonous victories are of less consequence to us than a picture of the daily life of the people, their religious observances and their literary and artistic achievements. Such criticism, whatever its validity at other times, appears to be somewhat inopportune at the present moment, because it is yet too soon to turn our attention away from the study of political history. The stress on political history is not accidental or perverse and it does not proceed from a failure to realize the value or importance of social history. Any picture of social life, if it is to be of real significance, must have a firmly established framework of chronology to fit into. And this framework, which alone could support and hold together the reconstructions of social and religious history, cannot be built up except by fixing the details of political history. This is true in some measure of the history of all countries and is especially so of our own. Most of the dates and sometimes even the names of our poets and artists are irrecoverably lost to us; but events in which kings and chieftains took part are oftener and better preserved in records which either bear their own dates or can be easily dated.

¹ Nos. 440 and 264 and 435 of the Epigraphical collection for 1913, Madras, and the *Annual Report*, 1914, part ii, para. 17. Also 1919, part ii, para 21.

² *Burma Epigraphical Reports*, 1907-8, paragraph 25; 1922, paragraph 14. 'The Hindu Illustrated Weekly' of May 11, 1930. Also G. Coedes,—*Le Royaume de Sri Vijaya*—B. E. F. E. O. XVIII 6, p. 6-7.

³ 'Les recits de batailles, de conquêtes, de successions de dynasties, qui remplissent les livres d'histoire ne servent le plus souvent, qu'à cacher le cours véritable de l'existence des peuples'—Gustave Le Bon; also Mr. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, *History of the Tamils*, p. 55.

It is not as if the sum of our achievement in the study of political history is substantial enough to justify a slackening of effort. The accounts that we possess of the Pallavas and the Pandyas are still tentative;¹ the publication² of a monograph on the Kadambas may soon be expected. Even on Vijayanagar,—which has been much studied since Sewell's time—fresh light is apparently forthcoming from the side of Kanarese literature.³ With the exception of the obsolescent notices of Fleet and Bhandarkar in the Bombay Gazetteer and the unco-ordinated discussions of the reporting epigraphists, there has been produced little work on the other leading dynasties of South India.⁴ Very much then remains yet to be done before we can arrive at a definitive political history of the South Indian kingdoms.

The mute grandeur of our numerous temples is a constant invitation to the study of local history. A study of each of these ancient foundations is bound to reveal how the rich and many-sided life of the people centred round the temple as its nucleus. In India as in Greece art was the handmaid of religion and the genius of the people, their ideas and aspirations, attained exuberant expression in the houses of their gods. By its legendary associations, by its mural inscriptions, by the richness and beauty of its architecture and sculpture, by its icons and jewels, every one of the more important temples is worthy of a separate and sumptuously-produced monograph, which would show how closely interwoven were the fortunes of gods and men in the web of national life.

Among the most striking features of the ancient and mediaeval polity of Southern India were the management of local affairs by

¹ G. Jouveau-Dubreuil, *The Pallavas* (1917). *Pallavas of Kanchi*, R. Gopalan, (1928) and the *Pandyas Kingdom*, K. A. Nilakanta Sastri (1929).

² By the Bombay Historical Society.

³ Besides the valuable papers of Mr. H. Krishna Sastri in the Director-General's Annual Reports on Archaeology we have '*The Sources of Vijayanagar History*' by Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, '*The Nayaks of Madura*' by R. Sattianathan, '*The Aravidu Dynasty*' by Rev. Henry Heras and '*The Foundation of Vijayanagar*' by the same. There are numerous articles in learned periodicals, which need not be noticed here. Mr. M. H. Rama Sarma in his papers in the Q. J. M. S. and the Journal of the Bombay Historical Society has brought together much useful information that is new on the Kingdom of Kampli which immediately preceded Vijayanagar in Central Dekkan. Almost the same ground is traversed by Dr. N. Venkataramanayya in his *Kampili and Vijayanagara*.

⁴ G. Jouveau-Dubreuil's *History of the Dekkan* is indeed valuable as an outline sketch to be filled in by further work. Mr. Gopinatha Rao's *Cōlavamsa Caritam* (Tamil) is now a rather weak book on a great subject. There is no up-to-date survey of the Cālukyas, the Rāshtrakūtas, the Hoysalas, not to speak of many local dynasties that could be mentioned. The history of Kerala continues to be exceedingly obscure. Mr. K. P. Padmanabhan Menon's comments on Visscher's Letters published under the heading '*The History of Kerala*' vols. i & ii contain useful hints on the subject but do not constitute a history of Kerala.

the people themselves and the richness and stability and the cultured fullness of the rural life of the country. But no serious attempt has yet been made to study the structure of rural institutions and the details of administration. Few would be led to expect, from the current writings on the subject, that there was any evidence on rural institutions other than the celebrated Uttaramallur records. In reality, however, a great many other inscriptions furnish data which, if analysed and co-ordinated, would yield a comprehensive view of the classes of villages, the constitution and functions of the sabhas, their relations as among themselves and with the central administration and other matters of absorbing interest.

It is remarkable how in matters of institutional history even acute scholars are sometimes betrayed into easy assumptions. Baden-Powell gave currency to the notion that the grain-share (balute) system of remunerating village servants was Dravidian in origin. This view Mr. Altekar has conclusively disproved.¹ But though he has thus repulsed the Dravidian hypothesis on a small front, he is utterly captivated by it in the end and he declares that the system of village-government by regularly constituted assemblies and their standing sub-committees must have been Dravidian in origin. Owing, no doubt, to an imperfect appreciation of the evidence at hand he rashly extends to all councils what is true of only one class of them and lays down the following strange dicta: 'Dravidians were converts to Hinduism and their zeal in carrying out its orthodox behests was, as is usually the case with converts, far more intense than that of the Hindu Aryans themselves. Superstition and orthodoxy were therefore rampant in the South Indian villages. Thus Brahmanas alone were eligible for election to a council.'

We hear now-a-days a great deal too much of things Dravidian and things Aryan; it is to be wished that persons who talk with

¹ Altekar, *History of Village Communities in Western India*, 1927, pp. 25-29, 91 & 123-4. Mr. Altekar wisely observes: "It is indeed high time for scholars to realize that (the) real and reliable history of India's past can be reconstructed not by wide generalizations but by intense research, province by province, century by century." (p. 26.) But in his sweeping extension (p. 123) of the rules of the Uttaramallur Sabha to all village-councils in Southern India, Mr. Altekar forgets the warning he has himself uttered. The Sabhas constituted only one among several types of local bodies and together with their mahasabhas they appear to have been characteristic of *caturvedamangalams*, Brahmadeya villages. Of such sabhas we know the typical constitution from the Uttaramallur and Manur inscriptions (*Annual Report for Epigraphy*, 1914, part ii, para. 23). In some devadana villages besides the sabha, the Ūrōm is another body which acts with the sabha (Inscr. Nos. 186 and 180 in *S. I. I.* vol. iii). In other villages only the Ūrōm appear (No. 47 of 1919). Then there were nagarattār in some places who performed duties identical with those of the sabhas and 'Ūrōm' of other localities (Nos. 127, 130, 134, 138, 141 and 144 of 1919). Lastly, in one instance a case of murder is tried and punished by 'a nāḍu' and the Brahmanas (No. 33 of 1919).*

such assurance on these difficult matters make clear to themselves as well as to others by what methods and with what criteria they effect this distinction.¹

In interpreting evidence we are apt to slide into vague romancing if we disregard the inherent limitations of our sources. The utmost patience and skill may not avail to satisfy our curiosity in many matters. Despite the obscurities and contradictions in the records bearing on the reign of an ancient monarch like Rajaraja I or Sundara Pandya we do not lack the means of deciding with sufficient precision the course of public events during the reign; but except when, as rarely happens, a keen foreign observer describes the appearance and character of a monarch we cannot recall him to life. Contemporary poems and inscriptions, by adopting the mode of conventional adulation, often idealize into an unvarying perfection all the heroes they commemorate and hence we fail to form clear outlines of their individual lives and characters. Thus we know many things that Rajaraja did; but of what he was it seems as if we shall have to remain for ever ignorant. And this is typical of the way our curiosity is baffled at every turn.

VIII

The study of the modern history of South India touches us most intimately and is to be approached, partly for this very reason, with due caution. 'The records of the company's governments in India,' said Grant Duff,² 'are probably the best historical materials in the world: there we find the reasons for every undertaking; the steady rules intended for conduct; the hurried letter from the scene of action; the deliberations of the council, the separate opinions of the members composing it, and their final judgment. The scrutiny, censure or approval of the Court of Directors from a remote situation and after a long interval bring to recollection all that was done and all that was speculated; what has occurred in India in the meantime and what opinions have stood the test of events.' But it

¹ 'The absence of any really early Dravidian evidence as to culture deprives us of any assured knowledge of pre-Indo-European conditions such as would enable us effectively to gauge Dravidian influences in Vedic religion or philosophy. This leads to the necessity of relying on conjectures of which many may be easily shown to have no solid foundation or at most to be mere possibilities. We may of course accept such possibilities if we like, but in doing so, we cease to be judicial, and arrive merely at subjective judgments which have no lasting value.' *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*,—Keith, pp. 629-30. The entire appendix from which this extract has been made is well worth careful study.

² Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*. Ed. S. M. Edwardes (1921)—vol. i, p. 549.

is hardly to be expected, at any rate in the near future, that our government would follow the example of the European governments and throw open its archives to the close scrutiny of historical research. Indeed, in the special conditions obtaining in India, such scrutiny of recent history might unduly tax the students' capacity for impartiality and sound judgment. In spite of these difficulties the modern side of the history of Southern India is entitled, on account of its interest and importance, to receive more attention than it has so far obtained.

The records of the Madras Government are the primary source of our knowledge after the advent of the European powers.¹ Much information of value can also be gathered from the publications of the India Office and the Imperial Records Department and for the period of the French struggles from the archives of Pondicheri. These sources are to be supplemented by the diaries, memoirs and biographies that are published from time to time. Of all the Indian record-offices, Madras has the largest collection of Dutch records and a Research Fellow of our University is at present engaged in writing the history of the Dutch in India.

IX

The study of all History is an ennobling discipline and to us that of South Indian History is an inspiration as well. For in high endeavour and worthy achievement we can look back on a great and glorious past. Though in the organization of free government Ancient India must rank below some other lands and far below ancient Greece, yet even here the continued vigour of the village institutions of the South mitigated for many centuries the evils of a weak central government. In all the other arts of civilized life Southern India was the peer of any other country. From the very earliest times South India carried on and developed a maritime trade which linked her with the empires of Rome and of China. She gave Burma her earliest script and profoundly influenced the art and religion of distant Indo-China. Her social economy was securely based on the harmony of divers groups, each free in its own sphere to pursue its proper methods and cherish its distinct ideals. Each of her dialects developed into a copious language and gave birth

¹ What has been published of the Madras Records is a small portion of a great mass, of which there is an excellent Press list available for consultation in the Records Office. Mr. Dodwell's *Report on the Madras Records* also furnishes valuable guidance to them. The existing rules throw open records only up to A.D. 1800, while the archives of the India Office up to 1858 can be inspected by students. The publications of the '*Societe de L'histoire de L'inde Francaise*' should not be neglected by any student of modern Indian History.

to a literature which by its richness and power is the most precious treasure inherited from the past. These literatures vividly portray the thoughts and lives of her saints, philosophers and kings and give moving and musical expression to the joys and sorrows of her people.

History is often said to furnish lessons for the future. It can however offer no direct or specific guidance to present day politics and statesmanship. But the memory of what was good and great in olden days may serve to fill us with hope and inspire us with patriotic energy.

Considered merely as a discipline, the study of history is indeed ennobling. For the task of the historian is twofold; it is severely scientific as well as genuinely artistic; first to make sure of his facts by patient investigation and close analysis, and then 'by the light of imagination and the living touch of sympathy' to make clear the significance of these facts to himself and to his generation.

The pursuit of facts, simple as it may appear, is an arduous task. It is essential not only that each fact is correctly discovered and set forth but that no relevant fact is overlooked. And the historian must be content to go where his facts lead him. When history is studied without this detachment, when preconceived theories are allowed to warp, or present prejudices to cloud, the understanding of the past, there is no limit to the harm that results alike to History and to Politics. It has been said that propagandist history was, in part, the cause of two recent European wars. There are many subtler evils that flow from the spread of false historical values, and these cause as much suffering as the overt horrors of war. That is why, as Dollinger said, it is catholic to take ideas from history but heresy to carry them into it. We, in India, have been blamed as a race for lack of the historical sense and works of a professedly historical nature are rare with us. But the ancient Tamil poet who wrote

காய்த லுவத்த வகற்றி யொருபொருட்கண்
ஆய்த லறிவுடையார் கண்ணதே,

has laid down once for all the basic qualities requisite for sound historical work.

NON-ECONOMIC CRITERIA IN THE STUDY OF ECONOMICS

BY

MISS L. C. M. OUWERKERK, B.A. (*Cantab.*)

Professor, H. H. the Maharaja's College for Women, Trivandrum.

Economists have, almost from the first moment that their science became self-conscious, debated the relevance of ethical considerations to their analysis of the economic world. The science claims to be autonomous, or at least to have sufficient provincial autonomy in the federation of social sciences, to preserve its purity and impartiality; and it claims therefore to set up its own criteria in its own province. The economists' test of economic institutions, it is said, must be the economic one, which can be variously interpreted as a monetary test, or an efficiency test—efficiency ultimately being measured in monetary terms, as the market measures it. To intrude non-economic, ethical considerations into the assessments of the economists, is deprecated on two grounds—the danger of unscientific partiality, and the danger of abandoning the one quantitative factor, money, in the unmeasurable qualitative data which form the subject-matter of sociology as a whole. Thus the orthodox economists. But they have always felt it necessary to defend their position even when it was not openly attacked, as if a little uneasy about it; and of late the validity and the impartiality of the monetary criterion have been vigorously criticised. With this attack the whole question of the method and scope of Economics, never satisfactorily settled, has been opened up afresh.

Is Economics an art or a science? Does it seek to discover precepts for the guidance of statesmen and those engaged in economic activities, or does it merely seek to discover the uniformities underlying economic phenomena? What is and what is not an economic phenomenon? If wealth is the subject-matter of Economics, what exactly constitutes wealth? These questions, raised a hundred years ago, are still no nearer a complete settlement now than then, although there is sufficient agreement among a large number of economists for us to be able to call them 'orthodox', the rest presumably being heretics in the Chestertonian sense.

The generally accepted view of the scope of Economics has been most clearly put by Marshall, founder of the Cambridge school and

chief prophet of the orthodox. In his inaugural address at Cambridge in 1885, he said, 'The true philosophic *raison d'être* of economic theory is that it supplies a machinery to aid us in reasoning about those motives of human actions which are measurable.' Economics, in other words, is to deal with monetary phenomena and with monetary phenomena only. And he rightly assigns a very humble rôle to a science on which such limitations are placed. He recognises the 'complexity and intricacy of social phenomena', of which economic phenomena are but a part. 'But the complexity and intricacy of social phenomena afford no reason for dispensing with the aid of the economic organon in its proper place; on the contrary they increase the necessity for it. . . . Having done its work it retires and leaves to common sense the responsibility of the ultimate decision.'

There are two important reasons why economists have so rigorously restricted the scope of their science. They are attempting in the first place to achieve absolute impartiality, to rid their presentation of the facts of the bias of a definite point of view, be it philosophical, ethical or political. In the second place, they are attempting to achieve accuracy by confining the study to measurable motives which do admit of scientific treatment. Mr. Lionel Robbins writes on this problem: 'It is not because we believe that our science is exact that we wish to exclude ethics from our analysis, but because we wish to confine our investigation to a subject about which positive statement of any kind is conceivable as soon as we include investigations of what should be, we are embarked on speculations whose very nature no philosopher since the beginning of time has succeeded in making clear.'

In spite of these and similar protestations, no economist has freed himself from bias, neither has any economist refrained from the adoption of non-economic criteria in his analysis of primarily economic phenomena. Human life is an organic whole, and both the isolation of certain phenomena to be classed as subjects of economic study, and the selection of criteria by which these phenomena are to be analysed, involve a more or less arbitrary choice on the part of the economist. That choice is inevitably governed by his mentality and outlook on life, and in these matters different points of view are bound to arise. Again, whether the economist has regarded his study as an art or a science, he has nearly always had a practical aim in view, sometimes the strengthening of the political State or the reorganization of the public finances, but mainly the improvement of an admittedly 'imperfect economic world. At no time has the science been entirely 'light-bearing'; the human issues involved in it are too vital. Even

where the economist has undertaken to study 'what is' in a purely scientific spirit, he does so with a view to assisting in the attainment of 'what ought to be', and his personal ideals inevitably govern his selection of subject-matter and method.

At its first emergence it was most literally Political Economy, the study of the economy of the body politic, and more of an art than a science. To Adam Smith is given the credit of first erecting something like an impartial study of the economic world, and the title of his great work, 'An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,' does bear with it the promise of scientific impartiality. Smith, however, was not bent on formulating a strict science, and analysis and precept are almost inextricably mixed in his work. The erection of a formal science was due to the English Classical School, Ricardo, Malthus, and Senior, who regarded Political Economy as an inquiry into the laws governing economic phenomena, and very sharply isolated those phenomena from other aspects of human activity. Ricardo in particular approached most closely to a 'pure' science, and dissociated Economics from any ethical considerations. Not only did he refuse to judge the whole economic system by any ethical standards, but he refused to admit the objective fact that man is not governed solely by economic motives even in his economic acts. Wealth was the subject-matter, the economic man the fundamental assumption of the whole science. Nassau Senior expressly excludes any study of the effects of wealth on human life from Economics. 'Wealth, not Happiness, is the subject-matter,' he writes. Yet, be it noted, even he translates the monetary costs into terms of real effort and real sacrifice, penetrating to the human values behind the monetary aspect.

The Classical Economists may have limited themselves to the economic system as it is, but they were content to do so because they believed that the state of affairs brought about by unrestricted competition was the most desirable. Observe that they one and all departed from their objective analysis to discuss the relative merits of State intervention in industry and *laissez faire*, and concluded in favour of the latter. Their lack of further criticism was in reality a tacit approval. They failed to apply ethical criteria because they believed enlightened self-interest served the community better than altruism. Had Adam Smith doubted the efficacy of the 'natural order', his criticism of the existing system might have been more penetrating, as was that of so many Socialist thinkers of the nineteenth century. Smith put forward at least one dogmatic proposition which no amount of purely economic analysis can either prove or disprove. 'Consumption', he wrote, 'is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interests of the producer ought

to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. This maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it would be absurd to prove it.' And indeed, if it be taken as self-evident, the economists have a certain amount of justification in regarding the system of unrestricted competition as leading to the economic summum bonum; for *prima facie* it tends to lead to the greatest output at the lowest (monetary) cost, and thus to the interest of the consumer.

There was of course another reason for the limitation of the study of Economics to 'what is' in the days of the Classical School; many economists believed the laws of Economics to be inexorable, and any attempt to improve on the present system by State action or even private charity to be doomed to defeat by the inevitable working of the laws of the dismal science. The later economists, however, admitted the possibility of improvement of the economic system by concerted human action; Mill in particular examined the economic system by the light of Utilitarianism, admitting an ideal not measurable by purely monetary tests.

Marshall, as we have seen, assigned a place, albeit a humble one, to Economics in the improvement of society. But while he proclaimed himself the most rigid adherent of a positive, non-critical science, there is an undoubted non-scientific bias to his economic analysis, obscured though it may be by his mathematical treatment of costs and utility. He saw in the free play of economic forces the emergence of economic justice, and conceived of his 'Long-period state of normal equilibrium' as an ideal state, in which all costs should be compensated by corresponding utilities. He points out, it is true, certain qualifications to the older 'doctrine of maximum satisfaction'—industries subject to increasing returns deserve special encouragement; inequalities of income have to be taken into consideration—but these qualifications are treated rather as surface blemishes on the doctrine than as completely vitiating it. This view lies at the bottom of his optimism

'God's in His Heaven,
All's right with the world,'—

if you will only remove the obstacles to the free play of economic forces, and allow them to find those so desirable but so elusive margins. Now this view is only justified on the assumption that the monetary costs and utilities, which the realities of the market place do in some rough way correlate, have some quantitative correspondence with real costs and real satisfaction—that the economist's measuring rod of money does really measure something. Marshall assumes that it does; for ultimately it is real

human satisfaction balanced against real human cost that concerns him in his discussion of 'maximum aggregate satisfaction'. Yet there is no measurable relation between real and monetary costs and utilities; Marshall's own analysis goes to demonstrate this. None the less, he is always striving to establish some such relationship, to penetrate, in fact, behind the monetary superficialities of the market place to the human realities underlying them—those realities which by his own hypothesis lie outside the scope of economic theory. Even in the 'pure' theory of Marshall, therefore, the economic analysis must be applied to the incommensurable, the 'human valuations' of pleasures and pains, costs and utilities, which have no necessary relation to their monetary expression. And if these human valuations are to be analysed at all, they must be analysed by criteria which inevitably are non-economic.

Marshall himself set up the machinery; the manipulation of that machinery by his successors has shown the impossibility of confining Economics to the purely monetary, the 'chrematistik' of Aristotle. Take for instance Professor Pigou's 'Economics of Welfare'. The preliminary assumption is that the volume of total welfare varies as the volume of economic welfare, and secondly that the volume of economic welfare varies as the size of the National Dividend; this leads us to the implied assumption that the practical aim of economic endeavour is the maximization of the material means of satisfaction. This is the *raison d'être* of Professor Pigou's subtle and ingenious mathematical analysis of the effects of various factors on the maximum National Dividend. These assumptions have received severe handling from Mr. Hawtrey in 'The Economic Problem' and from Mr. J. A. Hobson in his two most recent books. Above all, the concept of a maximum aggregate of satisfaction has been attacked. Professor Pigou's method is to take the actual desires of consumers, as measured by the money they offer for commodities, as an index of the satisfaction they obtain, and to base his idea of total satisfaction on actual consumers' demand. Mr. Hawtrey doubts if there is such a thing as an *aggregate* satisfaction which can be maximised; some satisfactions are good, some bad, and they cannot be added together. If the economic system is to be criticized at all—and what else is the purpose of 'Economics of the Welfare'?—it should be tested by the desirable. And of the desirable the purely economic test is no indication.

