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THE
HISTORY OF COLONIZATION

From the Earliest Times to the Present Day

BY
HENRY C. MORRIS

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I

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THE HISTORY OF COLONIZATION

TO
MELVILLE W. FULLER
Chief Justice of the United States
AS A SLIGHT TESTIMONIAL OF ESTEEM

PREFACE

THE present work is in a certain measure the satisfaction of a personal need. Upon the occupation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands by American troops, the problem arose whether the United States was to become a colonial power. With the swiftly passing events of the conflict with Spain and the consequences inevitably following in its wake, the horizon of national influence and authority suddenly widened. "The results of war are invariably far beyond the anticipations of its promoters" is a time-worn adage, the truth of which has once again been proven; for this recent triumph of the Republic has opened, or will in due course open, a series of questions, new to this people and fraught with grave import. All great nations have passed through similar experiences; many have solved their doubts, others are still engaged in the task. Statesmen of every age have been more or less occupied in formulating doctrines and rules of administration, trade, and conduct in, with, and toward the possessions of their respective countries. The main topic, whether colonies are advantageous and hence desirable, has been frequently debated. Wherever the policy of territorial expansion has been adopted, every current phase of management and treatment has necessarily received attention and solution. History in other aspects yields bountiful instruction to the student of social phenomena; why should it not in the sphere of colonization contribute to the evolution of better methods and more enlightened theories?

Francis Parkman, in his preface to "The Old Régime in Canada," quotes from De Tocqueville: "The physiognomy of a government can best be judged in its colonies, for there its characteristic traits usually appear larger and more distinct.

When I wish to judge of the spirit and the faults of the administration of Louis XIV, I must go to Canada. Its deformity is there seen as through a microscope." It is the fact, that in the dependency national weakness or strength is most apparent, which gives additional zest to this study; because of it, the subject gains its highest interest; for in the disposition of the problems incidental to distant realms the ultimate destiny of a people may well be said to be presaged. The establishment of new germs of social, civil, and political organization in unexplored regions, and their subsequent growth in importance and influence, must ever be reckoned as most potent in results. How much the more significant this record becomes when the effects of these communities upon the citizens and the institutions of the parent state are considered.

Such thoughts, due to a natural interest in the affairs of the day, aroused in the author a desire for detailed knowledge. At that time he was residing in a land where the issue of the utility and propriety of colonial endeavor has been for several years agitating the public mind; so that the opportunity to hear arguments *pro* and *con* upon fundamental principles was not lacking. As his examination extended, he found, of course, that a considerable number of volumes relative to colonization had been published. European scholars have not neglected this theme, while in the United States distinguished writers have elaborately described the early period of American development. More careful investigation, however, shows that of these treatises almost all are devoted to certain special phases, epochs, or fields of research, are written from the standpoint of some one nation, or are too technical to be available and interesting to the majority of readers. The main object of this book may therefore be stated to be succinctly to supply information of a department of human activity, the progress of which, by reason of its peculiar complexity, it is difficult to trace within a few pages.

In pursuance of this purpose, the writer, while strictly adhering to his own method of presenting the subject, has not

hesitated to be generally guided by those whose eminence is a guarantee of their accuracy. The notes, while in many instances supplementing the text, are primarily designed as a means of acknowledging to whom the inspiration is due. In connection with the Bibliography they will also serve, it is believed, as an index to the best and most accessible literature treating the various aspects of colonization. To make any more explicit reference to specific works or sources of information in this place would be to draw an unwarranted and invidious distinction. Many, it might well be said all, the various details of the subject have been repeatedly discussed. Wherever possible the principal authorities in each instance have been cited, and to them the credit should be attributed.

Although every effort has been made to verify details of facts and figures, it is scarcely conceivable in a book of this nature that mistakes should not exist; while it is hoped that not any material errors or inconsistencies have been inadvertently overlooked, the author craves indulgence for such as may appear.

HENRY C. MORRIS.

CHICAGO,
October 1, 1900.

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THE HISTORY OF COLONIZATION

INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL research is always instructive. The study of the record of colonization is more especially attractive because, for the most part, it treats of newly discovered regions, of distant and unexplored portions of the earth; describes the meeting of civilized races with the savage and uncultured tribes native to the soil; and recalls the heroism of those, who, at the command of country, have abandoned homes and friends, to seek, across the broad expanse of waters, military, commercial, or political supremacy for their fatherland, or, as in so many instances has happened, fleeing the tyranny of church or king, have wandered afar to find freedom of thought, speech, and worship. This investigation is useful, in that it discloses the motives which have actuated states or individuals in their primary steps of establishing or forming settlements in remote localities; in that it leads to the consideration of the various circumstances which have subsequently contributed to the growth of powerful dependencies or to the evolution of independent bodies politic, thus revealing the causes or springs of action which have tended to create international friendships or animosities; and finally, in that it explains the sources of language, of customs, of trade relations, and of laws. Such discussion is necessary to a community which is debating the advisability of entering upon a colonial policy, that it may be informed of the experience of other peoples in this sphere of development; that it may not be neglectful of the duties and obligations imposed by such enterprises nor ignorant of the risks and profits involved; so much the more is it inevitable for the citizens of the parent state, after the assumption of such a connection with foreign lands, to review this branch of history that they may be warned by the errors and strength-

ened by the successes of the colonizing powers of the past and the present; to the end that they may be the more capable of granting an honest, enlightened, equitable, and Christian form of rule to those whom the stroke of destiny may have placed in their charge. Nor should the nations of the Western Hemisphere forget their own common origin, to be universally traced through the colonial phase of government. A comparison of their situation at this stage of their respective careers with that of other former and subsequent colonies should, in itself, be profoundly interesting.

To endeavor briefly to give an adequate conception of the theoretical ideal colony will therefore be the first task of the present treatise. The order then followed will be to define the subject, to classify colonial possessions into their various groups, to determine the requirements and conditions of colonial activity, to delineate the multiple characteristics requisite for the metropolis and for the colony, as essential to the welfare of the one as to the prosperity of the other. After the accomplishment of these preliminary aims, the facts of history will be elucidated with the design to show how the various principles of colonial policy have been developed. The object will be to state these details impartially and without bias, fairly and without prejudice, so as to enable the reasoning reader to formulate in any instance his own independent judgment; the effort will be strenuously made to supply concisely the data from which conclusions may be deduced, in order that he may be able to determine the best methods as well as the effects of colonization, not only upon the lands thus peopled and governed, but also upon the nation undertaking such an important labor.

In pursuance of this plan, the following particulars will in each case be mentioned:—

Causes of colonial origin;

Objects of colonization;

Requisite conditions in parent state and colony;

Methods of colonization;

Systems of government applied to the colony;

- Period and course of development of colonial life;
- Cost of colonization to mother country;
- Advantages derived and disadvantages accruing from a colonial policy;
- Causes leading to the severance of colonial ties, and the establishment of independent states;
- Finally, in some measure, the relations existing between the former parent state and the liberated colony, after the latter's freedom has been attained.

The discussion of these various questions will effectually comprehend the field of colonial action. The lessons deduced from practical experience will indicate how far and to what extent the theoretical doctrines of model colonization have in reality been recognized and applied; what have been the exceptions, and how the force of facts has sometimes outweighed the apparent probability of theory. In this study it will be necessary to examine the circumstances relating to the origin and the earlier development of numerous influential states which have sprung from colonial establishments.

Some nations, more than others, have manifested the spirit for colonization; but genius and ability in the solution of the problems, incident to such a policy, have distinguished few peoples; still those less fortunate yield instruction by exemplifying the many embarrassments and errors possible to arise in their treatment. It is well, therefore, to include within consideration not only the more successful, but even likewise the less prosperous colonizing powers of the past. The states renowned for their colonial empires are: in antiquity, Phœnicia, Carthage, Greece, and Rome; in the Middle Ages, Pisa, Florence, Genoa, and Venice; in modern times, Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, and England. As more available and more useful to students of this topic, the greater attention will be paid to those countries of the existing era, which have retained their possessions.

After the outlines of the creation and maintenance of colonial life, past and present, shall thus have been sketched, some vital questions naturally arise. What is really the prime

motive for the establishment of colonies—the extension of trade or the diffusion of civilization? Are colonies useful to the parent state? If so, in what sense and to what degree? Do the advantages or disadvantages of such a system preponderate? On these problems the views of statesmen have always been at variance. It is not the purpose of this work to advocate either cause. When the experiences of mankind shall have been recalled and considered, all—even though disagreeing in opinion—will be able to judge and reason independently.

One of the difficulties encountered in the study of colonization is the orderly arrangement of the matter presented in some sequence of time or locality. History, as a rule, treats of one people or one country; events are limited to some one region, and follow each other in a fixed chronological order. This narrative is different in that reference must frequently be made to many of the contemporaneous races, other than the principal nation; while numerous events, removed in space but simultaneous in time, cannot be treated consecutively. A grave problem is therefore presented, how to attain a clear conception of the era when the actions described were transpiring: only one method will obviate confusion,—the recollection that many occurrences, narrated of various peoples, are more or less coincident with each other; that there is a constant forward and retrograde motion; that fragmentary portions of the annals of many states are in fact being read; after the one is perused from the beginning to the end, another must then likewise be traced from its source. Nevertheless, it is hoped, the reader of these chapters will realize that there has gradually been a steady improvement in the administration of dependencies.

Another delicate task is to discriminate the historical facts which properly relate respectively to navigation, trade, and colonization. Throughout the ages the three topics have been more or less blended. In antiquity the origin of commerce was contemporaneous with the birth of the science of seafaring, while colonial activity was so associated with trade as to render the history of the one almost the chronicle of the other; in mediæval times the development of the Italian republics in

maritime skill, in mercantile enterprise, and in colonial effort was parallel; while, finally, in the modern era, national pre-eminence in distant lands has always depended upon sea power, and has sprung from the desire for wider trade relations. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the art of navigation exercised in a regularly increasing ratio its influence; in recent years this element, by reason of its approximate perfection, seems to have become fixed; but the effect of commercial and trade motives upon colonial policies is still daily more and more intense. If, therefore, in this treatise — especially in the earlier chapters — undue attention should appear to have been given to these allied subjects, let it be remembered that colonization found in both its origin and has been closely connected with them during its entire career.

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

THE Latin "colonia," whence the word "colony," primarily means a possession in land, a landed estate, a farm; secondarily, an abode or dwelling; and in the third place, a colony or settlement.¹ The allied word "colonus"² describes a husbandman, or tiller of the soil, a farmer, one who cultivates another's land, a colonist, and finally an inhabitant of a colonial town. Hence it may be stated that a colony conveys the idea of a landed possession, wherein agriculture is the chief occupation of the inhabitants; a colonist, in the true meaning of the term, is essentially an agriculturist.

Modern authorities generally define the word "colony" in almost identical language. Johnson's Dictionary reads, "A body of people drawn from the mother country to inhabit some distant place." "The country planted; a plantation."

Webster says: 1st, "A company or body of people, transplanted from their mother country to a remote province or country to cultivate and inhabit it, and remaining subject to the jurisdiction of the parent state." 2d, "The country planted or colonized; plantation; also the body of inhabitants in a territory colonized, including the descendants of the first planters."

Worcester gives the definition: 1st, "An establishment or settlement formed in a foreign country by a body of men

¹ In so far as words are concerned it may be said that the Greek "apoikia" corresponds more nearly to the modern word "colony" than does the Latin "colonia"; cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 438.

² A later meaning is serf or villein, an unfree tenant; the Roman "colonus" was a direct predecessor of the mediæval serf; for full description cf. Du Cange, "Glossarium Mediæ et Infimæ Latinatis" (Nivot, 1883), II, 414, *sub* "colonus."

emigrating from their mother country." 2d, "The country planted or colonized."

The Century Dictionary describes a colony as: 1st, "A company or body of people who migrate from their native country or home to a new province, country, or district, to cultivate and inhabit it, but remain subject to or intimately connected with the parent state; also the descendants of such settlers so long as the connection with the mother country is retained." 2d, "The country or district planted or colonized."

McCulloch, in his Dictionary of Commerce, lays down the rule, "Colonies are establishments founded in foreign countries by individuals who either voluntarily emigrate from or are forcibly sent abroad by their mother country."

Littre's French Dictionary defines colony as: "An establishment founded by a nation in a foreign country — Possession of an European nation in another part of the world — Assemblage of individuals who have left one country to inhabit another. The place whither they have gone — People of one same country inhabiting a foreign locality."

The Dictionary of the French Academy reads: "Colony is properly applied to the assemblage of men who have left one country in order to go to inhabit another and, by extension, to the population which forms and is perpetuated in the place of their settlement; also to the place or country inhabited by a colony."

Brockhaus' German Conversation Dictionary states: "A colony in general is a settlement in a foreign land or among a foreign people. The settlement must be enduring and must spring from a large number of the subjects of the same nation, who preserve their native customs and language, and thereby, generally in connection with an independent organization, establish a distinct society in the midst of a foreign people. In this sense, the maintenance of political dependency on the metropolis is not necessarily involved. In the narrower definition of the word, however, only such settlements as preserve their connection with the mother country are denominated colonies."

It is thus evident that the essential characteristic of a colony is the common nationality of its original settlers;¹ these latter must recognize one flag, must have emigrated in some considerable numbers from the same fatherland, and must have been strong enough to transport with themselves their language, customs, and laws, transplanting them to the foreign soil. Any dependency, the inhabitants of which do not, at least in part, correspond to these requirements, is not properly a colony, but merely a possession; such is, for example, an island owned by an European power, but entirely, or almost entirely, peopled by the aborigines, no matter of what degree their civilization.² In treating the subject at hand, this distinction should always be borne in mind. Sometimes such fine shades of variance exist as to render it extremely difficult in any particular case to determine the real status. Many colonies have grown out of possessions. The importance of this discrimination will subsequently be more apparent; to it may be attributed differences in conditions and especially in legislation by the parent state, which otherwise would be unaccountable.³

Colonies are classified, according to their method of origin and acquisition, into four leading groups:⁴ 1, those created

¹ This characteristic was not true of those ancient colonies which had not any governmental connection with the mother country.

² Inasmuch as the word "colony" is constantly changing its meaning, the most satisfactory definition for any particular country is that specific enumeration of its "colonies" which may be found in the decisions of its courts. An interesting case is mentioned by Lucas in his Introduction to Lewis' "Government of Dependencies." "A nation can colonize in two ways. It can settle a land either mainly with its own race or mainly, if not entirely, with some other foreign race, and this second method of colonization is apt to be left out of sight by writers on colonial subjects." Introduction by Lucas, xxiv. For example, the Jewish captivity, the African slave trade, the Chinese emigration.

³ Most modern writers seem to favor a broad use of the word "colony." Thus Ireland says, "A colony is in fact to be considered a territory situated at some distance from the sovereign state, but subject to the sovereign authority." Introduction, 3. It is hard to-day to distinguish a colony from a dependency, *ibid.*

⁴ For discussion of various kinds of colonies, cf. Heeren, 23; Rosscher and Jannasch, 2 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 747 et seq.; Lewis, xviii and 115; Seeley, 64; Merivale, 260 et seq. Leroy-Beaulieu classifies modern colonies into three

or acquired by military force; 2, those engaged in agricultural pursuits, where farming is the main occupation of the inhabitants;¹ 3, those employed in commerce or trade,² consisting chiefly of a few merchants, sent out from the parent state to carry on the barter and exchange of commodities with the natives of the region in which they reside;³ and 4, those in which the plantation system prevails, devoted to the cultivation of such products of the soil as cannot for climatic reasons be grown in the home country.⁴ As illustrations of these various classes, the Roman establishments may be cited, in antiquity, as colonies by conquest; in modern times the Spanish possessions in Central and South America belonged to the same type.⁵ Among agricultural colonies the United States — while a British dependency — and Australia may be reckoned. The principal commercial colonies are those under the administration of trading companies, such as formerly the Dutch and English domains in East India and in that vicinity; of plantation colonies those in the West Indies and in the torrid zones of Africa are the most important to be noted.

Nor should a fifth order be entirely forgotten; reference is made to penal stations, to such as those whither England

principal classes, commercial, agricultural, and tropical. The last variety is perhaps best designated in English as "plantation colonies." Heeren distributes colonies as "agricultural, plantation, mining, and trading"; Merivale says that colonies may be divided into two groups, first, "those in countries possessing no peculiar advantages for the production by agriculture or mining labor of articles of value in the foreign market; . . . secondly, those in which the industry of the settlers has been principally turned to the raising of staple articles of produce for foreign markets."

¹ For the preferable location of such colonies, cf. R and J. 19; colonial establishments engaged in cattle breeding form a special division of this class, *ibid.* 23.

² The fisheries are a subdivision, *ibid.* 18.

³ Rosscher and Jannasch consider that almost all colonies begin as commercial stations or trading posts, but likewise just previously remark that merely commercial outposts never develop into independent nations, "Colonies and Colonial Policy," 16.

⁴ A clear distinction must be drawn between agricultural and plantation colonies. The latter might now be better termed "cultivation colonies," R. and J. 25, 27; in fact they are frequently known as "tropical colonies." How would it do to call them "promotion colonies"?

⁵ Movements tending to national expansion as the result of migration partake of this character, and still they must be distinguished, R. and J. 3.

used to deport her criminals and to which France still to-day sends certain of her offenders.¹ This category is, however, of very slight account; for naturally, as time passes and new generations are born, they merge into one or the other of those previously described.² Earlier writers also recognized mining colonies as a variety, but recent authorities are disposed to omit this distinction, as settlements exclusively for that purpose can scarcely be said ever to have existed.³

In reality, another simpler, but much broader, classification of colonial origin may be made by dividing colonies into those voluntarily and those involuntarily founded by the metropolis;⁴ or rather those intentionally established by the government and those unconsciously created by the people.⁵ Among those organized under official direction all distant military strongholds must be included; likewise commercial stations, at least in their inception; plantation and penal settlements are also comprised in this same group. Agricultural communities and a certain portion of trading establishments alone are due to individual initiative, without any material assistance from the mother country, and frequently, as history shows, without her coöperation.⁶ As belonging to the class of colonies directly inaugurated by the state, those of Rome and

¹ Cf. R. and J. 39 et seq., who include the piratical establishments of former times as a subdivision of this class.

² For penal colonies, cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), xviii, li; Dilke, 519 et seq.

³ For the instability of mining colonies, cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 442 et seq.; Rosscher and Jannasch mention still another variety to which they apply the word "Kulturberufungskolonien"; an equivalent term in English might be "civilizing colonies," their object being to propagate and foster in the localities where they are established the ideals of a higher degree of civilization. Such were the German settlements in Russia, Poland, and Hungary. "Colonies and Colonial Policy," 30.

⁴ "The history of colonization is not simply that of the migrations of men across the world. It is also that of war and of the exploitation of races and of nations one by the other," (tr.) De Lanessan, 17.

⁵ The Greek words "cleruchos" and "apoikia" express the distinction; the Romans had "colonias ex secessione conditas" and "colonias ex consilio publico," Servius ad Virg. *Æneid*, I, 12; R. and J. 44.

⁶ Among the causes for this variety of colonization are religious persecution or distress and want at home, cf. De Lanessan, 41-43.

of Spain may be mentioned; to the number indirectly erected or aided by its authority, those of Holland and England in and around the Indian Ocean; while to the division constituted by personal effort, those of Greece and the North American and the Australian territories, past and present, of Great Britain may be assigned. Among all the different kinds of dependencies, military outposts are the least productive, the least happy, and the least enduring; they are the most exposed to the risk of abandonment or of war: agricultural colonies, on the other hand, are the most profitable, satisfactory, and permanent. The former are strong in the beginning, weak in the end; the latter are at first weak, but in the course of their development grow stronger and stronger.¹ Trading stations, by reason of their commercial element, occupy an intermediate position. A military establishment, as a rule, is merely a possession, and as such its retention depends for the most part upon the will of the government; it is also expensive; necessitates a large outlay of money for the maintenance of a sufficient armed force to retain it, as well as to keep the native inhabitants in order and submission; and usually yields little actual profit to the nation by which it is owned, unless it be by the speedy and headlong exhaustion of its resources; on the other hand, it often involves the parent state in appalling expense and ultimate ruin. An agricultural colony, on the contrary, occasions little cash outlay; returns in general large profits; and, so long as it remains loyal, helps to strengthen the power on which it depends; even after acquiring liberty it usually remains friendly and on trading terms with its former metropolis. These characteristics are well established by the evidence of history. Frequently, however, a settlement, military in its origin, has been gradually transformed into an agricultural community, and thus better conditions have been secured.² Throughout all ages, these varieties of colonies are recognized; some people have favored one class, others another; while a

¹ For advantages derived from a policy of non-interference with the colonies, cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), lv.

² For the transformations which may occur, cf. R. and J. 29.

few, especially in more modern times, have had possessions of each sort; in every case the experience resulting from the trial of their different forms has been very similar.

The object of establishments created by the state is manifest; not any nation has ever entered upon a colonial policy without the hope thereby to strengthen its power, to add to its riches, to assure its stability, to increase its influence, and to augment the prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants. Whatever may have been the temporary occasion, such have universally been the motives of action. A warlike empire founds colonies to protect threatened points of its territory, to widen its national domain, to give employment to its military forces, or to weaken a rival; a trading community seeks them in order to open new channels of commerce, or to protect those already won for itself but now threatened by an ambitious competitor; a people devoted to religion establishes them in heathen lands, with the professed object of converting the natives to its belief; a country deficient in natural resources, but strong in industry, locates them in more bountiful regions in order to procure the daily necessities which it lacks. The propagation of civilization has also played an important rôle in colonial development.¹ However various the causes for colonization under official authority, the results have been almost always identical.

Postponing for future discussion the effects of such organized enterprise, some consideration should first be given to the reasons which have actuated individuals to abandon home and friends, to travel afar, to settle in new localities among savage or half-civilized tribes, and thus, by their personal efforts, to create so many colonies; for it is universally true that marked characteristics have always distinguished every such settlement. The determination of those voluntary exiles of former days to journey as far as possible from their native hearths may be ascribed to their desire to flee material hard-

¹ For a statement of the principal moral motives for colonization, cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, 841-847. Civilization is the result of colonization more often than its cause, De Sismondi, "Pol. Econ.," II, 102 et seq.

ships, to escape moral or intellectual persecution,¹ or to gain for themselves some expected advantage. As the centuries have passed, however, the distance between the dependencies and the mother country has, by the increasing facilities of travel, been more and more curtailed, until, now that practically the entire surface of the globe is known, a natural limitation is placed upon this feature of colonial existence; for, as the means of communication develop, the feeling of remoteness from the metropolis is disappearing, and the colonists are being steadily drawn closer and closer in touch with their national centres of life.²

In the earliest era the principal cause for migration was the gradual expansion of races; as certain localities became more and more densely peopled, some shepherds, tending their flocks, were necessarily forced to wander farther and farther in search of sufficient pasture land; many of them, combining together for mutual society and protection, often removed to unexplored regions and there established themselves. Such were the first colonies.³ Subsequently, as towns were founded and nations developed, the human race in certain districts increased more rapidly than elsewhere. Men did not see the means of gaining a livelihood in their old habitations, while afar off they heard of untilled fields and unworked mines.⁴ Thither they betook themselves; hence sprang commerce; for, when they reached their new abodes, they discovered there products unknown at home; these they sent back and received in return other familiar manufactures. Here is seen, for the

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 10. note 6.

² For discussion of this point, cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), xl et seq.

³ Some of the Greek colonies thus originated both in Italy and in Asia Minor. The earliest movements of the Assyrians were also probably due to such causes; cf. Z. A. Ragozin, "Earliest Peoples," 98-102.

⁴ This was one of the motives set forth by Sir George Peckham for colonization in America; cf. Richard Hakluyt, "Voyages, Navigations, and Discoveries" (London, 1599), III, 167-181. It is important, however, to distinguish between emigration and colonization; although in a sense the advance posts of the moving nations may be considered colonies, yet they soon become the rear-guard of the advancing host, and have not the separate existence which seems to be necessary in a colony proper. For elaborate discussion of this question, cf. De Lanessan, 1, 2; for migrations, *ibid.* 2-16.

first time, the spirit of profit actuating the foundation of foreign settlements. While this disposition has in some measure prevailed throughout the ages, it cannot be said to have had marked influence upon colonial enterprises—so far at least as regards those due to individual effort—until the period of modern activity. The greatest momentum has been given to colonization; in antiquity, by the density of population and by the bitterness of civil strife in the capital cities of those days; in the Middle Ages and even later by the spirit of religious enthusiasm and commercial ambition,¹ and in more recent times by sectarian, political, and racial oppression.² The desire for adventure, as a separate motive, has always played a secondary rôle, although perhaps the strongest in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. The incentive of direct personal advantage to be won beyond the seas has never been more important, take it throughout all the world, than at present.³ Since the end of the seventeenth century, religious, moral, and intellectual reasons have had less and less effect. As a matter of fact, the higher the degree of organization which society attains the less possible the creation of colonies by independent endeavor becomes; they are to-day almost as much of the past as those formerly instituted by decree of the state. Quite as impossible would it now be for a nation to transfer at command a large number of its inhabitants in civil life to a distant locality as it is improbable that such citizens would voluntarily found a settlement in an uncivilized region, without official intervention.⁴ In this epoch of civilization, neither the government can inaugurate and maintain without the will of the people, nor the latter create and develop a colony without the protection of their country. This mutual dependence undoubtedly results in better organ-

¹ R. and J. 40.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 2; on the question of the benefit of the early colonies to Greece, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 32; for an extended discussion of the causes of colonization, cf. R. and J. 32 et seq.

³ For rise of commercial interest in colonies, cf. Seeley, 117 et seq.