Mr. Hobson's contribution to the discussion in 'Wealth and Life' is the most constructive, and at the same time the most controversial, attempt at the erection of a standard by which economic phenomena can be measured. He assumes that man is a 'psycho-

physical organism' and treats welfare as 'emerging in an organic harmonious whole of interrelated physical and mental activities.' In opposition to the supporters of 'enlightened self-interest', he emphasises the importance of 'community' in the enrichment of personality, and points out the co-operation of men in society produces results different in quantity and quality from that produced by individuals acting alone. On these conceptions he builds up a 'hierarchy of human values', and a standard of welfare. He perceives the danger of controversy, but argues that there is sufficient agreement about the physical and mental elements of welfare, as explained by the experts in hygiene, education, and so on, to make possible an agreed standard for employment in economic analysis.

Mr. Hobson has plunged us into controversy with a vengeance, in spite of this last contention. It may be true that there is substantial agreement about the details of physical well-being, and to a certain extent about the main requirements of education (though even here the place of religious teaching or of a political bias may easily rouse controversy) but there is not and cannot be substantial agreement about the relative importance of these ingredients in the whole hierarchy of human values. Those who believe in the immortality of the soul, for instance, could never accept the description of man as a 'psycho-physical organism', and would consider the soul as more valuable than either body or mind. Believers in the sacredness of the family could never subscribe to Mr. Hobson's views on rationing of population, which is desirable according to his conception of welfare. His views on the importance of 'community' conceal a Communistic philosophy of life with which many thinkers would entirely disagree. It is not my intention to enter into the inevitable controversy but merely to point out that controversy is bound to arise. At the same time, Mr. Hobson has done our science the signal service of laying bare the essentially non-economic character of our so-called economic standards, and to those who happen to disagree with the criteria of welfare which he substitutes for them, of laying on them the burden of constructing a hierarchy of human values which will prove as effective a measuring rod in their own assessment of economic phenomena.

There are times when controversy is of value, that is to say, when it promotes ultimate agreement by clearing up minor befogging issues; but in the controversy with which economists are now faced, there can be no prospect of ultimate agreement unless economists can first convert each other to a unanimous philosophy of life. Yet no economist can view this prospect without dismay; progress in the science depends on the co-operation of

many minds, and unless a substantial measure of agreement is reached about fundamentals, progress will be seriously hampered and the serviceability of economic science to society will be impaired.

It is essential that controversy be narrowed to its smallest limits. It appears to me that this can be achieved by the recognition that the economist has a dual task before him even within the strict scope of his subject as defined by Marshall, 'the study of man in the ordinary business of life'. He has first to analyse the laws governing the economic phenomena before him, or as Marshall puts it, what tends to be; he has to account for the actual structure of economic life, for the actual distribution of economic resources among the uses open to them, for the actual level of prices and the rewards of the factors of production. By studying the tendencies which have brought about past and present changes he can set up a machinery of thought, 'an economic organon', which can be used to guess at the probable results of actual or hypothetical changes. It is this which Marshall conceives as the true scope of pure economics, though he would have been more consistent had he explicitly included the analysis of the incommensurable behind the measurable phenomena. But this analysis of tendencies forms but half of the economist's task. His analysis of the economic world must include an analysis of the world as it actually is, a critical study of its institutions and phenomena. No economist has omitted to formulate such criticism; few would deny that critical analysis is outside the scope of their study. From the first, economists have discussed the advantages of the division of labour, of large and small scale production, of free competition and monopoly, of laissez faire and State activity. In short, economists in their study of 'man in the ordinary business of life' take it upon themselves to analyse not merely the *causes* of economic phenomena and the tendencies bringing them about, but the *effects* of those phenomena on man himself.

Only if we keep these two tasks distinct can we assign the exact place to ethical considerations in the study of Economics. Within the strictly limited sphere of the pure science postulated by Marshall, the monetary aspect is dominant. In a monetary economy, it is obvious that the motive force is money, and economic relationships can be expressed in the language of the market-place. In so far as non-economic motives emerge to disturb the utilitarian calculus of the Classical Economists, they can be treated as objective phenomena without any disturbance of the purity of the science. The beautiful symmetry of the economists' supply theory is disturbed by a recognition of the force of family affection,

but it does not disturb the scientific nature of economics to recognize it. To take a concrete example, Western Economics treats of labour as a supply more or less responsive to demand, and factors causing immobility as friction preventing the free working of economic laws; an Indian might be more scientifically accurate in regarding the supply of Indian labour as fixed in locality and occupation, and factors tending to bring about a change in the distribution of labour as disturbances of the normal equilibrium. 'Pure' Economics will gain rather than lose in accuracy by the recognition of the non-economic as objective realities governing economic phenomena. Differing points of view may arise as to how far excursions should be taken into the non-economic to account for the economic, but discussion will tend to promote ultimate agreement rather than dissension, as the facts are more closely studied and relationships more fully appreciated.

But the analysis of economic actualities requires some measuring-rod, some criterion by which the analysis can be conducted. And here ethical, non-economic considerations enter, not as objective facts, but as governing the outlook of the economist. It is the difference between painting a stick into a still-life picture, and picking up the stick to beat a donkey with. But in the case of the economists, just any stick will *not* do to beat the donkey with. As I have pointed out in discussing Mr. Hobson's 'standards of welfare', fuller discussion will widen the breach between different schools of economists rather than minimise differences.

It is in the interests of both the science and the serviceability of Economics to recognize these dangers. It would perhaps be as well to clarify the issue by the simple device of labelling the two parts of the dual task of the economist, to revive the name of 'pure' economics for the 'economic organon' of Marshall (with, however, fuller recognition of the part played by non-monetary motives as objective phenomena) while the critical analysis of actual economic institutions may well be christened 'social' economics. Mr. Hobson, in his 'Free Thought in the Social Sciences', makes use of the terms 'positive' and 'normative' Economics, but the latter term implies rather the setting up of ideal standards than the study of actualities in the light of those standards. In practice the two tasks are inseparably bound up together; the chain of cause and effect is too closely linked for 'pure' and 'social' Economics to become two distinct branches of the subject. Cause must be studied to assess effect; effect must be studied to appreciate the significance of cause. But by all means let us be quite clear in what way we are approaching economic studies; whether in the spirit of pure scientific inquiry, or in the spirit of criticism and

judgment. It is imperative in the interests that economists define the measure of their agreement and of the disagreement; in the sphere of 'pure' Economics agreement is possible, in the sphere of 'social' Economics it is not, and the recognition of this fact will impel economist to a more distinct realization of the assumptions on which they proceed.

There is a practical reason for defining the issue which economists cannot ignore. They have become, willy-nilly, something of oracles. Nearly every Government inquiry makes use of the economist; their words are reported in the newspapers; in public and private administrative posts you will find them thick as leaves in Vallombrosa. The economists have not remained insensible to this flattery, and the greatest purist among them cannot refrain from oracular utterances from time to time. They are listened to with respect, because they are considered to know what they are talking about in an exceedingly complicated matter, and their words filter down through the utterances of statesmen and the leading articles of newspapers into that passive receptacle, the mind of the man in the street. It is true that the economists do really know what they are talking about in so far as they pronounce on causal relationships—i. e., 'pure' Economics—but in their final assessments of the advantages and disadvantages of economic institutions, they must fall back on non-economic criteria, which may be better or may be worse than those of the man in the street. Or, as Marshall suggested in 1885, 'they may retire and leave the ultimate judgment to commonsense'. We have seen that it is neither human nor even advisable for the economist to follow such a self-denying ordinance; but it is well to remind ourselves of it when economists set up definite 'standards of welfare' and a 'hierarchy of human values'. In criticizing economic institutions, the economist should clearly define the basis of his criteria, so that the 'man in the street' knows where he stands, and is not dazzled by an apparent expert in a domain where the economist has no right to pose as the ultimate arbiter. Such clear definition will undoubtedly raise controversy, and disclose the economist's feet of clay; but it may help to prevent the dissemination of false popular notions through their influence—of which economists have not been completely innocent in the past. The best service which economists can perform towards the welfare of society is a fearless and scrupulous intellectual honesty.

A LITTLE-KNOWN ADVAITIN

BY

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI, M.A., (Madras), B.SC. (Oxon),
Barrister-at-Law, Reader in Indian Philosophy,
University of Madras.

Towards the close of the first chapter of the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*, its author, Appayya Dikṣita, devotes a considerable amount of space to the exposition of the view of a Kavi-tārkika-cakravartī Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya. Though the author's main purpose in that work is the statement of rival advaita views and not any appraisal of these, yet he indicates, here and there, at least that amount of criticism of a doctrine, as is immanent in the formulation of a rival view. The exposition of the Cakravartī's views is remarkable not merely for its length, but also for the absence of any criticism thereof. One feels that the Dikṣita was probably in great sympathy with the doctrine expounded. This feeling is confirmed when one turns to the *Parimala* on the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, especially the position relating to such illusions as the yellowness of the shell and the bitterness of sugar. Here, the Dikṣita offers an interpretation of Vācaspati, which, though quite consistent with what he says, is not quite clear from his own words or from those of his commentator, Amalānanda; and the words used by the Dikṣita, in his exposition, are practically those he puts in the mouth of the Cakravartī, in the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*. We shall see more of this later. Appayya Dikṣita's interest would warrant one in holding that the Cakravartī was an advaitin of some eminence; and even a slight examination of his views, as set forth by the Dikṣita, confirms our impression. It is all the more surprising that nothing more has come down to us about this Vedāntin, except the name and a second-hand exposition of his views.

The greater part of this paper is devoted to a translation of the relevant portion of the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*.¹ Some little space will be taken up to introduce the discussion and to mention the distinctive features of the view expounded.

External sense-perception, for the advaitin, consists in the intelligence that is specified by the internal organ flowing out through the sensory channel and taking on the form of the 'external

¹ Pp. 188-211. (Advaitamañjari edition).

object perceived. One of the many questions that arise in this connection is the need for this flowing out (*bahir-nirgamana*) of the psychosis (*vṛtti*). What exactly does it achieve? One answer is that it brings about the identification of the cognising intelligence with the object-intelligence or that it manifests the non-difference between the intelligence that perceives the object and the intelligence that is Brahman. Another answer is that the outgoing psychosis destroys the ignorance that envelopes the object, and by thus removing the hindrance to knowledge brings about knowledge. This view has the merit of conforming to the general advaita position that the function of psychosis is primarily negative, that knowledge is not produced so much as manifested by the removal of obstacles thereto. But it is not without its difficulties. One of these relates to a continuous stream of cognition (*dhārā-vāhika-jñāna*) relating to one and the same object. Here, the first psychosis in the stream destroys the ignorance veiling the object. What about succeeding psychoses? What is there for them to destroy? If they do not destroy any ignorance, are they really psychoses at all? The discussion is of some interest and one answer goes so far as to say that the succeeding psychoses are not authoritative, relating as they do to what is already apprehended, and that, hence, the question is of little importance. With this difficulty we are not here directly concerned.

The problem of illusion, however, presents more serious trouble, for, it requires the co-operation of knowledge and ignorance. There can be no illusion except on a given substrate and this substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*) must evidently be known. And the illusion itself is the product of ignorance; ignorance is its material cause (*upādāna*). If the act of cognition which makes us aware of the substrate destroys ignorance relating to the object, then there can be no cause for the illusion at all. If it does not destroy ignorance about the object, what else does it do? It may be possible to say that of the two aspects of an existent—existence and content—existence alone is apprehended by the first psychosis, and that ignorance not being wholly dispelled, there is room for a second mental act which relates the *that* to a wrong *what*, super-imposes an unsuitable content on the given substrate. The reply is not very satisfactory, for the question is as to what the ignorance relates to, in such a perception as 'this is silver', in the case of nacre. Does it relate to the *this-ness* of the confronting substance? If so, the psychosis does not dispel any ignorance. If not, and if the ignorance relates only to the content, the *what* of the perceived *that*, then the illusion should be of the form 'nacre is silver', not 'this is silver', as we find in experience. To get over

this difficulty, a distinction is resorted to by some writers¹ between the substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and the support (*ādihāra*) of the illusion, the latter appearing in the illusory cognition, not the former; in the cognition of nacre as silver, *this-ness* is the support and *nacre-ity* is the substrate, the latter being that to which the ignorance relates. The distinction is cumbrous and has little to recommend it. And greater plausibility attaches to the view of some others who resort to the well-known distinction between the obscuring and projecting powers of nescience and hold that though the psychosis relating to *this* does dispel ignorance in its obscuring aspect, ignorance continues to exist and function through its projecting aspect; hence the illusion.

Here steps in Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, saying that the whole question is misconceived, since there are not two psychoses at all, one relating to the *that* and another to the super-imposition of an erroneous *what* on the *that*. What comes to us is essentially one cognition, relating to a *that* in conjunction with a *what*, not to the *that* alone or to the *what* alone. This is but reasonable, for we never cognise immediately the bare existence of anything. The knowledge of existence comes to us, if at all, only along with the knowledge, more or less determinate, of some property or properties. If the knowledge is very indeterminate, we have doubt; if it is determinate, but the properties are not really those of the object, there is illusion. The illusory experience is due to the contact of a defective sense with the object before us. What happens in such a case is that, because of the defect, the distinctive features of the object are not perceived and their place is taken by other properties supplied from memory. Thus, in the shell which is seen, but not as white, because of a defect in the sense of sight, yellowness is supplied from memory; so too, when the child finds its mother's milk to be bitter, the bitterness, though not previously experienced in this life, is supplied from the impressions of a former existence. The sense-element and the memory-element together constitute the object of a single act of cognition. That is why one says 'I see this to be silver',—'this sugar tastes bitter to me'. There is no such experience as that of the bare substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*), that being impossible in the case of the shell, for example, since the sense of sight which apprehends colour must apprehend the shell as possessing some colour or not at all. Nor is the *what* experienced immediately as such, as will be evident from such experiences as 'the lump of sugar tastes bitter'. The lump of sugar in so far as it is not experienced as sweet is the

object only of the tactile sense ; the bitterness is a former taste-experience, which is synthesised with the present actually experienced sugar, in a single act of cognition. Nor does this view become indistinguishable from the view of the Naiyāyikas that what is perceived in error is what exists elsewhere ; for, on their view, the illusory silver, being merely existent elsewhere, cannot be an object of immediate experience, whereas we do say that it is so experienced, not, however, as existing elsewhere, but as the content of the single psychosis produced simultaneously with it, by neuroscience, which is set in motion through the act of cognition. Again, in the experience of the shell as yellow, it is not the yellowness of the bile in the eye that is perceived ; for, if that were the object of perception, neither the shell nor its relation would be the object of perception ; and such a conclusion conflicts with experience. Nor does the yellowness go forth with the bile through rays from the eyes and envelop the object ; for, once this is done, the shell should be perceived by all and sundry as yellow, as if it were gold-covered. The only hypothesis, then, which fits the perceptual nature of the super-imposition and the non-perceptual nature of the *what* by itself would seem to be the recognition of a single psychosis embracing the perceived *that* and the remembered *what*. Any modern psychologist would recognize this synthesis of sensed and associated elements as characteristic of all perception. The only difference in the case of illusion would be that the functioning of the sense-organ is defective. Illusion is a defective variant of perception, not a correct perception of the *that*, with an incorrect perception of the *that* and the *what* super-added to it.

It may be said that at least in those cases of illusion where similarity is the cause, as in nacre being mistaken for silver, the knowledge of the *that* is the cause of the illusion and must come before the illusion ; for, knowledge of similarity pre-supposes knowledge of what are similar. The discussion of the whole question is interesting. The essence of the reply is that recognition of similarity is no part of super-imposition. A blue expanse of water is seen where there is but a sandy waste ; water is super-imposed on sand and blueness is super-imposed on the water, which, if present, would be really colourless. There is no similarity which determines either of these super-impositions. Either the sense fails to perceive or the mind fails to attend to those details of the object which would clearly show it to be a sandy waste ; and the blueness and wateriness of other experiences are cognized along with the *that* noted defectively by the sense of sight. So too, when nacre is mistaken for silver, all its properties except its glitter fail to be noted ; and because of the glitter, silveriness is super-imposed

thereon. What is called similarity and what determines the association with silverness is really the partial identity with silver, in the matter of its glitter. Were the identity realized to be but partial, there would be but recognition of similarity, not super-imposition. A bar of steel lying in a treasury is thus mistaken for a bar of silver. Here, again, is a realization of the psychological truths that association is purposive and that association by similarity is in truth but a case of association by partial identity.

Vācaspati Miśra, in the *Bhāmatī*, seems to waver between two explanations of the experience of the yellowness in the shell. He mentions the yellowness of the bile which goes out through rays from the eyes; he mentions also the yellowness experienced on previous occasions in the heated ball of iron, etc. He leaves us in doubt whether the yellowness of prior experience is super-imposed or whether the identical reference (*sāmānādhikarānya*) of the former experience of the yellow iron-ball is super-imposed on the shell and the yellowness of present experience. The question in that context is whether there is any element of prior experience at all in the illusory cognition of the shell as yellow. So long as the identical reference at least comes from prior experience, the question is answered in the affirmative; and it need not be shown further that the yellowness itself comes from prior experience. But to treat the yellowness as present in the bile and cognized through that would lay the theory open to the criticism urged by the Cakravartī (whose criticism was probably directed against Vācaspati himself). Appayya Dīkṣita makes out, therefore, that criticism like that of the Cakravartī (whom he does not mention by name in the *Purimāla*) may be directed against the Tārīkikas (who are anyathākhyāti-vādins) and not against Vācaspati. For Vācaspati, the yellowness too comes from prior experience, like that of the heated iron ball. The earlier commentator, Amalānanda, appears not to have noticed any such difficulty. Appayya Dīkṣita's own interpretation of Vācaspati's doctrine is not as satisfactory, as it is ingenious; for, if yellowness is not cognized from its presence in the bile, there is no reason for its being mentioned as present in the bile, which goes with the rays from the eyes. Even assuming that this was the view of the Tārīkikas, there was no need for Vācaspati to mention it, except to approve or to condemn; and approval may not unreasonably be assumed, in the absence of condemnation.

On the assumption that Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭo-pādhyāya was criticising Vācaspati, and that he was not noticed by Amalānanda, he should be assigned to some period between the latter and Appayya. At the earliest, he might have been a contemporary of Amalānanda.

The present writer's attention has been drawn by his colleague, the Professor of Indian History, to two inscriptions¹ in a Viṣṇu temple at Śrī Kūrmam, Ganjam District. They commemorate the erection of a tower (prāsāda) and the gift of money for perpetually feeding a lamp, by the wife of one Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, a contemporary of King Anaṅga Bhīma and a famous performer of sacrifices (sarva-kratu-suyājin). The date of the endowment for the lamp is Śaka 1205 (1283 A.D.) This is not an improbable date for our Kavitārka-cakravartī. In the absence of further details, it is not possible to be sure of the identification. It is to be hoped, however, that more details will be made available about one who made such significant and valuable contributions to advaita thought.

TRANSLATION²

Kavi tārika-cakravartī Nṛsiṃha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, however, holds that since there is no modification at all with the form *this* (idam-ākāra-vṛtti), which is other than the modification of the nature of the illusion. 'this is silver', and occurs prior to the arising of (the cognition of) silver, the whole inquiry as to the existence or non-existence of the removal of ignorance by that (modification) has no basis. This is how: there is no modification with the form *this* established in experience, other than the modification of the nature of the illusion; for, the two-foldness of the cognition [as *this* and *this is silver*] is not experienced. Nor may it be posited, because of the effect (the super-imposition), that the cause of the super-imposition is knowledge of the general nature [as *this-ness*] of the substrate; for, there is no valid proof of the causality of that (knowledge) in respect of that (super-imposition). Nor is this the proof, that (the cognition of) silver, etc., is not produced in the absence of contact of the substrate (with the senses). For, there would follow from this the causality, in respect of super-imposition, only of the contact (of the substrate) with a defective sense, [not the causality of the knowledge in general of the substrate]. Nor may it be said that contact with the senses does not pervade every case of illusion, while the appearance (in cognition) of the substrate pervades even the super-imposition of individuality (ahamkāra) on the self-luminous inner self. For, even this (latter) does not pervade the super-imposition of pot, etc., [on

¹ Nos. 296 and 298 of 1896 from Śrī Kūrmam (Ganjam).

² This will form part of the author's projected translation of the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*. Explanatory matter is enclosed in rectangular brackets.

pure intelligence]. Prior to the perception of pot, etc., there cannot be a modification of the sense of sight having for its object the substrate of that (perception), i.e., the formless Brahman alone; (as for) the essential luminosity (of the substrate), (that) is obscured. If the bare luminosity of the substrate, common to (the stages of) obscuration and non-obscuration be the cause, then, since prior to the contact of the *this*-element of nacre (with the senses), there does exist the obscured luminosity of intelligence as specified by that (*this*-element), there should be super-imposition even at that stage.

Nor may it be said that there is no undue extension (of the rule), since the luminosity of the substrate in general is the cause of super-imposition in general, while the manifested luminosity of the substrate is the cause in respect of illusory super-imposition, it being but proper that the general should be the cause of the general and the particular of the particular. For, even thus, the illusory yellowness of the shell and the blueness of the water in the well are not pervaded (by the suggested cause), since, prior to the super-imposition there can be no modification having for its object the substrate—shell etc.,—the colourless not being cognizable by the sense of sight and the white colour (of the shell, etc.) not being perceptible at that stage. Nor may it be said that the above-mentioned (knowledge of the substrate) may be the special cause only of the super-imposition of silver, etc., even among illusory super-impositions. For, even then, the super-imposition of yellow shell etc., does not occur prior to the contact of the senses, and it has necessarily to be said that, in that super-imposition, the contact of a defective sense is the cause; it would follow, on the ground of parsimony, that that itself, being common to all illusory super-impositions, is the cause of these (as well); since, even from this (recognition of contact as the cause), it is possible to explain even the occasional nature of the super-imposition of silver, etc., [i.e., why it occurs at certain times and not at others], it is not established of the knowledge of the substrate, either general or special, that it is the cause of super-imposition.

Now, (it may be said), though not a cause of other super-impositions which are not dependent on likeness, yet in respect of the super-imposition of silver, etc., which is dependent thereon, causality must necessarily be predicated of the general knowledge of the substrate, in the nature of knowledge of the subject as qualified by a special colour, etc., like to that of silver, etc.; for, if contact with a defective sense were alone the cause, the super-imposition of silver, etc., would occur in the cinder, as much as in the nacre. Nor may it be said that likeness too is a cause only through

the defect in the object [that nacre gives rise to the illusion of silver, because of a defect in it, viz., its glitter; not so the cinder]; for, since the super-imposition is seen of blue rock, etc., in the expanse of the waters of the ocean, (seen) from a distance, super-imposition exists, where there is an erroneous cognition of likeness, even among dissimilars. [Here likeness alone is the cause, not any defect in the object, for, the blue colour which is the cause of super-imposition is not a property of the water, which is white or, more properly, colourless]. Nor is it proper to recognize as the cause the accessories to the knowledge of likeness, on the principle of the cause of that cause being the cause of the effect [let the cause of that alone be the cause; why that (other cause) in the middle?]; for, it has nowhere been seen that an accessory to a cognition is the cause of an object [the silver, in this case]; and the knowledge of likeness is a less cumbrous hypothesis than that. Nor may it be said that like the distinction that the super-imposition of blueness occurs only on the pure colourless water, which, itself colourless, is present in a pure golden vessel, but not in a pearl, even so it is because of the nature of the things that there is a distinction that super-imposition of silver occurs on mother-of-pearl, not on cinders, etc., (and that this distinction is) not because of dependence on the knowledge of likeness. For, though there is no super-imposition of a lotus-bud on a piece of cloth, as such, since that super-imposition is seen in that (cloth) as cut and fashioned in that form, it is ascertained that the super-imposition follows not on the nature of the things, but on the existence or non-existence of the knowledge of likeness; otherwise, that super-imposition would occur even at other times.

(To all this), it is said (in reply) thus: even on the view that the knowledge of likeness is the cause of super-imposition, its causality may be predicated only in the super-imposition of silver, etc., which are excluded by specific cognition (of the subject), not in the super-imposition of yellowness on the shell, etc., which are not excluded by it; for, it [that casuality] does not occur (in the latter case). And in the case of what is excluded by specific cognition, because of the rule that the accessories to the hindering cognition are (also) obstacles, (the function of) exclusion must necessarily be predicated even of the accessories to the specific cognition; all distinctions being explicable even on this basis, why posit causality of the knowledge of likeness? This is how (the necessary distinction is effected): when the cinder and the like come in contact with the sense of sight, there being present the accessory to the perception of its specific colour—blackness, etc.,—there is no super-imposition of silver. In nacre etc., too, when the contact of the sense of sight pervades that

part of it which is blue, that (accessory to the excluding cognition) being present, there is no super-imposition. When there is contact only with the part which is like (silver), that (accessory) being absent, there is super-imposition. If it be said that even then (in the latter case) there being *an accessory* to the specific cognition of *nacre-ity*, no super-imposition can follow, no (we reply); for, even you must say that at the time of the super-imposition there being no cognition of *nacre-ity*, etc., there was not, prior to that, the accessory to that (cognition). 'We recognize that at that stage there is no accessory to the perception of *nacre-ity*, that being hindered by the defect, i.e., the knowledge of likeness, which is the cause of super-imposition; but if you recognise the same, it would be like returning to the toll-gate at break of day.' If you say this, no (we reply), for, even when the glitter, which is like that of silver, is seen on a near approach, there is the perception of *nacre-ity*, and hence it is not established of that (knowledge of likeness) that it is an obstacle to that accessory (to the perception of *nacre-ity*); it has necessarily to be said, therefore, of the absence of that accessory, that it is due to exclusion by defects like distance, etc., or lack of the attention that should grasp the blue colouration, etc., indicative (of *nacre-ity*). Thus, in the waters of the ocean, because of the defect that brings about the constant super-imposition of blueness, and the lack of the attention that should grasp the waves, etc., indicative of wateriness, at a distance, there is not the accessory to the specific perception of the white watery expanse; thence the super-imposition of a blue rocky surface. In the spread-out cloth, there is no super-imposition of the lotus-bud, there being present the accessory to the specific perception of extendedness. That (accessory) being absent in the form fashioned by scissoring, there is the super-imposition of that (lotus-bud).

Now, if it be asked, why there should not be the super-imposition of silver, etc. on a piece of iron frequently handled, the accessory to the specific perception of its likeness being absent, and knowledge of likeness not being required (by us), that may happen (we reply). But, there being no accessory to such specific perception as will help to differentiate it from copper, etc., the super-imposition of that too may take place; hence, because of many super-impositions, sometimes it becomes the object of doubt. At other times, however, as in a treasury, where there is an abundance of silver, the super-imposition of silver alone takes place. Nor does it matter if at times super-imposition does not arise, in the same way as sometimes it does not arise, because of lack of defect in the instrument (of cognition), even when there is know-

ledge of the likeness to nacre etc. Hence, a modification with the form *this* has not to be posited because of the effect.

Nor has it be posited as the effect of the cause, viz., the unhindered contact of the *this* object with the senses. For of the very *this* modification, which arises from that (contact), it is said by us that the content is (not the *this*, but) the silver which arises simultaneously (with the modification) and which is a transformation of the nescience set in motion by the contact (of the object) with a defective sense. Though in the silver, which arises simultaneously with the cognition, and exists just as long as the appearance, (there is no contact of the senses prior to that cognition), yet because of the contact of the senses with the *this* where-with it (the silver) is identical, it is appropriate that it too should be grasped by the sense of sight. Though there is no contact of itself (i.e., the sense of sight) with the illusory silver, there is yet the experience of visibility in (such a statement as) 'I see the silver with my eyes.' Nor may it be said that that (silver) cannot be an object of the sense of sight, that being contradicted even by the (admitted) absence of its direct contact with the senses, that what is simultaneous with the *this* modification cannot be produced by contact with a defective sense, the sense-contact which is a cause of cognition not being established to be a cause of the object [the indeterminable silver], that it, rather, comes into existence after the *this*-modification, is produced by it and illuminated by it, being superimposed on the witness that is manifested by it, and that, as for the experience of visibility, it refers only to the indirect need for the sense of sight, as generating the *this*-modification which manifests the intelligence that illuminates it [the illusory cognition]. For, if this were so, there would follow the non-requirement of the sense of sight in the delusion of the yellow shell. The sense of sight is, verily, not required there for grasping the shell, that sense being incapable of grasping the shell alone, as devoid of colour. Nor (is it required) for the grasping of yellowness, since it is not admitted (by you) that what is super-imposed is a sense-object. Nor may it be said that yellowness is not super-imposed directly, but that the relationship alone of the yellowness of the bile in the eye is super-imposed on the experienced shell, and that the sense of sight is needed only for the experience of yellowness (in the bile). For, in that case, it would follow that the shell and its relation (to yellowness) are not perceived, for, not being related to the witness, manifested by the modification with the form of the yellowness of the bile present in the eyes, they cannot be illuminated by that (witness) and a single modification applying to the shell as conjoined with yellowness is not admitted (by you). Nor may it be

said that it is not of the yellowness of the bile in the eyes that, by a defect, relationship is super-imposed, but that the super-imposition of relationship takes place of that, which going out with the rays of light from the eyes pervades the object, as the redness of the dye (pervades) the dyed (cloth), and that through the manifestation of the modification with that form, there is relationship to the witness. For, in that case, in respect of the shell, seen by him whose sense (of sight) is affected by bile, there should occur in others too the cognition of yellowness, as in the case of what is covered with gold. Nor may it be said that that alone which is cognized near at hand can be cognized at a distance (too), like the bird which has flown off into the sky, and that in the case of others [those whose eyes are not affected by bile], there is no cognition (of the bile) near at hand, and that, consequently, they do not perceive the shell as yellow. For, even in the case of others, where their sense of sight is brought close to that sight (affected by bile), there being the proximity of yellowness, the cognition of that (yellow shell) cannot be helped; even so, since it is not possible to predicate super-imposition of what is (perceptually) experienced in the case of (1) the super-imposition of blueness in the clear river water imagined in the pure white sandy expanse, (2) the super-imposition of blueness on the sky, and (3) the super-imposition of blueness on a red cloth (as seen) by night or by moonlight; (and since, consequently), in these cases, there is not admitted a modification of the sense of sight having for its object the substrate as related to blueness, it is not possible to help the (conclusion as to the) non-utility of the sense of sight; further, the sensory nature of the directly super-imposed bitter taste is made clear by the statement of the *Pañcapādikā*, which teaches that the appearance of bitter taste in what is sweet, for the child which has not tasted bitterness before, is caused by the impressions produced by the experience of a former life; else, the need for the functioning of the sense of taste there is unintelligible. Hence, even in the cited cases of the super-imposition of blueness, its visibility must be admitted, because of the contact of the senses with the substrate, on the ground that the super-imposition which arises simultaneously with the modification of sense of sight relating to that (substrate) is the content of that modification; for, there being no modification relating to the substrate alone without (colour), [and there not being admitted a modification relating to the substrate as conjoined with the super-imposed colour], there is no manifestation of intelligence (as specified by the) object and there cannot be the illumination, thereby of water, the blueness super-imposed thereon etc. As for the super-imposition of the bitter taste, the substrate and what is super-imposed

thereon are not grasped by the same sense; there arises through the modification, which relates to the substrate (the sweet substance) and is generated by the sense of touch, the manifestation of intelligence as specified by that (modification); even from the contact therewith of the sense of taste affected by bile, there arises simultaneously the super-imposition of the bitter taste and a modification of the sense of taste having that alone for its content; hence, it must be admitted that the bitter taste is the object of experience by the sense of taste. For, (otherwise), there being no need for the sense of taste, even indirectly, in respect of the bitter taste that is revealed by the intelligence, manifested by the modification generated by the sense of touch and relating to the substrate the reconciliation therewith of the experience of taste cannot take place in any manner whatsoever. So too, visibility being appropriate to the case of the (illusory) silver, the experience, I see (silver) is not liable to be sublated.

Nor may it be said that if visibility be admitted of the silver which is not in contact with the senses, there would be violation of the rule about different effects having different causes, as that sense-contact is the cause of perception in general, that conjunction of the sense (with a substance) is the cause of the perception of substance, and that the conjunction of the sense with silver is the cause of the perception of silver. For, there not being any such thing as (one mode of) contact common to conjunction and other (forms of relation), the first (of these rules) is not established. As for the second rule, there is no conflict with it, because of the second rule having for its content that which is the locus of substantiality from the empirical point of view, and because of the admission of a cognition of substantiality in respect of the illusory silver by the super-imposition thereon of substantiality, in the same way as the *this*-ness of the substrate is super-imposed on it, such super-imposition of substantiality on something, which is not a substance and is not capable of entering into conjunction, being possible, as in the case of darkness (Tamas), according to the Naiyāyikas. The postulation of a special relationship of cause and effect other than the general relationship of cause and effect, set out in the second rule, being set aside as super-numerary (on the ground of parsimony), the third rule is not established. (As for) the principle 'where the general is the cause of the general, the specific is the cause of the specific', that relates to cases where, from the admission of the general relationship of cause and effect alone (as) between seed and sprout, there might follow the creation of a different sprout by a different seed; therefrom cannot be established any special relationship of cause and effect (which is

otiose), as comparable to the fleshy protuberance on the goat's neck. Nor may it be said that even here, on the admission of the general rule alone that conjunction of substance is the cause of the perception of substance, there is undue extension, in that the perception of a different substance might follow from the conjunction with another, for, the rule is admitted that conjunction with the respective substances is the cause of the perception of the respective substances, as otherwise, undue extension cannot be helped even on (the admission of) the third rule (of special causation). Hence, there is no possibility of violation of any established rule.

Further, there would be no harm even if an established rule were violated. For, unless the (application of the) principle, that in respect of all perception contact with the object is the cause and so on, though primarily apprehended, is restricted to empirically valid contents, it is not possible to explain experiences like 'I see this silver', 'I see the blue water', which cannot be established otherwise. Nor may it be said that, in this case, there being the postulation of a restriction to the effect that contact is the cause only in the case of valid knowledge, not in delusion, what is expounded is but the anyathākhyāti view, that there is super-imposition here of the silver that exists elsewhere and does not enter into contact. For, in the case of silver present elsewhere and devoid of identity with the intelligence manifested (by the modification), immediacy is inappropriate; and further, indeterminability (anirvacanīyatva) is established of the content of delusion through the unintelligibility (otherwise) of its perception and sublation; [for, if it is non-existent, it cannot be perceived; if existent, it cannot be sublated; hence its indeterminability.

Nor may it be asked, if the sensory nature of what is illusorily presented be admitted barely on the ground of the contact of the substrate with the senses, why at the time of the super-imposition of silver on nacre, there should not be even then the perception by sight of tin also, which may be super-imposed at a later time. For, though at the time of super-imposition there is no difference between tin and silver, in respect of the perception of glitter, yet at that time there is no super-imposition of tin, because of the non-existence of human defects such as desire, etc.; for the same reason, there is not admitted by me the rising of a modification with that (tin) as content. Hence, there is only one modification originated by the senses, relating to the silver which stands in a relation of identity to the *this*-element (of the illusion). There being no modification, prior to that, with the form *this*, the inquiry is not to be pursued as to the existence or non-existence of the removal of ignorance thereby.

THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY ON THE EVE OF THE BRITISH CONQUEST¹

BY

C. S. SRINIVASACHARI, M.A.

(Continued from page 81 of the Journal, Vol. II, No. 1.)

(4) THE CEDED DISTRICTS.

This region comprises all the territories acquired by the British Government in 1800 by treaty with the Nizam and situated south of the Krishna and the Tungabhadra rivers. The districts are so called because they were ceded to the Company by the Nizam in 1800.² Sir Thomas (then Major) Munro was their first (and their most famous) Principal Collector. He held immediate charge of the taluks which now make up the Anantapur District and of the Rayadurg taluk of Bellary; and the rest of the territory was administered by Sub-Collectors subordinate to him. Munro went to England on leave in 1807 and in the next year the territory was divided into the two Collectorates of Bellary and Cuddapah.

The troubles which so long prevailed in the Ceded Districts before their occupation by the British, occasioned the destruction of the greater portion of the revenue accounts. The ravages of the armies had destroyed the trees, except a few clumps chiefly among the hills. It was computed by Munro that, in 1800, there were scattered throughout the area, exclusively of the Nizam's troops, about 30,000 armed peons all of whom were under the command of about eighty *poligars*, subsisting normally by rapine and committing everywhere great excesses. Writing from Cuddapah, in 1801, Munro said that the ten years of Mughal (Nizam's) government had been almost as destructive as so many years of war; and in the year previous to the British occupation, a mutinous unpaid army was turned loose during the sowing season, to collect their pay from the villages, which they did by driving off and selling the cattle, extorting money by torture and plundering the houses and

¹ Readership Lectures, delivered in January 1929.

² The Nizam agreed to cede to the English all the territories acquired by him under the two treaties of 1792 and 1799 in return for a subsidiary force to be stationed in his dominions. Under Hindu and Muhammadan rule, this portion of the Balaghat was subdivided into many sections, the chief which were Kurnool, Adoni, Kumbum, Harpanahalli, Rayadurg, Bellary, Gooty, Ghazipur, Cuddapah, Dupaud, Gurrumcondah, Panganoor and Siddhout.

shops of those who fled.¹ It was necessary for Munro, in order to enable the cultivation for the season of 1801-2 to commence, to make advances to the ryots for the purchase of seed, implements and bullocks, for the repair of old and the digging of new wells and in many cases for the subsistence of the ryots as well. It was computed by Walter Hamilton, that, while according to the survey accounts, there were 50,268 wells in the Ceded Districts, nearly 14,000 of them were out of repair in 1807; and garden produce was supposed to pay only about 6¼ per cent of the land-rent.²

The poligars, with whom the country abounded, had greatly intensified the effects of war, famine and bad management. The indolence and corruption of the Nizam's officers had led them to abandon the collection of revenue to these *poligars* and the *patels* of villages. Almost every village was a garrison, the inhabitants of which turned out and fought a pitched battle with their neighbours as well as with the peons of the *poligars*. 'The Nizam's troops' were always engaged in the siege of some place, while the exactions of those thus armed with authority and the habitual obstinacy of the village people, made it difficult to say which was in the right.' The headmen of villages were little potentates in themselves; and in many parts they, the head cultivators and the accountants had become leaders of banditti, garrisoning dens and small castles. 'The importance, in short, of the Nizam's officers, the predatory and military habits of the natives, so frequently overrun by large armies, the frequent transfers from one government to another, and the frontier situation, which enabled offenders to escape, had introduced a state of anarchy scarcely ever excelled in the annals of India.'³

The *poligars* never paid their *peshcush* with any regularity. Haidar Ali would have rooted them out had he more leisure, but he burdened them with a *peshcush* so heavy that it left them no margin from which they could maintain armed forces. Tipu Sultan's weaker rule gave them the opportunity to regain all their old power. During the decade of the Nizam's rule to which Bellary was subject, they contrived to strengthen their position still further. When Munro took charge of that district, 'they were almost constantly in rebellion; and their reduction and rebellion

¹ Extracted from his letter of February 25, 1801, to Mr. Cockburn—quoted in pp. 319-20 of Gleig's *The Life of Sir Thomas Munro*—vol. i, (1830).

² W. Hamilton's *A Geographical, Statistical and Historical Description of Hindostan and the Adjacent Countries*—(1820), vol. ii, p. 326.

³ *Ibid.*, (p. 328). The *poligars* of the Adoni Division were described by its Collector, William Thackeray (in a letter dated September 8, 1807 and printed at the Bellary Collectorate Press, 1895) as always fighting with the troops of the *Sarkar* and with obstinate villages, while the *patels* and *karnams* had become captains of banditti, garrisoning independent castles.

were equally disastrous to the country, for the revolting *poligar* exacted contributions by every species of violence, in order to enable him to raise a numerous rabble to defend himself, and the army which marched against him, plundered the villages in its progress, and after reducing him, it usually restored him on condition of his discharging his arrears and paying a *nuzzarana* on account of the expenses of the expedition. If he fulfilled his engagements which was very rarely the case, it was not by refunding from his treasury, but by making new assessments upon the unfortunate inhabitants. Munro therefore assessed the whole lot of the *poligars* at the highest *peshcush* which they had paid either to the Nizam or to Haidar, and in case of their refusal or neglect to pay, they were coerced by his military peons. The Directors of the Company wanted that the *poligars* should be reconciled to British rule by more gentle measures and characterized Munro's action as disingenuous; and the latter retorted by showing that 'neither on the ground of their ancient rights, nor of their later conduct, were the *poligars* entitled to 'gentle measures', and their 'feudal habits and principles' consisted of crimes, oppressions and contumacies, which, if permitted to continue, would have rendered good government impossible.' He gave an exhaustive account of their claims and rights and recommended the grant of pensions to the more deserving among them.

The Bellary District gave less trouble to quiet than Cuddapah, though it was troubled during the Pindari campaign of 1818. The District of Anantapur gave less trouble to quiet than the rest of the Ceded Districts. 'In other portions of this region, especially on the Cuddapah side, the *poligars* already referred to, who had survived all the changes of government which had followed so quickly upon one another's heels, frequently required the argument of regular troops to reduce them to obedience. But in the country which now makes up Anantapur, there were none of these chieftains who were formidable enough to give any real trouble. Of the eighty *poligars* of the Ceded Country, only four lived within it and they were all of them at that time insignificant persons.'¹

The assessment fixed by Haidar Ali on the land was not much higher than the *kamil* assessment, fixed a few years after the subversion of the Vijayanagara Empire by the Bijapur conquerors. Haidar wanted to augment the revenue by the resumption of *inams* and *russooms* and in some instances by the

¹ W. Francis—*Gazetteer of the Anantapur District*—p. 24—Only one of these four was obstreperous and therefore expelled and the other three were given allowances in land or otherwise and deprived of control over their villages.

conversion of the *peshcush* paid by the *poligars* into a rent; but probably he did not realize more than was collected by the Maratha government. Under his rule the revenue continued to increase steadily from 1779 to 1788; while Tipu Sultan increased it by adopting the same means as his father, *viz.*, the resumption of *inams*, the augmentation of low rents and the expulsion of the *poligars*; but a good percentage of the realized increase was the result of several years of tranquillity and vigorous administration. Under the Nizam's rule, the revenue rapidly decayed owing to the weakness of the government, the return of many expelled *poligars* and the collection of requisitions by ill-paid horsemen.

Munro made for the year 1800-01 a settlement *mozawar*¹ for each village as a whole and held the headmen severally responsible for the assessment of their own villages and jointly for the whole of the district. In the next year 1801-02 (*fasti* 1211) he introduced the *kulwari* or *ryotwari* settlement which was in theory regulated by the quality of the land and the value (according to the prices of a series of years) of the supposed net produce, of which last it purported to take 45 per cent. The result of this settlement was an increase of about 25 per cent on the demand of the previous *fasti*; but even so the revenue was greatly below the valuation of 1792².

Munro's survey and settlement of the whole of the Ceded Districts were finished in the years 1802-05; and the highest rates that he fixed for dry lands, wet lands and garden lands were higher than those later imposed; while they were often enhanced greatly above the level to which he professed to restrict them. He followed the practice of granting *takkavi* advances to meet the expenses of cultivation. Surveyors took a census of the people and of the cattle, sheep and goats(*a*). They were followed by assessors who went over the fields with the village officers and the ryots and classified their soils, while allowance was made for distance from the village and for other circumstances by which the

¹ The lump assessment to be paid by each village was roughly arrived at by assembling the headmen (*patels*) and *karnams* and questioning them as to the value of their own and the adjoining villages. This settlement brought in hardly more than half the standard which Munro had set up.