⁴ For the necessity of official participation at the present day, cf. R. and J. 48 et seq.

ized, more happy, prosperous, and profitable establishments, in which the colonists are more peaceable, law-abiding, and loyal than those of previous ages.¹

To render any effort or system in colonization successful, certain well-defined conditions must exist, not only in the land to be colonized, but likewise in the parent state.² If on either hand these requirements are lacking, the attempt to maintain tranquil, harmonious, and satisfactory relations between the metropolis and its dependencies must prove futile. In the first instance, the connection implies power on the one side and weakness on the other; it necessarily involves superiority and inferiority. This principle not only applies to the form of government and the code of civil conduct, but also equally as well to individuals. The colonizing nation must be strong, possess a well-developed social organization, and be inhabited by men of intellect and education.³ The region to be brought under control must, on the contrary, be without a recognized method of rule, or with an administration very imperfectly constituted; its society must be more or less crude and uncultured, while its people must, as a race, be untrained in the higher type of civilization and inexperienced in manufactures, commerce, and statecraft.⁴ Just as soon as the colonists approach a degree of culture similar to that of the mother country, the association between the two becomes irksome and difficult to sustain, unless, indeed, the latter practically renounce all participation and intervention in colonial affairs.⁵

While power, then, is a prime necessity in the parent state,

¹ For a very thorough discussion of the problems arising in such cases, cf. "Problems of Greater Britain," by Sir Charles W. Dilke (London, 1890), Pt. VI, "Colonial Problems."

² R. and J. 51.

³ *Ibid.* 5.

⁴ "It is much easier to impress a new nationality on natives who have never learned to adopt any Western civilization than to erect a new standard of existence among a people who have been absorbing an European nationality for centuries." — IRELAND, 219.

⁵ On the necessary conditions for successful colonization, cf. De Lanessan, 33-41.

not the less is density of population.¹ There must be excessive competition in some lines of occupation and trade; a surplus of labor and a want of work; hence a certain degree of discontent, a desire for new fields of exertion, a feeling that there is not any further chance at home; the belief must prevail that the avenues of advancement are there closed before many individuals will be found ready to go to the ends of the earth to gain their livelihood.² In this condition of the public mind, opportunities to emigrate are eagerly sought; the impulse from within is felt and the peopling of distant possessions becomes a comparatively easy task. It is not merely the temptation of possible riches and future prosperity which attracts; it is rather dire necessity, which urges the masses to seek relief afar, but still under the flag, laws, and protection of their fatherland.³ For this reason the colonial designs of densely inhabited countries are always easily and quickly executed.⁴ Thus England, with a small area, a compact and industrious population, has the most numerous and most prosperous dependencies. The gain of the latter is to the direct advantage of the former; the one needs men, the other has more than it can employ.⁵ A man without work, without resources, without prospects, becomes in a brief time, by circumstances, a malcontent, an individual who may — especially if multiplied a thousand fold — be a most serious menace to

¹ A comprehensive table giving the increase in population of the various European countries for many years past may be found in Ricaud, 11.

² This statement applies to political as well as to social discontent, which are often merged, cf. R. and J. 36 et seq.

³ The effect is sometimes to send the people to other lands, notably to the United States. The yearly immigration to this country during the past century has exceeded all the vast migrations of antiquity; cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), xxvi et seq.

⁴ R. and J. 19, 32; for the effects of emigration on the parent state, cf. Merivale, 137-166, Leroy-Beaulieu, 671-696

⁵ For mutual advantages and disadvantages resulting to the mother country and to the colony, cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), xlv and Ch. VI-IX; Ricaud, Ch. III; also Seeley, "Expansion of England," Lect. VI and VII, Course I; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 463-508, Hurlburt, "Britain and her Colonies," 60-128; for a view decidedly adverse to colonization, cf. J. B. Say, 202 et seq.; Benjamin Franklin was also an opponent in theory as well as in practice of the colonial régime.

his government; in a colony he finds labor, satisfaction, and contentment, is encouraged to better thoughts, is given renewed aspirations, and almost inevitably makes a model citizen.¹ To this class of persons Australia, for example, mostly owes its earlier unparalleled development; many, who in old England would have been agitators and revolutionists, on breathing fresh air and seeing green fields, consecrated themselves to the upbuilding of their adopted land.² A thinly populated metropolis does not, as a rule, contain sufficient of these characters, who, as the consequence of critical exigencies in trade and industry, are impelled elsewhere to seek employment for their energies. The conditions do not exist; hence the resulting emigration cannot be obtained; and without frequent arrivals from the protecting state, the new community is destined to stagnation. The difference between British and French establishments exemplifies this fact. The Englishman is born a wanderer; the Frenchman is prone to remain at home. The populating of British colonies has been easy and their evolution rapid; the growth of French settlements has been extremely slow, and their situation generally precarious.

The essential of power on the part of the mother country likewise implies the element of wealth.³ That a poor nation cannot afford the luxury of colonies is almost an economic maxim. Vast expense is requisite for the maintenance of an army and navy, and without adequate military and sea forces any possessions would be of brief duration. Money is also necessary to the utilization of colonial resources; to the clearance of forests, to the tillage of fields, to the operation of mines, to the improvement of harbors, rivers, and watercourses, to the construction of railways, to the creation of manufactures, to the marketing of products, to the proper inauguration of government, to the education of the people, and to the development of all the varied material and intellectual forces within the colony.⁴ Not riches alone suffice to support a colonial

¹ R. and J. 38.

² *Ibid.* 33.

³ *Ibid.* 17.

⁴ For the effects of the exportation of capital on the parent state, cf. Merivale, 167-186; Leroy-Beaulieu, 697-711.

policy; something more is demanded, there must be an excess of capital. Money must be plentiful and cheap, investments difficult, interest low; all or many of the conditions must exist which would cause financiers to welcome with pleasure new opportunities for ample returns.¹ The stress of affairs should be even more pressing; for colonial risks involve exceptional danger, and even the higher rates of profit always prevailing will not attract capitalists unless the home market be such as to preclude safe, steady, and at least slightly remunerative transactions; only then can the colonies secure the funds necessary to their progress.²

The situation of trade must also be similar. Warehouses must be overstocked; there must be overproduction; the demands of domestic consumption and of buyers in independent foreign lands must be less than the supplies of national industry. Manufacturers and merchants must feel the need of new openings for their goods and wares, while they must find in the colonies an outlet for them.³ Farming, on the other hand, in the dominant state should be insufficiently developed to satisfy the daily wants of its people. Colonists are naturally tillers of the soil, and an agricultural community cannot, as a rule, guarantee them the necessary sales. The metropolis must at least lack in some measure the products which they cultivate; for this reason colonies are found to be peculiarly advantageous to industrial nations.⁴

Having thus discussed the material requirements essential for a country engaged in colonial enterprises, it is now proper briefly to consider two other necessary attributes. A race without the military and naval spirit is ill fitted for these tasks.⁵

¹ R. and J. 35.

² For the financial aspect of the colonial question, cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), xlix et seq.; also Dilke, Pt. VIII.

³ "Foreign colonies are therefore a necessity for industrial and commercial nations. They offer the metropolis the best and easiest outlet for the surplus of its products" (tr.).—RICAUD, Ch. III; Leroy-Beaulieu, 712-736; Ireland, "Tropical Colonization," 84-127.

⁴ For the two schools of opinion concerning colonial policy in England, cf. Seeley, Lect. VIII, Course II.

⁵ Cf. Seeley, Lect. VI, "Commerce and War," and p. 724.

The possession of colonies involves the control and protection of distant lands; it implies the maintenance of order within their boundaries, as well as the subjugation of the native, barbarous, or semi-civilized tribes; it means the management of many half-explored regions; and, above all, it requires their defence against the world.¹ Where a people would not meet one enemy on its own borders or shores, it will encounter many foes in the vicinity of its dependencies; still great armaments might not be demanded were simply their protection in view. Would that all the struggles inaugurated in or for them had been confined to their soil! But hostilities, once begun, will spread; many of the international conflicts of history have been of such origin.² A contest thus commenced often serves as the excuse for an attack on the parent state. A colony is, as some one has very truly said, a tinder box, which only requires a stray spark to ignite the conflagration of war. The inhabitants of the mother country must therefore always be ready, at command, to render service in behalf of her wards, or as frequently happens, to protect their own land against the foreign aggressor to whom some territorial dispute offers the desired pretext. On the other hand, well-situated possessions may thwart blows aimed at the metropolis. Witness the Greek colonies, which for centuries served as effective barriers to the attempted invasions of the Asiatic hordes directed against their central governments.³ With the more complex interdependence of races the probability of discord, by reason of distant dominions, has in modern ages greatly increased.⁴ The

¹ R. and J. 17; Merivale, 584-591. Such conflicts are not, however, necessarily due to any fault of the colonists. Speaking of the English possessions, Hurlburt says: "Nor has any policy or folly of the colonies ever involved the mother country in hostilities. . . . No colonists believe that England will go to war on a purely colonial question," "Britain and her Colonies," 58-59; they must rely on their own militia and volunteers for defence, *ibid.*, also 89 et seq., 127-128, 200 et seq.

² A most familiar example, in so far at least as France and England are concerned, is the Seven Years' War. In ancient times an illustration would be the Peloponnesian War.

³ Eventually, however, these same colonies occasioned the great war between Greece and Persia; to confirm the statement that colonies tend to prevent war, cf. Hurlburt, 200 et seq.

⁴ As to the probability of war because of colonial possessions, cf. Lewis

military and seafaring disposition is therefore more and more essential. Such are briefly the requisites indispensable to any nation to enable it successfully to pursue a colonial policy; without these resources and characteristics—or the most of them—those undertaking colonization have already failed; others which do not heed the voice of experience are destined to a similar result.

After this study of the qualifications demanded of the dominant power, it is equally important to examine the conditions necessary on the part of the colony. Authorities agree that in colonial affairs the maxim, "All men are created equal," does not hold true. Peaceably to tolerate the foreign rule exercised over them, the natives of the land to be colonized must be inferior in capacity. Leroy-Beaulieu has classified the races of the world into four categories: The Western civilization, "our own"; the Eastern, "comprising the Chinese and Japanese nations—different but compact, coherent, stable, destined by their history and present character to self-government"; another, including peoples "quite advanced in many respects, but entirely, or almost entirely, stationary, or who have not yet succeeded in establishing united, pacific, and progressive nations," frequently troubled in the regular course of their administration. "British India before the conquest, Java, and Cochin-China are examples of this class"; "finally, a very large portion of the inhabitants of the Asiatic and African continents, addicted to murderous customs, ignorant of regular labor as well as of the arts and sciences, and thinly scattered over immense regions of wilderness."¹ As that author says, only men of the first type are fitted to become colonizers, while they must found their colonies among those who belong more especially to the fourth group; even the races of the third order are frequently not sufficiently docile or submissive to permit colonial enterprises in their midst. To yield to the parent state the rightly expected profits and to reap

(Intro. by Lucas), xlvii; Dilke, Pt. VIII; Seeley, Lect. VII, Course II, entitled "Internal and External Dangers."

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 841 et seq.

from it full reciprocal advantages, not only the aborigines, but even the colonists themselves, must be willing to bear many burdens; above all the former should be amenable to discipline, to regular forms of government, to reformed methods of life, and to reasonable primary instruction in the ordinary rural occupations and trades.¹ If these conditions do not exist, a long period of turbulence is unavoidable; the natives must then be exterminated or reduced to such numbers as to be readily controlled, and in this process, so contrary to civilization, but for its sake, the mother country must inevitably expend much treasure and blood.

The soil of the colony must be new; it must be fallow to the ploughshare; forests should exist and rivers be plentiful; fish and game should be unlimited; in short, the first settlers must there find all the prime necessities of existence. Hardships there will be, but to steady, energetic efforts the fields must respond, producing abundantly. Climate also is a great consideration; salubrious latitudes, free from fever and pestilence, are the most easily colonized.² Land must be cheap and readily obtainable, so that human endeavors be not handicapped.³ At the same time, while the establishment must be capable of growing sufficient food for the support of its own inhabitants, it must likewise furnish considerable quantities of such articles to be shipped to the home country, there to be exchanged for the luxuries of life. A community necessarily cannot in the first few years of its existence have many or varied manufactures; it must buy many goods and wares; and naturally its people will turn for them to the protecting nation.

The same rule applies to capital. The colony within itself

¹ For treatment of natives, cf. De Lanessan, Ch. IV and V, also 24-26, 43-46; Dilke, Pt. VI, who shows the necessity of docility on their part; also Ch. IV and V, entitled "Labor Problems in the Tropics."

² It is noteworthy that colonists seek the same or warmer climates as a rule, De Lanessan, 31-33; for requirements in the matter of soil, etc., *ibid.* 33-41, 43-46.

³ For the importance of plenty of good land, cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 444 et seq.; Merivale, 381-486; Leroy-Beaulieu, 754-771; De Sismondi, "Pol. Econ.," II, 112-114.

must lack financial resources. The metropolis rightly expects to find there opportunity for investment and legitimate speculation. The prosperity and general good feeling of both depend upon this reciprocal exchange of products and money, in excess within the one, deficient in the other. The supply and demand in the state and in the dependency must, in a measure, be correlative. They must to a great extent be capable of providing for their mutual needs, material, moral, and intellectual; hence intercourse, trade, and commerce should be free and untrammelled. On this basis alone a permanent connection can be assured. Throughout history, therefore, the colony the most distant from the mother country and the most unlike in climatic and agricultural conditions has always proved the most successful, prosperous, and remunerative. Competition between the two is thus at a minimum, and the markets of each are the more open to the other.¹

Another important element, from a national standpoint, in the choice of a region for colonization, — whenever such an occasion presents itself to a people, — is its strategic value. Military and naval considerations may outweigh other deficiencies; they must then, however, be so evident, and the part of national territory to be defended must be so exposed, as not to permit any serious doubt of the advantages to be gained.

Reference must finally be made to a further problem necessary of solution as quickly as the dominant power has assumed control, and before it can anticipate any confidential relationship with the individuals lately brought under its authority. Political economists lay down the rule that the language and laws of state and colony must be uniform. This question is of special import when the land to be colonized is already inhabited by a race somewhat above the level of barbarism. It means, then, that much greater energies must be put forth to supplant the existing statutes, dialects, and customs by new ideas of justice, a different tongue, and reformed manners, than

¹ For this aspect of colonization, cf. R. and J. 7 et seq.; for discussion of trade and colonization, Leroy-Beaulieu, 712-736; R. and J. 417-469; for the progress of wealth in colonies, Merivale, 564-584; Leroy-Beaulieu, 784-800,

would be required to train minds undrilled in any school. To teach from the foundation upward is much simpler than to eradicate false notions, prejudices, and beliefs previously acquired.¹ Whatever be the degree of intellectual advancement in the dependency, its native citizens must be taught to respect the institutions of their protectors.

But what now of the colonists? The true colonist is here contemplated; he who, as a pioneer, goes forth from the land of his birth to seek a home under strange skies. What class of society furnishes the most desirable settlers?² What are the qualifications of emigrants best adapted to colonial life? They must in the first instance be imbued with the traits of their own nation; they must be truly patriotic, above selfishness and below socialism; sturdiness of character and firmness of conviction are their two chief needs. As in the case of our own origin, when men were ready to sacrifice friends, families, and estates to brave the harsh New England winters and the burning summer suns of the South, so those seeking abodes beyond the sea must always be willing to bear hardship. The medium grade of society is the most suitable element for new communities.³ On the one hand not inured to ease, nor on the other weighed down by destitution, the middle-class citizen is the most easily transformed into the model colonist. He knows how to exercise to a reasonable degree both his brains and his hands. It is a false impression that one of the factors thus typified—labor or education—alone can assure prosperity. To direct the course of distant enterprises intelligence is required, while every one must be eager to join in manual exertion.⁴ The experience of nations has shown that establishments organized by, or for the most part composed of, wealthy men or the scions of nobility have with difficulty,

¹ *Supra*, p. 15, note 4. For a discussion of the treatment of native races, cf. Merivale, 486-563; Leroy-Beaulieu, 818-823.

² R. and J. 6 et seq.; 18; J. B. Say, "Pol. Econ.," 400 et seq.

³ R. and J. 35.

⁴ The labor problem has always been one of the most important colonial questions; for its discussion, cf. Merivale, 253, 381; Leroy-Beaulieu, 771-784; Ireland, 128-216.

if at all, survived their founders' indifference to the value of toil; on the contrary, settlements created by poverty-stricken persons have seldom ever cohered long enough to amass the riches essential to the development of their internal resources. A due sufficiency or moderate standard of fortune is ordinarily first requisite to carry the emigrant to his adopted home, and upon his arrival there strongly conduces to the probability of his industry, thrift, and permanence. These three characteristics should distinguish the settler in his new life. He must be active, not only for the sake of himself, but for the benefit of the colony.¹ Idleness brings success neither to the individual nor to the community. Thrift is the necessary complement of activity; afar from his fatherland and friends, the colonist must accumulate for his old age and for the support of his family. Permanence is the inevitable result of activity and thrift; nor is it less than either of them a condition of colonial prosperity. Without these intrinsic qualifications on the part of their founders, outposts will never grow into towns; public improvements will never be constructed, roads opened, harbors deepened, railways built, not to mention any of the other durable, material, social, and intellectual institutions and forces which are to be generated in a nascent colony.² Even-minded, honest, sturdy, and persevering pioneers are needed for these tasks, men unshrinking before hardship, undaunted before toil; such were our own forefathers; and such as they — the glorious type of successful colonists — alone can inaugurate new nations and create for the world enduring empires.³

¹ Merivale, 73 et seq., 336 et seq.

² For society and the local institutions of colonies, cf. Merivale, 591-622.

³ The qualities necessary for success abroad are much the same as those required at home. Lucas says, "Strong healthy nations like healthy human beings must grow. They can grow in two ways — either by simply enlarging their limits at home or by taking possession of distant and less civilized parts of the world," Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), x; cf. also J. B. Say, 401. For the evil influences of adventurers and convicts on new colonies, De Sismondi, II, 117-120. Lucas has also shown that a new feeling toward colonization is arising throughout the civilized world. Seeley emphasizes this change; while Ireland points out that the modern conception of a colony does not date back more than about fifteen years.

After the establishment of the colony, many important problems are at once presented for the decision of the citizens of the parent state.¹ The military, economic, moral, social, and political questions connected with colonial administration are multiple;² it is not the purpose here to detail them, for only one general topic may be mentioned; attention can alone be briefly directed to the consideration of the chief attributes requisite for permanent rule. Patience in awaiting results and justice in the treatment of the people, whether natives or emigrants, are the two principal characteristics required of the mother country. The greater number of colonial failures have been due to haste and imprudence. Time is the sole medium of knowledge. A colony is not born nor developed in a day; before a fair estimate can be made of its value a considerable period must elapse. Bacon has said that at least thirty years must pass before judgment can be given. Special reasons often contribute to render a settlement temporarily prosperous, under the influence of excitement, pride, and false stimulation, which cannot be long maintained. A colony may, just like a mining town, transiently succeed, and then subsequently wither and fade. Frequently those which at first seemed to have the least anticipation of growth have, by reason of forbearance and just administration on the part of the dominant power, yielded, in the long run, the best returns and attained the highest degree of fortune.³ Nor can one people draw a conclusion from the results obtained by others. Some races,

¹ The most comprehensive work on these questions is "Problems of Greater Britain," by Sir Charles W. Dilke (London, 1890).

² For a discussion of some of them, cf. Rosscher and Jannasch, "Colonies and Colonial Policy," 56 et seq., where the price of land, interest rates, wages, political, social, agricultural, and other questions are briefly discussed; also *ibid.* 70 et seq., 93 et seq., 116 et seq.

³ As illustrative of these facts the early history of the Spanish colonies in South America may be cited as showing how such settlements may temporarily flourish by reason of some peculiar and ephemeral influence; on the other hand Canada may be recalled as a colony which at first appeared to have very poor prospects, but which subsequently, after the inauguration of a more liberal form of administration, exceeded all original anticipations. For some of the causes which contribute to permanent colonial prosperity, cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 444 et seq.

it is admitted, are the better adapted for colonizing work.¹ A community without prospects, unsuccessful or mediocre in the hands of one state, may flourish under the control of another. Moderation is not less an element of equity than of good government. A country headlong to secure quick profits from its possessions is inevitably led to forget their real lasting interests. Laws are made for the day without regard to the future. Colonial wealth is ruthlessly extracted, stolen, and wasted; the natives are exterminated; the rights of the colonists themselves are violated.² Governors and subordinates are selected, judged by their fitness speedily to fill the coffers of the nation; but it is forgotten or overlooked that, while collecting the taxes so hated by the colonists, they are for themselves amassing private riches, until it becomes a common byword that justice is not to be found in their provinces. The management of colonies offers a tremendous temptation to unscrupulous adventurers, to men who, heedless of the dependency's claims and of their own country's ultimate prosperity, seek only personal aggrandizement, for there it is so much easier than at home to accomplish such ends.³

Unfortunately, but too truly, throughout history the record of colonization has been often marred not less by the oppression of the weak than by the profligacy of the powerful. Only such nations, indeed, as have reasonably well controlled the action and conduct of their officials have had successful careers in their enterprises. The organization and maintenance of a colonial government exempt from corruption and sufficiently free to please the colonists, as well as strong enough to secure adequate returns to the parent state, form, therefore,

¹ An example in point would be the colonial record of New York, which under Dutch rule only stagnated, but which, as soon as transferred to the English Crown, began to prosper; Canada also would again be a good illustration, the two periods of its history respectively under France and England strongly attesting the statement made in the text.

² It must never be forgotten, "It is exceedingly rare that a colony furnishes a net profit to the mother country; in infancy it cannot, in maturity it will not." — LEROY-BEAULIEU, 737; 737-746.

³ The administration of the colonies of Spain and of those of England on the American continent is illustrative of this contrast.

most difficult problems.¹ The elaboration and perpetuation of a proper administration require of the citizens of the metropolis the possession of great knowledge, the exercise of profound sagacity, the frequent sacrifice of apparent self-interest to the probabilities of the future, and the wisdom to realize that such conservative action—although seemingly without immediate results—may contain the germs of subsequent welfare and really be not the less in the interest of the country than of the colony.

From this brief statement of the various requisites and conditions, essential to model colonization, few conclusions of experience can be drawn. Had all these theories been practised in reference to the colonial establishments of the past and present, oppression, discontent, rebellion, and revolution would never have ensued. How far and in what respects the facts of history vary from the doctrines of philosophy will be demonstrated in the course of the succeeding chapters.

¹ To the subject of administration almost all writers on political economy and colonial policy—such as Dilke, Seeley, Leroy-Beaulieu, Merivale, and Ireland—devote considerable attention. A more or less full discussion will be readily found; for these reasons specific references here seem hardly necessary or useful. Lewis, "The Government of Dependencies," is a standard work.

PART I

ANTIQUITY

CHAPTER I

EARLIEST COLONIZATION

EXCHANGE and barter seem to have constituted the oldest phases of mercantile activity. One man found advantage in turning over his surplus products to his neighbor, taking in return some needed article which the latter could not, by reason of his plentiful supply, consume. Both parties soon realized the mutual benefits arising from such action, and interchange of wares became the common rule. A short time after these first separate transactions, the primitive outlines of general traffic may be recognized. As the centres of population grew more numerous and more crowded, villages, towns, cities, and nations came into existence. The habits of the individual developed into the customs of the community. Trade was born.¹

The prehistoric peoples naturally had very little nautical skill, and hence ventured seldom, if ever, upon large bodies of water. The most ancient races of mankind probably resided in the interior, and did not possess any knowledge of the oceans; to them the rivers were indeed almost insuperable barriers; consequently the transportation of commodities was then restricted to land routes, while even such highways as existed were comparatively short and unimportant. Business was certainly not much more than local until the origin of navigation; the subsequent extension of both has been more

¹ Genesis xxvii. 25; for an account of the beginnings of trade, cf. De Goguet, "The Origin of Laws, Arts and Sciences," I, 277; for some details of early Egyptian traffic, its methods, incidents, and difficulties, cf. Maspero, I ("The Dawn of Civilization"), 323; several instances of the exchange of wares are found in the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey." India seems to have been the earliest seat of trade; in remote ages it was apparently the source of supplies—especially products of industry—for the more western regions.

or less parallel. The inception of seafaring is in fact obscured in the myths of antiquity; but from the time of the inauguration of this means of locomotion, it inevitably exercised a potent influence; its ease, rapidity, and advantages were soon apparent. Improvements in the construction and management of boats were slowly made, but nevertheless the tide of humanity rapidly turned toward the sea. Maritime states increased in power, and acquaintance with that element was recognized as indispensable for national prosperity.¹

Modern authorities show the early Egyptians to have been both hardy and adventurous.² In the time of the Fifth Dynasty³ they were familiar with the deep; they knew of the lands beyond, and had some intercourse with those living on the farther coasts. Their ships were commodious and adapted to lengthy voyages.⁴ They themselves were not unversed in foreign commerce; even the lumber of which their vessels were constructed was imported from the shores of Asia Minor; for Egypt then, as now, was deficient in forests.⁵ Amber and bronze seem also to have come from over the waters. The caravan trade with the races of the East was equally flourishing. To the south the Egyptians were extending their domain, gradually imposing their nominal sov-

¹ For brief account of early navigation, cf. Lenthéric, "La Grèce et l'Orient en Provence," 67-92; De Goguet, I, 277, 302.

² For Egyptian history consult the works of Professor Maspero, "The Dawn of Civilization," "The Struggle of the Nations," and "The Passing of the Empires"; also the "History of Egypt" by W. M. Flinders Petrie, and Von Ranke, "Universal History."

³ Maspero approximates the period of this dynasty between 3990-3804 B.C., I, 389 (note); Petrie says 3721-3503 B.C., "History of Egypt," I, 68.

⁴ For an illustration of an early Egyptian vessel, cf. Mas. I, 195, 393; Petrie, II, 12. After describing the construction of an Egyptian ship, Maspero says: "Its complement consisted of some fifty men, oarsmen, sailors, pilots, and passengers. Such were the vessels for cruising or pleasure. The merchant ships resembled them, but they were of heavier build, of greater tonnage, and had a higher freeboard. They had no hold; the merchandise had to remain piled up on deck, leaving only just enough room for the working of the vessel. They nevertheless succeeded in making lengthy voyages and in transporting troops into the enemies' country, from the mouths of the Nile to the south coast of Syria." — MASPERO, I, 392.

⁵ Pliny, XVI, 76, 35; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 75; in prehistoric times forests existed; Petrie, I, 4.

ereignty upon the tribes which dwelt in those regions. Traders appear to have made journeys to Pûanît and to have brought thence stores of precious wares.¹ Papi I of the Sixth Dynasty² opened and operated the mines of that locality.³ Under him and his immediate successors conquest was persistently pursued, so that the Egyptian frontier was pushed farther and farther up the Nile.⁴ Then a dark age intervened; from the Sixth to the Twelfth Dynasty the course of events is shrouded in mystery.⁵

When the veil lifts, the Egyptians have just overthrown the supremacy which the Heracleopolitans had usurped over them.⁶ With the Twelfth Dynasty traffic again resumes its pristine activity.⁷ Great prosperity prevailed during this period, comprising about two centuries.⁸ Commercial relations were re-

¹ Mas. I, 390-398. "Having traced the dynastic race so far, we can more readily value the strong resemblance between them and the people of Pun, a country at the south end of the Red Sea. The Egyptians called Pun 'the land of the Gods'; and they do not appear to have made war on the Punite race, but only to have had a peaceful intercourse of embassies and commerce. The name of the Puni people appears to be connected with the Pœni or Phœnicians, who in later times founded the Punic colony of Carthage. The Philistines, who are probably a branch of this race, are also on the monuments very similar to the Egyptians and Punite type." — PETRIE, I, 12-13.

² Sixth Dynasty, 3503-3335 B.C., Petrie, I, 86.

³ Mas. I, 421; Petrie, I, 89-96.

⁴ Mas. I, 416-440; Petrie, I, 86-107, 106; expedition of Una overland, about 3350 B.C., to secure stone for building operations, when it became necessary to build a boat for part of the return journey, Petrie, I, 94 et seq.; another expedition to Pûanît, *ibid.* I, 100.

⁵ Mas. I, 440-442; Petrie, I, 108-144; the events of this period are gradually being unravelled.

⁶ Mas. I, 117 et seq.

⁷ Petrie, in mentioning an Egyptian expedition to Pûanît, which occurred about 2800 B.C. (Eleventh Dynasty), cites a contemporaneous inscription: "On reaching the coast, vessels were built to transport the men;" apparently along the shore at the south end of the Red Sea, "History of Egypt," I, 141.

⁸ "It lasted 213 years, 1 month, and 27 days, and its history can be ascertained with greater certainty and completeness than that of any other dynasty which ruled over Egypt." — MASPERO, I, 468. About 2778 to 2565 B.C., Petrie, I, 145; comparing this dynasty with the Fifth, the latter author says, "It is singular how parallel the two cycles of development run one with another; but such seems to be the course of government in its growth and fall in all ages; and growth, prosperity, foreign wars, glory, and decay succeed each other as the seasons of the great year of human organization," "History of Egypt," I, 199.

newed with the East and the South; quantities of merchandise were purchased abroad, while wealth and civilization increased. The gold mines on the Sinaitic peninsula were once more worked; regular colonies were possibly established, and every few years an expedition was sent thither to bring back the highly prized metal. Nubia was conquered by Usertesen I; the yellow ore was found also to exist there;¹ a military force went out annually to collect from the natives whatever they had extracted since the preceding visit. Pûanit was still the objective point of numerous trading adventures, both by land and by sea. While foreign traffic was thus fostered, the domestic needs of the country were not forgotten; palatial structures were erected, canals were built, works of irrigation undertaken, and agriculture generally promoted.² The fertility of the Egyptian soil is proverbial; the crops were always sufficient to supply ordinary demands.³ Notwithstanding all the hostile and mercantile energy which was directed to distant regions, there seems very little probability of any real colonial endeavor during this era.

Again Egypt is hidden in obscurity; for nearly one thousand years⁴ the continuity of the historical narrative, as reconstructed by modern scholarship, is broken.⁵ Only after the expulsion of the Shepherd Kings⁶ the perspective becomes

¹ "This was the Nubian gold, which was brought into Egypt by nomad tribes, and which the Egyptians themselves, from the time of the Twelfth Dynasty onward, went to seek in the land which produced it. They made no attempt to establish permanent colonies for working the mines as at Sinai, but a detachment of troops was despatched nearly every year to the spot to receive the amount of precious metal collected since their previous visit." — MASPERO, I, 481.

² Usertesen III (about 2650 B.C.) reconstructed a great canal and made a warlike expedition on it, Petrie, I, 179; 145-199; Amenemhat III (2622-2578 B.C.) reclaimed considerable land from overflow and regulated the course of the Nile. "Colonies of soldiers and their families were settled on the newly reclaimed land; towns and temples sprang up as the lake (Moeris) receded. . . ." *Ibid.* I, 192; Mas. I, 469-528.

³ For description of fertility of Egypt, cf. Mas. I, 64 et seq.; De Goguet, II, 89.

⁴ From 2565 to 1587 B.C., Petrie, I, 252.

⁵ More and more details of this epoch are coming to light, Mas. I, 528-537; Petrie, I, 200-247; II, 1-24.

⁶ For the period of the Hyksos (about 2098-1587 B.C.), cf. Mas. II, 50-89; Petrie, I, 233-240; II, 16-24.

clearer. Thutmosis I, of the Eighteenth Dynasty, certainly invaded Syria, although his authority over the greater part of his dominions was seemingly not very firmly fixed.¹ Hatshepsut or Maatkara, his daughter, maintained the glorious reputation of her father, rearing many imposing monuments, constructing interior waterways, and reopening the mines of Sinai.² Her most celebrated action was the despatch of a fleet of five vessels to the land of Pûanit, of which voyage evidence is afforded by a sculptural record. The ships brought back a valuable cargo and vastly added to the renown of the queen.³ Thutmosis III⁴ more thoroughly perfected the task of conquest and subjection which his predecessors had begun.⁵ Egyptian supremacy, although generally recognized, was not burdensome. Territories were not annexed, but tribute was exacted.⁶ Hostages were retained by the Pharaohs as pledges for obedience, and vassal princes were invested with and relieved of their functions at discretion. Taxation was the measure of loyalty, devastation of country and loss of power were the penalties for insubordination.⁷ During this epoch commerce, notwithstanding the multiple risks and dangers, was revived, extended, and, it may well be said, primitively organized. Custom-houses existed, foreign agents are to be noted, and some official regulations were enforced.⁸ The monarchs immediately succeeding to the throne were not especially distinguished, while their reigns were brief; for, within a few years after the zenith of its splendor,⁹ the Eighteenth

¹ Mas. II, 209-235; Petrie, II, 57-71.

² Mas. II, 236-254; Petrie, II, 73-96; her reign lasted approximately 1516-1481 B.C.

³ Mas. II, 245-252; Petrie, II, 82 et seq.; Von Ranke, I, 11 et seq.; this expedition to the "Ladders of Incense" was primarily to obtain a peculiar aromatic gum for religious worship, Mas. I, 245-246; it reminds us somewhat of the later search for spices.

⁴ Maspero says he reigned 1550-1490 B.C.; Petrie fixes it 1503-1449 B.C.

⁵ Mas. II, 254-289; Petrie, II, 97-152.

⁶ For some account of the tribute exacted, cf. Petrie, II, 109-123.

⁷ Mas. II, 271-282.

⁸ *Ibid.* 282-288.

⁹ For some description of civilization in Egypt under Thutmosis III, cf. Petrie, II, 145-152; also 179-180.

Dynasty¹ was overthrown; the decadence of Egypt had silently begun.²

Under the Nineteenth Dynasty, campaign followed campaign, magnificent edifices were erected, and wealth was, as previously, drawn from the gold mines; but the peoples of Asia Minor were growing and developing, so that it was to be only a comparatively short interval before they would overwhelm Egypt.³ A period of affluence was now, however, experienced. Trade flourished; ships plied in incredible numbers on the north to and from Phœnicia, while, to the south, the intercourse with Pûânit was active.⁴ Rameses II, the most renowned member of this dynasty, has recently been identified with the Sesostris of the Greeks.⁵ To him Herodotus credited a naval expedition across the Red Sea and an invasion of Syria.⁶ Whatever may be the facts, it is certain that he had a long and glorious career. Soon after his decease the reaction was manifest. Egyptian history is thenceforth for the third time enveloped in oblivion.⁷

Rameses III, a descendant of the old Theban line, was destined to rescue his country from alien oppression, to resuscitate its army and fleet, to send out colonists, and to renew the prosperity of commerce.⁸ All these efforts were nevertheless unavailing; for his successors quickly dwindled into insignificance. With the end of the Twenty-first Dynasty the supremacy of the Egyptians seems to have once more entered into eclipse, but that imperceptible, silently working influence of customs and habits was still strongly to act upon those

¹ Duration of the Eighteenth Dynasty, 1587-1328 B.C. (?), Petrie, II, 29.

² Mas. II, 289-338.

³ Cf. Petrie, chapter entitled, "Decline of Egypt in Syria," II, 259-321.

⁴ Mas. II, 407-408.

⁵ *Ibid.* 426-427.

⁶ Herodotus, II, 102; Diodorus, I, 64.

⁷ Mas. II, 340-450, 440.

⁸ "He strengthened the garrison of Sinai, and encouraged the working of the ancient mines in that region. He sent a colony of quarrymen and of smelters to the land of Attika (Gebel-Ataka) in order to work the fields of silver which were alleged to exist there. He launched a fleet on the Red Sea and sent it to the country of fragrant spices." — MASPERO, II, 474.

racés which had been subject to their rule.¹ Involved in constant domestic and foreign struggles, few of the subsequent monarchs, prior to the Assyrian conquest, are remarkable. Bocchoris, who died about 720 B.C., although still famed for his wisdom, has lost much of the halo of glory with which early historians formerly invested him.² About 693 B.C. Taharqua, of Ethiopia, invaded and subdued the land. A great builder and a tenacious fighter, he finally fell in 670 B.C. before the victorious hosts of Esarhaddon. Egypt, thenceforth divided and administered as dependent provinces, received Assyrian governors and paid tribute to the conqueror. Confusion prevailed among the numerous petty states along the Nile.³

The period of thralldom was, however, to be brief; after some ten years, marked by many ineffectual rebellions, the country again found in Psammeticus I a deliverer. His reign (659-611 B.C.) is distinguished by the reannexation of Thebes, the revival of nationality, the reconstruction of public works, the reorganization of government, and the first settlement of the Greeks upon the shores of Africa.⁴ Necho II, who next succeeded to the throne, was not as illustrious as his father; carrying war into Syria, he there met defeat at the hands of Nebuchadrezzar. Still, in history his fame may be more enduring, for to his spirit of enterprise the earliest voyage around the Cape of Good Hope (604 B.C.) is probably attributable. He not only rehabilitated the Egyptian army and navy, but seems also to have been the promoter of some hardy mariners who, the first, braved the tempestuous waters of the Southern Ocean.⁵ Under Apries (589-569 B.C.) the Egyptians sent a fleet against the Phœnician coasts,⁶ routed their rivals on the sea, sacked Sidon, and captured several neigh-

¹ Mas. II, 453-566.

² For a plate of King Bocchoris, like Solomon, giving judgment between two women, rival claimants for a child, cf. Mas. III, 233-246.

³ *Ibid.* 360-386, 295, 371 et seq., 385 et seq.

⁴ *Ibid.* 425, 488-506, 512.

⁵ To him is also credited the construction of a canal connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, Grote, III, 148, based on Herodotus, II, 153, and IV, 42; Mas. III, 512, 532, 533.

⁶ Diod. Sic. I, 68; Herodotus, II, 161.

boring cities.¹ This triumph encouraged the victors to turn their arms against the Greek colony of Cyrene, which since its foundation by Battus had rapidly risen to opulence. Tempted by cupidity of the possible spoil, they determined to destroy this establishment; but the issue was disastrous. Apries suffered a repulse,² a revolution followed, and Egypt under Amasis was again on the verge of ruin,³ for the East was filled with awe. Cyrus had overthrown the empire of Media; and Cambyses, his successor, in 525 B.C. accomplished the downfall of the kingdom of the Pharaohs.⁴

Egypt was henceforth a Persian satrapy, yielding homage and paying tribute to its new lord. With the exception of a few brief insurrections,—of varying intensity and success,—this land for two hundred years continued to be ruled by foreign princes. After the short period of connection with Greece under Alexander the Great,⁵ and upon the rise of the Ptolemies (323 B.C.) the nation regained not only independence but prestige.⁶ Until the death of Cleopatra (30 B.C.), when it became a Roman province, Egypt was once more at the height of power. The Ptolemies overran Cyprus, allied themselves with Rhodes, and had close relations with Greece; to which results the Greek element in the population decidedly contributed. The Black Sea was opened to Egyptian ships and the trade with India was prosecuted with vigor. A canal joining the Mediterranean and the Red Sea was also built; while Alexandria became not only a political and intellectual but likewise a mercantile centre.⁷

Whether or not Egypt owned distant possessions cannot be definitely determined. Probably, in the real sense of the word, not any colony—unless possibly the Sinaitic mining estab-

¹ Mas. III, 550.

² *Ibid.* 554 et seq.

³ *Ibid.* 556, 557.

⁴ *Ibid.* 657-668.

⁵ *Ibid.* 811, 812; cf. also "A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty," by J. P. Mahaffy, which forms the fourth volume of Professor Petrie's "History of Egypt," 1-24.

⁶ Mas. III, 769 et seq.

⁷ Von Ranke, 466; for the entire Ptolemaic period, cf. Vol. V of Petrie's "History," by J. P. Mahaffy.

lishments and Cyprus¹—can ever be said to have existed. Nevertheless the evidence of the long-enduring maritime activity of the Egyptians, which in recent years has been revealed by the labors of archæologists, strongly tends to support the supposition that they must have employed all the customary means to increase and protect their trade. They have been shown to have rivalled, if not to have anticipated, the Phœnicians on the domain of the sea; they trafficked and bartered with strange peoples. Who can say that they did not avail themselves of all the paraphernalia of a commercial nation? Why may they not have had settlements of merchants—perhaps even garrisons of soldiers—in those shadowy lands to and from which their ships plied for precious ores and fragrant perfumes in the earliest days of antiquity? With due regard to the revolutionary edicts of modern research, it may not be hazardous to presume that some relics, more firmly testifying to a remote colonial system, may yet be discovered. The most remarkable feature of ancient Egyptian history, in view of the extensive territories conquered by the kings, is the apparent indifference of the latter to the retention of the regions thus acquired; seldom endeavoring to impose their permanent control upon other than those districts which immediately adjoined their own former dominions, they limited themselves to the neighborhood of the Red Sea; nor do they appear to have desired to govern those scattered colonists who may have gone to Greece and to more distant places. While some of the first settlers of the Hellenic peninsula, as attested by their worship, arts, sciences, and nomenclature, may have wandered from Egypt,² they never recognized this country as connected with them in commerce or government.

¹ Niebuhr seems inclined to agree with Herodotus that the Colchians were an Egyptian colony, and states his reasons at length, "*Ancient History*," I, 61; Von Schlegel, 219, 221 et seq.; Von Ranke, 466.

² Ancient historians chronicle at a very early date the departure—probably legendary—of some few adventurers for Greece; whether exiles, merchants, or fortune-seekers it is not easy to decide, Herodotus, II, 154; Holm, I, Ch. IX; E. Meyer, 194, 234, 260 et seq., based on Herodotus; for the presumable influence of Egypt on Greece, cf. Niebuhr, "*Ancient History*," I, 68-80; to this series of tales belongs that of Danaus and Cecrops.

Escape from religious persecution or political tyranny, rather than any intentional effort of the state, seems to have been the cause of their migration. Traces of such reasons for self-exile are not entirely lacking, for civil strife was frequent. Whatever the motive and the importance of these movements, it is practically certain that, with the exception of slight advantages in trade, Egypt never exercised any authority over them or derived any benefit, influence, or strength from those of its subjects who perhaps located on the farther shores of the Mediterranean.

While, in grouping together the succession of events in Egypt, the chronological order as to other peoples has necessarily been anticipated, still it is only thus possible consecutively to review the enterprises of this nation. Reverting once more to earlier times, attention must now be directed to the eastward, where the race which first regularly practised colonization was in due course to arise; but, prior to entering upon the discussion of the system adopted by the Phœnicians, it is preferable to glance at the scattered fragments of information concerning this activity disclosed by modern investigators in the records and monuments of the other great empires of the ancient world which were parallel to, even if they did not in part precede, the line of the Egyptian dynasties.

The history of Chaldea, could it be reproduced, would open to the student a narrative the length of which has not yet been measured.¹ Legends of mythical character float darkly around the creation of the human race, the earliest men, the deluge, and the repopulation of the land. According to the Scriptures, Nimrod, "the mighty hunter,"—now identified with the hero Gilgames of Uruk,—is said to have come in the primitive ages—and it may be by sea—to establish a kingdom in lower Mesopotamia.² Subsequently, within the historic era, the Chaldeans slowly developed in nautical skill. Their voyages seem originally to have been limited to the Euphrates and the Tigris; at last, although their boats were very crude in design, as well as in spite of the danger from shipwreck and

¹ Mas. I, 572 et seq., 592 et seq.

² *Ibid.* 574, 590.

capture by hostile tribes, they ventured to sail out on the Persian Gulf.¹ The traders of Uru were the leaders among those hardy adventurers through whose efforts traffic was gradually extended from point to point along the adjacent shores. Chaldea thus received the fine woods, the stones, and the marbles used in the construction of its temples, not less than the perfumes and the gems piously employed in its adoration of the gods.

Babylon, in the days of the first Chaldean empire, was already renowned for its size and splendor; a city which, although at a later date overwhelmed by its Assyrian conquerors,² was destined, two thousand years subsequently, to renewed glory.³

The early epoch of Assyrian supremacy is coincident with the decadence of Egypt after the reign of Rameses III. This country, racked with internal dissensions, was losing its hold on the races to the east of the Red Sea. The preëminence of Babylon was likewise waning. Out of the tumultuous upheavals of rebellious subjects a new state was to come forth.⁴ Tiglath-pileser, who flourished about 1150 B.C., was the first of the Assyrian monarchs whose deeds assume historic reality. The struggle between Chaldea and Assyria was long doubtful; and at intervals both were, by the exhaustion of their vitality, buried in equal oblivion; but ultimately the issue for the latter was to be triumphant.⁵ Soon after the close of the eighth century B.C., Assur-nazir-pal emerges out of the gloom as the founder of the second and more substantial period of national greatness.⁶

Thenceforward his people continued almost uninterruptedly during two hundred years to enlarge the circumference of their influence;⁷ with the conquest of Egypt by Esarhaddon,

¹ Rawlinson, II, 219.

² For fall of Babylon before Sennacherib, cf. Mas. III, 307-309.

³ Mas. I, 590-591, 603; II, 19-27; III, 783.

⁴ *Ibid.* II, 569, 621.

⁵ *Ibid.* II, 642-671.

⁶ *Ibid.* III, 13-51; "In a small town near one of the sources of the Tigris Assur-nazir-pal founded a colony, on which he imposed his name," *ibid.* 15.

⁷ Sargon and Sennacherib were the most distinguished of Esarhaddon's predecessors.

they attained the pinnacle of their power.¹ Under this sovereign and immediately after the accession of his successor, Assur-bani-pal, the empire comprised immense dominions (670–660 B.C.).² Besides its possessions throughout Western Asia, its sway then also reached over Egypt and included Cyprus as a dependency;³ still its constitution was inherently weak, as evidenced by its sudden and unprecedented collapse. At the moment when outward glory was apparently the greatest, Phraortes, the vassal prince of Media, himself the conqueror of the Persians, attacked his feudal lord and lost his life in the fruitless endeavor; but his son, Cyaxares, taking up the task, invaded Assyria, and after overwhelming all opposition humbled Nineveh in the dust (*circa* 608 B.C.). Nabopolassar, who was the local ruler of Babylon, also rebelled. Thus Assyria fell; from its ashes the two mighty realms of Media and Babylonia—the latter more properly known as the second Chaldean empire—arose; Egypt was at that time again free.⁴

The tie of the subject states to the central government of Assyria was always loose and ill defined; usually organized into provinces, each was placed under a governor and garrison; whenever the fortune of arms again extended Assyrian authority in any direction, the newly acquired territory was either subordinated to some neighboring administration or, if sufficiently important, granted separate autonomy.⁵ Moreover subjugated districts were thus attached to almost every province. The sword was the sole claim to supremacy; but, as the frequent periods of decadence testify, even the control thus exercised was ephemeral and limited. The chief effects of the loss of liberty upon the defeated nations consisted in the obligation to do homage, to pay tribute, and to render military service,—in brief, to assist their masters in hostile

¹ Mas. III, 15–322.

² *Ibid.* 323–442, 461–464; more especially for conquest of Egypt, *ibid.* 295, 371, 385, 397, 401.

³ Von Ranke, 65 et seq.; Raw. I, 501; Mas. I, 614–617, 650 et seq.; III, 259–260.

⁴ Mas. III, 454–486.

⁵ *Ibid.* III, 42–43, 193–198, 201–204, 373, 375.

operations against other foes.¹ While the degree of dependency at certain epochs and in different regions more or less varied, it may generally be said that, so long as the lords of secondary rank fulfilled these duties, they remained otherwise practically undisturbed; but in the event of non-compliance, or in the contingency of rebellion, they suffered severe punishment.

From the time of their earliest empire, the Assyrians had the habit of deporting vanquished races from their homes and settling them in remote localities.² At first the custom was, like that afterward adopted by Rome, to bring them within the boundaries of Assyria proper and send forth citizens to replace them in the annexed districts. For a period this system of colonization worked admirably and served to diffuse nationality not less than to consolidate the empire; but subsequently, when the frontiers of Assyria were being advanced with prodigious rapidity, it was found that continuance of the former method of scattering the native people would involve their dispersion over too large an area, their consequent weakness, and the anomaly of introducing into the body politic of the ruling community a factor equally as dangerous by reason of its variety as because of its enmity. Tiglath-pileser III followed the plan of removing the residents of one conquered province to the soil of another and then substituting in their stead those taken from the latter region; thus "he

¹ Von Ranke, 75; Raw. I, 501, 505; for description of the nature of such tribute, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 98 et seq. "The Assyrians ravaged their country, held their chiefs to ransom, razed their strongholds, or, when they did not demolish them, garrisoned them with their own troops, who held sway over the country. The revenues gleaned from these conquests would swell the treasury at Nineveh; the native soldiers would be incorporated into the Assyrian army, and when the smaller tribes had all in turn been subdued, their conqueror would at length find himself confronted with one of the great states from which he had been separated by these buffer communities; then it was that the men and money he had appropriated in his conquests would embolden him to provoke or to accept battle with some tolerable certainty of success." — MASPERO, III, 13.

² Von Ranke, III, 31; Raw. I, 503; Mas. III, 639-642; this system of deportation and forced colonization was likewise practised by the Incas of Peru; for an account of their *mitimæ*s, cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 330. Is this method of deportation not the origin of penal colonization?

transplanted the Arameans of the Mesopotamian deserts and the Kaldâ to the slopes of Mount Amanus or the banks of the Orontes, the Patinians and Hamathæans to Ulluba, the inhabitants of Damascus to Kir or to the borders of Elam, and the Israelites to some place in Assyria."¹ Opinions widely differ as to the effects of this system. All agree that it eradicated sedition and weakened the spirit of local patriotism; some claim that, while the dominant state designed the policy of forced colonization as a means of self-protection, the employment of these methods estranged the affections of the deported peoples, and exposed the metropolis to the risk of their defection in case of foreign invasion.² Others incline to the view that this general diffusion and mingling of vassal nations — many of which were hostile to each other — tended to promote their mutual antipathies and to cause them to regard the Assyrians as their common protectors, thus consolidating and strengthening the empire.³ Whatever be the true theory, it is certain that the sovereign power by its garrisons, governors, and alien colonists never impressed upon the greater part of its acquisitions either language, customs, or laws.

The history of the Medes, prior to the reign of that Phraortes who first challenged the supremacy of Assyria, is still involved in the obscurity of legend.⁴ The conflict with the Scythians, — summoned in terror by Assur-bani-pal to the support of his tottering empire, — is the birth-struggle of Media.⁵ After the expulsion of these uncouth invaders⁶ and the destruction of Nineveh by Cyaxares (606 B.C.)⁷ the Medes, continuing their conquests, rapidly increased in prestige until they finally erected the most important state in that portion

¹ Mas. III, 200; also 186, 199.

² Raw. I, 503 et seq.

³ Mas. III, 200, 201.

⁴ *Ibid.* III, 243, 327, 446-454; Raw. II, 82.

⁵ Raw. I, 493 et seq.; II, 89 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 148 et seq.; the statements of the latter authority in regard to the Scythians are based on Herodotus, I, 103-105. *Query*: Did not these people from the fact of their invasion and residence in a hostile land practise the elementary principles of colonization?

⁶ The text follows Maspero (III, 473-481).