² The *kulwar* (or *ryotwar*) settlement was at first in practice impossible, as the fields had never been properly surveyed or assessed; and the settlement was made first by assessing the village in a lump and then apportioning this total, as equitably as possible among the ryots in accordance with the rules fixed.

(*a*) The total number of inhabitants according to the lists returned was 1,917,376, which showed an increase of one-fourth of the population in five years of tranquillity. The number of cattle and sheep could not be ascertained with the same accuracy as the owners were averse to giving true reports. Nearly 12 lakhs of black cattle, half a million of buffaloes and two million of sheep and goats were registered in 1806.

expenses of cultivation were increased. Cultivated land was distinguished from waste, wet and garden land from dry, and government land from *inam*. The highest rates on dry, wet and garden land were respectively Rs. 2-14-8, 17-8-0 and 29-2-8; and in no village should there be more than ten rates for dry land, six for garden land and eight for wet land.¹ The poorest lands could only bear a very light assessment, and hence, in order to make up the total due from the village, the rates on the best soils were frequently very high. When once the assessment on each ryot was fixed, the settlement of subsequent years was much less troublesome.

In 1804 a desire was expressed by Government to revert from the *ryotwari* to a permanent settlement, in which each village was to be rented out as a whole for three years for a fixed sum to *zamindars* and proprietors, or, failing them, to the headmen; and the renter was alone responsible for the payment of the fixed rent. Munro condemned the proposal and declared that a direct settlement with the cultivators was more suited to the manners and prejudices of the inhabitants, was more likely to reclaim them from their wandering habits and fix them to their fields and would afford greater security to the revenue and would raise more produce than the system of great estates would do. In 1807, he reiterated his conviction in favour of the *ryotwari* settlement; and he fully set out his views as to the modifications in his own system that he deemed necessary. He held that to give land any saleable value at all, the assessment should not exceed one-third of the gross produce; and as his own rates took about 45 per cent, he recommended that all his rates should be reduced by about 25 per cent, and an additional 8 per cent (or 33 per cent in all) should be knocked off the rates on all land under wells and small tanks, on condition that the ryots agreed to keep these in workable repair.² He also proposed that the ryots should be given complete ownership of the land for which they paid assessment and that they should be at liberty at the end of every year to throw up part of their holdings or to occupy more land (provided there was a proper proportion of good and bad land taken up or relinquished) and that unoccupied land should remain in the hands of Government. It was only long afterwards that his views were given very partial effect to.

¹ For full details see Extract Proceedings of the Board of Revenue, Fort St. George, August 24, 1807, containing the report of the Principal Collector of the Ceded Districts, dated November 30, 1806, etc.: pp. 413-34 of vol. ii, of the *Fifth Report* from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company (ed. of 1866) and Arbuthnot's *Sir Thomas Munro*, Appendix C.

² Vide Munro's Reports of July 29, 1807 and August 15, 1807, printed at the Bellary Collectorate Press (1876) and given in Arbuthnot's *Munro*, vol. I.

The severity of the famine of 1791-2 had made grain sell as high as two seers per rupee ; the scarcity of the years 1802-04 destroyed a large number of cattle and raised the price of provisions from 200 to 300 per cent of the average rates. Now Munro suspended the importation duty on all kinds of food grains. Rice sold in 1804 at eight seers per rupee at Adoni, while at Raichur on the other side of the Tungabhadra it was only 5 seers. In 1805 there was a great increase of revenue ; again famine occurred in the years 1806-07 ; and as a remedy for this situation, Munro suggested a remission of revenue and deprecated any sort of interference with the grain trade.

Throughout the Ceded Districts, uncultivated land not occupied by hills, thick jungle or other obstructions was regarded as capable of being reclaimed. The poverty of the cultivators and their lack of capital prevented any material addition to the revenue from high, unirrigated and extensive wastes. It was the practice for the cultivators to change their holdings annually or periodically and to occupy fallow or waste land, in order that the previously cultivated land might have rest. The custom of the previous governments was to endeavour to create an increase of revenue by forced cultivation, so that while much land was under tillage, none was well cultivated. For long the British Government also followed this practice and the usual result was that when waste land was occupied, stock and labour were abstracted from land where it might have been profitably employed and in all cases where government was not insupportable, the peasantry seldom migrated for the sake of occupying waste.

The Nawabs of Kurnool from whom a portion of the present district of Kurnool was acquired (the rest having formed part of the Ceded Districts) in 1838, had pursued a system of very arbitrary revenue assessment and oppressive collection. 'The whole known history (of the Nawabs) with the honourable exception of Munawar Khan's rule, (1750-1790) is but a series of acts of oppression and violence on the part of the Nawab and passive resistance or flight on the part of the people. Mr. Blare, the Commissioner, on the assumption of the country, constantly mentions these facts and shows that the population was about one-half in proportion to that of surrounding districts.' There were however very few records of Muhammadan rule preserved. During the time of the last Nawab, the revenue administration was in the greatest disorder and was carried on without any system at all. No public accounts were kept except by the village accountants ; and the amount to be paid by each village was changed according to the caprice of the Nawab, who gave *covls* to the ryots and thus induced them to cultivate

their lands only to seize their produce and indefinitely increase his demand without any ostensible reason. Even in fertile places like Nandyal, the Nawab's oppression was so great that the cultivators often threw up the land, leaving their serfs to carry on cultivation as best they might. Many of the evils arose from a sub-division of the country into petty *jaghirs*, assigned by anticipation to the Nawab's creditors, while the lands under his own superintendence were wretched. In 1813 the resources of the country had fallen down from 20 to 10 lakhs.¹ The duties on consumption and on merchandise passing through the country supplemented by the collections from pilgrims who visited the celebrated pagoda of Parvati and the taxes on spirituous liquors amounted to over a lakh and three-quarters of rupees. The administration of justice was neglected, and there was not even any ostensible tribunal for its dispensation. The Pathan followers of the Nawab committed atrocities with impunity.

(5)—MALABAR

In Malabar which was acquired by treaty in 1792, even under Haidar the quarrels between the different rajas and the turbulent spirit of the Nair chiefs, greatly obstructed the introduction of order and settled government. But the land was rich, and large sums of money were got by the military officers of Haidar and by the Canarese Brahmins who had been placed by him in charge of the revenue management. These officials armed the rajas with despotic authority, 'instead of the very limited prerogatives they had enjoyed under the feudal system, under which they could neither exact revenue from the lands of their vassals nor exercise any direct authority in their districts'. Thus, in the words of Mr. Murdoch Brown, 'the ancient constitution of government, which, though defective in many points, was favourable to agriculture, from the lands being unburthened with revenue, was in a great measure destroyed, without any other being substituted in its room. . . . The *Raja* was no longer what he had been, the head of a feudal aristocracy with military authority, but the all-powerful deputy of a despotic prince, whose military force was always at his command, to curb or chastise any of the chieftains who were inclined to dispute or disobey his mandates. The condition of the inhabitants under the rajas thus reinstated in their governments, was worse than it had been under the Canarese Brahmins, for the rajas were better informed of the substance of individuals and knew the methods of getting at it.' The country rapidly declined in

¹ See Hamilton—Vol. ii, p. 337.

produce and wealth as well as in population, so much so, that at the accession of Tipu, the population and produce were reduced to one-half of what they had been at the time of Haidar's conquest. Tipu's religious fanaticism, backed by the Moplahs, led to an almost universal persecution and plundering of the Hindus. In 1788 the Nairs of South Malabar, headed by Ravi Varma of the Zamorin's house, rose in rebellion; and many were killed including the Raja of Chirakkal, while the richer land-owners fled to Travancore and the poorer to the jungles.

The quick destruction of Tipu's authority in South Malabar and the operations of Colonel Stuart and General Abercromby in the war of 1790-92 led to the speedy establishment of British supremacy in the whole region. The district was formally ceded to the British by the Treaty of Seringapatam and was first administered by a Commission on behalf of the Bombay Government. It was only in 1800 that the Commission was abolished, and the territory was transferred to the Madras Presidency, Major Macleod, the first Principal Collector taking charge in 1801, with the assistance of nine Subordinate Collectors.

The situation in 1792 was very depressing. South Malabar was in a condition bordering on anarchy.¹ "Trade was at a standstill and of the pepper-vines in the south of the district, Tipu had left not one in fifty standing. His religious persecution had engendered a fierce and abiding hatred between Hindu and Muhammadan, and the claims asserted by the Brahmin and Nayar land-lords, now flocking in their thousands from Travancore, to lands which for years past had been in the undisturbed possession of the Mappilla cultivators, widened the breach still further. The Zamorin's Nayars had already come into collision three times with the Mappillas of Ernad; and the intractable Mappillas of Valluvanad who had never been amenable even to Mysorean rule, terrorised the country side by frequent raids from their fortified posts in the jungles at the foot of the Western Ghats. The Joint Commissioners (who were in office from 1792 to 1800) worked with untiring industry and introduced many excellent measures. Their first acts were to proclaim the freedom of trade in all articles of merchandise except pepper, to establish Courts of Inquiry and Justice presided over by themselves in rotation, and to declare a general amnesty for all "the manifold enormities" of the past twenty years. But their mistaken revenue policy adopted under the orders of the Governments of India and Bombay, retarded for years the pacification of the district and culminated ultimately in the fierce blaze of the

¹ Innes and Evans—*Gazetteer of Malabar and Anjengo*, pp. 77-8.

Pazhassy (Pychy) rebellion. The Mysoreans had collected their revenue direct from the cultivators through the medium of their own officials. The Company, failing to realise how deeply the old régime and the power of the Malabar chieftains had been undermined by the Mysorean conquest and the introduction of a general land-revenue, farmed for a lump sum to the Rajahs the collection of revenue in their former dominions. The leases, at first yearly, were renewed in 1794 for a period of five years. . . . Long before the leases had expired in 1799, the system had broken down and the Company had assumed charge of the revenues of most of the districts. The Rajahs had not the power to enforce their demands for the revenues." The Zamorin wrote to the Joint Commissioners in 1792 thus: "When my people ask for revenue the Mappillas shake their swords at them, and the Nayars, who formerly had paid no revenue to any one, but were bound to attend the rajahs when called on to war and who lived in hills and woods, with every house separate, and that house defensive, barred their doors against the tax-gatherer." The assessments of the Rajahs were again unequal; and the Mappillas were assessed at higher rates than the Hindus. The general discontent increased and in South Malabar resolved itself into a predatory group of banditti, headed by the notorious robber, Unni Mutta Mooppan,

The two Pychy rebellions (of 1797 and of 1800-05) were rendered worse by the attempt of Major Macleod to disarm the district in 1802, to enhance the land assessments and to revise the table of exchange. The Nair risings of 1808 and 1809 in Travancore and Cochin did not seriously disturb the peace of the district, whose subsequent history has been marked in later times by Mappilla outbreaks which have always blazed out within a radius of fifteen miles from Pandalur Hill in Ernad Taluk—the so-called fanatical zone.

Early English authorities like Mr. Farmer, one of the first Commissioners and Dr. F. Buchanan, stressed upon the *jenmkars* (free-holders) who held their lands either by purchase or by hereditary descent and the *kanamkars* or mortgagees 'to whom the land had been pledged in security for the interest of money advanced to the *jenmkar*, which advance is the *kanam* that is ever incumbent on the land until it be redeemed'.

The peculiarity of the *kanam* or Malabar mortgage is that it is never foreclosed, but remains redeemable even after the lapse of a number of years. The quantum of money lent characterizes the different gradations of the *kanam* tenure. Their variety and numbers till they reach the deed which for ever alienates the *jenm*, afford the most conclusive evidence that can be adduced of the

tenacity with which the ancient land-holders cling to the *jenm*-right. . . . It was a prerogative and (and is still claimed) inherent in *jenm* right that the *kānamkar* should renew his *kānam* deed after the lapse of a certain number of years. The renewal entitled the *jenmkar* to a remission of a fixed percentage on his original debt. . . . There is no such thing as an established division of the produce in shares between the *jenmkar* and tenant.¹

The industrious and observant Dr. F. Buchanan, mentions another tenure the *Vir-pattam*, or net produce, in which the tenant deducted from the gross produce, the quantity of seed sown and an equal quantity which was the whole granted them for their stock and trouble; and he gave the remainder to the landlord. This was a tenure very unfavourable to agriculture; the cultivator had no immediate interest in raising more than two seeds of which he was always sure; and the only check upon him was the fear of being turned away from his holding—'a very inadequate preventive against indolence where the reward for industry was so scanty.'² According to the same authority, the *kānam* tenure was evidently unfavourable to agriculture, as the proprietor always reserved the right of resuming the holding whenever he pleased, by paying up the sum originally advanced and no allowance was made for improvements. The fact that the right of redemption was rarely exercised by the landlord was, according to him, a clear proof that this tenure prevented improvement and that agriculture as an art was at least not progressive. 'Before the conquest of Haidar, the mortgagees (*kānamkars*) were mostly Nairs, but after this event many Moplas and still more Puttur Brahmins acquired that kind of property, and now,' he says, 'many Shanars and other persons of low caste have become *Cānumcārs*.'

Haidar taxed the low ground (*paddum*) of the arable land; and the tax known as *negadi* fell upon the *jenms* first. The share which they had reserved in the mortgage lands being totally inadequate to pay this tax, their interest in the assessed land completely ceased. The high lands (*parumba*) were exempt from this taxation; and the profits arising from them were left entire to the proprietors (*jenmkars*), to prevent them from falling into absolute want; and they were all reduced to comparative poverty.

On account of the flight of many Nambudiri landlords into Travancore owing to Tipu's persecution, many of the mortgagees

¹ Mr. Thackeray's *Report* to the Board of Revenue dated August 4, 1807, and Mr. Warden's *Report* to the same body dated September 12, 1815—For an explanation of *kanam* tenure, see p. 7 of the *Report of the Malabar Tenancy Committee of 1927-28*, vol. i. (Report).

² Buchanan—*A Journey from Madras through Mysore, Canara and Malabar* (1807), vol. ii, p. 366.

on their estates assumed the title of *jenmkars* and maintained that, when the Nambudiris fled, being in want of money, they had sold their estates fully and taken the whole balance of the value of the (*virpattam*) neat produce. Many of the mortgagees and other landholders now let their lands to tenants. But they could seldom procure any person who would give the net produce. The leases were in general for three years and the annual rent was fixed and always paid in kind. This was what was called a *pattam* or produce of an estate. When the land-holder was poor, he was under the necessity of allowing the tenant to pay the land-tax; and the latter would naturally charge a large share of the produce as expended for this purpose. The *Devastānams* or temple-lands and the *Cherikal* or demesne lands which belonged to the rajas were under the management of these chiefs and were let out in a similar fashion. Haidar exempted the temple-lands from taxation, but would not exempt the latter which were deemed to be private property. Tipu seized on the former and subjected them to taxation; but still they yielded a profit.

‘The *pattam* or rent for a *poray* sowing of land varied from 5 to 2 *porays* of grain. Some lands produced 2 crops a year; and the average rent for one crop was about $2\frac{1}{2}$ *porays* for one *poray* of sowing. The average produce of rice in Palghat, after deducting 10 per cent for contingencies was $7\frac{1}{2}$ times the quantity sown. After deducting $4\frac{1}{2}$ times for rent and expenses of every kind, this left $2\frac{7}{8}$ as clear gain to the farmer, or rather more than 40 per cent of the gross produce. The whole of the low (paddum) land was assessed tax of $1\frac{1}{2}$ *fanams* for a *poray*-land¹ (a *poray* being equal to 9 *paddis* and about $1\frac{1}{2}$ pecks; 1 *poray* of seed sowed a field of 58 feet square). Dr. Buchanan calculated that in 1801 the land-tax exhausted about 60 per cent of the net rent. He thus remarked upon its incidence. ‘This is no doubt a heavy tax; and must have greatly distressed individuals not accustomed to pay land-tax of any kind, and must have also annihilated the remaining property of those whose estates were involved in mortgages; still however the present occupants of the ground possess a much larger property in it than is usual in India.’²

The *parumba* lands were generally composed of higher grounds formed into terraces and partly occupied by houses, gardens, orchards and plantations and partly cultivated with a peculiar kind of rice and with various pulses and grains and partly reserved for

¹ The Madras rupee exchanged then for $3\frac{3}{4}$ Viraraya *fanams* and $2\frac{1}{2}$ cash. The exchange of *pagoda* into *fanams* was very variable and altered from $11\frac{1}{4}$ to $11\frac{3}{4}$; and the commission for the money-changer for giving *fanams* for *pagodas* was 2 *cash* for each *pagoda*.

² Buchanan, vol. ii, p. 369.

pasture. The *paddum* land was called by Mussalmans *Dhanmurry* and *Batty* field by the English officials at first. 'There can be little doubt that this is the origin of the word *Paddy-field* used by the gentlemen of Madras, and which from thence had been carried to Bengal and extended to the grain usually cultivated in such fields. It comprehends all the lower grounds of the province, which are cultivated almost solely for rice.'¹ There were very few plantations in the neighbourhood of Palghat. The cultivation of the arable part of the highlands was very neglected in spite of the fact that no land-tax had been imposed upon it. The cattle were very diminutive and very inadequate for the proper cultivation of the land. It was estimated by Mr. Warden, Collector of the District in 1800, estimated that the produce of a field ploughed with large oxen was nearly double of that which had been tilled with the common breed of cattle. Every cultivator who occupied *paddum* land had a certain part of the high land attached to it for pasture; and to this he had an exclusive right paying no rent; but one was allowed to cut grass wherever one pleased. Horses, asses, swine, sheep and goats were generally imported from eastwards. The forest tracts were divided into *puddies* or villages inhabited by a rude tribe called *Malasir*. Both the *puddy* and its inhabitants were considered the property of some landlord who farmed out the labour of these people with all that they collected to some trader. 'The most productive *puddy* in the whole district pays only four rupees a year. A capitation tax on the *Malasir* might raise a greater income to the proprietors of the woods and be much less oppressive.'

The most valuable product of the forests was their timber, of which teak was by far the most valuable kind. There was little attempt made for its preservation; only in 1798 an order was issued by the Commissioners prohibiting trees that were under certain dimensions from being cut. The condition was such that valuable trees had been cut and only useless ones were allowed to remain and come to seed in all places of easy access. According to Mr. Warden, between four and five thousand *candies* of teak fit for ship-building might be annually procured from the forests in his districts; but this could be only done by a large body of trained elephants, 'an expense beyond the reach of individuals and only to be undertaken by the Company.' Each *candy* of teak, when seasoned, measured nearly 11 cubical feet. No lac or sandalwood was produced in the hills in any large quantity. The elephants were a great nuisance

¹ *Ibid.* Yule and Burnell (*Hobson-Jobson: revised edition*, p. 650) would regard the Canarese word *bhatta* (rice in the husk) is the origin of *batty*. Malay *pādi*, Javanese *pāri* means rice in the straw, is more probably the direct parent of *paddy*.

to the farmers who lived near the forests and had prevented much land from being cultivated. Four forges near Kollengode had iron ore supplied to them in the strata near the river.

The produce of the cocoanut palm was an important economic asset. The nuts were generally bought by Moplah merchants who made advances from 3 to 6 months before the time of delivery. The nuts sold from 4 to $4\frac{1}{2}$ *fanams* the hundred if the producer was not necessitated to take advances, and from 2 to 3 *fanams* for the hundred if the price was advanced. A proprietor let his garden at a rent of 8 to 15 *fanams* for every hundred trees; the occupant paid the land-tax which was $\frac{1}{2}$ *fanam* for every tree that was in full bearing; unproductive trees, both old and young being exempted. The occupant who had received an advance, if he found that the produce of the garden was greater than that for which the advance had been made, sold the surplus quantity as he pleased. If he had received advances for more than he could deliver, he had to pay for the deficiency, not at the rate of the advance received, but at the prevailing market-rate. On an average not above 10 trees in a hundred paid the tax; each tree produced annually from about 80 to 100 nuts. These conditions varied slightly in the different parts of the district.

Among the cocoanut trees were raised plantains and a variety of kitchen-stuff on which no tax was collected. The jack-fruit had always a ready sale; and a tax was levied on the tree. Mangoes were not readily saleable and no tax was demanded for them. Palms fit for wine were let to *Tiyyas* who extracted jaggery and arrack from the juice. In a good soil the trees yielded juice all the year; on a poor soil they were exhausted in six months. A clever workman managed from 30 to 40 trees and paid annually for each from 1 to $\frac{1}{2}$ *fanams*.¹

No tax was imposed on betel-leaf which was not grown in gardens. The tenures by which plantations were held differed considerably from those by which *paddum* land was cultivated. The landlord usually granted a lease for a time sufficient to allow the cultivator to have at least two years, full produce from the garden and often much longer. Long leases were generally accompanied by some money paid in advance which was called the *kānam*

¹ Arshid Beg Khan, an officer of Haidar, imposed a tax of $\frac{1}{3}$ *fanam* on every cocoanut tree, but exempted the old and young, which gave rise to immense frauds. Mr. Smee, one of the Assistants to the Collector, thought that the tax was too high and proposed to reduce it to $\frac{1}{3}$ *fanam*, estimating the average produce of a tree to be nearly 2 *fanams* (Buchanan Vol. III. pp. 403-04). It was estimated that the produce of an acre planted with cocoanut trees would be 12 s. $8\frac{1}{2}$ d. and the tax thereon would be 3 s. $3\frac{1}{2}$ d., taking the *fanam* at $3\frac{1}{3}$ for the rupee.

or mortgage. On the expiry of the lease, the landlord could reassume the plantation by paying up the mortgage and all the charges incurred by the *kānamkār* for building wells, fences, etc., together with the value of the trees brought to maturity, the total amount due being generally determined by arbitration. Then the landlord might grant it to the planter on proper *kānam* or full mortgage. "In this case, the *pattam* or neat rent of the garden, having been ascertained to the satisfaction of both parties, the mortgagee agrees to pay the amount to the landlord, after deducting the land-tax and the interest of his claims; which are then consolidated into one sum called the *kānam* or mortgage.

In South Malabar, the cultivation of pepper vine, owing to Tipu's destruction was much less than it formerly was. The gardens were small. Most of the cultivators received advances from traders, which, if needed urgently, would not be above $\frac{2}{3}$ of the value to be given. If the cultivator did not deliver the stipulated quantity, he had to pay for the deficiency at the Calicut price which was considerably higher than the rates in the interior. The advance was frequently made in cloth or other goods. In North Malabar the whole pepper trade was controlled by the Mousa of Tellicherry, who was a great monopolist. In the South there was some competition and the farmers got for their produce something like a fair price. The English Commissioners at first thought that the most ready way of encouraging the cultivation would be to allow the proprietors to pay it to Government in lieu of the revenue at a certain fixed rate. Those who could sell it at a higher rate than the Company's offer might sell it as they pleased. What the Company did not want for their own immediate commerce might be sold by public sale at Tannore, Calicut and Tellicherry. By this it was thought that smuggling also could be prevented, as there was a duty of $10\frac{1}{2}$ per cent *ad valorem* on all pepper exported.¹

The tenures of pepper gardens were given on mortgage-bonds and on an annual rent. The tax on pepper-vines was 3 *fanams* for every full-grown tree, supporting 10 or 12 pepper-vines. In the revenue accounts a sufficient number of smaller trees were written as one. The produce of a full tree was estimated at about 16 lbs. to 24 or even 32 lbs.; and the land-tax amounted to about a third part of the produce:

¹ Compare this with the scheme of Mr. Spencer who, in 1757, arranged with the Rajah of Travancore to take the whole of the pepper produced in his dominions at a fixed price. In Travancore the ruler monopolised all pepper and gave the cultivators a fixed price for all that they could raise. The Company exported since 1793, 4,000 candies of pepper. Europeans purchased about $\frac{2}{3}$ of all the pepper produced in the country. The price which they gave regulated the whole.

Salt was manufactured all along the coast by the natural evaporation of sea-water, mainly by the labour of a tribe called Vaituvans. Sandalwood that was produced towards the sources of the Cauvery to the eastward of the Western Ghats was diverted from the Malabar coast owing to the unsettled state of the country under Haidar and Tipu's prohibiting the exportation of that article. The abolition of the prohibitory laws had led to a diminution of the price and had brought larger sorts to the market. Cardamoms were another branch of the Malabar trade, although but a small quantity of them was produced in the region.

The principal merchants were known as *Tarrnagaars* who were a sort of brokers and warehouse-keepers, and in whose store-houses, the merchants coming from the East or the West deposited their goods. The broker was not answerable for fire or theft and charged a warehouse duty of $\frac{1}{4}$ *fanam* for every *tolam* or 8 *visays*. Cloth merchants paid a higher commission and always sold their woven goods. The brokers maintained that they had a more extensive trade under Tippu than under British rule. At Calicut, Mr. Torin, the Commercial Resident, had been attempting to establish a manufacture of plain cotton goods called long cloth, each piece being about 72 cubits long and $2\frac{1}{4}$ cubits in width. The prices given to the weavers ranged from 30 to 34 *fanams* for the piece; and the cloth was afterwards bleached and sent to Europe on the Company's account. The weavers were brought from Travancore and Cochin; there were 237 looms working in Calicut, each producing about 2 pieces monthly. Mr. Torin had also started another manufactory of the same cloth at Palghat which seemed to him to be a fit station for weaving and whose cloths, he expected, would be better and cheaper. By far the greater part of the clothing that was used in the country was imported and at Tellicherry a few weavers made table-cloth, napkins and towels for the Europeans and the Indo-Portuguese.

The weavers who were scattered over the country, weaving very coarse cloth were mainly Devangas and Kaikkolars settled from outside. Trading boats, known as *pattamars* carried on an average 50,000 cocoanuts or about 500 Bengal bags of rice; there was a class of larger *pattamars* also used for coastal trade. The vessels of the Moplahs had sailed to Surat, Mocha, Madras and Bengal. But Tipu's rule had reduced them to great poverty. From Bombay, wheat, fenugreek, pulses, sugar-cane, jaggery and salt were imported in these; and teak-wood and cocoanuts formed the bulk of the return cargoes. Goa, Rajapur and Gheria also did much trade with the Malabar ports. At Ponnani, the Moplah traders were numerous and prosperous; many of the houses were two-stories high and

seemed to be very comfortable dwellings. It was also the residence of the *Tangal* or the chief priest of the Moplahs who claimed to be descended from Ali and Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet.

Agricultural labour was performed by polluting castes like the *Cherumas*, who were the absolute property of their lords. They could be employed in any work that their masters were pleased to set for them. These serfs were not even attached to the soil and could be sold and transferred in any manner. Only the husband and the wife could not be sold separately; but children could be separated from their parents and brothers from their sisters. They belonged to different castes, according to which there was variation in the right of the master to the children of his slaves. Adults received a certain allowance of rice weekly; children and old persons past labour got half this pittance; but the slaves on each estate got $\frac{1}{24}$ of the gross produce, in order that they might be encouraged to bestow care and become more industrious. The usufruct of slaves was transferred by three modes, (1) by *jenmam* or sale where the full value of the slave was exchanged, and the property in him was entirely transferred to the new master. (*N.B.* Usually a young man with his wife sold for about 250 *fanams* = £6-5-0); (2) by *kanam* or mortgage, where the proprietor received a loan of money, generally $\frac{2}{3}$ of the value of the slave, and also annually a small quantity of rice, the latter to indicate that his property in the slave was still alive; and (3) by *pattam* or rent where the master gave his slave to another for an annual rent, which was usually 8 *fanams* for an adult male and half as much for a woman. "In fact the slaves are very severely treated; and their diminutive stature and squalid appearance show evidently a want of adequate nourishment. There can be no comparison between their condition and that of the slaves in the West India Islands, except that in Malabar, there are a sufficient number of females who are allowed to marry any person of the same caste with themselves and whose labour is always exacted by the husband's master. . . ."¹

¹ *Buchanan*—vol. ii (pp. 370-71). Five families of slaves numbering 24 persons of all ages, were enough to cultivate 200 *perays* of land, with 5 ploughs and 10 oxen.

SHAKESPEARE CRITICISM¹

BY

V. K. AYAPPAN PILLAI, M. A. (Oxon.)

A SURVEY FROM THE BEGINNINGS TO 1765

LECTURE 1

I

I must first explain the scope of this survey. It is not my purpose in this course of six lectures to cover the whole wide field of Shakespeare Criticism and Investigation, from the beginnings down to the present time—an almost impossible task, considering the amplitude of the subject. I hope, however, to make a reasonably adequate and clear survey of the subject from the beginnings in the Elizabethan age itself to the year 1765, when Dr. Johnson gave to the world his long-promised edition of Shakespeare preceded by a memorable preface. It is hoped to undertake the second half of this survey, the history of Shakespeare Criticism in the late Eighteenth, the Nineteenth and the Twentieth centuries, at some future date.

This is an immense and singularly interesting subject. Shakespeare is not so much an English as a world-poet,² and he is of all English poets, perhaps the most widely known and the most popular in India. It is profoundly interesting to watch how great minds react when they come in contact with the myriad-minded Shakespeare. The appreciation of Shakespeare in a particular age is virtually the touch-stone of the age—the standard by which the *zeit-geist* could be judged. In France as in England, says Jusserand,³ the history of Shakespeare Criticism is intimately connected with national literary tastes and ideals. Benedetto Croce,⁴ the Italian philosopher and critic, maintains that the history of Shakespeare criticism would form an excellent history of Æsthetic, because the fame of Shakespeare became⁵ wide-spread concurrently with the liberation of æsthetic theory from external norms and concepts.

I cannot do more than glance at the strange, yet singularly persistent, theory, which would ascribe the plays of Shakespeare to some other Elizabethan writer, Bacon or other, who was content to

¹ University Lectures.

² Shakespeare is not our poet, but the world's,
Therefore on him no speech!

Landor-Sonnet on Browning.

³ Shakespeare in France—J. J. Jusserand.

⁴ Ariosto, Shakespeare e Corneille; Engl. translation. Douglas Ainslie,

masquerade under Shakespeare's name. The Shakespeare problem, from this aspect, has been discussed by various writers, one of the sanest of whom is George Green Wood, the author of '*Is there a Shakespeare Problem?*'¹ He contends truly enough that those who write

On Shakespeare's life invariably place
A heavy structure on a narrow base,
And finding that the facts are few and slight,
Indulge conjecture in unmeasured flight.

and argues that Shakespeare of Stratford, the actor on the London stage, could not have been the dramatist. Had he been, like Homer, '*nomen et umbra*', our imagination would have been free to supply the rest. The inadequacy of the biographic material and the apparent irrelevance and triviality of the ascertained facts by the side of the marvellous personality revealed by a study of the plays are about the only real basis offering any justification of the strange Baconian heresy. As Dr. R. W. Chambers recently remarked, 'we make trial of all things: nothing is too certain to be questioned. Recently for the Malone Society was printed a large book attributing *Hamlet*, *Julius Cæsar* and *Othello* to Chettle.' Edward Carpenter invites us to reflect how the figure of Shakespeare, dead only three hundred years, is almost completely lost in the mists of time, and even the authenticity of his works has become a subject of controversy. Croce declares that although 'almost every year there appears some new life of Sakespeare, it is now time to recognize with resignation and clearly to declare, that it is not possible to write a biography of Shakespeare.' This has a good deal of truth, no doubt: a biography of Shakespeare the full and satisfying kind is certainly out of the question. Nevertheless, an appreciably large number of facts and a mass of more or less authentic tradition are available from which the outlines of Shakespeare's life could be sketched. Of no other Elizabethan writer is the biographer in possession of ampler facts or fuller details with the exception of Ben Jonson. Nothing—not even the dates of his birth and death—is known of the life of Webster—the greatest master of Elizabethan tragedy outside Shakespeare.

Shakespeare, the greatest poet of England, and perhaps of the world, was endowed in superabundant measure with genius—a fact too often forgotten in the theories about him. The immense width

¹ 'Greenwood died in November, 1928. In the various books he wrote on the 'Shakespeare Problem' he affected not to be peculiarly predisposed to a Baconian solution but to be merely convinced that Shakespeare did not write the plays.'—M. L. R., Nov. 1928.

and range combined with the marvellous receptivity of Shakespeare are ignored by the theorists. The poet's genius flowered in 'that strange out-budding of English existence which we call the Elizabethan era'¹, when London was full of life, was far more sociable, offered far more opportunities of frequent and free intermingling of different classes of society.

It has been often and repeatedly maintained that the still silence with which this greatest of Englishmen came into the world was equalled only by the silence in which he left it again. This is obviously an exaggeration. The Elizabethan age could not be expected to recognize in the Stratford peasant the greatest poet of the world, but sincere eulogies and panegyrics from his fellow poets flooded the country at his death in 1616. It is true that his reputation during his lifetime rested as much on his poems as on his plays, that he is not regarded as unique, scarcely even as *primus inter pares*.² But the age was warmly appreciative of his genius and character. Neither the passionate Shakespeare worship nor the full discerning praise of modern times could be expected from his fellows and contemporaries, themselves men of genius, fellow craftsmen from whom Shakespeare differed in no striking respect save in the matter of genius. Shakespeare was in no sense a revolutionary—he did not have that arrogant and defiant personality of Ben Jonson. The gentle Shakespeare was not startlingly inventive—he accepted without demur the conditions of the age, gave the public what they wanted but gave them the same transmuted into something rich and strange by the shaping spirit of a powerful imagination.³ Coleridge said in memorable words: Assuredly that criticism of Shakespeare will alone be genial which is reverential. The Englishman who without reverence, a proud and affectionate reverence, can utter the name of William Shakespeare, stands disqualified for the name of critic. Certainly judged by this standard much of the criticism of Shakespeare before the romantic period stands self-condemned. But an attitude of this kind is unreasonable. A poet's contemporaries, says Croce, perhaps with some exaggeration, and his fellow-countrymen are not good judges of his poetry and no one is a poet or prophet among his familiars and in the place of his birth. Although the term pre-critical as applied to the Elizabethan age could be accepted only with qualification, critical

¹ Carlyle, *Hero as Poet, Shakespeare*.

² Boas, *Introduction to Shakespeare*.

³ 'In their design as in their very means and methods, his plays were like those of his immediate predecessors, which themselves were the fruits of a slow and compact growth. He affected no novelties, essayed no surprise. He died just what others did, but did it incomparably better, supremely best.' Grant White, *Genius of Shakespeare*.

spirit was only slowly growing in the Elizabethan age. Criticism necessarily implies two things; the existence of a developed body of literature of all kinds and the presence of a spirit of analysis and reflection and a developed taste. Criticism was absent in mediæval England—it is well known that in all Chaucer's writings anything which has a claim to a critical utterance is the definition of tragedy put into the mouth of the parson. The jumble of work of very varying quality in the *Canterbury Tales* and the association of Chaucer with Lydgate and Gower for years are the very negation of criticism. In the Elizabethan Age, however, the Renaissance and the consequent acquaintance of a whole body of amazingly perfect literature of all species started English Criticism. There were the classics on the one side, the rapidly growing vernaculars on the other—there was also, in the possession of the classically trained student, a whole armoury of critical canons and dogmas. These necessarily induced the critical spirit. Nevertheless the wonderful creative spirit and the exuberance of the Elizabethan imagination were such that genuine criticism could rise only slowly and the age passed away without producing, with the possible exceptions of Sidney and Jonson, any really original and independent critic. Sidney was full of good promise—his enthusiastic praise of Chevy Chase—'I never heard the old song of Percy and Douglas, that I found not my heart moved more than with a trumpet'—was full of good augury. But he was cut off in his prime before the great outburst of the literature which was to make the age memorable. Had he lived longer to enjoy the triumphs of Shakespeare we might possibly have had a valuable appreciative criticism of Shakespeare even in the Elizabethan age.

Nevertheless, the dramatist's genius and character are appreciated in his own age. Professor Kittredge of America maintains that in his own day Shakespeare was one of the best-known figures in England. In all the various references to Shakespeare's character and person and his poems and plays are discernible 'great appreciation of the poet's works and strong admiration of his greatness among his fellows'. The rapid rise into distinction, fame and financial prosperity of the fugitive from Stratford was of itself bound to arrest attention. Although not beyond dispute, the poet Spenser in his *Colin Clout is Come Home Again*, a poem in the prevailing pastoral manner, in which Colin gives an account of his visit to Eliza's court, probably refers to Shakespeare in the lines.

And there, though last not least, is Action,
A gentler shepherd may no-where be found;
Whose muse full of high thoughts invention
Doth like himself heroically sound,

The epithet *gentle* is specially significant—a phrase which becomes permanently labelled to Shakespeare later in the Elizabethan age. Spenser's poem was completed in 1594, the year in which Shakespeare's '*The Rape of Lucrece*' saw the light, and was warmly received by the public. Spenser-like his contemporaries, may have been drawn to admire and praise Shakespeare, the author of the popular Poems *Venus* and *Lucrece*.

During the years 1591-94 Shakespeare's prentice hand turned to the refashioning of plays. His work was singularly well received by the public to the great perturbation and chagrin of the older dramatists in the busy literary world of London. This occasioned the most bitter attack of Greene, a dramatist from whom Shakespeare never disdained to borrow even later and whose gracious and high-minded ladies pointed the way to the marvellous women of Shakespeare. The *Groat's Worth of Wit bought with a Million of Repentance* is virtually the death-bed confession of a man dying in poverty and misery repenting the reckless life he led. Addressing his quondam acquaintance, the playwrights, he warns against an 'upstart crow beautified with our feathers that with his tiger's heart wrapt in a player's hide, supposes he is as well able to bumbast out a blank verse as the best of you; and being an absolute *Johannes factotum*, is in his own conceit the only Shakescene in the country'. This violent outburst from the pen of a dying playwright is interesting in itself and in the protest which it evoked from its publisher, Chettle, in the address to the Gentlemen Readers, prefixed to his *Kind Heart's dream* which together constitute the earliest references, beyond reasonable doubt, to Shakespeare's success in London as a playwright, to the excellence of his character and to the distinction he won as an actor. Chettle admits that he is sorry for the offence which Greene gave to one only, viz., Shakespeare, 'his demeanour being no less civil than he excellent in the quality he professes—divers people have commended his uprightness of dealing which argues his honesty his facetious grace of writing approves his art.' Before 1598, the date of the invaluable *Palladis Tamia*, numerous eulogies to Shakespeare, the poet, the man and playwright are recorded. Shakespeare as the painter of poor Lucrece's Rape comes in for special praise. Robert Southwell, the author of the *Burning Babe*, Barnfield and probably Drayton are the poets who refer to Shakespeare. John Weever, whose allusion to Antony's speech over Cæsar's funeral in Shakespeare's play, is well known, writes a poem '*Ad Gulielmum Shakespeare*' 1596. Shakespeare is eulogized as a honey-tongued poet and his two poems and the early plays are highly commended. The sweetness

and grace of Shakespeare, his wonderful fancy attract attention early and these are echoed down the age.

In Meres' invaluable reference in *Palladis Tamia*—a collection of apothegms on morals, religion and literature—Shakespeare is one of the great Elizabethan writers who have made English famous and eloquent in the same manner as the Greek tongue is made great by Homer, Sophocles and others. Shakespeare, the mellifluous and honey-tongued is compared to the sweet witty soul of Ovid, who, we know, was one of Shakespeare's favourites. In other words Shakespeare is recognized as the great English poet of love, the author of *Venus and Lucrece* and 'the sugared sonnets among his private friends.' To Meres, again, Shakespeare is the English counterpart of Plautus and Seneca, the masters of comedy and tragedy highly esteemed in Renaissance times. Meres' list of early plays of both kinds forms perhaps one of the great landmarks in the unchartered field of Shakespearean chronology. The muses, adds Meres, would speak with Shakespeare's fine-filed phrase if they would speak English. Perhaps as criticism it may not be very discerning or helpful; but that it is the highest praise, admits of no doubt. Richard Barnfield in his *Remembrance of some English Poets* devotes a stanza to the dramatist in which Shakespeare's honey-flowing-vein is commended, adding

Thy name in fame's immortal book is plac't
Live ever you, at least in fame live ever,
Well may the body die, but Fame dies never.

Gabriel Harvey, too, the antagonist of Nashe, the Elizabethan satirist, the friend of Sidney and Spenser and the active spirit of the Areopagus, ever eager to mould the English verse into the alien quantitative pattern, makes an interesting reference to the dramatist: the younger sort take much delight in *Venus and Adonis*; but his *Lucrece* and the tragedy of *Hamlet*, Prince of Denmark, have it in them to please the wiser sort.

We now come to the most considerable figure among Elizabethan dramatists after Shakespeare, the singularly individual and striking personality of Ben Jonson. A man of great stature and corpulent figure, weighing in his forty-sixth year 19 stones 12 pounds, Johnson was, both in physique and character a thoroughly arresting personality. The literary autocrat of the age, the learned classicist and arrogant scholar, Ben Jonson was a conscious theorist before being a creative artist. If he had his way the stream of romantic drama would have been choked—but the tendencies of the age and the national instincts were too strong for him. 'Rare Ben', was Shakespeare's later contemporary and he is obviously the founder of Shakespeare criticism,

A tradition recorded by Rowe, Shakespeare's first formal biographer, which has to be accepted with caution, especially at the present time when so much of early Shakespeare tradition is discredited among scholars, maintains that Shakespeare's acquaintance with Jonson began with a remarkable piece of humanity and good nature—a play of Jonson, as yet unknown, offered for production was on the point of being rejected by the players, when Shakespeare who looked into the play and was pleased interfered and got it accepted. After this they were professed friends though Johnson, proud and indolent, did not return the cordial sympathy of Shakespeare. Frank Harris¹, who of course accepts the tradition, comments that the story reads exactly like that of Goethe and Schiller. 'Schiller held aloof: Goethe advanced and did all the kindnesses. It is always the greater who gives and forgives.'

It is obvious that between Jonson and Shakespeare there was no fraternity of genius or community of aim furnishing a permanent ground of fellowship. Jonson evolved² and developed to perfection the 'comedy of humours', a type which Shakespeare tried his hand at in his early play, *Love's Labour's Lost* and soon abandoned. *Every Man in his Humour*, the first of the Jonsonian humour comedies, was played by the Lord Chamberlain's Company in 1598, Shakespeare himself being one of the actors. The play is launched with a verse prologue, as self-conscious, arrogant and challenging as the famous verses preceding Marlowe's *Tamburlaine*. Jonson's ideals in comedy, explained in the prologue, are derived from classical comedy and in their emphasis on the three unities, the unity of tone, the sedulous exclusion of the tragic or the inter-lacing of the two, in the truth to life, i.e., congruity with what is typical, they were a challenge to the romantic comedy of which Shakespeare's plays were the most perfect exemplars. Jonson's artistic ideals throughout his career remain surprisingly uniform—critics note the singular absence of that marvellous growth and development of genius which marks out Dante, Goethe or Shakespeare. Jonson's affinities were really with the age of Dryden. His genius was for the 'drastic and humorous presentation of the life of Elizabethan England', the holding of the mirror to the fashions and foibles, the manners and morals of his day, the creation of dramatic types singularly live at times but woefully lacking in the rich humanity of Shakespeare. Further Jonson was both a scholar and a satirist. He had the scholar's downright contempt for shams and he lashed with concentrated power contemporary folly and crime and as his

¹ Shakespeare. Frank Harris.

² The works of Ben Jonson, Herford and Simpson.

genius matured, his power of satire increased. With the classicists and therefore Jonson, comedy should be '*imitatio veri* and should observe decorum'.