⁷ *Ibid.* III, 484-486, 521-529.

of Asia;¹ their independence was, however, to be of brief duration; for about 550 B.C. the capital city of Ecbatana fell before Cyrus, and thenceforth Persia assumes the leading rôle in the dual hierarchy.²

Their form of control for the conquered districts resembled that of Assyria at the pinnacle of its fortunes; a regular system of dependency was built up. The nearest regions alone were subject to the central government, while the latter intrusted the administration of the more remote provinces to those situated between them and the metropolis. Hence a permanent source of weakness; since Media was less recognized as suzerain by its outlying possessions than their own immediate masters, to whom they were directly responsible for their revenues. Military strength was here again the only effective force of cohesion.³

Chaldea, the ancient, was one of the two principal states which arose from the ruins of Assyrian greatness;⁴ but the length of its second period of glory was scarcely longer than that of its ally and contemporary — Media. In 538 B.C. Cyrus triumphantly entered Babylon; and again in 519 B.C., after an interval of rebellion, Darius recaptured the place.⁵ Notwithstanding the fact of its subjection, first to one and then to another master during many cycles, Babylon is destined always to remain prominent among the cities of antiquity. Some idea of the volume of traffic transacted by the early Chaldeans has already been given;⁶ throughout the ages they were farmers, traders, and sailors;⁷ twenty centuries after they had first navigated the Persian Gulf they pushed their victorious arms to the banks of the Nile. Known by their enemies as the "Hammer of the Whole Earth,"⁸ they seem frequently to have deserved this appellation.

¹ For history of Media, cf. "Media, Babylon, and Persia" (in the "Story of the Nations" series), by Z. A. Ragozin; also Von Ranke, 89 et seq.; Raw. (Third Monarchy); Raw. II, 92 et seq. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 36, 91.

² Mas. III, 600.

³ Raw. II, 116 et seq.

⁴ Mas. III, 486.

⁵ *Ibid.* III, 634-637, 678-682.

⁶ *Supra*, 40-41.

⁷ Raw. II, 166, 218 et seq.

⁸ Jeremiah I. 23; Raw. II, 166.

Agriculture¹ and commerce were their two leading pursuits; the production of grain was enormous, while the cultivation of the date was carried to the highest degree;² industry—especially the making of carpets and the weaving of textiles³—also occupied a large proportion of their energies. Scriptural authorities call Babylonia “a land of traffic,” Babylon “a city of merchants,” and attribute the prosperity of its inhabitants to “their ships.”⁴ The vast quantity of their imports and exports attest their commercial activity. The open ocean was probably not a barrier to their ambition;⁵ so that after their subjugation by the Persians they may very naturally have aided in supplying the demand of their conquerors for seamen. According to the testimony of Strabo, the Chaldeans possessed the port of Gerrha, one of the first real colonies mentioned in history.⁶ This town is said to have been situated on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, and to have been a centre of transportation between Babylon and the South, while considerable of the more northern trade passed through it.

Chaldea, as a government, whenever preëminent, was practically the duplicate of its rivals.⁷ The plan of subordination of the more remote to the nearer provinces was likewise followed; native princes were retained on the thrones of van-

¹ “The Chaldeans carried agriculture to a high degree of perfection, and succeeded in obtaining from the soil everything it could be made to yield.” — MASPERO, I, 770; 761-770.

² Raw. II, 220.

³ Mas. I, 752-759. “Their linen, woollen, and cotton fabrics and their richly ornamental carpets were celebrated throughout the Eastern regions. Their cotton was brought in part from the Persian Gulf. The flocks of sheep tended by the Arabian nomads supplied the wool.” — GROTE, III, 118.

⁴ Ezekiel xvii. 4; Isaiah xliii. 14.

⁵ Raw. II, 219.

⁶ “Nebuchadnezzar also constructed the seaport Teredon at the mouth of the Euphrates, and excavated a ship canal four hundred miles in length, which joined it with Babylon.” — GROTE, III, 119, based on Strabo, XIII, 617; Raw. II, 219.

⁷ “The tie which bound together the petty states of which Uru was composed was the slightest; the sovereign could barely claim as his own more than the capital and the district surrounding it; the other cities recognized his authority, paid him tribute, did homage to him in religious matters and doubtless rendered him military service also, but each one of them nevertheless maintained its particular constitution and obeyed its hereditary lords,” — MASPERO, I, 618.

quished kingdoms; similar tribute and service were exacted. To a still greater extent this system of oppression was enforced. Hardly any effort was made to ameliorate the position of the subjugated nations; while immense treasures, drawn from them, were employed within the central state in the construction of works of public utility and luxury, the development of the metropolis was almost exclusively the aim of its rulers. Other regions were left to their own mutilated and weakened resources, and not anything was done to improve the condition of their agriculture, commerce, or industry. This short-sighted policy was the chief cause of national weakness when peril threatened.¹

The Chaldeans, more than other Asiatic races, if not alone among them, had the genius to sketch the principal outlines of civilization.² From them the Greeks drew deep inspiration in architecture, sculpture, science, philosophy, and mathematics. Although their influence in this respect may be somewhat exaggerated, they certainly rendered invaluable benefits to mankind, and assured humanity of moral, intellectual, and social qualifications broader than it ever could have obtained from other Oriental sources.³

Of the ancient Persians little in this connection need be said. Notwithstanding the importance of their navy,⁴ equipped and manned by sailors drawn from subject states, they held traffic and commerce in contempt. Shops were excluded from the thoroughfares of their cities and the transactions of buying and selling were relegated to obscure quarters. Trade, believed to require falsehood, was regarded as contrary to the spirit of religion.⁵ Persia, therefore, although subsequently powerful, never developed either its own internal riches or those of its dependencies; its dominion was maintained entirely by the sword.⁶

In their organization, all the countries heretofore mentioned

¹ Raw. II, 245 et seq., 258.

² Mas. I, 703-784.

³ Raw. II, 257.

⁴ *Ibid.* 333 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.* 361; in later times, however, these prejudices seem to have disappeared, Duncker, "Gesch. des Alterthums," II. 664.

⁶ Cf. generally: Raw. II, also Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 135, 136; the government of Persia was subsequently very much improved by Darius Hys-

displayed the same characteristic.¹ Military strength was the prime attribute of government. Their various possessions—for such they were more strictly than colonies, so far as records indicate—were secured by force of arms, and not any, or scarcely any, by peaceful and voluntary emigration. Desire for glory and the necessity of conquest on the one hand, or submission to a foreign victor on the other, appear to have been the mainsprings of activity. In the condition of civilization during that era the subjugation of extensive regions and great multitudes to some stronger aggressor obtaining the mastery over them, seems to have been a natural result. Any considerable period of peace was an anomaly; the struggle for preëminence was unending. Of the five great empires,—Egypt, Chaldea, Assyria, Media, and Persia,—one and then another again and again attained the leadership; with every upheaval the former ruling power relapsed into the rank of a province. There was not any fixed or permanent order of society. The alternation of supremacy and dependency was such as to involve almost complete disruption when revolution came.

Let it not be forgotten that the annals of the races respectively dwelling in Egypt and in Western Asia, as just briefly outlined, practically relate to the same epoch. Attention is now to be directed to that people which, although for a long time politically connected with one or the other of the realms the history of which has been reviewed, was the first among nations destined to bequeath to posterity the memory of a vast system of colonization; wherein it set an example universally followed by all important states of ancient and modern times. The story of Phœnicia, the acknowledged forerunner in historic colonial enterprise, rightfully claims special consideration.

taspes, who organized or perfected the satrapal form of administration in the place of the crude methods of Assyria and Babylon. A good description is to be found in Grote, III, 447-453; also Oman, "History of Greece," 136; Mas. III, 686-687; for the slight traces left by Persia after its fall, cf. Mas. III, 813.

¹ Compare with these conquests and methods of rule those of the Peruvians before the arrival of the Spaniards in the New World; Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 325 et seq.

CHAPTER II

PHœNICIAN COLONIZATION

THE chronology of the Phœnicians is parallel to that of the Egyptian dynasties and of the Assyrian empires. From the day when their colonial régime is recognized by history, a well-defined and consecutive narrative of colonization may be traced; the characteristic features of that relationship between a dominant state and its weaker dependences are to be distinguished, and the natural development of policies from age to age, as modified, improved, and ameliorated, is evident. They are thus the earliest ancestors in the genealogy of colonizing nations.

Bounded on the one side by Mount Carmel, on the other by the river Eleutheros, Phœnicia, during the period of its ordinary prosperity, embraced a strip of land about two hundred miles long, and from three to fourteen miles in width, with an area approximating two thousand square miles; a few islands in the adjacent waters completed its territory.¹ To the southward snow-clad Hermon and to the eastward the long receding and gradually rising plateau of modern Syria seemed to threaten the people with expulsion into the Mediterranean. The entire region is noted for its wonderful physical diversity. Up on the steep barren mountain sides and in the higher uncultivated valleys the only individuals to be met are shepherds with their flocks of black goats; down along the narrow belt of seaboard, intersected here and there with lofty ridges, palms and figs are cultivated; while on the lower ranges of the terraced hills, fruitful vineyards, topped

¹ Rollin, "Ancient History," II, 369; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 76 et seq.; Cantu, "Universal History," I, 440.

with mulberry and cedar trees, are seen. The tablelands are cold, deserted, even desolate: but to breathe their air is life-giving; the other districts are fertile, but damp, hot, and insalubrious.¹

In the midst of this variety and combination the forefathers of the Phœnicians located. While on the more immediate coast their descendants at the time of their subsequent affluence dwelt, the original people seem to have come from the rugged country of the South; perchance attracted thither, as Frederick von Schlegel suggests, by the brighter constellations of the northern firmament, or urged forward by some instinctive impulse rather than by any deeply rooted desire for commercial advantage.² With some reasonable degree of assurance they are supposed, in the first instance, to have resided in the neighborhood of the Persian Gulf and to have migrated thence by easy stages.³ The date of their earliest establishments in Phœnicia is sometimes fixed in the year 2800 B.C. Although great doubt has been expressed whether they should be reckoned among the Semite or Hamite races, recent opinion is in favor of the former view. One fact is certain: they are mentioned in the Old Testament as inhabiting the land of Canaan; throughout their career they were also frequently associated with the Hebrews.⁴

Whatever may be the details of their primitive history, several tribes were, in remote antiquity, domiciled in the vicinity of the Mediterranean, some on the slopes and others along the shore. Of those now in question, the Sidonians, whose name means "fishermen," had their abode at the foot of the Lebanon; they possibly were the most ancient settlers in that locality. Farther to the north, the Gíblites, or "mountain dwellers," were found; next to them the Arvadites—

¹ Duncker, I, 136 et seq.; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 169.

² Von Schlegel, "Philosophy of History," 80.

³ "One fact . . . appears to be certain in the midst of many hypotheses, and that is that the Phœnicians had their origin in the regions bordering on the Persian Gulf."—MASPERO, "Struggle of the Nations," 64. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 76; Duncker, "Geschichte des Alterthums," I, 139; Cantu, I, 438; Ragozin, 102; Von Ranke, 65.

⁴ Von Ranke, 60,

otherwise Zahi — occupied a very limited tract.¹ All these communities were situated in a well-watered section, not only rich in woods and meadows, but luxuriant in palms, wines, fodder, and grain.² The Greeks knew them collectively as Phœnicians — a word which means the “red skins,” or “eastern people,” not “inhabitants of the palm land,” as was once believed.³

Still other races lived in the hills in the direction of the Dead Sea.⁴ During the sixteenth century before Christ Thutmosis of Egypt made an expedition against Syria.⁵ Many of the smaller nations, forced to flee before the army of invasion, were then displaced; set in motion by this incursion, they, in turn overrunning the lower districts, obliged those dwelling there to seek relief elsewhere. The migration of these tribes does not seem to have been warlike, but rather friendly, in its character; they were simply avoiding the Egyptian foe and seeking to find protection among their more powerful neighbors, the Philistines and the Phœnicians. The effect — whether peaceful or hostile — could have only one result. Phœnicia, although highly productive of all the necessities of life and many of its luxuries, was already crowded; this increase in numbers — as unexpected as it was unnatural — augmented therefore the demand for food supplies beyond its resources. Alleviation by a reduction of inhabitants was the only solution.⁶

¹ Maspero, “Struggle of the Nations,” 169 et seq., for an account of these tribes and their principal towns; also Strabo, XVI, ii, 13.

² “The Phœnicians naturally took to agriculture, and carried it to such a high state of perfection as to make it an actual science. Among no other people was the art of irrigation so successfully practised, and from such a narrow strip of territory as belonged to them no other cultivators could have gathered such abundant harvests of wheat and barley, and such supplies of grapes, olives, and other fruits.” — MASPERO, “Struggle of the Nations,” 188.

³ Duncker, I, 139 et seq.

⁴ Duncker, I, 140; the Egyptians called all the tribes whom they met Kafiti or Kefâtîû, which term was originally used only “for the people of the sea-coast, more especially of the regions occupied later by the Phœnicians,” Maspero, “Struggle of the Nations,” 120. For some description of the variety of these petty communities, cf. *ibid.* 147 et seq.

⁵ Maspero, “Struggle of the Nations,” 126; *supra*, p. 35.

⁶ Duncker, I, 141; Rawlinson, in his “History of Phœnicia,” 88-90, speaks of the overcrowding as being the natural result of the increase of the population rather than due to the influx of other kindred peoples.

At this early date, Sidon,¹ said to have been founded by and named after the eldest son of Canaan, was the metropolis. Tyre, somewhat later in origin, but ancient at the time of the Egyptian invasion,² lay a little farther to the southward. Opposite to this latter city, on a rocky island, the famous temple of the protecting god, Melkarth, was built. Other important towns were Berytus³—now Beirut—and Byblos belonging to the Giblites, and Arvad to the Arvadites; Arka, Simyra, Marathus, Sarepta, Dor, and Joppa should also not be forgotten.³ Many of these places enjoyed considerable trade and carried on commerce with foreign nations; but until this epoch they had not extensively, if at all, entered upon their policy of colonization. Now they realized the necessity of transporting the surplus population to some remote region; and at the same time they proposed, while thus relieving themselves at home, to render these settlements, from a commercial standpoint, serviceable. Versed, as they were, in nautical science,⁴ they did not hesitate to seek for such establishments some land beyond the sea. Thus the Sidonians deported many of their compatriots to Cyprus and there erected the cities of Citium and Amathus, while numbers also went to Crete.⁵

¹ "The First-born of Canaan," Genesis x. 15; a name meaning a fishing-place.

² Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 183; the foundation of both these cities is obscured in legendary myths; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 78; Von Ranke, 60.

³ Duncker, I, 140; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 188 et seq.; Cantu, I, 440.

⁴ "The epoch, which was marked by their first venture on the Mediterranean, and the motives which led to it were alike unknown to them. The gods had taught them navigation and from the beginning of things they had taken to the sea as fishermen, or as explorers in the search of new lands. . . . It was the nature of the country itself which contributed more than anything else to make them mariners." — MASPERO, "Struggle of the Nations," 191 et seq., and "Dawn of Civilization," 392.

⁵ Duncker, I, 142: "The first colony of which the Phœnicians made themselves masters was that island of Cyprus, whose low lurid outline they could see on fine summer evenings in the glow of the western sky." Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations, 199: "It is not easy to determine the race to which the first inhabitants of the island (Cyprus) belonged if we do not see in them a branch of the Kefâtiâ, who frequented the Asiatic shores of the Mediterranean from a very remote period." *Ibid.* 201.

Besides being skilled mariners, the Phœnicians were an industrious people, renowned both in legend and history for their various manufactures; they especially promoted the useful arts.¹ Commerce, in the more extended meaning of the word, was probably due to their inventive genius.² Favorable winds make the voyage to Cyprus and Rhodes easy; thence Egypt is not far, and from the African shores the current runs toward Asia.³ The early conformation of the Phœnician seaboard, endowed with numerous harbors, was also a condition strongly favoring the development of navigation.⁴ It must be remembered that the tides, setting throughout the ages in this direction, have filled up many formerly excellent havens and naturally changed the coast-line from that of antiquity. Lumber for ship-building was likewise plentiful in the interior hills and on the neighboring mountains.⁵ The inhabitants were not slow to avail themselves of these advantages. Hence there are traditions that they sailed in the time of Abraham to Greece, and even, perhaps, to other more distant regions. Of the nature and extent of their trade at this period and of their methods not any record exists. These myths are only mentioned as tending to prove the high antiquity of their acquaintance with the sea.⁶

With their knowledge and manifold facilities, it is not difficult to appreciate how the Phœnicians quickly embraced the opportunity to extend their influence, as soon as a short experience had taught them the beneficial consequences of such activity. The impulse, once felt, brought rapid results. They had the good fortune to find the ocean, at least comparatively, free; so that they seldom, if ever, had any enemies and probably not any competition on that element.⁷ They wandered, therefore, whithersoever the winds and currents

¹ Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 193.

² Cantu, I, 446 et seq.; Gaston Boissier, "L'Afrique Romaine," 37 et seq.

³ Von Ranke, I, 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 80.

⁶ *Ibid.*; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 192, 194.

⁷ For the little known concerning Egyptian commerce, cf. *supra*, Ch. I; also Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 282, 407, 582.

carried them. Wherever they went, they founded permanent colonies for trade with the natives and as places of refuge for their ships.¹ They not only located in Cyprus and Crete, but also migrated farther northward to Rhodes, Thera, Melos, and Cythera; thus gradually approaching Greece, and obtaining for themselves a complete line of commercial stations together with safe and convenient harbors. * If the story of Herodotus be true, they even reached the island of Thasos, near the Thracian coast.² Not only here, but even more successfully on the adjacent mainland, gold was sought. Cyprus, with its copper ore, was especially important to them; for, with their skill in metal working, they speedily made great profit out of its possession.³ Settlements, all paying their tribute to Sidon, soon multiplied.⁴

Naturally devoted to industry, the Phœnicians were not slow in drawing from the countries brought under their control such raw materials as they deemed useful in their manufactures. They also perceived that the agricultural deficiencies of their own overcrowded land could be supplied by the products of these regions. They traded their dyes, clothing, and weapons for grain and cattle.⁵ Phœnicia, thus partially provided with food from abroad, it was seen, could sustain with ease its surplus of residents, and was enabled, as a result of the demands of the uncultured tribes, to give a

¹ Rollin, II, 367; *post*, p. 60-61; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 194; R. and J. 10; the Phœnician trading establishments are, in fact, to be compared to the more modern so-called "factories," *ibid.* 13.

² Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 202 et seq.; Duncker, I, 142; for influence of the Phœnicians upon Greece, cf. Holm, "History of Greece," I, Ch. IX; the legends of Cadmus, of the founding of Thebes in Bœotia, and those of Minos and of Europa in Crete, seem to indicate connection in very early times between Phœnicia and Greece.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 78; Duncker, I, 142; Herodotus, VI, 47; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 199.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 76; Cantu, I, 458 et seq. "The Phœnicians were also accustomed to send caravans into regions which they could not reach in their caracks and to establish trading stations at the fords of rivers or in the passes over mountain ranges. We know of the existence of such emporia at Laish, near the source of the Jordan, at Thapsacus and at Nisibis, and they must have served the purpose of a series of posts on the highways of the world." — MASPERO, "Struggle of the Nations," 193.

⁵ Duncker, I, 143.

wider range to its own activities. Not merely the difficulty of supporting its increased population was overcome, but it was now possible to give all regular and profitable employment. The merchandise brought back by Phœnician ships was not merely destined for home consumption. Situated almost alone on the coast of a densely inhabited district, with immense empires to the eastward and southward, these people were soon destined to become the intermediaries of traffic between the East and the West,¹ between the old world of Asia and Africa and the new world of the Mediterranean, just being opened through their endeavors. Egypt, Babylon, and Judea became the chief purchasers of the articles received from their newly acquired domains. Thus Phœnicia not only found means to satisfy its own needs, but at the same time developed into the market-place of all races.²

The political influence of the Phœnicians then became important; but their power, although extensive, might have been greater, for they were not a conquering nation. In their treatment of the aborigines, so far as recorded, they rarely fought them, but rather sought with gifts and promises to maintain friendly relations, thence their reputation for wisdom and prudence.³ They never, in the true sense of the word, turned their eyes to conquest. Trade, not territorial aggrandizement, was their aim;⁴ and consequently their possessions were left practically independent in their connection with the parent state. Such was their policy from earliest antiquity.

About 1300 B.C. another tremendous impetus was given to colonial enterprise by the migration of the Hebrews, who, then coming over the Jordan,⁵ pushed the neighboring tribes into this overcrowded land. The exodus from Phœnicia again took a westerly direction. Efforts were made, not only to find habitable regions, but likewise to locate settlements at points

¹ Von Ranke, I, 60; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 80; Cantu, I, 457 et seq.; Gaston Boissier, "L'Afrique Romaine," 53 et seq.

² For excellent description of Phœnician trade, cf. Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 188-206, 407, 582.

³ Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 195.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 80.

⁵ Duncker, I, 144.

most favorable to commerce and to the sale or exchange of Phœnician products,¹ for these people had already learned the lesson of seeking trade. Hence on the more distant coasts of the Mediterranean they determined to build ports and provide harbors, even though it were necessary for their maintenance to protect them with the sword.² Westward they steered their ships through unknown seas and discovered Sicily. Motya on one of the western peninsulas, and Rus Melkarth — subsequently the Greek Heraclea — on the south, together with Solocis and Machanath — the site of the modern Palermo — on the north, became their principal establishments. Malta was also occupied by them; ruins of temples to the patron goddess, Astarte, still exist there. All these places were under the rule of the inhabitants of Sidon. Tyrian colonists landed on Sardinia, where their headquarters were Caralis, the present Cagliari; other islands of the Mediterranean were equally visited by them. Nor was the African mainland overlooked. Not only Hippo, but also Utica (1100 B.C.), and Carthage³, at a somewhat later date (880–826 B.C.), were founded by Phœnician emigrants. Leptis and Hadrumetum were likewise respectively settled by Sidonians and Tyrians.⁴

Once entered upon the domain of the sea, these hardy mariners knew not any bounds to their ambition. Ever and ever westward and still farther westward they sailed, until they arrived at the Pillars of Hercules. The gods dwelt beyond; as they believed, the ends of the world and of the infinite met there. Without the consent of the deities they dare not proceed. Disembarking therefore on the coast of Africa, they,

¹ Cantu, I, 462.

² This advance of the Phœnicians into the western Mediterranean was largely attributable to the loss of their establishments in the Ægean Sea, and the consequent decline of their trade in that region, due to piratical expeditions, which were multiplying; cf. Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 585; "Passing of the Empires," 281.

³ Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 280; Carthage is reckoned as an agricultural colony; Rosscher and Jannasch, 21.

⁴ For some account of the Phœnicians in, on, and around the Gulf of Lyons, cf. Charles Lenthéric, "Les Villes Mortes du Golfe de Lyon," 89 et seq.; also Duncker, I, 144 et seq.; Cantu, I, 461; Von Ranke, I, 60; Gaston Boissier, 40; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 586.

under the shadow of Mount Calpe, offered up sacrifice; but in vain, for the divinities were unpropitious. Whether the ocean was too rough or these ancient sailors were too timid, it is said, that two successive expeditions returned to Phœnicia without having passed the Rock of Gibraltar. A third and more successful fleet penetrated the Atlantic, and, keeping close along the Spanish shores, reached the mouth of the Guadalquivir. Here the Phœnicians located, about 1100 B.C., the outpost of Gadeira or Gades, the forerunner of the city of Cadiz.¹ In this region, it is recorded, they discovered many rabbits² and much silver. From the first circumstance they named the country Spain, the word in their language meaning "full of rabbits"; while by the second fact they were strongly influenced to make this settlement more than usually important. All statements agree that, in that age, silver abounded in Spain. Nor did this metal alone constitute its sole mineral wealth; copper, iron, and lead were plentiful. Gold also existed. Of the vast quantities of silver, supposed by tradition to have been found there at that era, the Greek poets give a glowing account; "rivers of the liquid metal, mountains of the solidified ore; forests and meadows covered with silver; silver, silver, silver everywhere in the land beyond the Pillars of Hercules," is their universal testimony. The prudent Strabo corroborates the plenty of natural, mineral, and metallurgical resources;³ fish and agricultural products were also abundant.⁴

A new epoch then opened for the Phœnicians. In the vicinity of the Lebanon, and in some of their early outposts, they had already practised mining, and were consequently somewhat accustomed to the extraction of metals from the soil; but never previously had such opportunities been presented to their genius and their industry as in the Iberian

¹ More exactly Tartessus, slightly to the southwest of Cadiz; Diodorus, V, 345; Von Ranke, I, 60; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 77, 79; Duncker, I, 145; Cantu, I, 458; E. Meyer, I, 338 et seq.; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 740; "Passing of the Empires," 281.

² Strabo, III, 213, 214, 256; also Pliny, VIII, 43, 83; and Varro, "De Re Rustica," III, Ch. XIII; the Hebrew word for "rabbit" is said to be very similar to that of the Phœnicians.

³ Strabo, III, 224.

⁴ Duncker, I, 145 et seq.

Peninsula. At first they simply traded, like the Spaniards subsequently in Peru, giving the poor, untutored savages mere tawdry trifles in exchange for vast riches. When, however, the aborigines observed the anxiety to obtain this wealth, they hoarded their store; or perhaps, indeed, after a time, it had become exhausted. Then the Phœnicians pushed inland, overran the southern districts, and laid the foundations of many future cities. They located mines, seized possession of them and worked them, or forced the natives to labor in search of the precious ores. A silver current flowed across the seas and poured upon the shores of Phœnicia. Returning ships carried valuable cargoes to Tyre and Sidon. As a witness to the prosperity of Gadeira, Strabo must again be cited; he says that "although situated at the end of the world, on a small island, this city had, through the industry of its inhabitants, become so great in wealth and population that it was only second to Rome; and that the largest trading vessels came thence and went thither."¹

Legendary stories, with some features of possibility, transmitted to later ages, state how the Phœnicians, sailing north from Cadiz, cruised along the Portuguese and French coasts, in the tenth century B.C.; crossed to the Scilly Islands, landed among the Britons, and explored the English Channel.² The account of their voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, at a slightly subsequent date, is probably more authentic.³ While of little importance in their hazy details, these myths certainly prove that the Phœnicians, at that time, far surpassed, in geographical knowledge, the Greeks, their competitors in the field of colonization.⁴

¹ Duncker, I, 147 et seq.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 79; Duncker, I, 148; Cantu, I, 458 et seq.

³ As elsewhere (*supra*, p. 37) stated, a Phœnician fleet by direction of Nekos, Pharaoh Necho (*circa* 600 B.C.) of Egypt, probably made the voyage around Africa; Grote, III, 148; Herodotus, II, 158; IV, 42; Cantu, I, 458; Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 532 et seq. Fiske clearly sets forth the beliefs of the ancients concerning the circumnavigation of Africa, and gives a full discussion of this alleged voyage of the Phœnicians, "Discovery of America," I, 267.

⁴ "The colonization (of the Phœnicians) was not so continuous as the Greek nor so extensive in one direction, but on the whole it was wider and it

It has already been told how the Phœnicians, in the first period of their colonial policy, developed their trade with the nations to the eastward and thus secured for their Asiatic neighbors, as well as for themselves, food and raiment. When new colonial riches were brought home, and especially after the discovery of the silver mines of Spain, their intercourse with the Orient augmented enormously. Ships going to the western shores of the Mediterranean were loaded, not only with their products, but also with goods brought from Judea, Babylonia, and beyond, to be sold to the peoples dwelling nearer the Pillars of Hercules. The return cargoes consisted of silver, gold, precious stones, and fine woods; many of which articles not merely stayed in Phœnicia, but were sent farther inland to Babylon, Nineveh, and other centres, to pay for the exports previously made. Thus, as merchant, banker, and agent, Phœnicia enriched itself, and contributed vastly to the prosperity of the ancient world; its cities were the metropolises of trade. To the eastward, caravans of merchandise, from Baalbec, Emesa, Thapsacus, Tadmor, Damascus, and Babylon, directed their march toward Tyre and Sidon; to the westward, from Utica, Gadeira, and other numerous Mediterranean ports, treasure vessels shaped thither their course.¹

Notwithstanding their vast traffic in foreign wares, the Phœnicians did not forget to foster their own industries. The reputed inventors of glass, the undisputed makers of purple,² the developers of rare dyes, the unsurpassed weavers of wool and skilful workers in metals: they stood in their day unchallenged, in the foremost ranks of industrial peoples.³ Their towns became known not less as great centres of manu-

was far bolder and more adventurous. . . . The commercial motive was predominant with them, and gave them courage." — RAWLINSON, "History of Phœnicia," 129.

¹ Duncker, I, 149 et seq., 172 et seq.; Cantu, I, 441; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 187 et seq.

² Maspero describes the process of purple making, "Struggle of the Nations," 203.

³ For description of Phœnician skill and renown in workmanship, cf. Gaston Boissier, 37 et seq.; also Cantu, I, 442; Duncker, I, 150 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 80.

facture than as excellent harbors and seaports. Of the riches of Tyre, and of its magnificence, the prophet Ezekiel, writing three hundred years later, gives in his twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth chapters a brilliant, but well-merited, description.¹

At the beginning of the tenth century before Christ, such was the reputation of the Phœnicians; they had then opened almost every portion of the Mediterranean to their ships, and wherever they had gone had established prosperous and permanent settlements.² The inhabitants of Tyre likewise knew, or surmised, the utility of the Red Sea as a route to the East. Not content alone with the commerce of the West and the overland caravan traffic, they determined to seek for themselves the sources of wealth hidden beyond the unsailed ocean of the Orient. King Solomon, whose building operations they had aided with workmen, fine woods, and precious stones, granted them permission to build vessels at Eziongeber, port of the city of Elath.³ The fleet there constructed made a three years' voyage in the Indian Ocean, returning with an immense shipment of jewels, ivory, metals, gold, monkeys, and peacocks. The country of Ophir had been discovered, and the trade, once begun, was regularly maintained.⁴ Under King Hiram, Tyre thus attained the height of its power.⁵ Shortly thereafter, some Tyrian political refugees went to settle in the vicinity of Utica, and there laid the foundations of mighty Carthage.⁶

The Phœnician establishments throughout the Mediterranean were not only important as commercial stations, but even the more as outposts of Eastern civilization, diffusing among the aborigines of the West the culture and education of the

¹ Ezekiel xxvii-xxviii; Isaiah xxiii, 8; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 81; Duncker, I, 153 et seq.; Quintus Curtius, Bk. IV, Ch. IV, 159; Strabo, XVI, 1037.

² Rawlinson, "History of Phœnicia," 105; for location of the colonies, *ibid.* Ch. V.

³ Von Ranke, I, 61; Duncker, I, 156.

⁴ Duncker, I, 157; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 741.

⁵ For account of Tyre at that time, Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 742.

⁶ Gaston Boissier, 41; Duncker, I, 157 et seq.; Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 280; *supra*, p. 56; *post*, p. 69 et seq.

most enlightened nations of that age;¹ while their own knowledge of the world and conception of the universe were in turn vastly developed. As the first colonizing people, the Phœnicians conferred unreckoned and incalculable benefits upon future generations.² In extending their commerce to the uttermost ends of the earth, they unconsciously bore with their ships a cargo immeasurably more precious than that of merchandise and silver. They transported the elementary rudiments of learning to the untutored tribes of the West, and thence they received not less valuable information of the breadth of the seas and of the uncounted millions of mankind who were not bounded or confined by any false or imaginary circle of limitation between the gods and men.

Before their vision the Pillars of Hercules fell. Would that they had had the bravery boldly to proclaim to their contemporaries the fulness of their discoveries! Progress in the sciences of astronomy and geography might have been advanced by two thousand years. But trade was their prime motive, and their avarice resulted in the desire to keep other races in ignorance and to retain alone for themselves the advantages which they had gained. Not less crafty than skilful in their actions and conduct, they adopted, as part of their colonial system, an exclusive policy. The mercantile transactions of the colonies were for Phœnicia and not for any other. Crude as the method in those days was, the end was similar to that held in view by many more modern states. A monopoly was sought.³ Captains, pilots, and sailors were instructed not to communicate to foreign merchantmen the course followed by their ships. When pursued or tracked by any competitor, they did their utmost to throw him off their wake; for this purpose any stratagem or trick was permissible.⁴ Thus during many

1 "The settlements of the Phœnicians always assumed the character of colonies, and however remote they might be from the fatherland, the colonists never lost the manners and customs of their native country." — MASPERO, "Struggle of the Nations," 194; *supra*, pp. 54–55.

² Cantu, I, 460 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 79 et seq.; Duncker, I, 172; Cantu, I, 459.

⁴ Strabo, III, 175, 265; Herodotus, III, 102 et seq.; Duncker, I, 174.

centuries, they sought wealth in regions, the direction and extent of which were unknown to their neighbors; and sold these latter's products to the barbarians, whose very existence was to them mythical and whose habitations were as remote and even more unfixed in their minds than the abodes of the divinities. By these means the Phœnicians amassed riches and concentrated the carrying trade of that age in their own hands.¹

What now can be said of the government of the people who experienced this wonderful and until then unexampled development? The details transmitted to posterity are few and scattered; very little information of the political or administrative system of Phœnicia is still extant.² At the epoch of the earliest invasion of the hill tribes into the coast districts; the country was, according to the most reliable accounts, divided into more than thirty petty kingdoms, each with its own walled capital and separate royal family. In many instances the newcomers seem to have overthrown the established authorities and to have usurped their power; but eventually, after prolonged strife, the old-time sovereigns regained the ascendancy. The division into several independent states continued uninterruptedly, save, as will be seen, when slightly modified at a later date.³ Similar to the experience of the Italian republics of mediæval times, one or the other of the Phœnician cities in turn acquired the preponderance. In the earlier days Sidon was the metropolis and thence the first colonies went forth; to it the Greek settlements especially traced their origin. The greater Tyre itself owed its foundation to some emigrants, who, wandering, had sought a home on the island opposite the ancient Tyrus.⁴ The new community prospered beyond measure, annexed the city on the mainland, assumed its name, and became the famous Tyre of story. By reason of its natural advantages, situation, and industry, soon surpassing Sidon in wealth and importance, it became the political and commercial centre of the world.⁵

¹ Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 206.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 77 et seq.; Duncker, I, 159 et seq.

³ Duncker, I, 160 et seq.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 78.

⁵ Duncker, I, 153, 172 et seq.; Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 279-283.

Among the towns of Phœnicia not any other equalled or rivalled it; almost, if not all, the colonies of the West, those in Spain, Africa, the islands of the farther Mediterranean, and beyond, were due to the initiative of its citizens.

The form of government in the independent cities of Phœnicia was always a limited monarchy.¹ Sidon, Tyre, Aradus, Byblos, and Berytus had their own royal families, in which the power was hereditary. The kings were highly honored and displayed much magnificence. Their wealth was undoubtedly great—especially upon the development of colonial possessions—and they enjoyed all possible luxury. During the history of the country, the succession remained after the first upheaval, and notwithstanding the numerous subsequent foreign invasions, in the ancient houses of old Phœnician stock; but despotism was never known. Well-defined limits were set to the authority of the princes, and there was a council of elders to advise and a system of magistrates to judge.² Above all, account had to be taken of the disposition of the populace. A race, conglomerate in its origin, as bold as courageous, containing a very large proportion of artisans and a still greater number of seafaring men, is not easily governed by a tyrant or by an aristocracy. Throughout Phœnicia it

¹ The degree of independence varied among the different cities and from time to time. The Arvadites were the bravest against a foreign invader. "Conquered again and again, on account of the smallness of their numbers, they were never discouraged by their reverses, and Phœnicia owed all its military history for a long period to their prowess. The Tyrians were of a more accommodating nature. . . . Their foreign policy was reduced to a simple arithmetical question, which they discussed in the light of their industrial or commercial interests. As soon as they had learned from a short experience that a certain Pharaoh had at his disposal armies, against which they could offer no serious opposition, they at once surrendered to him, and thought only of obtaining the greatest profit from the vassalage to which they were condemned. The obligation to pay tribute did not appear to them so much in the light of a burthen, or a sacrifice, as a means of purchasing the right to go to and fro freely in Egypt, or in the countries subject to its influence. The commerce acquired by these privileges recouped them more than a hundredfold for all their overlord demanded from them." The other cities acted likewise and very similarly to whomsoever might have the supremacy over them—he it Chaldea, Egypt, or Assyria. Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 190 et seq.; "Passing of the Empires," 279 et seq.

² Duncker, I, 159 et seq.; Cantu, I, 440.

would seem that the people must have had popular leaders, and that these representatives must, speaking in their name, have had considerable influence upon political, commercial, and economic policies.¹ Although the different communities were, indeed, entirely independent of each other, still — very much like the Hanse towns of the Middle Ages — they had a union to protect themselves against hostile foes and also to execute their more important undertakings. Entering upon great enterprises and meditating vast conquests, the Tyrians, the Sidonians, and the Aradians realized the profit to be drawn from co-operation. Just when, it is not known, but certainly at an early date, Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus joined in sending delegates to a national assembly; as the place of its meeting, the city of Tripolis was founded and built.² To this congress each of the allies seems to have sent one hundred representatives; their special duty was to develop Phœnician trade and commerce; undoubtedly, in this connection, they had much to say about colonial affairs. Such a system of rule inevitably favored freedom of thought, speech, and action; and to this independence Phœnicia owed its glorious career.

The social evil of human bondage, nevertheless, existed; and, as possessions increased, innumerable throngs of slaves were drawn thence to do service in the parent state.³ This traffic is a blot on the record book of all the nations of antiquity. Slavery, however, plays a rôle, not only in ancient times, but even throughout colonial annals; with or without it, many problems present distinctly varying aspects. As until recently this form of servitude has almost everywhere prevailed, so, it may be said, the colonization of the past is thereby differentiated from that of the future. This cruel factor of former ages, although now not any longer existent, must, nevertheless, be considered as an element, which has been eliminated.

Of the administration of the Phœnician dependencies still less is known than of the government of the parent cities.

¹ Duncker, I, 159 et seq.

² Duncker, I, 160 et seq.; Cantu, I, 440.

³ Duncker, I, 150; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 169.

The tie between them appears to have been principally maintained by reason of common origin, their participation in mutual benefits derived from commerce, and their recognition of the same divinities.¹ The Phœnicians were apparently content with very little direct control in colonial affairs. Although probably they collected certain taxes and amassed wealth from their colonies, they do not seem to have extended their political rule over them. Each establishment was in this respect free. A senate of elders and two governors, elected for life from its members, exercised the supreme local power.²

The very reasons for the prosperity of Phœnicia were likewise the causes of its decay. Its sailors opened the first far-reaching sea routes; its merchants first introduced many hitherto unknown products to the civilized nations of that day; its colonists first occupied untilled and distant regions; its priests first taught religion, science, and civilization to the rude races of the West. While this people drew immense resources from lands previously enveloped in darkness, it diffused not less light upon them. Through centuries unmolested or scarcely annoyed by enemies, the sole conqueror of a new element, — the sea, — Phœnicia forgot that, with its vast expansion in area and wealth, defensive organization must keep pace. While it restricted its energies to the narrow strip of Asiatic coast, and as long as rivals did not appear on the domain of water, Phœnicia was able to wield its own unchallenged sovereignty; but as the colonies grew and expanded, many of them in turn sent forth settlements and, becoming centres of trade, subsequently attained importance. Other highways were traced on the map of the world; vessels sought other harbors. The time of emancipation was approaching, or had come, when an invasion of the Babylonians, in 587 B.C., shattered the Phœnician government.³ Old Tyre was besieged

¹ For the common worship of Melkarth, cf. Diodorus, IV, 17 et seq.; for the participation of the colonists in the religious festivals of the parent cities, cf. Duncker, I, 171.

² Duncker, I, 161; Cantu, I, 462.

³ For the fall of the Tyrian kingdom before Sennacherib, cf. Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 285 et seq.

and totally destroyed by Nebuchadrezzar, in 574 B.C.;¹ New Tyre fell before Alexander the Great, in 332 B.C.²

The Phœnicians were never dazzled by the glory of conquest. Except Cyprus, all their possessions were acquired by peaceful methods. To their ultimate misfortune, they were not addicted to the maintenance of armed forces, nor even to military instruction. Their entire attention was devoted to commercial development.³ The fact, however, must be emphasized, that the field which they entered was practically new. In founding a colony, they had not to reckon with avaricious or envious rivals; many of their establishments were virtually unlimited in extent. Questions of uncertain boundary lines, delimitation of territory, and buffer states never arose. In the trackless deep they rested where they would. So long as Sidon and Tyre were the nearest or the most accessible marts of traffic and the most convenient ports, the colonists remained faithful; but when other more neighboring cities and more profitable markets arose around the Mediterranean, they naturally absorbed the trade and interests of those Phœnician dependencies, which, by their situation, were then cut off from the realm of their forefathers. Sidon and Tyre could not do more than protest. Without sufficient military and naval armaments, they gradually withered, like a too luxuriantly flowering plant. Their work had been done; the seed had fallen in many places.

The greatest bequest of the Phœnicians to posterity was their broad diffusion of the elements of civilization.⁴ Their method was not the less remarkable. They stand the first — in antiquity perhaps the only race — who by peaceful means attained world-wide supremacy; for, not only by sea, but like-

¹ Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 542-549, 601; Von Ranke, I, 87; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 81; Cantu, I, 441; for relations between Babylonia and Phœnicia after this conquest, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 110; between Persia and Phœnicia, *ibid.* II, 322 et seq. and Lect. 71. The political history of Phœnicia and its cities, after the period of decadence began is not here of interest.

² Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 811-812; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 384 et seq.

³ Cantu, I, 462.

⁴ Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 187 et seq.

wise on land, they were the acknowledged sovereign people of their times. Even to-day in daily life, their activity, their skill, their inventive genius, and their commercial instinct are memorable; and not the least of the lessons which they taught is the theory of colonization.

CHAPTER III

CARTHAGINIAN COLONIZATION

THE occasional traveller who visits the antiquated city of Tunis is usually attracted thither by its proximity to the ruins of old Carthage. The Goletta, the port of Tunis, must indeed be near the site of the ancient rival of Rome. Disappointment, however, is the fate of him who dreams that he may be impressed by any remnant of past grandeur. Some few scattered piles of stone, one or two broken columns, a museum containing many fragmentary inscriptions, the excavation of cisterns and the outline of an aqueduct, are the only relics of Punic or Roman Carthage which remain.¹ Even more memorials are to be found in the collections of European capitals, whither they have been transported by ardent and avaricious explorers. What recollections, nevertheless, this barren scene of destruction inspires! Carthage, the home of renowned generals and admirals, the victor over many nations, the mother of numerous cities, and once the metropolis of the world, lies crumbled in the dust.² Great in her legacies to future generations, these very gifts are for the most part undetermined, vague, unrecorded, and unappreciated; such knowledge as exists concerning the extent of her dominions and the glorious career of her arms is indeed chiefly due to the scattered notices found in the literature of her most powerful foe and eventual conqueror. All that *was* Carthaginian still extant is little more than meaningless. Suppress the record of the Punic wars, which ended in her annihilation, and short would be the historic narrative of her political career;

¹ Gaston Boissier, 48 et seq.

² For power and splendor of Carthage, *ibid.* 47 et seq.

yet the era of her prosperity embraced a period of six hundred years. What of her commerce, of her laws, of her learning, of her arts, of her customs? The answer is similar. Enveloped in the myths of time, all traces of the social, industrial, and economic life of this city seem to have disappeared, together with her palaces and temples, under the sacrilegious hand of the ruthless destroyer; even racial descendants to perpetuate language and religion were denied. The testimony of the brave deeds and the crushing disasters of the former mistress of the Mediterranean must be read in the annals of enemies.¹ These writers, in spite of their animosity, chronicle the struggles, the growth, the development, the rise, the long continued successes of an energetic and heroic people, until, in the circumscribed circle of that age, they met in mortal conflict their only rivals, destined for so long to be their antagonists and ultimately their annihilators. Due allowance made for the jealousy, envy, unintentional ignorance, or deeply rooted prejudices of these men of hostile race, foreign language, and different worship, the true bearing of the events, observed and noted only as necessary to the elucidation of their own national history, can be but faintly estimated. Legend and poetry also, while doing something to preserve the names of individuals and places, have been busy in confounding Carthaginian chronology.²

The details of the origin³ of the metropolis, as in the case of many other cities boasting of high antiquity, are absolutely lost. Authorities uniformly maintain that Dido, or Elisa, arrived there some time between 880 and 826 B.C. Whether or not long prior to that date a settlement existed in the immediate vicinity, not any man can positively say; although some claim that as far back as 1500 B.C. a village or collection of houses was on this site. In any event, Carthage did

¹ Gaston Boissier, 56.

² The most complete work on Carthage of recent date is "Geschichte der Karthager," by Otto Meltzer.

³ Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 280; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 158 et seq., 160; Gaston Boissier, 41; Cantu, II. 512. The foundation of Carthage was due to political discontent at Tyre, Rosscher and Jannasch. 36.

not attain celebrity until after the advent of Dido on these shores. Virgil, in his exercise of the poetic license, vividly describes how Æneas found the new city building, paid court to Dido, suffered complications with Tarbas, a neighboring monarch, and subsequently fled.¹ While, by assuming Æneas and Dido to be contemporaries, a romantic tale is woven, the anachronism is from the historic standpoint not less unpardonable. Æneas, if a reality, lived at least three centuries before the era of the queen. The accepted account of the flight of Dido, or Elisa, from Tyre is, however, probably not entirely devoid of truth. This woman, a daughter of the royal house, by reason of her marriage with Sichæus, a wealthy prince, had been unfortunate. Pygmalion, her brother, at that time king of Tyre, encompassed the assassination of her husband, intending to seize his great riches; but Elisa, by subterfuge, managed to elude the traps set for her, and, accompanied by a band of trusty followers, set sail on Tyrian ships, carrying away in Pygmalion's own vessels the treasures which he so much coveted. She first touched at Cyprus, there embarking, according to the story, eighty maidens as wives for the members of the crew. Thence she continued westward, undoubtedly influenced by knowledge of the existence of previous Phœnician settlements on the African coast, for Utica and Tunes had already been founded.² A landing was effected in their vicinity, and, on condition of paying a fixed tribute to the natives,³ the refugees were permitted there to establish their permanent residence. How Dido bought of the aborigines a tract of the soil only as large as might be encompassed by a bull's hide, and then claimed the right to cut the skin into narrow strips;⁴ how she built the city, how she worshipped the gods, and how, after rejecting Tarbas, she committed suicide, are well-known legends; whether they be true or only the product of imagination, little matters.

¹ For brief criticism of the character of Dido and Æneas, cf. Gaston Boissier, 56 et seq.; for founding of Carthage, cf. Meltzer, I, Ch. III.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 159 et seq.

³ *Ibid.* III, 161; Gaston Boissier, 41.

⁴ Gaston Boissier, 41.

The salient fact is the record of this community in the ninth century before the Christian era.

Carthage was most favorably situated.¹ In those days, the peninsula, on which the city stood, was connected with the mainland only by a long narrow isthmus, while the seaward extremity widened, on either side, almost symmetrically into two outspread elongated wings. The ceaseless action of wind and tide has since then connected both these natural jetties with the respectively opposite shore; leaving behind the strips of land, thus formed, two small shallow lakes; vast quantities of sand have also piled up against the ancient sea front; to estimate the real condition of this harbor twenty-seven hundred years ago would, therefore, be difficult.² All records confirm, nevertheless, its wonderful advantages. The Phœnician settlers, traders by instinct, sailors by necessity, anchoring in this haven, were not slow to appreciate the local surroundings of their new abode. Other events, beyond their most sanguine hopes, were also tending to favor their plans and crown with success their descendants. "The star of empire moves westward" was an axiom perhaps unknown to them, but absolutely as correct then as now. The great monarchies of Western Asia had well-nigh closed the most important period of their national careers; Phœnicia was at the height of its power; Greece was not yet great, and Rome had not risen;³ the Phœnician colonies in Spain and on the islands of the Mediterranean were developing; the science of navigation was daily growing in importance. Carthage, let it be recalled, was a Phœnician dependency, not only established by Tyrians, but acknowledging allegiance to Tyre; whether by the death of the parties to the domestic tragedy of Dido or by reason of the impossibility of punishment, the mother city never persisted in the chastisement of the self-constituted exiles. On the contrary, at Carthage, midway in the Mediterranean, the centre of many stations on the African coast,

¹ Rollin, II, 368; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," 159 et seq.; Gaston Boissier, 45 et seq.

² Gaston Boissier, 46 et seq. ³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 159.

as well as within easy reach of immense native markets, the Phœnicians found a safe, convenient harbor and a new, regular trade. Consequently the relations between the parent state of Tyre and her Phœnician neighbors on the one hand, and this vigorous colony on the other, must have been very intimate and profitable.¹

The city and port soon became prominent. Other settlements, possibly prior in origin, were absorbed and some adjacent territory was annexed;² but, like Phœnicia, Carthage never very extensively increased her realm on the African mainland. In the days of greatest prosperity, her own immediate area was little more than the present French regency of Tunis, the boundaries being, indeed, almost the same. Dominion, power, and riches lay beyond the seas. Under the Phœnician system of colonization, Carthage was practically independent to develop her own designs and amass her own riches. For a time the colonists, by religious offerings and gifts to propitiate good feeling, recognized the obligations of descent; but they soon acquired sufficient strength even to substitute themselves in place of their predecessors as protectors and patrons of many outposts scattered still farther to the westward.³ The waning power of the elder state and the dangers which were then encompassing it at home likewise contributed to this result.⁴ Historically, Carthage may therefore be justly considered as the successor of Phœnicia in the empire of colonization. While active in almost the same field, while frequently continuing the work begun by the parent cities, and while, for many similar reasons and aims pursuing a colonial policy, her methods were nevertheless essentially different.⁵

Carthage, as a body politic, was in the first instance more

¹ Rollin, II, 368; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 126; for the friendly relations between Tyre and Carthage, cf. Polybius, "Exc. de Legatt," 114; Herodotus, III, 17 et seq.; Diodorus, XVII, 41.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 161.

³ Ernest Babelon, 18.

⁴ The same author attributes the rapid growth, and the greatness of Carthage, to the Babylonian conquest of Tyre; "Carthage," 18.

⁵ Gaston Boissier, 41; the Phœnician colonies were *apoikiai*, the Carthaginian *clerouchoi*.

unified than Phœnicia.¹ The earliest immigrants, whoever they were and whenever they came hither, too weak to resist the aborigines, exercised, according to trustworthy accounts, great skill and astuteness in maintaining friendly relations with them.² Subsequently other villages sprang up in proximity to the principal city, and the gradual intermarriage of the colonists with the natives created the race known as Liby-Phœnicians. In this manner the first Carthaginian colonies originated, and thus the subjugation of the surrounding tribes was for the most part peaceably accomplished.³ The other Phœnician establishments on the African coast, originally the equal allies of Carthage, likewise soon acknowledged her supremacy.⁴ The people seem early to have extended their colonial efforts beyond the sea. In the myths of uncertainty the exact time when they first began to migrate to distant lands cannot now be specified, nor can the motives which then actuated them be accurately determined. Circumstantial evidence would, however, indicate that the rapid growth of the metropolis, its restricted area, the deeply rooted trading instinct of the inhabitants, the favorable occasion to supplant, or rather succeed, the cities of Phœnicia in commercial relations with the West, the facility of their situation as a point of departure for all Mediterranean ports, were inducements, if not really the causes, which decided the Carthaginians to embark their fortunes upon the deep. Their colonies were certainly the result of a well-defined endeavor, and not nearly as accidental in origin as those of their Phœnician ancestors. Very early, indeed, they appear to have realized the possibilities of the future for their nation, and to have appreciated the significance and value of distant possessions in the achievement of their destiny. From the most remote period they seem to have fixed upon colonization as the best method

¹ Von Ranke, 470.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 161; Gaston Boissier, 41.