Thus with these ideals and training, Jonson was not qualified to be a fully sympathetic and appreciative critic of Shakespeare. The *loci critici* bearing on Shakespeare are the unsympathetic references to the tendencies of romantic comedy in the prologues of Jonson's humour comedies and the explicit references, eulogistic or otherwise, to Shakespeare in the Discoveries, the Drummond Conversations and the famous Folio verses. *Bartholomew Fair* is one of the rich and bustling comedies of Jonson, full of rollicking fun and satire, in which 'all the resources of Jonson's art are expended to body forth the sordid humanity of the fair to the very image'. The satire of the Puritans lent it additional charm and it was frequently revived after the Restoration before royal audiences. In the Induction to this play Jonson lets himself go against what he considered the ridiculous licenses of the romantic comedies of Shakespeare 'There is no servant-monster in the fair but who can help it? He is loth to make nature afraid in his plays, like those that beget tales, tempests and such like drolleries—an obvious sneer at Caliban and the Tempest. This is a reference which betrays Jonson's incapacity to appreciate the imaginative loveliness and the mature poetry of Shakespeare's play. The genuineness of the Drummond Conversations has recently been called in question but without effect and has evoked a striking defence from the pen of Percy Simpson who proves that there is no evidence to doubt their authenticity. In 1618 Jonson walked all his way up to Scotland where he was the guest of the poet Drummond—an episode which was a delight to all the lovers of the incongruous, which evoked the kindly jest of Bacon'—I love not to see poetry go on other foot than poetical dactylus and spondaeus. Drummond did not completely sympathize with his guest although he extorted his admiration and the notes are composed not without irritation.

'1619. Certain informations and manners of Ben Jonson to W. Drummond. Shakespeare wanted art. Shakespeare in a play brought in a number of men saying they had suffered shipwreck in Bohemia, where there is no sea by some 100 miles.' Art implies rules of writing—the ideals of dramatic composition derived from the Ancients and interpreted by the classical critics. Discoveries, *Explorata*, are notes which flowed out of his daily readings—left behind him in manuscript. The Discoveries is completely dominated by his classical training and predilections. The bulk of literary criticism in it resolves itself into a brief and rather

abstract-consideration—poema-poeta—a poem a poet-*poesis et pictura*. The most vivid piece of autobiography in the volume, where he refers to the decay of his memory, has been shown to be a transcript from Seneca, the elder. Swinburne praised the Discoveries with his usual magnificence and more than usual extravagance when he wrote that 'a single leaf of his *Explorata* is worth all his tragedies, lyrics, elegies and epigrams together.'

1640. De Shakespeare Nostrati has all the appearance of direct impression—but the whole passage, says Gregory Smith,¹ is a conveyance of some remarks by Seneca the Elder. The players have mentioned it as an honour that he never blotted out a single line—would he had blotted out a thousand—I loved the man and do honour his memory on this side idolatry.

1623. The splendid eulogy of the verses prefixed to the First Folio. Here Jonson concedes that the quality of Shakespeare's genius is such that it will not do to compare him with others. He was the soul of the age, the delight, the wonder of our stage—he outshone sporting Kyd and Marlow—the universality of the dramatist's genius, the comparative poverty of his classical equipment, his excellence, surpassing the Ancients in both tragedy and comedy—Shakespeare the product of nature—all this and more are emphasized.

Jonson did not profoundly understand Shakespeare's genius; nevertheless posterity has found it impossible to better the great phases which Jonson has applied to Shakespeare.

In *the Return from Parnassus*, an academic play, one of the characters, Gull, says: 'I will worship sweet Mr. Shakespeare and to honour him will lay his *Venus and Adonis*, under my pillow.' Again Kemp remarks: 'Why here is our fellow Shakespeare puts them all down, aye, Ben Jonson too. O, that Ben Jonson is a pestilent fellow.' In the later Elizabethan period the great master of sombre tragedy, Webster, refers with appreciation to the right happy and copious industry of Master Shakespeare associating him with Dekker—and Heywood 'a sort of Prose Shakespeare' (Lamb) not an entirely uncritical combination. The most appreciable mark of the profound impression produced by Shakespeare's plays in his own age and immediately after is the monument raised to him by his two actor friends, by publishing the First Folio of 1623.

Sir Isreal Gollancz² discovered in 1922 a unique contemporary

¹ Elizabethan Critical Essays. Gregory Smith. Ben Jonson, Smith, E. M. L.

² 'Contemporary lines to Heminges and Condell.' Sir Israel Gollancz in T. L. S., January, 1922.

tribute to the editors for the service rendered by them both to the dead author and his living admirers.

But you have pleased the living, loved the dead
Raised from the womb of earth a richer mine
Than Cortez could with all his Casteline
Associates ; they did but dig for gold,
But you for treasure much more manifold.

Thus from the very beginnings, from the year 1592 or 1593, almost immediately after Shakespeare started writing for the stage, a continuous stream of allusions and references to his character and genius is available. The gentle Shakespeare is honoured and loved and his poems and plays are heartily praised. Jonson in spite of his many limitations towers among the idolaters claiming him as immortal, equal or superior to the Ancients.

LECTURE 2

In the preceding lecture the history of Shakespeare criticism and appreciation was brought down to the year 1623 when Heminge and Condell published the First Folio Edition of his works. Shakespeare's fortunes in the seventeenth century form the theme of the present lecture. It is very obvious and is a commonplace of criticism how these divisions of literature into periods and ages could never be satisfactory. The passing away of the great queen, strictly speaking closes the Elizabethan age, but, the greatest triumphs of Shakespeare in drama were achieved when King James was on the throne and the year 1603 in which the queen passed away did not bring in any marked change in literature. The wonderful creative activity which characterizes the Elizabethan age, however, passes away gradually and with the death of Shakespeare in 1616, the Elizabethan age virtually passes away. Nothing was more remarkable about this creative spirit than its sudden outburst and almost equally sudden decay. The greatest lyric and dramatic poetry of the age in which the summit of creative imagination is reached is all produced during the two decades in which Shakespeare was most active. Ben Jonson, Shakespeare's later contemporary was a portent and his humour comedies held within themselves the seeds of decay. Beaumont and Fletcher, Webster and others although men of power, have all outlived the glorious period of the Elizabethan age. Beaumont and Fletcher contrive to make singularly effective stage plots, but, they rely far too much on surprise as a dramatic motive. They and the others admit so much of violence and exaggeration. Shakespeare, in Coleridge's admirable words, kept at all times in the high road of life. The great movements of Renaissance and Reformation which had stirred the age to its depths were being exhausted: an age of analysis and cool reflection was following the age of creative activity. With the flagging of imagination, critical spirit becomes dominant—a spirit which already in the sixteenth century was singularly active, now asserts itself. Neo-classic movement had already triumphed in Italy and France, and in the seventeenth century the plays of Shakespeare came to be judged and criticized by a body of men who turned to the Italian and French critics of the Renaissance for their critical principles. We have already seen how in the Elizabethan age itself what criticism there was was neo-classic. Sidney's Apology c. 1581, written a year or two after the publication of the Shepherd's Calendar, at the very threshold of the Elizabethan age is an English statement of the critical principles current in Renaissance

Europe. He is on the side of the unities and is very severe on the English dramatists who violate them and, further, dare to mix comic mirth with tragic pity. *Gorboduc* is the only play which he commends. There was nothing, however, in the English drama of his time which did not justify the entire wholesomeness of these rules, but when the romantic drama developed and reached the level of supreme art, the inadequacy and, often, the futility of these rules became apparent. In the Elizabethan age two determined efforts were made to naturalize Italian critical rules in England.¹ One was the attempt to force English accentual verse into the alien quantitative pattern, and the other, to compel the romantic drama to conform to the supposed rules of Aristotle and the Ancients. The strength of the national taste and the genius of Shakespeare negated the efforts made on behalf of rules, and except in Johnson, the rules never secured a whole-hearted adherent. Johnson was rightly hailed by Beaumont and others as the master who taught the age those comic laws :

‘ Whose judgement was it refined it ? or who
gave laws by which hereafter all must go
But solid Jonson.’

The Seventeenth century, thus, must be described as an age in which an atmosphere singularly out of tune with the art of Shakespeare with his silent disregard of critical conventions, was gradually growing. Although his Latin was small and Greek less, and he could not possibly have read Aristotle or Horace in the original, the doctrine of the unities and the allied laws of dramatic writing were very familiar in England and must have been among the topics discussed at the Mermaid. It is not conceivable that Shakespeare wrote in ignorance of them. *The Tempest* is written in strict conformity to these laws.

Neo-classic criticism is the criticism by rules. Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Drama, together with Horace's Art of Poetry were the fountain-head of neo-classicism. Aristotle was essentially a deductive critic. His ideas on poetry and drama were derived from the experience and study of the great Greek masters, and it was certainly not his aim to lay down laws, immutable and perfect, binding poetic art for all time. The fragmentary nature of his writings together with certain other circumstances gave them a different impression and Aristotle was raised to the position of a lawgiver departure from the letter of whose code itself was an unforgivable sin. What were tentative, deductive or experimental with Aristotle, became definite formulæ with Horace, and with

¹ See Lounsbury. *Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist*.

Horace and his art of poetry and the excessive veneration for the classics which the Renaissance brought with it, began neo-classicism. The learned commentaries and interpretations of these masters by the Italian Renaissance critics¹ and the work of Boileau, *L'Art Poétique*, raised the rules to the position of critical dogmas to be accepted without demur. French Classical drama became subservient to rules. In England, after the Restoration, when the new age had definitely dawned, conformity to the rules was the only correct practice.

But we need not anticipate. The triumph of classicism becomes accomplished only in the latter half of the seventeenth century in England. In the earlier half we have several interesting references to Shakespeare. Jonson's remark, 'Shakespeare wanted art', becomes something to be conjured with. While Jonson represents art Shakespeare stands for nature, and the antithesis between Shakespeare's nature and Jonson's art becomes repeated *ad nauseam*. Thomas Fuller 1608-11 includes Shakespeare in his *Worthies of England*, published posthumously in 1662. Fuller was a scholar and an antiquary and it was said of him that he would sit for hours together 'listening to the prattle of old women, in order to obtain snatches of local history, traditionary anecdote and proverbial wisdom.' Fuller belonged to a generation which touched the fringe of the generation to which Shakespeare belonged and he described Shakespeare in his book—a miscellany of the countries of England—as a native of Stratford who was in some sort a compound of three eminent poets. Martial in the warlike sound of his name, Ovid, for the naturalness and wit of his poetry, and Plautus, alike of for the extent of his comic power and his lack of scholarly training. For Fuller, Shakespeare was an eminent instance of the rule that a poet was born and not made. Though his (Shakespeare's) genius was jocular and inclining him to festivity, yet he could, when so disposed, be solemn and serious. Then follows the famous passage—too vivid and too intrinsically probable to be dismissed (Herford and Simpson),—in which he refers to the wit-combats between Shakespeare and Jonson, which two I behold like a Spanish Great Gallion and an English man-of-war—Master Jonson was built far higher in learning: solid, but slow in his performances. Shakespeare with the English man-of-war, lesser in bulk but lighter in sailing, could turn with all tides***1*by the quickness,

¹ 'The Italian critics of the 16th century, or at least of its three later quarters, founded criticism anew, and taught it to all Europe. Accepted with almost implicit docility up to Milton's time, they gave way in the late 17th century to the far shallower school of French Neo-classics, which was represented by Boileau.' Saintsbury, *Loci critici*,

of his wit and invention. Here is preserved in vivid and pictorial language the traditional impression about Shakespeare and Jonson especially in their famous meetings in the Mermaid. During the years 1603-12 Jonson was one of the towering figures among English men of letters and it is to the period that 'the famous memories of the Mermaid tavern in Bread Street attach themselves.'¹ Beaumont is immortalizing these intimate parleyings in the famous lines :

What things have we seen done at the Mermaid !
 Heard words that have been
 So nimble and so full of flame,
 As if that every one from whence they came
 Had meant to put his whole wit in a jest,
 And had resolved to live a fool the rest
 Of his dull life.

Shakespeare's greater nobleness of wit in every-daylife is again proved by another tradition. Shakespeare consented to act as god-father to one of Jonson's sons and solemnly promised to give the child a dozen good Latin spoons, for his father to translate. Latin was a play upon the word 'laten' the name of a metal resembling brass—a good-humoured hit at Jonson's pride in classical learning. One of the great links in the oral tradition concerning Shakespeare is Sir William Davenant. He was born in 1606 ten years before Shakespeare died and he was Shakespeare's god-son. Davenant's father, a melancholy person who was never known to laugh,² while his mother was of the very opposite temperament, long kept at Oxford an inn in Carfax. Here, according to tradition, the dramatist used to stay in his annual journeys between London and Stratford. Shakespeare took delight in the company of Davenant and the other boys of his host and scandal even declared that Davenant was no other than the natural son of Shakespeare. Davenant was aware of the scandal but such was his esteem for Shakespeare that he was content to have the insinuation thought to be true. D'Avenant wrote a youthful elegy in Remembrance of Master William Shakespeare. In this poem the poet warns those who sing welcoming Nature in the freshness of Spring against disturbing the flowers on the banks of Avon. For the flowers are hanging down their pensive heads mourning for Shakespeare. The river Avon, the poet represents as weeping itself away. Sir John Suckling too, the author of *the Fragmenta Aurea*, a royalist gentleman,

¹ 'Shakespeare, Drayton and Jonson had a merry meeting, and it seems drank too hard, for Shakespeare died of a fever there contracted.' Diary of John Ward, Vicar of Stratford, 1648-79. Quoted by Legouis. *The Bacchic Element in Shakespeare.*

² See, Sir Sidney—Shakespeare.

an amateur in poetry and letters, gives his meed of praise to Shakespeare whom he imitates especially in his blank verse plays. In a verse letter addressed to Mr. John Hales of Eton, Suckling has :—

‘ The sweat of learn’d Jonson’s brain
And gentle Shakespeare’s easier strain.’

In his ‘ A session of poets ’ Shakespeare is not introduced, but Ben Jonson’s boastfulness is scornfully referred to.

The first that broke silence was good old Ben,
Prepared before with canary wine,
And he told them plainly he deserved the bays,
For his were called works, where others were but plays ;
Bid them remember how he had purged the stage of errors.

In one of his letters we read ‘ we are at length arrived at that river about the uneven running of which my friend Mr. W. Shakespeare makes Henry Hotspur quarrel so highly with his fellow rebels.’

A tradition arising about the same time. 1633, assigns to the ever memorable John Hales of Eton the saying—‘ That if Mr. Shakespeare had not read the ancients, he had likewise not stolen anything from them, and that if he would produce anyone topic finely treated by any of them, he would undertake to show something upon the same subject as well written by Shakespeare. Hales is supposed to have said thus in a conversation between Suckling, Davenant, and others in which Suckling, who was a professed admirer of Shakespeare, had undertaken his defence against Ben Jonson with some warmth. Ben Johnson frequently reproached Shakespeare with want of learning and ignorance of the Ancients and thus provoked the eulogy of Hales.

The greatest name in the century in the history of Shakespeare criticism and appreciation is that of the great Puritan poet, John Milton. ‘ Milton was the poetical son of Spenser as Waller of Fairfax ’ remarked Dryden ; Milton was in no sense appreciably influenced by Shakespeare. We do not expect from him anything like an adequate and sympathetic appreciation of the genius of Shakespeare. Their minds were far apart. The great re-birth of letters, in other words the revival of classical literature, brought with it much pseudo-classicism ; but in Milton for once classicism became the genuine thing. A profound student of the classics, and deeply read in other literatures, the lady of Christ was completely removed from the great dramatist, Shakespeare. It was Milton’s resolve to equip himself for his life’s task of leaving something to posterity which they would not willingly let die, by a rigid course of labour, self-discipline and intent study. This argues an intense self-consciousness which recalls Jonson, but which is entirely alien to

Shakespeare. Milton's professed aim was not to see life steadily and see it whole, but to justify the ways of God to men. His genius was a combination of the epic and the lyric and he had little of the supreme dramatic gift of Shakespeare. Coleridge remarked that Milton himself was in every line of *Paradise Lost*. Shakespeare was supremely indifferent to the religious and political controversies of his time, while Milton was one of the great protagonists and sufferers in the revolutions of his time. With none of the strong didactic instinct of Spenser, whom Milton extolled as greater even than Scotus and Aquinas, Shakespeare could not draw Milton to himself by any strong community of genius or literary sympathy. An intense idealist, Milton had none of the virtues of the great dramatist—his universality, his sheer power of character creation, his marvellous command over the springs of laughter and of tears. A great Italian scholar, deeply read in Dante, Petrarch and others and a master of the sonnet form, Milton is apparently not attracted to that lyric Shakespeare—the Shakespeare of the sonnets, the English Ovid, the poet of love. Milton's soul-animating strains are not, unlike their Elizabethan counterparts, poems of love. They are poems of an occasional character written in the genuine Italian as opposed to the English or Shakesperian form. Milton therefore has left no record of his impression of the early undramatic Shakespeare. His lines on the Admirable dramatic poet William Shakespeare, sometimes called sonnet or epitaph, were first printed in the second folio, 1632. In this early poem Milton praising Shakespeare says how the dramatist does not need for his honoured bones the labour of an age in piled stones, nor a star-y-pointing pyramid to hide his hallowed bones,

Dear son of memory, great heir of fame
What needs thou such weak witness of thy name.

For Shakespeare has built for himself a live-long monument in the wonder and astonishment of his readers. His easy numbers flow to *the shame of slow-endeavouring art*. In the last section of the poem the poet says that every heart deeply impressed by the oracular lines of Shakespeare becomes like an engraved monument. We are deprived of our fancies and our hearts are turned into funeral stones recording Shakespeare. Here, as elsewhere, in Milton the traditional ideas current in the century find expression. The verses in *L'Allegro* are well-known. The studious poet would visit the well-trod stage.

If Jonson's learned sock be on
And sweetest Shakespeare, Fancy's child
Warbling his native wood-notes wild.

The learned comic art of Jonson is here set over against the native wood-notes wild, the uncultivated but genuinely inspired imagination of Shakespeare. Here Milton is complimenting the Shakespeare of the romantic comedies. Milton does not seem to have admired Shakespeare, the master tragedian. For in the companion poem of *the Penseoso* when he has occasion to mention it, he does not mention Shakespeare. The tragedies of the great Attic masters he diligently pores over.

Sometimes let gorgeous Tragedy
In scepter'd pall come sweeping by,
Presenting Thebes or Pelop's line
Or the tale of Troy divine
Or what (though rare) of later age
Ennobled hath the buskin'd stage.

The last two lines, may, however, possibly contain a reference to Shakespeare's tragedies. Milton obviously is talking disparagingly of contemporary tragedy in which he fails to recognize an achievement as great if not greater than that of his own Greek masters. But this need cause no surprise. Later in life fallen on evil days, with all his hopes dashed to the ground, when Milton turns to the despised art of the playwright, he was careful to write *Samson*, *Agonistes*, a dramatic poem and no play, on the model of ancient classical tragedy. The whole piece, invested with a strangely personal significance, emphasizes the rift between Milton and Elizabethan tragedy. Milton's critical position is made perfectly clear by his memorable preface. He is a devout follower of the Italian Renaissance critics like Minturno. For in the preface, apologizing to the Puritans and offering an excuse for writing a drama, he says :

This is mentioned to vindicate tragedy from the small esteem, or rather infamy, which in the account of many it undergoes at this day with other common interludes; happening through the poet's error of intermixing comic stuff with tragic sadness and gravity; or introducing trivial and vulgar persons. In the words of the Oxford Professor of Poetry, ¹ not only does that leave no room for tragedy as Shakespeare and the Shakesperians understood it, but it excludes any possible compromise. The preface is in many ways a critical document of singular value. Milton is a student of Aristotle and the Renaissance critics and he would have nothing to do with modern drama as practised by the Elizabethans. Even earlier, before his puritanical tendencies reached their extreme development, his ideals of tragedy were not different. The evidence of this is the

¹ H. W. Garrod-Milton's Lines on Shakespeare, Essays and Studies of the English Association, Vol. XIII.

MS. notes of possible tragedies preserved among the Milton MSS. in Trinity College, Cambridge. Milton too, so far as his critical position is concerned, is, like Sidney and Jonson, an ardent neo-classicist.

Nevertheless, Milton must have looked into Shakespeare's tragedies, certainly Richard the Third. For in the notorious *Eikonoklastes*, Milton quotes a few lines of this play, and the mastery with which Shakespeare has conceived the character of the hypocrite and tyrant is referred to in the celebrated passage of Milton's reply to the Eikon Basilike which has given rise to so much controversy. Shakespeare is referred to as the closet-companion of the solitudes of Charles in his imprisonment. Warton says that 'Milton seduced by the gentle eloquence of fanaticism, listened no longer to the wild and native wood-notes of fancy's sweetest child.' This inference does not seem to be warranted. In the whole passage there is not one word in direct dispraise of Shakespeare. It may be, as Prof. Garrod suggests, that there is an implication that a pious king might better employ his last days than in reading a popular modern tragedian. Milton is comparing Richard as represented by Shakespeare, with the Byzantine tyrant who was a constant reader of St. Paul's Epistles. The passage is interesting because Milton acknowledges that Shakespeare has given a true representation of Richard as he was in real life, and also because it bears testimony to King Charles' appreciation of Shakespeare.

These are the only references to Shakespeare in the writings of the poet, Milton. In the second folio, however, is found, besides Milton's epitaph, a longer poem of direct personal eulogy. Coleridge read the initials I.M.S. as standing for John Milton, Student, for 'there was no other man, of that particular day, capable of writing anything so characteristic of Shakespeare, so justly thought, so happily expressed'.

During the seventeenth century although conditions were so unfavourable to the stage and drama in general, the plays of Shakespeare passed through three more folio editions. This provides the strongest evidence of the maintenance and steady growth of Shakespeare's reputation. Single editions of plays were practically absent after 1639, although they again began to be issued for the use of the play-goers late in the reign of Charles the Second. The third folio was published in 1663—Charles the Second had a copy of his own of this edition, and it is now preserved in the British Museum. The fourth and the last folio came out in 1685. These folios have of course no independent authority and are only reprints of the great first folio.