³ Cantu, II, 512.

⁴ Gaston Boissier, 42; Cantu, II, 513; for the decline of the west Phœnician colonies and the building of the Carthaginian empire, cf. Meltzer, I, Ch. IV.

to restrict their numbers, to eliminate the vagabond, restless elements of the population, and to supply themselves the wealth necessary for other enterprises.¹ Located as their capital was,² they were obliged to go afar to seek natural riches; in this search they did not forget nor overlook the errors of the Tyrians and of the Sidonians, but rather profited by their eventually unfortunate experiences. They resolved that their dependencies should be for them not only a fountain of wealth, but the source of power; with this object in view their policy was modelled upon broad lines. The colonies established formed not mere trading stations or forts, but rather permanent settlements; reënforcements were being constantly sent out to the support of the first emigrants, so that in time many of these outposts became large and important towns. With the tribute paid by them and the indirect gains arising from their trade, the mother city not only enriched herself, beautified the municipality, developed her industries, fostered the arts,³ and maintained an immense merchant marine, but likewise in a regular manner extended her dominion, conquered outlying territory, defended her possessions, and even waged protracted wars with rival nations. Carthage was at the same time merchant and fighter, sailor and soldier. She first promulgated the doctrine of conquest in connection with a colonial system.⁴

¹ Cantu, II, 513.

² The soil was not barren from the standpoint of agriculture, but by reason of the limited area of Carthage the crops were small and insufficient. Gaston Boissier states, "The land has not yet ceased to be fertile and smiling. Beule says, 'It is the richness of the African soil united to the poetry of Greek and Sicilian nature.' In the midst of fields of barley and grain little villages and beautiful country houses, taking shelter under the foliage of fig and olive trees, form green isles." — "L'Afrique Romaine," 48. Polybius says the neighborhood of Carthage "was covered with gardens and trees, with irrigating canals, country houses shaded with olive trees and vineyards, with fields of green verdure."

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 156 et seq.; Cantu, II, 513.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 157, speaking of the Carthaginians, says, "Their weakness consisted in their not being a warlike nation." *Contra*, the greater number of the Carthaginian forces were mercenaries, attracted into the service of this city by the high pay and the rich spoils awarded them; Cantu, II, 519.

Colonies were seldom planted where they could not be retained; hence islands, as more easy of defence, rather than the mainland, were preferred for occupation. Sardinia and the Balearic Isles were, after the early inland acquisitions of the Carthaginians on the African continent, the first objective points of their enterprise; while Malta, and possibly Corsica, soon fell under their control.¹

The long struggle for the subjugation of Sicily began at a very early date.² This island, situated so close to the metropolis and the ownership of which, would, in a measure, assure the control of the narrow intervening seas, was naturally very attractive; more fortunate would it have been, had it proved less costly to the treasury and less productive of evil to the state. In these expeditions, the enemies were chiefly the Greek colonists of Syracuse, Agrigentum, and other neighboring cities of like origin.³ Gelon,⁴ Theron, Dionysius, the elder, and the younger, Timoleon, and Agathocles were the skilful and crafty generals with whom the Carthaginians had to contest foot by foot their advances and to whom they, on several occasions, made abject surrender. For most of the successes here, as elsewhere, the great military leader Mago,⁵ his two sons and six grandsons, were responsible.⁶ Trained in the profession of arms, the first named commander drilled the Carthaginian army to a high degree of excellence, and tried it on many fields of battle. His sons, Hasdrubal and Hamilcar,

¹ Cantu, II, 514; R. and J. 10 et seq.

² For a concise account of this conflict, cf. Von Ranke, 471 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 163. "The value of the western point of Sicily was not likely to escape them (the Carthaginians). From the beginning of the sixth century onward we find them supporting the native or Phœnician inhabitants in their contests with the Greeks."—E. ABBOTT, "History of Greece," II, 433 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 163 et seq. *Post* Ch. IV.

⁴ Holm, II, 79 et seq.

⁵ Meltzer, I, 193, attributes to Mago the founding of the military system and the extension of the Carthaginian state into an empire. Mago is said to have concluded commercial treaties with the Etruscans, the Latins, and the Greeks of Sicily and Italy. The first treaty with Rome (509 B.C.) is his work. Cf. Polybius, quoted by Babelon, 20 et seq.; also Meltzer, I, 168 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 161; for brief account of the Sicilian wars, cf. Cantu, II, 44 et seq.

⁶ Cantu, II, 513.

subdued Sardinia,¹ while their six sons maintained or even surpassed in military achievements the reputations of their fathers. But let it not be imagined that the arms of this people were always crowned with victory; for, from the earliest epoch, when, as allies of the Persians against the Greeks, they invaded Sicily, their fortunes were varied and at times disastrous. Some of the reverses suffered by them are indeed memorable. Of all the foes whom they met in these wars Agathocles was the most formidable; after having been once defeated,² he suddenly shifted the scene of action by landing a considerable army on Carthaginian soil.³ He won some minor triumphs and with prompt action might have taken Carthage herself (309 B.C.); his delay, however, enabled the citizens to rally to her defence, and, after a heroic struggle, the invader was repulsed. Eventually a treaty was signed, according to which the Syracusans entirely withdrew from Africa, and the Carthaginians desisted from any attempt at further conquest in Sicily.⁴ From 480 B.C. to 264 B.C. Carthage was involved in almost continual hostilities to assert her rights in that island; still, in spite of this prolonged conflict and the vast expenditure of money and men, not more than one-third of it was ever under her rule.⁵

Taking advantage of civil dissensions in Syracuse, the Carthaginians, in 239 B.C., after capturing many of its possessions, invested the city itself. The Romans and Pyrrhus — whom the Tarentines⁶ had called to their assistance — were then at war, when the Syracusans enlisted the latter's support; on the other hand a treaty of offence and defence existed between the former and the Carthaginians.⁷ The Greeks appeared in Italy and the Carthaginians sent a fleet to aid the Romans; which

¹ Ernest Babelon, 20, accredits the first conquest of Sardinia to Mago; his sons were merely finishing his work.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 205.

³ *Ibid.* III, 97; Von Ranke, 478 et seq.; for brief account of the war with Agathocles, cf. Holm, III; also Ernest Babelon, 26 et seq.; for extended account, Meltzer, I, 360 et seq.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 149 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.* II, 163 et seq., Lect. 93, III, 97.

⁶ *Ibid.* III, 213.

⁷ *Ibid.* III, 223.

succor was however declined. The king of Epirus then successfully invaded Sicily, and, not satisfied with depriving Carthage of her colonies, meditated an attack on the African coast, a design which he did not execute. Meanwhile the Carthaginians, in an endeavor to extricate themselves from their Sicilian perplexities, entered into an agreement detrimental to the welfare of their allies. The Romans, envious of their rivals, and now angered by the evident attempt to injure their own interests, eagerly seized this pretext for discord. Thus the first Punic War sprang from the Sicilian imbroglio. The hatred of Rome was incurred, which was in time destined to end Carthaginian supremacy.¹

It is unnecessary further to trace political events in Sicily. What has been related suffices to show the difficulty with which Carthage maintained even a foothold in a neighboring island; how many men and how much wealth she there sacrificed, and how finally all was lost without any permanent, decided, or material advantage ever being attained. The story forms one of the saddest pages of colonial conquest. Ultimately national poverty, caused by the excessive drain on the treasury, prevented the regular and prompt payment of the troops, of whom the greater number were always hired mercenaries; incipient mutiny, the revolt of some of the Sicilian states, added to complications with Rome, precipitated their loss as well as that of Sardinia. The two great struggles, in which Carthage, during her career, participated, were with the Greek colonies of Sicily and with the Roman Empire. Had she withdrawn from the former enterprises, or, on the other hand, achieved a speedy triumph, her wars with Rome would probably have been at least postponed. As it happened, these prolonged hostilities, with their doubtful and changeable issues, eventually involved her neighbors on the mainland to the north, or rather afforded them an excuse to intervene. It is therefore not only as an attempt to conquer colonial possessions and

¹ *Ibid.* III, 224 et seq.; for account of the Punic wars, cf. Cantu, II, Ch. VII, IX; also Babelon, 30 et seq.; for an excellent longer account of the first Punic War, cf. Meltzer, II, 252 et seq.

retain them by armed force, but even the more as an illustration of the risk of foreign entanglements in such undertakings, that the Carthaginian experiences in Sicily are instructive.

While engaged in such ventures on this island, these people were not idle elsewhere. From the time of their earliest maritime expeditions, the land of Spain, by reason of its mineral resources, had always strongly attracted them;¹ here they also appear to have inherited the domains of Phœnicia; thus Gadeira became one of their principal ports. Many mines, already opened, likewise fell into their hands and afterward furnished them the sinews of war in their long contest for supremacy. In these regions, however, little peculiar to the colonization of the Carthaginians is to be noted. They merely succeeded to and maintained the work of their predecessors. Besides their establishments in Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, the Greek colony of Cyrenaica on the shores of Africa also yielded to their victorious arms; within a brief interval they had emigrants scattered westward along the coast to the straits of Gibraltar.²

The epoch of Carthaginian glory extended from 550 to 268 B.C. During this period Hanno went out to found a chain of colonies on the Atlantic seaboard of Africa. Of his record of this journey there is an inexact copy, subsequently made by some Greek, showing that sixty vessels took part, carrying thirty thousand individuals, who were distributed into six different settlements. Hanno sailed as far southward as Senegambia, and returned crowned with such success that his exploits were deemed worthy of a monument. Himilco, about the same era, made a voyage as far northwardly as Great Britain, leaving a few outposts on present Portuguese, Spanish, and French territory. The Carthaginians then ruled over three hundred cities in Africa, over two thousand miles of coast, washed by the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, over most of the islands in the former sea, and over many extensive districts in Spain.³

¹ Cantu, II, 515.

² R. and J. 10.

³ Cantu, II, 513 et seq.; Rollin, II, 368; Heeren, "Ideen," II, 511 et seq.; Pliny, "H. N." II, 67.

After their expulsion from Sicily, these people applied themselves, with renewed energy, to the further development of their Spanish possessions. They turned their eyes thither with the hopes both of recompensing themselves for the losses elsewhere sustained and of finding the treasure wherewith to resist their Roman rivals; and so well did they succeed that their empire there at one time almost equalled their dominion in Africa. Among many enterprises the building of Carthagera, about 217 B.C., by Hamilcar, on the site of the present city of the same name, was the most remarkable.¹

But very soon constant hostilities with the Romans occupied the principal attention of the Carthaginians, and the age of their constructive work may be said to have passed. For some time they courageously struggled to maintain their ascendancy; but, little by little, these wars sapped away their vitality; until, at last, Scipio repeated with greater effect the experiment of Agathocles. Invading Africa, he broke down the gates of Carthage, reputed inviolable, and humbled her inhabitants under the yoke; thus, in 146 B.C., this mart of commerce fell, after a decadence which was probably the most rapid in history.

The monopoly of commerce had been the ambition of Carthage.² For a long time her power nearly approached this limit. Her trading vessels plied in every sea, and her sailors visited all ports; her caravans penetrated the most barren deserts of Africa. Wine and oil came from Majorca, Minorca, and Iyça; flax, from Gozzo. Greece furnished fine stones and gold; Malta, cotton; the Lipari Islands, bitumen; Elba, iron; and Corsica, honey and slaves; while from the interior of the Dark Continent negroes and salt were obtained.³ All these and many other things were received only to be redistributed, in a great measure, to tributary nations. Carthage was the chief warehouse and emporium of trade. For many centuries this position was natural and voluntary, not depending on

¹ For the work of the family of Barcidæ in Spain, together with the events leading to the second Punic War, cf. Meltzer, II, 392 et seq.

² Cantu, II, 517.

³ *Ibid.* II, 518.

any act of law, but merely due to geographical situation and superior facilities. Her ships — for there were not then any others — came and went, without thinking of rival markets; so long, all was well! But finally other races developed, cities were founded, and states grew; new fleets came into being. In the Mediterranean, Carthaginians met boats manned by crews of other nationalities. They found them at home and they encountered them in colonial waters; then the people voted arbitrary laws, by which, with a few exceptions, they prohibited the entrance of foreign craft into the harbor of the metropolis or into the ports of the colonies; it was even forbidden to their own vessels to carry colonial goods elsewhere than to the capital. A large navy to protect trade, to maintain free communication with their possessions, and to enforce these regulations of the sea was a necessary consequence.¹ As early as the year 509 B.C., when the first treaty with Rome was made, there was a special provision that the latter's seamen should not sail to the south beyond a certain promontory, lest they should be tempted to the conquest of those districts; the Romans, too, were then strictly excluded from all dependent territories.² Any nation, desirous of buying their products, must purchase them in Carthage, which probably levied an export duty on wares sold to foreigners. Certain portions of Sicily alone were exempt from these taxes, it being a matter of prudence to favor their inhabitants and thus remove any occasion for sympathy with Rome, which might spring from undue oppression and proximity to Italy.

Such was the extent and system of Carthaginian commerce.³ The policy of the government in providing careers of adventure and vast opportunity drew into the channels of enterprise all those characters who, by nature or circumstances, might have been a menace to the state. The disposition and social condi-

¹ Cantu, II, 519.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 160. For an English version of this treaty, and of the one which followed it, cf. McCullagh, "Industrial History of Free Nations," I, 333 et seq.; for its history, *ibid.* 130.

³ It must not be forgotten that Carthage also had a considerable overland trade in Africa, cf. Cantu, II, 518.

tion of the individuals sent forth from the capital city did not apparently offer any guarantee of a happy issue. Those who left the metropolis were almost exclusively the destitute, urged by want at home and attracted by the hope of enriching themselves through the prevalent trade monopoly. Betterment of position and fortune was their sole motive. Frequently, too, those who emigrated belonged to the vagabond or criminal classes, whose removal for reasons of public safety was favored or forced. Nevertheless, in spite of these unpropitious omens, the results achieved were decidedly favorable. The adventurers sometimes found relief in sea-roving or in fighting the battles of their people against a foreign enemy; again, those who were so inclined settled in some peaceful colony, and there in undeveloped regions, by their own energy, availed themselves of the means to accumulate riches or to attain to a certain degree of power.

In marked contrast with the discontent of the subjugated tribes, the one characteristic of the colonists who had migrated from the parent state was their strong allegiance. The religious worship of Melkarth¹ served to bind them firmly to it, while their common commercial interests rendered any rebellion or disobedience not less fatal to the colony than injurious to the nation. In the condition of the world at the time of Carthage's greatest prosperity, colonial possessions were necessary to her, as the sources of her food supplies and revenue, while the supremacy of the metropolis was essential to the dependencies, as affording them a market-place for their products, and a patron, from whom they could in time of need rightfully demand protection. Thus both worked to further the welfare and increase the wealth of the race. Had the colonies not existed, had the commerce incident thereto not been fostered and cherished, this city, with a small national domain, would at an early day have been an easy object of attack from without, and a ready prey to insurrection from within. Had her ambition been limited to rational bounds and had she been content to develop her authority in

¹ Cantu, II, 520.

territories properly belonging to her by nature and descent, without coveting wider realms, her dominion might have endured much longer, and have had a vastly greater ultimate influence on posterity. Failure in the attempt to realize vain dreams of conquest shattered her entire fabric.

The form of government at Carthage varied from a moderate monarchy to a hereditary aristocracy.¹ In the beginning the first type seems to have prevailed, and under this rule most fortunate results were attained. In subsequent times, two high governors, known as *suffetes*, formed the executive; they were, however, responsible to a representative assemblage. Of this latter, one hundred members were chosen as a consultative body to prevent any usurpation of authority. So long as the chief magistrates and this council were in accord, the people had little voice, but in case of disagreement the popular will decided between them. As a matter of fact, wealth was the necessary stepping-stone to power and political preferment.² The cumulation of functions in the hands of a few persons was the custom. The governors were usually also the generals, and in the later history of the city such as Hanno and Bomilcar undertook to set themselves up as dictators. The position of *suffete* or even member of the council necessitated enormous expenditures, and, as these offices seem to have been unremunerated by the state, only rich citizens could aspire to them.

The dependencies of Carthage were politically distributed into two classes: the first division comprised those possessions near the metropolis, on the mainland, heavily taxed and directly tributary to it; the second category included the more remote establishments, likewise subject to the mother city, but partaking more than the others of a mercantile character. Un-

¹ Aristotle records that in antiquity the constitution of Carthage was held in high esteem; he directs special attention to the fact that sedition and tyranny were there unknown during a period approximating five hundred years; Aristotle, "De Republica," Bk. II, Ch. XI; for brief description of the constitution and administration of Carthage, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 162 et seq.; Shuckburgh, "History of Rome," 228-231; Cantu, II, 521.

² Cantu, II, 523,

like the Greek colonies, those of Carthage never were free; all were under military commanders, and, as Polybius records, the Carthaginians admired and honored the officials who were the sternest and collected the largest tribute; in this respect the African conquests especially suffered; and, for this reason, they were frequently in rebellion. Carthage maintained her supremacy for the most part by the sword; wherever she ruled, she made her acquisitions by force of arms; she was, it is true, the commercial power of her time; but side by side with her trading vessels, frequently in advance of them, her war galleys and her mercenary legions went.¹

In the military and naval system of this city grave defects existed. Her ships were generally, if not always, manned by slaves; while the greater proportion of her armies consisted of hirelings. Thus patriotic spirit or national pride was lacking to urge either soldiers or sailors to acts of valor. Her vassals fought boldly so long as they were well fed, well paid, and well treated; but any temporary embarrassment or discomfort led to mutiny, and the offer of better wages from a richer enemy precipitated desertion. While the treasury was full, and the contest was against poverty-stricken peoples, victory and glory were hers. A bountiful inheritance from the parent state, Phœnicia, the profitable development of earlier possessions, and a relatively clear field for activity, at the outset, favored the accumulation of wealth and consequent rise to fame. But political decay, profligacy, and corruption did their work; not even commerce could save Carthage.

Insatiable desire for the extension of their boundaries, encounters with foes as tenacious as themselves, and the wasteful expenditure of money in wars waged abroad by generals ambitious to secure renown at home, conflicts which so often ended disastrously for the republic, creating not only poverty but even dissension in the state, — combined to exhaust the Carthaginians not less physically than financially. Undue oppression and unjust taxation caused discontent in the colonies; they grew restless under the burden; democracy in

¹ Rollin, II, 368.

the capital city asserted itself, and civil strife was threatened; money ran short, mercenaries could not any longer be hired, and the gilded youths of Carthage were, by the excesses of generations, too effeminate successfully to fight their own battles. When a formidable rival appeared, new in the lists, endowed with greater resources and seconded by the fresh vigor of its own citizens, the collapse of Punic prestige was as speedy as hopeless. The victorious nation rejoiced in the opportunity to be severe to those who had never been otherwise than stern toward their enemies. Deprived of her realms, her fleet destroyed, Carthage was for some time dependent on the favor of Rome; but, writhing under the yoke of the oppressor, she girded herself for one more mighty combat and, like a wounded giantess, rose again; the world trembled; but, wasted by previous fatigues, the dying struggle, although heroic in courage, was brief in duration.¹ When finally this empire fell, the national light was so burnt out that scarcely a trace of institutions, laws, language, polity, or people survived. In commerce and in the science of colonization intelligent beyond her contemporaries and many of her successors, Carthage perished, a victim of ambition.² The first rule of conduct, as prescribed by her founders, was correct:

“Attempt not to acquire that which may not be retained.”

¹ For brief account of the fall of Carthage, cf. Gaston Boissier, 70 et seq.

² “Ambition was the ruin of the Carthaginians.” — ROLLIN, II, 368.

CHAPTER IV

GREEK COLONIZATION

SOME one has said that when Greece was at the height of power, the Mediterranean was a Greek lake with a girdle of Greek colonies around it.¹ The statement is scarcely exaggerated; for Greece not only controlled almost all the islands within this sea, but its representatives were likewise established to the eastward along the coasts of Asia Minor, on the Ægean and Black seas, and thence westward on European soil, from the regions of present Russia to the territory of modern Spain. On the Adriatic, in southern Italy, in Sicily, at the mouths of the Rhone, and beyond the Pyrenees settlements had sprung up; while nearer Africa was not forgotten; for here and there along the shores of this vast continent a few colonists had scattered.²

The Greeks themselves formed a race rather than a nation, a group of states rather than a unified political community.³ Their home dominions, including the mainland, the Peloponnesus, and several of the principal islands off the eastern and western coasts, approximated in area only twenty-five thousand square miles. Here, practically throughout the period of antiquity, resided numerous clans of varying importance, originally hostile to each other, constantly rivals for the leadership, occasionally linked together in times of peace by a very fragile chain of common interests, and seldom thoroughly in accord except in the face of some general enemy. The process of con-

¹ Cicero says the lands of the Mediterranean "wore a Greek fringe," "*De Republica*," II, Bk. IV.

² For an excellent brief description of the Greek colonies, cf. Wachsmuth, "*Historical Antiquities of the Greeks*," I, 70, who cites numerous sources. For list of these establishments, cf. Cantu, II, 109 note.

³ For description of the tribes of Greece, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 34 et seq.

solidation was destined to be accomplished only under the hammer of disaster, wielded throughout centuries. Many petty political organizations meant independence, and freedom fostered the growth of originality.¹ The Greek is for all time the type of free action and unrestricted thought; not any other people has ever been equal in the development of character.² The later day confederation was only a *modus vivendi*; it existed, because of exterior circumstances, not by reason of voluntary choice;³ so that, notwithstanding the glorious position attained by united Greece at that epoch, the partial surrender of individuality, state and personal, was the first step toward decadence.

Migrations, passing over this soil in prehistoric cycles, left well-defined traces.⁴ The tide of humanity here ebbed and flowed with its consequent invasions, conflicts, expulsions, and confiscations of territory. From the north tribes out of Thrace⁵ and Illyria precipitated themselves upon this land; while, afterwards, on its southern coasts mariners from Egypt and Phœnicia appeared.⁶ Vague as these legends, enclouded in the mist of ages, are, there seems little doubt of the possibility of their truth.⁷ A similar upheaval among those dwelling along the Caspian Sea occasioned their general removal; some of them, skirting the shore line or pushing from island to island across the Ægean, finally reached the mainland of the peninsula. The Pelasgians, thus slowly

¹ For some idea of the variety of Greek life and character, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 105 et seq.

² Von Schlegel, "Philosophy of History," 228; McCullagh, "Industrial History of Free Nations," I, 15 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 231 et seq.

⁴ The argument from the primitive and fundamental character of the migration from the north as compared with that from the east, is well presented by Meyer, "Geschichte des Alterthums," II, sec. 36 et seq.

⁵ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 141, also Lect. 16, 23; Thirlwall, "History of Greece," I, 32-62; Cantu, II, 26.

⁶ "Widely dissimilar as were the Greek tribes and nations in their original seats and settlements, their occupations and modes of living, their manners and political institutions, they differed not less in the primitive elements of their civilization. . . . The Greeks were of very various extraction."—VON SCHLEGEL, 233; Thirlwall, I, 62-78.

⁷ "The life of the Greeks is mirrored in their legends."—HOLM. I. Ch. X; Von Schlegel, 229, 239; Thirlwall, I, 78-122.

approaching, overran about 1870 B.C. the country, in course of time established several kingdoms, and were in turn defeated, subjugated, and merged with other conquerors.¹ The Hellenes followed them in chronological order.² The mythological story is that the son of Deucalion, Hellenes by name, was their chief; he had three sons, Dorus, Æolus, and Xuthus. The last, driven from his ancestral home by his brothers, located in the vicinity of Athens, where by Creusa he had two sons, Ionus and Achæus. The brothers, Dorus and Æolus, and their nephews, Ionus and Achæus, became the founders of the four races known by their respective names. Such personification typifies the common origin of the Hellenes from one stock.³

The characteristics of the early inhabitants were modified by the stragglers, — exiles or refugees, — who came thither from the south.⁴ These latter, however few and whatever their nationality, not only served to reawaken and reënforce in the populace the longing for adventure, but likewise brought with them a knowledge of distant states and familiarity with seamanship. Originally the residents of Greece, uncouth in their manners and belief,⁵ were deficient, if not utterly lacking, in maritime science; enlightened through association with Phœnician and Egyptian emigrants⁶ they seem first to have attained a faint appreciation of its utility. Legend recounts their gradual development thenceforth in the field of ship-building and water travel.⁷ As soon as the attention of a people so situ-

¹ Meyer and other recent German historians of Greece hold that the Pelasgians, as primitive and widely scattered Greek settlers, belong to the domain of legend.

² For this legendary period, cf. Grote, I, Ch. IV-XV; Holm, "History of Greece," I, Ch. IV-VII; also Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 196-212.

³ Von Schlegel, 234; Thirlwall, I, 87 et seq.

⁴ Herodotus, V, 94; Holm, I, Ch. IX; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 210; Thirlwall, I, 62-78.

⁵ Thucydides, I, 2, 3; Strabo, III, 238; Ovid, "Metam." I, 121; Pliny, VII, 57, 413; "Schol. Pindar ad Pyth." IV, 107, 219.

⁶ Von Schlegel, 235; Æschylus, "Prometheus Vincto," 466.