LECTURE 3

In the latter half of the seventeenth century the critical atmosphere sketched in the preceding lecture has come definitely to stay. Neo-classicism triumphs. The reaction from the excessive fluency, the extravagance and conceits of the later Elizabethan age and the recondite allusions and the vicious style of the metaphysicals provide a strong stimulus to the classical tendencies already present in later Elizabethan literature. Thus poetry, prose and criticism are overtaken by the all-pervading movement known as Neo-Classicism. Imagination, fancy, enthusiasm—these are suspect and good sense and reason are extolled. Correctness in poetry comes to be regarded as the highest ideal to be attained. Poetry discards its exalted and transcendent ideals. The Earl of Mulgrave, in his verses in praise of Hobbes, stated the new poetic ideal :

While in dark ignorance we lay afraid
Of fancies, ghosts and every empty shade
Great Hobbes appeared, and by plain Reason's light,
Put such fantastic forms to shameful flight.

The new tendencies culminate during the Restoration which may therefore be considered as coinciding with a radical change in literature. The national solidarity of the age of Elizabeth was lost when the nation was split into two warring camps, and the ultimate triumph of the Cavaliers, although it brought with it a revival of all literature and the arts under royal patronage, only brought an age rather vulgar and sentimental, lacking in ideals, an age prepared to give over to the excesses of the reaction from the rigours of Puritanical suppression. Charles and his courtiers were determined at all events to enjoy themselves. Shakespeare was not likely during this period to be a great favourite and at no time perhaps did his reputation fall so low as during the years immediately following the Restoration. In itself, however, his reputation was not low. His great plays continue to be acted: the inspired actor Betterton devotes his genius to the interpretation of *Hamlet* and others among the dramatist's creations. Much of our information of this period is derived from the vivid pages of the diarist, Samuel Pepys. His predecessor Evelyn was not a regular visitor to the theatres unlike Pepys: nevertheless, he has one significant sentence. He records, under November 26, 1661, 'I saw *Hamlet*, Prince of Denmark, played, but now the old plays began to disgust this refined age, since His Majesty being so long abroad.' The diarist's statement should not be understood to mean that the old

plays were not acted during the Restoration period. For some years after the sudden opening of the theatres, after the Restoration the theatre managers had to rely on the Elizabethan plays to keep them going. The old plays were often altered to suit the tastes of 'the refined age'. Pepys, in spite of his desire to be economical, frequently visited the theatres and this confirmed play-goer may, in this as in other respects, be considered as absolutely reflecting the spirit of the England of the Restoration. The diarist, who was born in 1633, and was therefore Dryden's junior only by two years, was educated at Magdalen College, Cambridge, where his famous library, the formation of which was one of his life-passions, is preserved to this day in the form in which he left it. In the words of the late Sir Sidney Lee, who has a valuable paper on Pepys in relation to Shakespeare, Pepys presents himself to the readers of his naive diary as the incarnation or the microcosm of the average man. 'No other writer has pictured with the same life like precision and simplicity the average play-goer's sensations of pleasure or pain.' It would thus seem that in the pages of the diary we have a record of what Shakespeare's plays meant to the average Restoration Englishman. Pepys does not betray any sense of æsthetic appreciation. Neither the poetry nor romance, the imagination nor the passion of Shakespeare's plays, made any great impression on him. His attraction for the theatre was often in the externals. He is interested in the acting and superb acting always moved him to admiration—in gorgeous scenes and pageantry and in music. He was further singularly susceptible to the charms of a pretty woman and it was during his time that women appeared on the stage for the first time. He first saw women come upon the stage in January 1661. Indeed there was no indignity which he would not pass over provided the offender were a pretty woman. Once when he was in the pit, a curious experience befell him. 'I sitting behind in a dark place, a lady spit backward upon me by mistake, not seeing me; but after seeing her to be a very pretty lady, I was not troubled at it at all'.

The diarist witnessed no less than fourteen different plays of Shakespeare, including plays of all groups, comedies, histories and tragedies. In 1662 he saw the *Mid-summer Night's Dream* at the King's theatre which 'I had never seen before, nor shall ever again, for it is the most insipid ridiculous play that I ever saw in my life.' A remark which at the first blush we are apt to gasp at. It merely means that Pepys and the large class of people of whom he is so perfect a representative, was insensible to the supreme excellence of Shakespeare. He praises *The Merry Wives*, Shakespeare's only bourgeois comedy, although, apparently because of inferior acting

Falstaff does not enthuse him. *Hamlet* he admired always especially when the hero was impersonated by the great actor, Betterton. 'Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, done with scenes very well, but above all, Betterton did the prince's parts beyond imagination.' He condemns *Romeo and Juliet* 'a play of itself the worst I ever heard in my life, and the worst acted.' *Twelfth Night*, the perfect romantic comedy of Shakespeare, evoked his disgust. Although well acted, it was but a silly play and not related at all to the name or day. He records the popular impression of *Henry VIII* as an admirable play. But when he sees it for himself, he is disappointed. Pepys lived and died 'in complacent ignorance of the supreme excellence of Shakespeare.' No word of admiration of the marvellous genius of Shakespeare escapes this most intimate of diarists. He was a collector of books but he evinced no particular regard for the volumes of Shakespeare which he says were offered to him by the booksellers. He records the purchase of one play only, the *First part of Henry the Fourth*, although he read in addition *Othello* and *Hamlet*. He preferred to buy from his bookseller *Fuller's Worthies* and *Buller's Hudibras* while he rejected the offer of the great first folio. Subsequently he brought a copy of the third folio which was later exchanged for a copy of the fourth folio. By this volume alone is Shakespeare represented in the extant Pepysian library.

He admired like his contemporaries, Jonson, Beaumont and Fletcher and Massinger more than Shakespeare. *The Alchemist* appeared to him to be an incomparable play, and in *Every Man in His Humour*, 'I heard the greatest propriety of speech that I ever read in my life.' These preferences are not exceptional and are fully intelligible.

The most amazing piece of judgment in the diary, however, is found in the entry in which he blandly admits that *Othello*, which has always been one of his favourites, 'seems a mean thing', 'having so lately read the *Adventures of Five Hours*'. Sir Samuel Tuke's play is a trivial comedy of intrigue in which is shown how the attempt of an angry guardian to marry his ward and sister, against her will, to a man of the guardian's own choosing, is frustrated by the ward's stratagem. It is a bald and prosaic play. It has neither poetry nor imagination. But Pepys thought *Othello* was mean in comparison and thus wrote himself down as entirely unfit to appreciate the genius of Shakespeare. *Hamlet* he always liked and spent along with Mrs. Pepys, a whole afternoon in getting up the great soliloquy by heart. *Macbeth* and *Tempest* he saw, but probably in garbled versions.

The name of Thomas Betterton, the celebrated actor during the Restoration, deserves honourable mention in the history of Shake-

spere criticism in the seventeenth century. From all accounts that have come down to us, it would appear that he was an inspired actor. He was a friend of Davenant and infected by Davenant's enthusiasm for Shakespeare. Betterton, who was already genuinely devoted to the memory of the dramatist, went on a pilgrimage to Stratford to glean oral traditions concerning Shakespeare in his own native town. For several details in Rowe's life of Shakespeare, Rowe was indebted to Betterton and he generously acknowledged it. 'I must own a particular obligation to Betterton for the most considerable part of the passages relating to Shakespeare's life; his veneration for the memory of Shakespeare having engaged him to make a journey into Warwickshire, on purpose to gather up what remains he could find of a name for which he had so great a value.

Seventeenth century dramatic critics are at one in praising him. His impersonation of Hamlet and the ghost in 'Hamlet' received special commendation. But whatever role he played in he interpreted it to perfection. The supreme excellence of Shakespeare's plays was kept vividly before the public eye by the inspired interpretation of Shakespeare's creations by Betterton.

Another aspect of the attitude of the seventeenth century to Shakespeare is revealed in the large number of adaptations of Shakespeare's plays during the period. Mutilation of Shakespeare's plays was apparently not inconsistent with profound admiration of a kind for his genius. Reference has already been made to Davenant's relations with the dramatist and his worship of him. The pioneer in this scandalous mangling of Shakespeare's text was none other than Davenant himself. The unfavourable attitude of romantic criticism towards the seventeenth century view of Shakespeare is to be explained in part by this wanton re-handling of Shakespeare's plays by them. Romantic criticism idolized and worshipped Shakespeare and a tempering of Shakespeare's masterpieces was to them an unthinkable sacrilege. Davenant and Dryden, the pioneers of the moment, took the same liberty with regard to Shakespeare's plays which Shakespeare took in regard to the plays of his predecessors, Greene and Peele.

To them Shakespeare, like Chaucer, was a glorious ancestor and they did not hesitate to rewrite them to suit the tastes of what, they thought, was a more refined age.

The Tempest, which Dryden himself fittingly described as 'a clear and solemn vision,' was the first of Shakespeare's plays to suffer re-handling. Dryden and Davenant together produced in 1670 *The Tempest or the Enchanted Island* a Comedy. This Version is preceded by a famous prologue in praise of Shakespeare and a preface in which Dryden says that it was Davenant who first

taught him to admire Shakespeare. Nevertheless the two Shakespearians have vulgarized Shakespeare's play beyond description. Several new characters were added: especially, 'Hippolito,' one that never saw woman, a counterpart to Miranda. Miranda is given a sister by name Dorinda and Sycora appears as Caliban's sister. Thomas Shadwell, the hero of Dryden's famous satire, introduced further changes into this version which appeared in 1674 and was known as Shadwell's opera of the *Tempest*. Dryden dealt in the same fashion with *Troilus and Cressida* but his adaptation of *Antony and Cleopatra* gave us his finest play. *All for Love*; or, *the World well Lost*. 1678. Dryden's play is described by its latest editor as 'beyond doubt a proud and lovely masterpiece—the fine flower of Dryden's genius.' Dryden limits the scope of his work, centres the interest in the hero and heroine, and evolves a finely-conceived tragedy out of Shakespeare's unwieldy masterpiece. Davenant rehandled *Macbeth*, to which he added a few scenes, gave the witches some new songs, and 'carefully clipped the wings of the most poetical passages in the original.' Thomas Duffet produced a burlesque, *The Mock-Tempest or the Enchanted Castle*, 1675, which resembles the original *Tempest* only in the names of the characters. The author of *Venice Preserved*, Otway, made out of *Romeo and Juliet* 'the History and Fall of Caius Marius.' The characters are all re-named but some passages are almost bodily transferred from Shakespeare's tragedy. Otway, like all the others, is eloquent in Shakespeare's praise and in the prologue spoken by Betterton, Shakespeare is described as 'the happiest of his time and best.' *The first part of Henry the Sixth* was adapted by Thomas Southern in 1681 into an anti-Roman Catholic polemic.

To-day we bring old gathered herbs, it is true,
 But such as in sweet Shakespeare's garden grew,
 And all his plants immortal you esteem
 Your mouths are never out of taste with him

* * * * *
 But what to please you gives us better hope,
 A little vinegar against the Pope.

Nahum Tate was responsible for the mutilation of two plays. Of these *King Lear* is better known from the indignation which it aroused in Lamb. In his great essay on *The Tragedies of Shakespeare* considered with a view to their fitness for stage representation, Lamb, arguing that the tragedies lose most of their value when put on the stage, says, 'It is not enough Cordelia is a daughter, she must shine as a lover too. Tate has put his hook in the nostrils of this leviathan for Garrick and his followers, the showmen of the scene, to draw the mighty beast about more easily.' For Tate in his version had, deliberately set himself to

give what the Restoration taste demanded. 'It was my good fortune', he says, 'to light on one expedient to rectify what was wanting in the regularity and probability of the tale, which was to run through the whole a love betwixt Edgar and Cordelia, that never changed word with each other in the original. This method necessarily threw me on making the tale conclude in a success to the innocent distrest persons. Yet I was wrack't with no small fears for so bold a change, till I found it well received by the audience.' Tate's version with its many fundamental changes makes a perfect botch of the original. Nevertheless it is significant of the tastes and demands of the age that Tate's version held the stage until Garrick's time who made his version from Tate's with some changes. With all his enthusiasm for Shakespeare, Garrick himself did not give evidence of any high regard for Shakespeare's plays as Shakespeare left them. He too retained the love scenes and the happy ending of Tate's version of Lear. Both Tate and Garrick agreed in leaving out the fool. For Garrick was convinced that 'such a character in a tragedy would not be endured on the modern stage'. The happy ending and the poetic justice were condemned by Addison in *The Spectator* No. 40. He remarked 'that King Lear as it is reformed according to the chimerical notion of poetical justice, in my humble opinion, has lost half its beauty.' But Dr. Jonson's welcome of the dismissal of Cordelia with victory and felicity represents the prevailing opinion.

As many as twenty-one plays of Shakespeare were thus adapted during the fifty years which followed the Restoration. An examination of these plays leads us to certain interesting conclusions. As already noticed, no one of these adapters omits to praise the great dramatist. It was in fact the recognition of the supreme excellences of Shakespeare, side by side with what they considered to be their crudities and imperfections that prompted this re-handling. In the adaptations the dramatic rules brought into prominence by neo-classic criticism were observed. The laws of the three unities were faithfully observed. The supreme art of Shakespeare manifested in the introduction of comic episodes in his tragedies was misunderstood and these scenes were cut out. The low characters in conformity with the law of decorum, were dropped. Again the rehandling of these plays was made the occasion of the introduction of spectacular scenes, of pageantry and music. The sentimentalism of the age disliked tragic conclusions of tragedies—Prior's *Henry and Emma*, Goldsmith's *Edwin and Angelina* are noted instances of this taste working in poetry. These attempts to rehandle Shakespeare's plays in conformity with standards apparently more refined, were more and more resented with the steady

growth of Shakespeare reputation and they become very rare after the middle of the eighteenth century, although as late as 1814—Kemble's version of *Coriolanus*—unwarranted liberties were taken with Shakespeare's text by producers.

A lady critic of Shakespeare in the Seventeenth century is the Dutchess of Newcastle, whose play *The Humourous Lovers* is described by Pepys as the most silly thing that came upon the stage. But she was an excellent person in many ways and although her remarks on Shakespeare are commonplace, they are still not without interest. In one of her Sociable letters, written in answer to one of the detractors of Shakespeare, she speaks warmly in praise of the dramatist. The head and front of the correspondent's objection was that Shakespeare's plays were made up of clowns, fools, watchmen and the like. But Shakespeare's wit remarks the critic, was fitted to represent the higher and the lower classes. He has expressed in his plays all sorts of persons—one would think he had been transformed into every one of those persons he hath described. There is not any person he hath described in his book but his readers might think they were well acquainted with him. In conclusion she says that 'our countryman Shakespeare' was one of the persons she loved from her earliest childhood for his comical and tragical humour. She, however, later married her husband who is as far beyond Shakespeare in comical humour as Shakespeare is beyond an ordinary poet!

But the most considerable figure in the history of Shakespeare criticism in the seventeenth century is, as in many other fields of literature, 'glorious John Dryden'. With him English criticism becomes an art.¹ He is the first critic who discusses principles and determines merit by reference to them. The conditions of the age were favourable to the rise and growth of criticism and Dryden had in himself several of the qualifications for the true critic. In poetry, prose and criticism Dryden was the most outstanding figure of his time—leaving out Milton, whose soul like a star dwelt apart—and his vigorous personality thoroughly impressed itself on all he wrote. He had in himself something 'of the genius of the giant age before the flood', and although as a child of the age ever ready to be led by popular opinion and fashion of the hour, he had a respect for critical rules and conventions, 'his love of literature was instinctive; his mind answered at once to the touch of poetry, and gave in return his estimate of it in 'the other harmony of prose'. As a critic he had above all the advantage of possessing a perfect instrument—an easy, well-mannered and lucid style. As a dramatist himself he

¹ Shakespeare Criticism. D. Nichol Smith.

was compelled to face some of the most urgent problems of his time—the relative superiority and value as models of the ancient and modern drama—the modern French classical drama and the English drama of his own time; the contemporary drama and the great Elizabethan drama. As many of these problems in the manner in which they presented themselves to Dryden and his contemporaries, have lost their interest for us, a good proportion of his critical writing, in respect of their substance, is now rather out of date. But, even these are kept alive by the excellence of their form. Like Corneille, the French classical dramatist and critic, Dryden feels bound to pay reverence to the ancients, to respect and bow to the claims of contemporary fashion and also to consider his own genius and genuine independent taste. Professor Ker suggests that it was probably from Corneille that Dryden got the impulse to write freely and with an open mind about his literary opinions—one of the most valuable points in Dryden's critical manner. •

Dryden's writings from beginning to end are strewn with references to Shakespeare—references which bear eloquent testimony to his admiration for Shakespeare. A consistently sympathetic and unprejudiced critic of Shakespeare, Dryden certainly is not. Nor could we expect it from a man of Dryden's age and position. Consistency indeed was the least of his virtues. The earliest of his critical utterances on Shakespeare is in the prologue he wrote to the *Tempest* as rehandled by himself and Davenant.

So from old Shakespeare's honoured dust this day
Springs up and buds a new reviving play
Shakespeare, who (taught by none) did first impart
'To Fletcher wit, to labouring Jonson art

* * * * *

If they have since out-writ all other men,
'Tis with the drops which fell from Shakespeare's pen.

* * * * *

But Shakespeare's magic could not copied be,
Within that circle none durst walk but he.

The prologue concludes with an apologetic reference to the popular superstition of the Elizabethan age—belief in witchcraft. Shakespeare 'then writ, as people then believed.'

Prologues to plays are written to please the audience, to disarm criticism, and to put them in a mood favourable to the reception of the play. In this prologue Dryden gives the primacy to Shakespeare and says how Jonson and Fletcher are only his pupils. The great eulogy of Shakespeare comes in that early yet the most perfect of his critical writings in some ways, the *Essay of Dramatic Poesy*. The characters of Shakespeare, Jonson and Beaumont and

Fletcher here given provide in Jonson's emphatic language a perpetual model of encomiastic criticism. Shakespeare, says Dryden, was the man who, of all modern and perhaps ancient poets, had the largest and most comprehensive soul. Comprehensive, i.e., having the power of grasping or including, as Dryden himself explains. All the images of nature were still present to him, and he drew them not laboriously, but luckily; when he describes anything, you more than see it, you feel it too.' The view that Jonson was learned and that Shakespeare was without learning he of course accepts, but says nobly, 'Shakespeare was naturally learned; he needed not the spectacle of books to read Nature, he looked inwards and found her there. Admiration for Shakespeare's genius does not blind him to what he considers to be his faults.' Here Dryden is judging as a dramatist and poet of the Restoration which was an age rather satisfied with itself. King Charles the Second whose manners were refined by his travels and his court set a superior standard of refinement and Dryden says that Shakespeare, who wrote in a less refined age, is many times flat, insipid; his comic wit degenerating into clenches, his serious swelling into bombast. But immediately he adds the truly critical and just remark—'But he is always great, when some great occasion is presented to him. No man can say he ever had a fit subject for his wit, and did not then raise himself high above the rest of poets.'

In the same essay Dryden examines the various critical problems in drama brought to the forefront in the Restoration period. The three unities, the non-observance of which was one of the perpetual charges brought against Shakespeare; come in for a great share of emphasis. The unity of action, rigidly interpreted, rules out the under-plots by which Shakespeare enriched and diversified the dramatic pattern, gave it massiveness and dignity. 'The French do not burden their plays as the English do,' says Dryden, 'with under-plots.' Dryden notes, not unjustly, that Shakespeare's Historical plays are rather so many chronicles of kings, and are loose and ill-constructed. Into the space of two hours and a half is cramped the business of thirty or forty years, which is not to imitate Nature. Shakespeare wrote first and did not observe the laws of comedy; but he has like all English dramatists gained certain invaluable advantages by this freedom unknown to the French.

One interesting judgment in the Essay is that Beaumont and Fletcher understood and imitated the conversation of gentlemen much better than Shakespeare "whose wild debaucheries and quickness of wit in repartees, no poet can ever paint as they have done." This is not untrue in itself. Fletcher's dialogue is lighter, more airy and more sparkling. His comedy *The Wild Goose Chase* is an

anticipation of the Restoration comedy of manners in its substance, morals, as well as its brilliant dialogue. The atmosphere of this comedy is completely removed from that of the romantic comedies of Shakespeare. The dialogue of Fletcher's comedy is a genuine merit and it is this that prompts Dryden to make this judgment about Fletcher's superiority. Dryden says, for these reasons obviously, 'Their plays are now the most pleasant entertainments of the stage; two of theirs being acted through the year for one of Shakespeare's or Jonson's'—there is a certain gaiety in their comedies. Shakespeare's language is a little obsolete and Jonson's wit comes short of theirs. In the same document Dryden remarks, Shakespeare is the Homer, or father of our dramatic writing, Jonson was the Virgil, the pattern of elaborate writing; I admire him but I love Shakespeare.

The most seriously adverse remark about Shakespeare in Dryden's prefaces is made in respect of the language. Here Dryden must be judged from the historic point of view. The extravagances, and the superfluities of expression were during the period rigidly excluded and terseness, clearness and simplicity, correctness, in short was becoming the ideal of the age. Our language, says Dryden, has improved since the last age. 'Let any man who reads English read diligently the works of Shakespeare and Fletcher; and I undertake that he will find, in every page, either some solecism of speech, or some notorious flaw in sense.' He excuses this of course by the ignorance of the times, the general imperfection of the development of poetry in his age. He severely arraigns the 'carelessness of Shakespeare, who precipitates himself from the height of thoughts to low expressions.

An adherent of rhyme, in practice and theory, Dryden becomes, under the influence of Shakespeare, a convert to blank verse. In 1678 he writes *ALL for love*, in which he has 'professed to imitate the Divine Shakespeare.' He is moved to wonder that so much of the language of an author like Shakespeare who had to rely on his own untaught genius, remains so pure. The play was written to please himself. 'I have endeavoured in this play to follow the practice of the Ancients, who, as Rymer has judiciously observed, are and ought to be our masters.' But the English tragedy Dryden also says has to be built on larger compass.