⁷ Diodorus, IV, 185; "Iliad," I, 16; Thucydides, I, 8. On this subject generally, cf. McCullagh, I, 10, 17 et seq.; De Goguet, "Origin of the Laws, Arts, and Sciences," II, 306 et seq.; Cantu, II, Ch. XXVII.

ated was once directed to the advantages of such means of communication, it is not surprising that it should have rapidly adopted and improved this method of intercourse. In a mountainous region with deep indentations of the beach, a relatively long extent of coast, with numerous islands near the shore and innumerable isles scattered throughout the neighboring deep, navigation soon became not only as useful as necessary, but even attractive. Natural barriers, almost insurmountable, on land and an innate wish to exchange their surplus of products for articles of service and luxury, stimulated by a disposition for piracy and supplemented by the realization of the facility of flight, often needed to escape some stronger foe, incited the Greeks to train themselves in this pursuit to such a point, that at last they became the greatest sailors of their era, and their domain was in fact the sea.¹ Without emphasizing the use made of boats and other craft in their expeditions and fratricidal quarrels of earlier date, it is only essential to recall the degree of perfection already achieved by them in nautical skill at the time of the siege of Troy. The story of the "Iliad" and the subsequent adventures of Ulysses, as related by Homer in the "Odyssey,"² testify to the proficiency and hardiness of Greek mariners of that age. While it is difficult to establish the historic basis and identity of the many fabled colonies, reputed to have been founded by Agamemnon, Jason, Menestheus, Ulysses, and other heroes, still the fact remains that migrations from Greece occurred.³ The Trojan War with its attendant excitement and resulting spirit of conquest, coupled with the practical experience then acquired, undoubtedly inspired the Greeks with the

¹ Von Schlegel, 229 et seq.; Duncker, III, 1 et seq.; McCullagh, I, 22; Thirlwall, I, 1-31; Wachsmuth, I, Ch. I, and p. 104.

² For thorough discussion of the Homeric poems and of various views on them, including the "Prolegomena" of Wolf, cf. Grote, II, Ch. XXI.

³ By 1500 B.C. there was a unified Greek civilization extending around the Aegean from the Peloponnesus to Cyprus. The relations between the various centres were mediated by sea, cf. Meyer, II, sec. 97 et seq., and the latest discussion by Hogarth in "Authority and Archæology," 220 et seq.; cf. also Duncker, III, 1-218; Thirlwall, II, 81; Rosscher and Janasch, 42.

desire for more extensive power.¹ They began to appreciate the benefits to be gained from wider relations with other portions of the world — still strange to them — and first comprehended in some measure the importance of control of the sea.² These legendary tales, therefore, at least mark the birth of their ideas of dominion, the dawn of their aspirations; ³ but their ignorance of geography manifests nevertheless the crudity of their knowledge.⁴

The colonial system pursued by the Greeks — if an activity, wherein order and design were lacking may be so characterized — is, because of its variety and multiplicity in origin and effect, exceedingly interesting; the consideration of its methods, aims, and results is recognized to be the more necessary, if it be borne in mind that they close the story of ancient colonization; for, when their supremacy ceased to predominate, the efforts of antiquity in this field of enterprise, properly described, came to an end. Henceforth until after the decline of the Roman Empire — in spite of the latter's foreign possessions — not any real colonies are to be reckoned.

History fixes the earliest record of Greek colonization about 1124 B.C. A general movement of races was just taking place; ⁵ the Æolians had invaded Bœotia and the Dorians in turn overran the Peloponnesus.⁶ The former, pushed toward the sea by the Pelasgians, went to settle in Asia Minor on the shores of Mysia. Numbers of the Dorians next were forced to seek there new homes in the southernmost section. The

¹ For the mythical character of the Trojan War, cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 195; for conditions of navigation at that time, Thirlwall, I, 218 et seq.

² For the great influence of the sea on the Hellenic people, cf. Grote, II, 152 et seq., who cites Cicero, "De Republica," II, 2-4.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 140.

⁴ For some account of Homer's geographical knowledge, cf. Thirlwall, I, 209 et seq.; also Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 113; Herodotus, II, 23; IV, 8, 36, 42, 45; VIII, 132.

⁵ Cantu I, 546 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 221-235; Wachsmuth, I, 70; Thirlwall, I, 249-290; II, 81-112; Holm, I, 139.

⁶ For these movements of the Æolians and the Bœotians, cf. Grote, II, 217 et seq.; for that of the Dorians, *ibid.* Ch. IV and V.

Achæans, hard pressed by those who remained and were moving toward the Peloponnesus, drove the Ionians, then living in the north of this region, before them; these latter, reënforced by multitudes of poverty-stricken individuals of all tribes, likewise turned their eyes and steps across the *Ægean*, where they found an asylum in the territory between the colonists of *Æolian* and *Dorian* stock.¹ It is especially noticeable that this Greek emigration—the first of which trustworthy details exist—was eastwardly.² The memories of the Trojan War and the information derived from that expedition seem to have suggested the course which these mariners followed; but the mainspring of the exodus was the enormous momentum which the foreign aggressors, coming from the north and west, imparted to the weak and divided clans dwelling along the eastern coasts of Greece. This district, with its limited resources and small area, was overcrowded. Relief was not there to be had. Beyond the *Ægean* and even within its expanse of blue waters, vast fields of rich grain and orchards of bountiful fruit were beckoning on new settlers to come and help in their cultivation. It is, therefore, not astonishing to see horde after horde leave the mother country to scatter themselves along the opposite shores or on the nearer isles.

Those islands, with which Greece is, so to speak, surrounded, afforded great advantages to the wanderers; abounding in good harbors and fertile in their soil, they offered safe and pleasant havens of rest, whether for temporary suspension of the voyage or for permanent abodes. *Melos*, *Pharos*, *Lemnos*, *Delos*, *Crete*, and *Cyprus* were only a few of the places serving as refuge for these early emigrants and marking the progressive stages of their journeyings; they themselves were to be peopled, to be civilized, and in turn to lend their own peculiar glory to the race. To these lands of the

¹ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 249; Holm, I, 135-155; Duncker, III, 234-257.

² Meyer is of the opinion that colonization had already begun in the Mycænæan age through the impulses of commerce and conquest, "Geschichte des Alterthums," II, sec. 141.

sea, lying as stepping-stones across the waters, due consideration must be attributed as one of the facilities for Greek colonization.¹

About the opening of the eleventh century ² before Christ, then, the Æolians, — or perhaps better the Achæans, — whose descendants claimed Agamemnon as an ancestor, sailed from Aulis and disembarked on the northern portion of the coast of Asia Minor.³ Starting from the same port as the Trojan expedition, they took practically its route. The island of Lesbos was their first resting-spot; here they built six cities, of which Mitylene was the principal; Tenedos and Hecatonnesi were also visited by them.⁴ Upon reaching the Asiatic continent, they spread out, from the Hellespont to the river Hermus, over a region to which they gave the name of Æolide. From the best authenticated accounts, it would seem that the Æolians, or Achæans, for more than a century, continued to draw new recruits from Greece. The number of their towns was twelve, of which Cyme was the capital; Smyrna, which subsequently fell into the hands of the Ionians, was also one of their settlements.⁵

The Ionian emigration, occurring almost a century later, was destined to have the most important influence.⁶ Codrus, king of Athens, was, according to legend, killed in a struggle with the Carians, and his two sons disputed the succession. Medon won in the arbitration of the oracle; whereupon his brother Neleus withdrew to the farther shores of the Ægean, being followed by countless multitudes from the various provinces of Greece. The pressure of foreign invasion, seconded by the pangs of famine, undoubtedly formed the real occasion of this general irruption from the fatherland. These people passed by

¹ Grote, II, Ch. XII.

² As to this date, cf. Holm, I, 147 et seq. and note; Duncker, III, 246 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 81; Cantu, II, 111 et seq.

³ For a critique on the tradition of the Æolic Movement, cf. Meyer, II, sec. 150 et seq.

⁴ Thirlwall, II, 82.

⁵ Grote, II, 209; III, Ch. XIV; Von Ranke, I, 129 et seq.; Holm, I, 121 et seq.

⁶ Meyer, II, sec. 135; Grote, III, Ch. XIII; also, II, Ch. X and XI; Duncker, III, 237 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 83 et seq.; Cantu, II, 112 et seq.

the Cyclades, and inaugurated the shrine of Delos—ultimately to become the common place of worship of all the Greeks. They finally located next to the Æolians; on the north the Hermus, on the south the Meander, served as their usual boundaries, although at times they prevailed farther to the southward. Including practically the entire district between Halicarnassus and the Gulf of Smyrna, their possessions enjoyed the advantage of a comparatively long seaboard, which then abounded in sinuosities, fine bays, and well-protected harbors; many of these latter have, in modern times, filled up, so that the outline is now essentially different. Notwithstanding the varied origin of the settlers, their numerous dialects, and the mixture of races, they all became known as Ionians, were in the end amalgamated, and conferred the name Ionia upon the land which they occupied. With some of the natives who resided there they seem to have united; or rather, perhaps, they absorbed them. The hostile tribes were exterminated.¹

For the present purpose it is not necessary to recount at length the fanciful tales of the early history of the cities of Ionia; their founders furnish abundant material to the student of legend and story; but here a few words must suffice.² Sometimes the new arrivals appear to have simply entered towns already existing, massacred or subjugated the inhabitants, and taken possession. Miletus affords an instance in point; here the men were slaughtered by the invaders and the women became the wives of their conquerors.³ Elsewhere establishments were peopled from the beginning with Greeks. Eventually there were twelve settlements, many of which, because of their importance, attained celebrity.⁴ Among them Miletus, Samos, Chios, Ephesus, Lebedos, Colophon, and

¹ Holm, I, 142; Grote, III, Ch. XIII et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 84.

² For some account of them, Thirlwall, II, 84 et seq.

³ Von Ranke, I, 130.

⁴ Strabo, XIII, 872; Duncker, III, 239 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 281; also, Lect. 32; R. and J. 52; Cantu, II, 112; for a more detailed statement of the government, commerce, and culture of these cities, cf. Duncker, IV, 92-149; more especially for their manner of life, *ibid.* 143 et seq.

Clazomenæ may be cited, some on the mainland, others on the neighboring islands. Ephesus and Miletus¹ were famous as seaports and centres of commerce. The most prosperous epoch of the last-named city may be placed between 700 B.C. and 500 B.C., when in traffic and affluence it rivalled Tyre and Carthage. Four different harbors received its merchant fleet and the one hundred men-of-war which it is said to have been able to fit out. It, in turn, had founded three hundred colonial or trading stations on the Black Sea — of which subsequent mention will be made — and drew thence great quantities of grain, fish, skins, and slaves.² Intercourse with the interior was also flourishing; caravans from Miletus followed the old Persian routes into the more remote quarters of Asia, taking thither the merchandise of the West to be exchanged for the precious wares of the Orient. Such was one of the Ionian cities; many of the others were not much less noted.³ At a later date Ephesus developed in power and, after the fall of Miletus and Phocæa, assumed the preëminence; the temple of Diana lent it its chief renown.⁴ The Ionians boasted of several other thriving towns, among which need be recalled only Samos,⁵ Chios,⁶ and Smyrna. The first, on the island of the same name, displayed remarkable activity in navigation, discovery, and colonization. To Crete, to Egypt, to Sicily, and to Spain its ships ploughed their way. Pythagoras may have been born there, and Homer, tradition recounts, there died. Chios also attained distinction for the vigorous resistance made by sea at the time of its conquest by the Persians. Both Samos and Chios once aspired to the leadership of the Ionians. Smyrna — originally belonging to the Æolians — was destined to become the principal city of the East and to play a dis-

¹ Herodotus, V, 28; Duncker, III, 242 et seq.

² Von Ranke, I, 130; Holm, I, 143; Cantu, II, 113 et seq.

³ For the wealth and refinement of the Ionian cities, cf. Thirlwall, II, 110 et seq.; Holm, I, 143 et seq.

⁴ Cantu, II, 115.

⁵ For brief description of Samos, cf. Cantu, II, 115. The earliest deep-sea voyage undertaken by the Greeks is attributed to a merchant of this city, Herodotus, IV, 152.

⁶ For description of Chios, cf. Cantu, II, 116.

tinguished rôle in early Christianity.¹ Of all the ancient Greek centres on the Asiatic coast, it is the sole modern survivor.

The Dorian eruption took place about the same era as the Ionian upheaval;² it was possibly not only due to the impetus given by the myriads of Pelasgians in the rear, but likewise accentuated by the fortunate results already achieved by the Æolians and Ionians in Asia. The Dorians seem to have very gradually approached those distant shores. First they went to Crete under the guidance of Althæmenes, and thence to Rhodes; on both, settlements were made. Halicarnassus and Cnidus on the mainland of Asia Minor were soon afterward founded, and the island of Cos was occupied by other migrating bands of the same tribe.³ The sphere of their enterprise was thus the southwestern district of the Asiatic peninsula and the adjacent islands. Altogether their establishments numbered six. Of the three races their colonies, although the fewest, were the foremost in energy. In Doris, Cnidus was the metropolis of terra firma. The celebrated statue of Venus Eupolemus, due to the chisel of Praxiteles and in the sanctuary of that goddess, was here the object of great admiration. Halicarnassus, the rival of this city, was indeed eventually excluded from the union. Rhodes, built after the time of Xerxes, and which in time planted many colonies, is memorable for the Colossus and for its laws of commerce.⁴ The Romans subsequently not only adopted the Rhodian legislation, but frequented its schools of philosophy, oratory, and fine arts.

These three colonial systems constituted practically three bodies politic, in so far as they were in fact organized; for both association and centralization in government were repugnant to the Greeks. Each community preferred to form a

¹ Thirlwall, II, 88.

² Meyer, II, sec. 177 et seq.; Grote, II, 211 et seq.; Von Ranke, I, 130 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 88 et seq.; Holm, I, 145 et seq.

³ Strabo, XIV, 965; Cantu, II, 116; Duncker, III, 251 et seq.

⁴ For laws of Rhodes, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," 98 et seq. For its trade and commerce, cf. McCullagh, I, 327 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 89; Duncker, III, 253 et seq.; Cantu, II, 116 et seq.; Cicero, "Pro Lege Manil." V, 18, 19; Strabo, XIV, 964.

separate state and to be a law unto itself.¹ The settlers in remote regions realized, however, in the end, that mutual alliance was necessary to maintain their position. Taking, then, the respective races as bases of consolidation, the colonies in each section undertook to unite, thus creating three political federations. Twelve cities were included in the Æolian league; the same number in the Ionian confederation; while only six and finally five were comprised in the Dorian coalition.² At the best these unions were, especially in early times, very imperfect; for each municipality had an administration which in its own matters was generally independent. The leagues, which only eventually developed into means of opposing more formidable foreign foes, when the necessity arose, were originally designed chiefly to afford opportunity for joint religious festivals and to inaugurate a common shrine of worship. The Ionians, because of their situation and other external circumstances, are recorded to have had the strongest organization; still, the motive of piety was the uppermost. In the beginning their towns, with one exception, were governed by descendants of Codrus. Androclus of Ephesus is said at first to have exercised, by right of age, authority over all the members of the confederacy; but Miletus, by reason of its rapid growth, soon outstripped its neighbors, and certainly did not then tolerate outside interference in its own affairs; for a long period it held the supremacy, until its fall, when Ephesus regained the ascendancy. As a fact, a regular organism of laws, of courts, and of finances did not exist. The alliance of the Dorian people was much weaker than that of the Ionians, as the easy expulsion of Halicarnassus therefrom indicates. They had, however, a public meeting-place on the Triopian promontory near the temple of Apollo. The Æolians were the least firmly bound together; for it cannot be positively affirmed that they even met periodically. Panionium

¹ For brief outline of the institutions and life of the Asiatic Greeks, cf. Duncker, III, 257 et seq.

² Von Ranke, I, 129 et seq. For some account of this league, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 167 et seq.

near Mount Mycale seems to have been the locality of occasional assemblage. The centre of political activity in Æolus was at Cyme, where it may be that its general assembly convened. Mytilene on Lesbos — the largest island in the eastern Ægean — was the principal trading mart, and was not less renowned for effeminate manners than for commerce.¹

Considered together, the Æolians, the Ionians, and the Dorians Grecianized the entire western coast of Asia Minor and all the islands lying to the north of Crete between the country of their origin and the land of their adoption. But, notwithstanding their apparently common interests and their proximity to each other, the three groups of colonies never seemingly manifested any tendency or effort toward union or concerted action until the menace of Persian conquest hung over them. The same reasons worked to hold them apart as operated on the Greek states of Europe to a like end. Athens was the parent of the Ionians; Thebes and Argos or Sparta — partially at least — stood sponsors respectively for the Æolians and the Dorians.²

As may be imagined, the ties binding the colonists to the fatherland were slight; originally, for the most part, the settlers were by stress of circumstances voluntary exiles. Throughout the history of Greece, the cities founded by them were regarded as allies on an equality rather than as possessions. There was not indeed any political dependency; for these colonies, as they are called, exercised not only all the domestic functions of government, but likewise reserved the right to declare and wage war, a privilege which they frequently seized, not only against the Asiatics, but even against each other. At first, for a brief time, monarchies, they later were usually organized as nominal republics;³ and every community had probably a republican form of rule. The authority in the leagues appears to have been actually vested in the hands of an oligarchy or aristocracy, while the chief magistrates of the different towns, although perhaps chosen by popular vote,

¹ For description of the three leagues, Thirlwall, II, 100 et seq.

² Von Ranke, I, 131 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 101.

³ Thirlwall, II, 104.

were undoubtedly selected for life, and generally belonged to the same family. Notwithstanding their political liberty, the colonists retained their ancient worship, language, and manners, the former remaining unchanged, the two latter being possibly somewhat modified by contact with the peoples among whom they had settled. Thus the links which bound them most strongly among themselves and to the parent states were those of religion and commerce. Numerous common shrines arose on the islands of the Ægean, and this sea became at last a lake, covered with craft plying to and fro in either direction. The Black Sea likewise was explored and opened to Greek enterprise, while ship-building and navigation experienced many improvements. Nor were these colonies more important for their trade than for their intellectual activities. Such men as the philosophers *Beas* and *Thales*, *Anaximander*, *Euclid*, *Archelaus*, and *Xenophon*, were of Asiatic birth.¹ Freedom from restraint and complete independence of action enabled these settlements, as organizations, and their citizens, as individuals, to overcome all other disadvantages and to attain a high degree of commercial, political, and intellectual development. But, unfortunately, intercolonial quarrels were frequent, and within their own limits civil discords were often rife. *Miletus*, for example, had a series of internal revolutions lasting the lifetime of two generations; in spite of which it was during this period that the city rose to its highest prosperity.²

Still, notwithstanding the disunited condition and local dissensions of these establishments, they were, by reason of their own power, safe from outside aggression so long as not any strongly constituted neighbor of another race existed in the vicinity;³ thus they continued to prosper in an increasing measure until the time of *Cyrus*, the Persian, who first in 547 B.C. threatened them.⁴ The *Æolians* and *Ionians* then united for mutual defence, but the *Dorians*, believing themselves capable

¹ Von Ranke, I, 280-342; Cantu, II, 112.

² Holm, I, 269 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 104.

³ Holm, I, 319-338.

⁴ For the Ionic revolt, cf. Grote, III, Ch. XXXV.

of repelling the invader, refused to join the alliance; Cyrus sent his general, Harpagus, against them and finally subjugated them all.¹ The colonists, in several instances, rather than submit to foreign dominion, abandoned their homes and took refuge on islands in the Ægean Sea;² those who remained were often forced to serve in military operations against their own compatriots.³ After the defeat of Xerxes they again were freed by the efforts of their brethren (479 to 469 B.C.) but in 387 B.C. their cities were once more restored to the Persian empire.

About the era of the foundation of the three groups of colonies already mentioned, the Greeks had also overrun another slightly more remote portion of Asia Minor. To the southward of the Dorian regions, just east of Rhodes, a small but attractive semicircular peninsula projects into the sea; a well-watered district, it abounds in fertile valleys and wooded mountain sides. Although the exact date of its first colonization is not known, this land seems very early to have aroused attention.⁴ Settlers scattered not only over Lycia, but farther inland through Pamphylia and Pisidia. Xanthus, famous for its heroic resistance against sieges, was the principal city. Other notable places were Selge and Sagalassus, Aspendus and Sida. But the Greeks do not seem to have been sufficiently numerous to obtain complete mastery over the natives. By their bravery—a notable characteristic of the Lycians—the aborigines appear to have avoided subjugation, and on the contrary to have absorbed the immigrants into their midst; that they were greatly modified by contact with the Greeks, the remains of their edifices discovered in modern times fully attest; thus, while not accepting the language or supremacy of those who came among them, they did receive in a marked degree the effects of their culture.

In government the Lycians perhaps first exemplified the

¹ Thirlwall, II, 169 et seq.

² *Ibid.* 170 et seq.

³ For the condition of these colonies after their conquest by Cyrus, cf. Holm, I, 333.

⁴ The latest and best discussion is to be found in the "Geschichte der Lykier," by Treuber (1887).

advantages of a centralized power combined with the individual independence of its members. Their twenty-three cities were represented according to their population in a federal congress, and taxes were paid to a common fund in a ratio proportionate to representation. There was a central executive, a supreme court, a general treasury, and an assembly with jurisdiction over peace, war, and other national affairs; a fleet of considerable importance also existed.¹ Lyciā, under Cyrus, became a Persian province; was subsequently conquered by Alexander, fell under the control of the Ptolemies, was annexed to the Syrian empire, and at last, 190 B.C., was vanquished by the Romans. Somewhat later the yoke was thrown off and the nation reconstituted; its twenty-three towns then organized a league for common defence; but finally, after a period of freedom alternating with subjection to Rome and another brief era of liberty, this entire region was permanently incorporated in the Roman province of Pamphylia.

Cyprus, luxuriant in wheat, wine, figs, honey, and other products, was by reason of its fertile soil very inviting.² The earliest settlers were probably Phœnicians; whether the fact be true or not, it is certain that the Greeks, upon arriving there, found colonists of that race before them.³ The Greek establishments apparently date from about the same epoch as the foundation of the colonies on the mainland of Asia Minor; but the Cypriotes themselves, disposed to boast of higher antiquity, deduced their descent from Trojan heroes who, after that expedition, were reputed to have wandered thither.⁴ Greeks soon preponderated, especially throughout the central valleys and in the city of Salamis, where their influence was the greatest; but, whether because of admixture with the aboriginal inhabitants or as the result of climatic conditions and the natural richness of the land, they in time became sluggish, indolent, and inert. Consequently the

¹ For brief account of the Lycian federation, cf. Thirlwall, II, 103.

² Thirlwall, II, 89; Cantu, II, 107.

³ Holm, I, 146 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 257.

⁴ Thirlwall, II, 89.

Cypriotes were generally subjugated to foreign rule. Already, in the eighth century before Christ, Assyria had acquired the mastery; subsequently Egypt and then Persia gained the supremacy. Alexander the Great succeeded in restoring the island to Greece for a brief period; after his death, it remained in the hands of the Ptolemies until the era of its conquest by Rome. Under the early Greeks, Cyprus was divided into nine states; of these Salamis and Citium were the most important; their capitals, known by the same names, possessed fine harbors. The towns of Paphos and Amathus were celebrated for their temples of Venus; and the latter was especially valuable because of its proximity to the copper mines.¹

Besides the regions, already described, under Greek control, there was among the eastern islands of the Ægean only one which, on account of its size, may be thought to merit separate mention. As a matter of fact, however, Crete, which belonged to the sphere of Dorian activity, does not offer any features of special interest.² Its chief cities, Cnosus and Gortyna, might be cited.³ Among the Cretans, noted for their licentiousness and degeneracy, civilization soon disappeared; royalty was abolished and in its stead corrupt republics followed, world renowned for the depraved character, moral, social, and intellectual, of their people.⁴

These five systems of colonization — Æolian, Ionian, Dorian, Lycian, and Cypriote — comprised all the Greek settlements made in the eastern Mediterranean, and were indeed the only colonies belonging to the first period of migration.⁵ The epoch within which this movement occurred cannot be precisely

¹The literature relative to Cyprus has been greatly enlarged in consequence of the recent excavations; besides Cesnola's remarkable though somewhat unscientific researches, excellent material is found in Ohnefalsch and Richter, "Cyprus, the Bible and Homer"; cf. also Meyer, II, sec. 142 et seq.

²Von Ranke, I, 131; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 251; for lack of industry in Crete, cf. McCullagh, I, 207.

³For brief account of the constitution of the cities of Crete, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 137.

⁴Duncker, III, 254.

⁵A general view of this first period of Greek colonization will be found in Busolt, "Griechische Geschichte," I, sec. 8.

fixed. Any accuracy in the statement of dates is impossible, for the best authorities do not agree within a century. The most which can be said is, that a reasonable conjecture, supported by such evidence as is obtainable, would establish the time of the earliest expulsion of the Greek races from the Hellenic peninsula about 1000 B.C.¹

The consequences of these expeditions in Greece were evidently not less momentous than the results in the Ægean and on the coast of Asia Minor. The land was relieved of its surplus population, the boundaries of states were readjusted on a more permanent basis, and tranquillity was assured. The changes thus effected materially altered or at least modified the national character. For two or three hundred years peace reigned. There was repose; the existing situation not being favorable to forced exile, emigration slackened and indeed ceased. When, in the eighth century before the Christian era, conditions similar to those previously prevailing again arose, the desire to find relief beyond the seas once more was manifest; but this time the tide of humanity — with a single exception, which shall at once be mentioned — turned westward to the more unexplored fields of Italy and Sicily.²

Eubœa,³ — now Negropont, — the first point of departure in the second period of Greek colonization,⁴ lies just east of Greece, from which it is separated by a narrow strait; in fact at the place where the opposite shores come nearest together, the intervening distance is not more than two hundred feet. This chasm has in most ages been bridged; so that, artificially at least, the district has been connected with the mainland. The island — about one hundred miles in length, and varying from six to twenty-six miles in breadth, with an area of fifteen

¹ "The state of Greece in 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, and 1400, B.C. . . . cannot be described to the reader from anything like decent evidence." — GROTE (Introduction), vii. He begins authentic Greek history with the first Olympiad; cf. also, Holm, I, 135, 148, and note 22 at end of Ch. XII.