Many of the judgments already expressed are repeated in the *Essay on the Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy*, written as a preface to his *Troilus and Cressida* which he, by the way, considers to have been one of Shakespeare's first endeavours for the stage.

As Prof. Ker observes with Dryden's change of authorities, from Corneille to Bossu and Rapiq, and perhaps Rymer, there is more

obsequious respect for rules than is usual with him. Shakespeare's language is again criticized as ungrammatical and obsolete. *Troilus and Cressida* he took in hand because 'there appeared in some passages of it, the admirable genius of the author; he wished to remove that heap of rubbish, under which many excellent thoughts lay wholly buried. He defers to Rymer's view of the great deficiency in plot construction of Shakespeare's and Fletcher's plays and contrasts the masculine and fiery genius with the softer and more womanish genius of the other, and adds that both especially Shakespeare failed in the observance of the unities. Incidentally in Dryden's essays there are fairly full and appreciative sketches of individual characters, for example, Falstaff and Caliban whom he admires for the truth to nature and the distinction with which they are portrayed.

There are certain other interesting accounts of Shakespeare recorded in the Seventeenth century. Edward Philips in his *Theatrum Poetarum*, or a complete collection of the poets, 1675, a dictionary of authors, devotes a paragraph to Shakespeare. Shakespeare is 'the glory of the English stage—his nativity at Stratford-on Avon is the highest renown that town can boast of. Philips, who was Milton's nephew, praises Shakespeare as a maker unsurpassed in tragedy although not the equal of some others in decorum. He pleases with a wild and native elegance. In the preface he suggests that Spenser and Shakespeare were both possessed of a graceful and poetic majesty—his expressions are unfiled, his fancies rambling and ill-digested. In these remarks there is nothing new or original.

William Winstanley in his *England's Worthies* 1684 also gives an account of Shakespeare. It is however merely compiled from the writings of Fuller and Philips. 'Hasti-vibrans or Shakespeare from which some have conjectured him of military extraction; so writes Winstanley. Gerard Langbaine's *Account of the English Dramatic Poets* has a valuable and interesting notice of Shakespeare—1691. He notes the severity of Dryden's censure of Shakespeare's wit and he emphatically states his conviction that Shakespeare's plays 'are beyond any that have ever been published in our language'. He admires Jonson and Fletcher extremely, but Shakespeare more. *Terentium amo, admiror sed Plautum magis*. The account is however in the nature of a bald catalogue of Shakespeare's plays among which appear the pseudo-Shakespeare plays as well. The main interest of his account is the attempt he makes to note against each play the source from which he draws it. 'The Merchant of Venice is described as a tragi-comedy and Dryden's praise of Falstaff is quoted with approval.

SECCIÓN B.

THE PLACE OF PADDY IN OUR RURAL ECONOMY.¹

BY

G. R. HILSON, B.Sc.

Director of Agriculture, Government of Madras.

I understand that you are interested not only in the dry facts of economics but also in the effect on the community at large, of maladjustments in the economic position. I have therefore chosen as the subject of my discourse what I consider to be a grave maladjustment in the agricultural economy of this Presidency. I refer to the large area under paddy, more particularly swamp paddy.

The total area actually under crop, in the Presidency, is approximately thirty-nine million acres. The total area under paddy is approximately eleven million acres, of which area approximately eight millions are swamp paddy. This does not mean that every third or fourth crop is a paddy crop and that other crops are grown in rotation with it. If that were so, much of what I have to say would not need to be said. As you are aware, there are wide stretches of country where paddy follows paddy monotonously every year and these stretches are getting wider and the area under swamp paddy is being added to yearly. This is the position. I propose to examine it from the swamp paddy aspect first and then view the paddy position as a whole. I am following this order because, whatever the paddy position generally, the aspect of the swamp paddy position which I propose to lay before you, will remain the same.

The salient feature of swamp paddy cultivation is that the land is by preference kept under a slowly moving stream of water three or four inches in depth. This procedure is attended by many disadvantages.

The first is that enormous quantities of water are used in growing the swamp paddy crop, much more than is necessary for growing any other crop which requires irrigation only occasionally. The main effect of this is that for a given supply of water under given conditions, the area which can be protected from failure of season is less when swamp paddy is grown than otherwise would be the case. The cultivators who insist on growing swamp paddy determine the shape that an irrigation project shall take and the limits of the area which shall be benefited. In a country like this

¹ Lecture delivered at the Senate House, on Wednesday October 5, under the auspices of the Madras Economic Association.

where failure of crop for climatic reasons is comparatively frequent, it is obviously better that as large an area as possible should be protected against drought.

The second disadvantage is worse than the first. While the paddy crop is on the ground, it prevents or inhibits the growing of crops other than paddy. The first result of this is that the majority of the cultivators have to depend on paddy and paddy alone. This is particularly the case when it is possible to grow more than one paddy crop in the year. The evil of a one-crop rotation is therefore established. The second result is that it places a very definite check on enterprise. Anybody can grow swamp paddy and the opportunities for exercise of skill are very limited. The third result is that it ends in a loss of all knowledge of how to grow other crops so that when that knowledge is needed as at present, the cultivator does not know what to do and is unable to react to change of conditions as quickly as he should.

The third disadvantage is that while the crop is on the ground, there is no room for the cattle of the village. They have therefore usually to be sent away long distances to a forest to graze. As they go they collect and spread diseases of which many of them die. The forest is usually overstocked, with the result that the cattle lose such conditions as they had and at the same time lose some of their resistance to disease. There is therefore an enormous wastage annually and the cattle are the poorest of their kind. This state of affairs leads to a practice which causes a further aggravation of the position. Cattle treated like this cannot produce milk in any quantity. It is hopeless to try. The buffalo is therefore introduced as a milk producer and that puts the final closure on any idea of improving the cattle so that they will produce a reasonable supply of milk and a good calf. On the need for a greater all-round consumption of pure cows' milk there is much to be said, but that is a subject in itself. Before leaving this item it has to be mentioned that this practice of grazing cattle in the forest in this way besides being bad for the cattle is bad for the forest.

The fourth disadvantage is that the swamp paddy crop demands the application to the land of large quantities of unrotted organic matter. If these cannot be obtained from waste land or by growing a green manured crop, then the forest has again to be drawn upon, to the detriment of the forest.

The fifth is that between planting and harvest, the paddy crop requires very little attention and as, there are no other crops to provide occupation between times, there is an unequal demand for labour. Short spells of activity are followed by long spells of idleness. One result is that gangs of labourers wander round the country in the

busy seasons following the work. They are at times a distinct measure to public health.

The sixth is that the paddy crop provides little in the way of subsidiary industry which will afford employment for the population in excess of that required for the cultivation of the land. This is not strictly a disadvantage peculiar to swamp paddy but this is the most convenient place at which to mention it. The point I wish to make is that when the population in an area is in excess of requirements for the cultivation of the land and the subsidiary industries dependent on cultivation, the surplus must migrate, emigrate or compete for a share of the labour requirements of the land and the subsidiary industries. Paddy affords little scope for the establishment of subsidiary industries.

There is a further disadvantage of swamp paddy cultivation, dependent on the fact that such large quantities of water are used in its cultivation, to which reference must be made. In order to avoid the trouble of having to lift so much water, the level of the fields has been lowered so as to permit the water to flow on to the fields. This has resulted in the high ground of the village being pared away until there is very little left except that on which the houses and a few topes stand. The paddy fields come right up the doors of the houses in some cases. The few cattle that are kept in the village have only a restricted space to move in, and sanitary arrangements frequently leave much to be desired. Pools of water lie about the place and mosquitoes and other insects are prominent. Altogether during the monsoon a paddy village is not the pleasantest of places to live in. Life would be healthier if the people lived on their holdings when these are big enough but that would interfere with the paddy.

I have indicated the more direct and some of the consequential disadvantages of the swamp method of cultivating paddy. What about its advantages? It is supposed to have two. One is that by this means large quantities of food are produced on the spot and the other that this crop can be grown where natural conditions would forbid any other crop being grown. The latter advantage remains and to my mind should be the only excuse for growing paddy under swamp conditions. The former advantage has lost most of its point now that food can be so easily moved by road and railway to whatever point there is scarcity and it should not be forgotten that a grain of paddy is one-third husk which is not fit for human consumption, while with ragi the proportion of husk to grain is one-twentieth. The first advantage can now be ruled out. Times have changed and continue to change. The agricultural labourer in the future will expect more of the good things of life which he sees others enjoying, and will demand higher wages, which the paddy crop will not be able to

provide. The farmer himself wants a better return on his money than he can get by growing paddy. Paddy will have to concede some area to other crops. It is already doing so, but slowly.

And now we will turn to the general paddy position. Last year I worked out the statistical position, and on a basis of a population of 46 millions, with 40 per cent of the population rice-eaters an average consumption of rice per head of 4 cwts. per annum, a yield of rice per acre of 8 cwts., after allowing for wastage, draige and reserve for seed and an acreage of 11.3 million acres. I came to the conclusion that the needs of the Presidency were being met, and suspected that rice was being held up. Against this was the fact that on the average of three years there was a net import by sea of 345,000 tons of rice. Owing to the absence of information as to the movement of rice by road and rail, it is not possible to make an absolutely definite statement but it is, I think, a fair assumption to make that the paddy and rice imported into the ports of Tuticorin and Cochin are for the use of Travancore. During the three years in question the average import into these two ports was equivalent to 250,000 tons of rice, thus accounting for a very large proportion of the net import.

The position for 1929-30 is more favourable still to the idea that we are able to meet our own needs as the net import for the year is equivalent to only 245,000 tons of rice most of which comes from Burma. The import into Tuticorin and Cochin is equivalent to 220,000 tons of rice, thus leaving a net import of 25,000 tons. It is known that paddy is being stored in the country in the hope of a return to better prices.

Now if we have reached a position like this, where we are as it were balanced on a knife edge, with one year a net import of 100,000 tons, and the next year a small net export, we shall be wise to take stock of the position and see what the future has in store for us. 100,000 tons of rice spread over 8,000,000 acres is equivalent to an average increase of 50 lbs. of paddy, a mere flea-bite. If all the swamp paddy crops or a large proportion of them were got in early and the season was average, this increase would be easily surpassed. If to this possibility is added the efforts, the Agricultural Department is making successfully to reduce the seed-rate, to encourage the spread of the practice of growing green manure crops for use in conjunction with phosphatic manures and to increase the acreage under heavier yielding strains, it must be admitted that the time is in sight when the normal position will be that there is a considerable net export. Add to this that wheat is coming into favour as a substitute for rice among the educated classes thereby reducing the demand for rice and adding to that

a substantial increase in acreage and very soon a good season will land us into the same plight as the jute-growers in Bengal. For the line we are following is the line that all the other paddy-growing countries in the world are following. They are all strong to increase the average yield per acre and the total acreage, especially those countries which do not at present produce enough paddy for their own needs. The outlook for the future does not look very promising for those who are hoping for a rise in prices.

Now look where we are drifting and look at the position we are in as regards other matters. With a properly regulated supply of water to be used to eke out rainfall or as a stand-by, we have ideal conditions for producing sugar, fruit, vegetable oils, fibres, cotton, milk and milk products, eggs and vegetables. Look at this list and look at the things we import and you will arrive at the conclusion that the cultivator of this Presidency would be wiser to try and capture his home market and to produce raw materials which other countries are less favourably placed for providing than to drift into, aim, is too definite a word, becoming the importunate seller of rice to an unwilling buyer. If, further, it is remembered that some of the articles on this list form the raw materials of industries which already exist and could expand or of industries which could be established and which would provide more employment for the people of the country than is the case with paddy, then this conclusion is the more inevitable.

A NOTE ON THE OCCURRENCE AND THE METAMORPHOSIS OF POLYGORDIUS SP. OBTAINED IN TOWNET-WATER, MADRAS.

BY



R. GOPALA AIYAR, M.A., M.SC.

In July 1929, in a sample of townet-water—Mr. Sankara Menon of the Zoological Laboratory of the Madras University—noticed a trochosphere larva very much resembling that of *Polygordius*. But no attention was paid to it as more specimens could not be found. Later on (30-9-1929) several similar trochophores were noticed and these were picked out and placed in glass jars of clean seawater. Along with these trochophores minute specimens of post larval *Polygordius* were also collected from townet water, and the doubt arose that the trochophore larvæ might develop into the young *Polygordius* and this turned out to be the case.

The young *Polygordius* obtained measures 3.6 mm. long and 1.44 mm. broad (Fig. 7.) Body consists of about 30 segments and the alimentary canal is correspondingly constricted. General body colour is free from pigment externally, and greenish internally, due to small masses of green pigment. Alimentary canal was also filled with closely-packed minute globules of nutrient matter. In front, these globules are more scattered. Two smooth tentacles are present, placed close together. Two distinct eyes, red to dark-red in colour, are present. Buccal region is clear and the buccal opening is oval to elongate. The swollen anal end is green with masses of dark green pigment. No part of the body is ciliated externally. The hind end of the alimentary canal seems to be ciliated judging from the currents of water observed in this region.


LARVÆ.—Youngest larval stage observed measures 510 μ long and 306 μ broad across the broadest part which is the prototrochal region (Fig. 1). In normal condition the part of the body in front of the prototroch measures 170 μ . The trunk is now provided with 5-6 segments and the entire trunk is enveloped in a transparent jacket or amnion which extends backwards with very little space in the living condition, between it and the ectoderm of the body. General colour of the larva is greenish. The green colour is specially marked along the front rim of the prototroch, the posterior

* Paper read before the Zoological Section of the Indian Science Congress held at Allahabad, 1930.




1

2




4






5



3



6



9

11

rim being not at all or very slightly coloured. Immediately in front of prototroch the prostomium is deep green but towards the apical plate, the colour rapidly shades off. The apical plate is almost colourless. The post-trochal part of the larva is clear except at the extreme posterior end where round the anal segment there is a deep deposition of green pigment.

The anus is terminal and is surrounded by a thickened tumid rim which appears to crenulated. This thick rim acts as a sucker and the animal can often be observed to stop suddenly in its movements, stick to the slide by its anal rim, stand vertically up and execute slow movements in a circle.

The apical plate is quite prominent. The margin of this region is raised and in the depression so formed rudiments of the tentacles are visible. Two eyes spots, red in colour, can also be noticed. The alimentary canal is filled with nutrient globules; mouth and oesophagus are not clear at this stage and the animal does not seem to feed.

In the next stage observed, the larva has grown bigger, measures 960 μ long, 576 μ across the prototroch, and the amnion now measures 570 μ (Fig. 2). The prototroch appears as a vivid green circle. The pigment instead of being continuous has broken up into 18-20 groups. Round the anus, the intense green colour persists. The amnion is quite clear and at this stage the body projects slightly beyond the amnion. Prototrochal cilia are powerful and very active, the telotrochal are shorter and measure 72 μ . Behind the telotrochal circlet a few stiff cilia can be noticed.

The alimentary canal is quite distinct and extends from near the anterior end to the anus and is still filled with clear nutrient globules. The anterior part has, however, become clearer and the oesophagus has become more distinct and is found to be ciliated; the oesophageal filter is quite definite and powerfully ciliated. The larva lengthens visibly and the segmented body projects to a fair extent outside the jacket. Often, in freshly-caught specimens the trunk is suddenly shot out and appears very elongated. In this condition the larva measures 2.16 mm. long and .144 mm. broad (Fig. 3).

The marginal portion of apical plate can be sunk to a certain extent while the middle stands out like a hollow cone in which the rudiments of the tentacles could be seen. Prototroch now consists of 120 μ cilia actively working. Telotrochal cilia persist, but are fewer and work but feebly. The pigment groups on the prototrochal ring have become smaller but more numerous. Anus is capable of a slight eversion and by a cup-like action often holds on to the slide,

At a later stage, the amniotic fold undergoes tearing along one side (Fig. 4). The torn fold hangs on to the prototroch for some time more as a withered mass. By this time, the telotrochal cirlet has almost disappeared but the prototroch persists though the cilia have become feeble. At this stage the larva undergoes a series of contractions probably with a view to cast off the rapidly withering amnion but then it had evidently become enfeebled and this could not be effected rapidly enough.

The Prototroch now undergoes rapid reduction, the cells bearing the cilia become disorganized and the cilia are gradually lost all round. Soon the prototrochal thickening has completely disappeared.

Woltereck (1902, 1924, 1925) in his description of the metamorphosis of *P. lacteus* and *P. appendiculatus* describes the amnion and the prototrochal ring as being cast off quite rapidly in the form of a ring. Söderström (1925) states that the phenomenon described is pathological and it was really due to development taking place under artificial conditions, that it was in fact due to the increasing salinity on account of the evaporation of the water in which the larvæ were kept and watched by Woltereck. With a view to solving the question, however partially, several larvæ of the same age were placed in a finger-bowl and the water was not renewed. Every one of the larvæ kept in this manner underwent a very curious development. The amnion was cast off by gradual reduction. After this all the larvæ except one underwent, while the prototrochal cilia were still fully active, a constriction behind prostomium (Fig. 8). This constriction deepened resulting in the complete separation of the prostomium with the prototrochal cirlet behind from the segmented body or trunk. After this separation both the parts continued to live for several days the prostomium by rapidly swimming about and the hind part by slow creeping movement at the bottom of the glass. The body part was not observed to develop the tentacles. From what has been said it appears likely that the casting off of the amnion and the prototroch as described and figured by Woltereck might possibly be due to unnatural conditions.

It has not been found possible to identify the species in the absence of adult forms. Dredging has been attempted with a view to secure the fully-grown worms but so far has proved unsuccessful. That they exist in the Madras coast is beyond doubt. It is interesting to note in this connection that Goodrich (1900) mentions the capture of larvæ of *Polygordius* which he obtained from the coast of Trincomalee, Ceylon. He refers them to an undescribed species.

EXPLANATION OF FIGURES

- Fig. 1. Youngest larva obtained. $\times 100$.
 „ 2. Slightly older larva. $\times 40$.
 „ 3. Larva in which the body has become fully extended beyond the amnion. $\times 40$.
 „ 4. Larva showing the amnion torn and sticking on to one side. $\times 40$.
 „ 5. A newly captured larva without the amnion and with the prototrochal thickening getting disintegrated. $\times 40$.
 „ 6. The same larva with the prototrochal thickening practically gone, only the remnants found hanging to one side. $\times 40$.
 „ 7. Young Polygordius. $\times 40$.
 „ 8. Larva kept in sea water of increasing salinity undergoing abnormal division behind head region. $\times 40$.
 „ 9. Freely swimming anterior part of larva viewed from the top. $\times 100$.
 „ 10. Another larva undergoing constriction behind anterior end at the same time division of the anterior part. $\times 40$.
 „ 11. Oesophageal filter. $\times 100$.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1900—Goodrich, E. S. The nephridia of Polychæta. Q.J.M.S., Vol. XLIII.
 1902—Woltereck, R. Trochopore-studien. Zoologica.
 1924—Woltereck, R. Bemerkung Zur Katastrophalen metamorphose der Polygordius-Endolarvæ. Zoologischer Anzeiger, Vol. 60.
 1925—Woltereck, R. Nochmals Dr. Söderstrom und die Polygordius-Endolarvæ. Zoologischer Anzeiger, Vol. 63.
 1925—Söderstrom. Kurze Bemerkung Zur 'Katastrophe metamorphose der Polygordius larven, Zoologischer Anzeiger, Vol. 64.
 1925—Woltereck, R. Neue und Alte Beobachtungen Zur Metamorphose der Endolarve. Zoologischer Anzeiger. Vol. 65.

NOTES ON BRYOLOGICAL GEOGRAPHY FOR THE
PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS

BY

REV. G. FOREAU, S.J., PALAMCOTTAH

(Concluded)

ERPODIACEÆ

Erpodium mangiferæ C. M.—Tinnevely District: Mundanthurai.

ORTHOTRICHACEÆ

Zygodon humilis Thw. et Mitt.—Upper Palnis: Shembaganur.

Zygodon Reinwardtii (Hornsch.) Al. Br.—Upper Palnis: Kodaikanal, Shembaganur.

Zygodon tetragonostomus A. Br.—Lower Palnis: Manalur.

Rhachithecium perpusillum (Thwait. et. Mitt.) Broth.—Upper Palnis: Near Neutral Saddle.

Macromitrium Perrottetii C. M.—Upper Palnis: Tiger Shola.

Macromitrium nepalense (Hook. et. Grev.) Schwægr.—Upper Palnis: Kodaikanal, Tiger Shola, near Neutral Saddle; Lower Palnis: Togaivarai Shola, Periyur.

Macromitrium polygonostomum Dix. et. P. de la V.—No. 845, 1926. Sirumalai., Described in A. de B. p. 181.

Macromitrium Schmidii C. M.—Upper Palnis: Kodaikanal, Tiger Shola; Lower Palnis: Perumalmalai.

Macromitrium japonicum Doz. et Molk.—Palni Hills.

Schlotheimia Grevilleana Mitt.—Upper Palnis: Villupatti Paddy Fields; Lower Palnis: Perumalmalai, Togaivarai Shola, Periyur.

RHACOPILACEÆ

Rhacopilum Orthocarpum Wils.—Upper Palnis: Kodaikanal.

Rhacopilum Schmidii C. M.—Upper Palnis: Tiger Shola, Villupatti Paddy Fields; Lower Palnis: Perumalmalai, Togaivarai Shola, Manalur, Periyur, Sirumalai

Rhacopilum Schmidii (C. M.) var. *breviaristatum* Card.—Upper Palnis: Tiger Shola. Cf. Rev. Bry. 1923, p. 77.

HEDWIGIACEÆ.

Hedwigidium imberbe (Sw.) Bry. Eur.—Upper Palnis: Kodaikanal.,

Braunia secunda (Hook.) Bryol.—Upper Palnis: Kodaikanal.