² A good general description of the colonization of the eighth century with references to pertinent literature will be found in Busolt, "*Griechische Geschichte*," I, secs. 9, 10, and Meyer, II, sec. 284 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "*Ancient History*," I, 250.

⁴ Holm, I, 274.

hundred square miles — is mountainous and well-wooded, but with few streams; notwithstanding which the valleys are fertile and rich in agricultural products. While the east coast is rocky and frequently precipitous, the west has several good harbors. Eubœa constitutes, as it were, a natural bulwark of defence, rendering the approach of hostile fleets difficult and affording a safe refuge for Greek ships; its earliest inhabitants, reputed to have come from Phœnicia, are rarely noted in history prior to the eighth century before Christ.

Chalcis and Eretria, the two principal towns, were then important centres of life, for a long period rivals, until after a severe struggle the supremacy of the former was assured.¹ Subsequently it fell under the domination of Athens, with and against which it repeatedly fought. Eretria perished in 490 B.C. at the hands of Persian invaders. Megara and Corinth were likewise at that epoch the wealthiest and the most aristocratic of Greek communities. These four cities, from which so many emigrants were to go forth, — at that time each governed by an aristocracy, — were favorably disposed to the exodus of the poorer classes, not so much for these latter's benefit as to secure themselves from the danger of revolution and the evils of discontent.

The Chalcidians, in their search for new homes, turning northward, established themselves on the southern peninsula of Macedonia.² This region, partially separated from terra firma by an inlet, and linked to it only by a thin strip of land, — thus forming almost an island, — took the name of the settlers and became known as Chalcidice. Its winding, deeply indented seaboard, with long promontories and protected bays, bore great resemblance to the Greek coast. Hence the Greeks — especially the inhabitants of Chalcis — were attracted thither in large numbers. Of the two chief cities, Potidea, nearly surrounded by water, was founded by Corinth about 600 B.C., and Olynthus by the Thracians a

¹ Holm, I, 271 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 280.

² Holm, I, 279.

little subsequently. In 370 B.C. this latter organized a league of the neighboring towns to oppose Philip II of Macedonia, and the war waged by him upon this alliance occasioned the Olynthiac orations of Demosthenes, when he exhorted the Athenians to send aid to Chalcidice; but his efforts came too late; for before the Athenian forces had arrived Philip had achieved its conquest.¹ Both Potidea and Olynthus were in their day of prosperity noted for trade and commerce.

Attention must now be directed to the Greek empire which was growing up in the West.² In remote antiquity it would seem that the Pelasgians went to locate in Hesperia, as Italy was then called. According to the narrative, one expedition of these people, under CEnotrus, setting out from Arcadia, reached the central portion of the peninsula. They had a king, Italus, whose name in turn was adopted not only by his own subjects, but also by the surrounding tribes. Another party of emigrants, whose home had been in Thessaly, settled at the mouth of the Po and built the town of Spina; thence numerous colonists departed to found other cities. This race seems to have eventually overrun all Italy, everywhere asserting itself; Croton became the capital. Based upon these beliefs as to that which may have occurred in prehistoric cycles,—although the greater number of details is lost,—many fantastic myths originated. This primitive intercourse between Italy and Greece, ascribed to the voyages made by the heroes of the Trojan War, was probably subsequent to that event; Cumæ and Metapontum undertook nevertheless to trace back their descent to that age.³ If these stories have any value, the settlements of the Greeks in southern Italy might perhaps be considered prior in chronological order to their colonization of Sicily; for the former always claimed in legend a preëxistence of several centuries; but historically their earliest emigration into Sicily

¹ Thirlwall, V, 307 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, Lect. 68.

² For the Western colonial establishments of the Greeks, cf. Grote, III, Ch. XXII.

³ Holm, I, 289 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 90.

preceded their entrance into Magna Græcia by about fifty years.¹

Leaving undetermined the precise time of the origin of Cumæ,² said to have been founded in the eleventh century before Christ, and of Metapontum,³ boasting to date from 900 B.C., it is true that nearly eight hundred years before the Christian era these places—both afterward celebrated—received reënforcements of Greek colonists.⁴ The first owed its foundation to wanderers from Æolian Cumæ, Chalcis, and Eretria; the latter was generally called Achæan. Cumæ was a prosperous commercial mart, ruling over considerable territory and planting various colonies, among which were Naples and Zancle, otherwise known as Messina.⁵ Slight ruins of Cumæ still exist, while Metapontum has utterly disappeared. The other settlements in Italy were made about the end of the eighth century B.C. Croton, Sybaris, Tarentum, Locri, and Rhegium commenced their chronicles with this epoch. Several other cities likewise subsequently sprang from them. Of the Greek races, the Achæans held the supremacy in Magna Græcia.⁶

The fact of the proximity of Greece to the eastern extremity of Italy readily explains the course which the emigrants followed.⁷ From all accounts the earlier peoples of these regions were mountain dwellers; vast expanses of plain and seacoast were uncultivated, untilled, and uninhabited.⁸ These conditions, combined with a pleasant climate and the fertility of the soil, undoubtedly were highly conducive to immigration.⁹ The Greeks were active in commerce, and at this time had in a measure developed the science of navigation. They saw in Italy the chance not only to escape tyranny and poverty

¹ Holm, I, 284 et seq. For the rapid development of the Greeks in Italy and Sicily, cf. Grote, III, 173 et seq.

² Cantu, II, 393.

³ *Ibid.* II, 394.

⁴ Holm, I, 282 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 283 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 90.

⁶ For details of Greek colonization in Magna Græcia, cf. Lenormant, "La Grande Grèce," I.

⁷ Holm, I, 283.

⁸ Cantu, II, 388.

⁹ The Greek colonization both in Magna Græcia and in Sicily was agricultural in character, R. and J. 21.

at home, but even more the opportunity to enrich themselves and to extend their power;¹ once the current set in this direction, it flowed steadily thither until, by the number and importance of their colonies in southern Italy, this entire district assumed the name of *Magna Græcia* (Great Greece). Having landed on the Gulf of Tarentum, these enterprising mariners skirted the shore line as far north as the Bay of Naples,² and overran the island of Sicily. The origin of most of these establishments is obscure for want of historic records. Corinth, Megara, and Chalcis were the chief points of departure. Both the two first mentioned had harbors on the western side of the Isthmus of Corinth, while Chalcis was then the leading commercial metropolis of Greece. The position of Megara is attested by its many dependencies.

Sybaris, possibly the most ancient Greek community in southern Italy, being founded a little before 700 B.C., attributed its beginning to Achæans and Troizenians.³ Its authority extended over four neighboring tribes and twenty-five cities. The inhabitants, renowned for their wealth, luxury, and enjoyment of ease, multiplied so rapidly that within two centuries they are said to have been able to put three hundred thousand fighting men in the field. This army, however large, was defeated by that of Croton in 510 B.C., when Sybaris was literally drowned; for the conquerors turned the course of the river Crathis so that its overflow destroyed the town.⁴

Croton was likewise settled by the Achæans in 710 B.C.⁵ The extent of its trade, the strict morality of its citizens, and its superior government soon rendered it prosperous and influential. The school of Pythagoras was situated here, and hence his disciples, Charondas and Zaleucus, disseminated their teachings.⁶ The subjugation of the Sybarites marked the

¹ The first Greek adventurers in the West were probably pirates, Grote, III, 163.

² For list of colonies in *Magna Græcia*, cf. Cantu, II, 387; Holm, I, 359-375.

³ Holm, I, 289; Cantu, II, 389.

⁴ Holm, I, 365 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 180 et seq.

⁵ Cantu, II, 389 et seq.

⁶ Holm, I, 366 et seq.; Cantu, II, 390 et seq.

height of the power of Croton. Its people were not long afterward repulsed by the Locrians, and from that time their decline began.¹

Tarentum, the most easterly of the important Greek settlements in Italy, also dated from 710 B.C.² Possessing a fine harbor and situated in the midst of a fertile region, this city was once the most prominent and flourishing of Magna Græcia, not less because of its merchant marine and ships of war than on account of its population, industries, and high degree of civilization.³ Although subsequently corrupted by wealth and degenerated in morals, it remained independent until 272 B.C., the date of its conquest by Rome.⁴ Tarentum was one of the last places in Italy to abandon the Greek language. Some few ruins are still to be seen on its site.

Thurium was built in 443 B.C. on the spot where Sybaris had stood.⁵ The survivors of the latter were first aided in their enterprise by colonists — among whom Herodotus and Lysias — from all parts of Greece; but the newcomers soon expelled the Sybarites, superseded them by more recruits, and raised the colony to a position of considerable rank.⁶ Thurium fell into the hands of the Romans in 296 B.C.

Poseidonia (city of Neptune), or Pæstum,⁷ so called, a little south of Cumæ, famous for its beautiful roses and the prevalence of malaria, founded by Greeks from Sybaris in the sixth century before Christ, was destroyed by the Saracens in 1000 A.D.; extensive remains recall its former splendor.

Rhegium, the only other Greek town of note in this vicinity to be mentioned, situated almost at the southern extremity of

¹ Holm, I, 365 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 180 et seq.

² Holm, I, 290; Cantu, II 388.

³ Among its citizens is reckoned Archytas, the celebrated mathematician. For account of the constitution of Tarentum, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 123.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, Lect. 91; Cantu, II, 502 et seq.; Holm, II, 251 et seq.

⁵ Holm, II, 251 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 184 et seq.; Cantu, II, 393.

⁶ For political constitution of Thurium, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 123 et seq. It was one of the Athenian cleruchies, cf. *post* 119, 120, and notes.

⁷ Holm, I, 291; Cantu, II, 394.

the mainland, directly opposite the Sicilian coast, was established, possibly as early as 743 B.C., by Chalcidians. About 668 B.C. it received further immigrants of the Dorian race, by reason of its fine harbor and large fleet soon became powerful, and exercised sovereignty over the inhabitants of the entire neighborhood. Finally, in the fifth century before the Christian era, this city, becoming embroiled with Syracuse, was conquered by the first Dionysius; after which disaster its greatness never returned.¹ The Greek tongue was here spoken until a very late day.

¹ Nearly all the colonies around the Gulf of Tarentum, in their turn, located settlements farther to the northward on the western coast of Italy. Some have been described, others were merely of secondary importance.² A few words respecting the political constitutions of these dependencies may now not be amiss. Generally the colonists of early days adopted in their new home a form of government similar to that of the state from which they migrated; but subsequently, in many of those communities where aristocracies had prevailed, revolutions occurred, so that oligarchies or democracies became almost universal. Class distinction, nevertheless, was everywhere strong; the inhabitants of the cities ruled the country people as serfs, and later arrivals were considered inferior to those families which had participated in the foundation of the municipality.³

The first settlers of Sicily are supposed to have been refugees from Troy, as presumptive evidence of their Asiatic origin exists.⁴ The Phœnicians undoubtedly came hither at a remote date.⁵ The Greeks and the Carthaginians soon followed, the former preceding the latter by at least two centuries.⁶ Within fifty years after the inception of the earliest Greek town—

¹ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 185; Cantu, II, 393.

² For description of other Greek colonies in this region, cf. Holm, I, 290 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 181 et seq.; for the later political situation in Magna Græcia, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 489, 550.

⁴ Holm, I, 284 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 252, II, Lect. 50.

⁵ Grote, III, 97; Holm, I, 291 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 91 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 96.

⁶ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 96.

Naxos — numerous flourishing colonies, such as Syracuse, Catania, Megara, Hybla, Gela, and Agrigentum, arose;¹ while the location and development of the Greeks at other points continued unmolested throughout three centuries, until the invasion of the Carthaginians.² These two races, as is known, were here destined to wage a prolonged strife for supremacy; from 400 B.C. to 250 B.C. the struggle for the mastery persisted; and, ultimately, out of this conflict Roman hostility to Carthage sprang. At the end of the first Punic War Rome took possession of the western half of the island, and during the second contest of the same name seized all Sicily. It is only necessary here to relate the story of Greek power in that vicinity so far as it is independent of Carthaginian complications.³

Chalcis was the first to send emigrants thither. About 735 B.C.,⁴ from twenty-five to fifty years before the historic colonization of the Italian peninsula, Naxos on the east coast was settled by Chalcidians, seconded by some colonists from Megara; it grew rapidly and within a short time had in turn established offshoots,⁵ but eventually in 403 B.C. was razed by the tyrant Dionysius.

Syracuse, the greatest Greek city outside of Greece, if not of the entire Greek world, owed its origin, about 734 B.C., to Dorians from Corinth.⁶ When these emigrants landed on the Sicilian shores, they probably found there a small Phœnician outpost, surrounded by the ancient inhabitants, the Siceli; of them the newcomers made slaves, setting themselves up as the nobility and rulers.⁷ The Greeks became the land-owners and, assuming the chief political authority, established

¹ Holm, I, 285 et seq.

² For description of Greek colonization in Sicily, cf. Freeman, "History of Sicily," I; Holm, "Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum," I.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 93 et seq., *supra*, pp. 75-77.

⁴ Grote, III, 163 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 91.

⁵ Holm, I, 285 et seq.

⁶ For the foundation of Syracuse, cf. Grote, III, 176; Holm, I, 286, 288; Thirlwall, II, 92; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 98 et seq. For explanation of the motives for the foundation of Syracuse, cf. R. and J. 37.

⁷ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 95, 101.

among themselves a nominal republic. Those who subsequently arrived and engaged in trade and commerce formed an intermediate class; but, as Syracuse increased in wealth derived from their occupations, they became even more influential than the so-called "Gamori" or proprietors; so that in 485 B.C. these latter were driven out of the city and the period of the tyrants began.¹

Gelon of Gela,² attracted by the internal dissensions, lent aid to the refugees and, in consideration of the sovereign power, led them back. He also transferred the people of several smaller towns to Syracuse and offered many inducements to other Greeks. To secure wealthy men as citizens was his special object, in the execution of which he went so far as to sell, or exile, multitudes of the poor. "One hundred rich men are more easily governed than one poverty-stricken individual," was his maxim. Under his rule Syracuse attained a more important position than any other Greek state. He organized an efficient army and navy for the defence of the Greeks against the allied forces of Persia and Carthage, and with his fleet won a signal victory over the vessels of the African metropolis. In peace, not less than in war, he was distinguished. His court was splendid and he was the patron of Epicharmes, Æschylus, Pindar, and Simonides.

The brother of Gelon — Hieron — who followed him, extended his influence over Magna Græcia, and maintained the traditional policy of his predecessor.³ Thrasybulus, who upon Hieron's death had been designated as regent during the minority of the rightful heir, was soon expelled by the citizens; the republic was restored, and amassed greater and greater riches. Slaves were innumerable; for, alas! in Sicily human bondage existed, and the number of serfs was the standard of wealth. Developing in foreign prestige, Syracuse was torn

¹ For some account of the tyranny at Syracuse, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 407 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 101 et seq.

² Holm, II, 79 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 103 et seq. For brief history of Syracuse subsequent to this time, cf. Cantu, II, Ch. XXVII, 394 et seq.

³ Holm, II, 83 et seq.

with civil discord; one after another its principal men were banished, out of fear that they might usurp the supreme control.¹ The Siceli also inaugurated, in 451 B.C., a strong league for the purpose of evicting the Greeks; but the Syracusans routed them and later, capturing Agrigentum, obtained the mastery throughout Greek Sicily.² Troubles were not yet, however, ended, for some of the minor states persuaded Athens to declare war.³ First Alcibiades, and subsequently Nicias, was placed in command of the blockading squadron. After a protracted siege and the timely arrival of succor from Sparta, the enemy was defeated, and its fleet sunk, while among the prisoners were Nicias and Demosthenes.⁴ Syracuse then perhaps reached the pinnacle of its fame (412 B.C.).

The next two centuries certainly measured the most glorious epoch,⁵ when the long struggle with the Carthaginians for the leadership in Sicily was being waged. The principal domestic event was the rise of Dionysius,⁶ who, of humble station in his youth, accomplished by intrigue the overthrow of the republic and assumed the dictatorship. His tyranny lasted thirty-eight years. At first unfortunate in war against the Carthaginians, he finally made with them a compromise, by which the possessions of both parties were respected and peace reestablished.⁷ Then, after the suppression of rebellion at home, he aspired to stretch his sway over Magna Græcia.⁸ In these efforts he was only partially successful, although he seems to have planted some colonies on the shores of the

¹ For the constitution of Syracuse about this time, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 118 et seq.

² Holm, II, Ch. XXV.

³ Von Ranke, I, 248 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 66, 109, 117. For political conditions of this war, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 175 et seq. For the period immediately following it, *ibid.* 283 et seq.

⁴ For good account of the Sicilian enterprise, cf. Holm, II, 466-481; Von Ranke, I, 259; Thirlwall, III, Ch. XXII et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," Lect. 52 and 53.

⁵ Thucydides, VI and VII; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 106 et seq.

⁶ Holm, II, 521; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, Lect. 94. For the political aspect of Syracuse under the Dionysii, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 407 et seq.

⁷ Von Ranke, I, 472 et seq.; Holm, II, 516-525; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 176 et seq.

⁸ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 179.

Adriatic;¹ still undaunted, and turning his attention to the affairs of Greece, he delegated his brother to represent him at the Olympic games, but there met defeat. In the festival of Bacchus Dionysius won a prize; he unfortunately died soon afterward at a banquet given in honor of this victory (368 B.C.). Among the renowned men of his court Plato was for a time the chief; but ultimately a quarrel arose and the philosopher was sold into slavery. Damon and Phintias, whose story of friendship is well known, were likewise of his age, but reckoned among his enemies.²

Dionysius II, son of the preceding, and following his father in the dictatorship, was quickly deposed;³ after ten years passed in exile, while revolutions were rapidly succeeding one another in Syracuse, he eventually regained the ascendancy. His reign, however, lasted only five or six years. On his return many people abandoned the city, going to found Ancona; while others were continually planning to deprive him of his authority, with the additional object of breaking down the increasing predominance of Carthage in the island. Aid was sought of Corinth, and Timoleon⁴ was chosen to assist in the task. This skilful general, and not the less great man, vanquished Ictas, — who in the meantime had driven out Dionysius, — banished him to Greece, annihilated the Carthaginian forces, liberated all the citizens of Sicily, and restored the republic.⁵ The Greek settlements were then organized into a league, of which Syracuse became the leading member. Timoleon, one of the grand characters of antiquity, was never corrupted by wealth nor dazzled by power. Under his direction the laws were revised, and many reforms instituted; but upon his death chaos again prevailed both at home and abroad.

¹ Among others probably Ancona can trace its antiquity back to that epoch; cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, Lect. 95.

² *Ibid.* III, 189 et seq.

³ *Ibid.* III, 191 and Lect. 96.

⁴ Von Ranke, I, 475; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 197 et seq.

⁵ For the political affairs of Sicily after the fall of the Dionysii, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 484 et seq.

Agathocles,¹ a man of the people, usurped in 317 B.C. the absolute command. His rule was warlike, for, as elsewhere related,² he invaded both the territory of Carthage and the soil of Italy. After his decease, in 278 B.C., seditions and misfortunes intervened.³ Then Hieron II became an ally of Rome, and from 241 to 215 B.C. Syracuse enjoyed extraordinary good fortune; but, subsequently espousing the cause of Carthage, was in 212 B.C. captured and partially destroyed by the Romans, Archimedes, its defender, perishing in the conflict. After this event the government remained in the hands of the conquerors.

The prosperity of Syracuse was not less due to the fertility of the region surrounding it than to its central position in the Mediterranean and its wonderful harbor. Thus trade and commerce grew to vast proportions, and in the political world the city assumed a most important rôle; the population is variously estimated to have been at one time from 500,000 to 1,200,000 souls, while its area was nearly as extensive as that of present Paris.⁴ A few ruins may still be visited by the curious archæologist. Within the first century of its existence this metropolis had likewise become the parent state of many settlements, among which Acræ, Camenæ, and Camarina may be mentioned.

The neighboring Greek colonies, as compared with Syracuse, scarcely require notice. Agrigentum, its early competitor, which, however, soon fell under its dominion, was situated about midway on the southwest coast.⁵ It owed its origin to emigrants from Gela in 582 B.C. Pindar called it the most beautiful abode of mortals. Its wealth was once immense and its buildings magnificent. The number of its citizens is said to have approximated 200,000, although some authors put as high as 300,000.⁶ By reason of proximity to Carthage,

¹ Von Ranke, I, 475 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 203 et seq. and Lect. 97.

² *Supra*, p. 76.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 215 et seq.

⁴ *Ibid.* II, 101; R. and J. 53.

⁵ Cantu, II, 408.

⁶ For brief account of constitution of Agrigentum, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 122; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 100.

and owing to its affluence, it naturally suffered much from invasions. The period of greatest opulence was from 470 to 406 B.C.; the trade with Africa was then enormous. In the last-named year Agrigentum was taken by the Carthaginians and sacked; afterward rebuilt, it became head of the league against Syracuse and was entered by the latter's army in 306 B.C. In the Punic wars it sided with Carthage, and in 262 B.C. opened its gates to the Romans. Numerous remains testify to its power and extent. Leontini,¹ famous for its public edifices and its scenery; Catana, submerged by Etna; Hybla, remarkable for its honey; Camarina, infested by the malaria; Eryx, renowned for the temple of Venus; Himera, with its hot baths; and Enna, annually celebrating the fêtes of Ceres,—were other places of secondary importance.²

The Greek dependencies in Sicily rapidly developed because of the natural advantages of their location.³ In the days of Rome the island was known as the granary of the Empire, and is reputed to have previously been even more fertile. Its great products were cereals,—chiefly wheat and barley,—fruits, wines, and metals.⁴ In this era, when so little attention is given to the cultivation of the soil, it still produces large quantities of grain, oranges, lemons, and sulphur. Its architectural ruins of to-day are not less noted than its wealth of preceding ages. Over its territory the civilizations of Phœnicia, Carthage, Greece, and Rome passed, and in its antiquities traces of all these varying influences are perceived.

To the west Sicily did not mark the farthest outpost of Greek enterprise. About 600 B.C. some Phocæans, having visited several of the minor islands in the Mediterranean, disembarked on the mainland to the north and laid the

¹ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 107.

² Thirlwall, II, 93; Cantu, II, 408 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 98 et seq.

⁴ Herodotus, VII, 158; Thucydides, VI, 20; Xenophon, "Œcon." 20 and 27; Polybius, V, 88, XXVIII, 2; Demosth. "adv. Dionysiod," 1285; Cicero, "Verr." III, 18.

foundations of Massilia, — the modern Marseilles, — which, owing to its fine harbor, soon became an important trading point.¹ The colonists, as the result of their bravery, commercial instinct, and skill in seafaring, soon gained renown. They extended their sway to the site of the present city of Genoa on the east and, crossing the Pyrenees to the west, planted scattered settlements in the south of Spain.² Pythias of Marseilles made a voyage of discovery, coasting around the Iberian peninsula, and, sailing northward beyond Britain, reached the land of "Thule," the identification of which has puzzled so many geographers. The Massilians, as might be expected from their energetic spirit, came in conflict with the Carthaginians,³ routed them in a sea engagement, and always maintained their independence until their district became a Roman province; when, indeed, they still preserved their own constitution and local administration. Later they espoused the cause of Pompey against Cæsar, were captured by the latter's troops, and suffered severely (49 B.C.). Not only was Marseilles for several centuries one of the leading marts of the world, but in subsequent times it also is famous for its schools of philosophy and literature, which attracted students from Rome herself. The government was an aristocracy; affairs were in the hands of an assembly of six hundred, from which a committee of fifteen was charged with their actual management, while three of this body formed the executive.

About the same date as the Greeks first went to Sicily, perhaps when en route, some Corinthians wandered to Corcyra, whither the Eretrians had apparently preceded them.⁴

¹ Holm, I, 292 et seq.; Duncker, III, 498 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 108; Cantu, II, 114. For an extensive description of Marseilles and the coast around the Gulf of Lyons in the time of the Greeks, cf. Lenthéric, "La Grèce et l'Orient en Provence," 154 et seq., 331 et seq.

² For Phocæans and Rhodians at Tartessus, and elsewhere in Spain, cf. Thirlwall, II, 107 et seq.; also Duncker, III, 497 et seq.; Cantu, II, 114.

³ Holm, I, 293, based on Thucydides; Duncker, III, 501; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 164. The Massilians had also come in conflict in earlier times with the traders of Phœnicia, Grote, III, 161.

⁴ Holm, I, 287; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 270.

This island, situated in the eastern part of the Adriatic Sea, midway in its length, of great fertility and possessing two good havens, rapidly grew in prominence, and soon established on the adjacent isles and opposite shores numerous colonies, among which may be mentioned Epidamnus, Apollonia, Leucas, and Anaetorium. Within a century Corcyra had developed into a formidable rival of Corinth, and in 604 B.C. open hostilities occurred. The Corcyreans then met the Corinthians in the first naval battle recorded by history, and administered to the mother city a crushing defeat;¹ subsequently they were the primary occasion of the Peloponnesian War.² After various experiences,³ Corcyra fell into the hands of Rome in 229 B.C. Under its modern name of Corfu, it is the chief of the Ionian group.⁴

On the northern coast of Africa, half-way between the mouth of the Nile and the site of Carthage, a stumpy-shaped promontory juts out. This region, now a part of Tripolis, was in olden days called Cyrenaica, then as now renowned for its delightful climate and luxuriant soil. Mountain streams and cool breezes render its tablelands most agreeable. These natural conditions early aroused Greek attention. A colony from the island of Thera, under the leadership of Battus, migrated thither and in 630 B.C. built Cyrene.⁵ Other emigrants from the Peloponnesus followed, founding Barca, Apollonia, and Hesperia. The house of Battus reigned about two hundred years, when Barca became semi-independent. Persia afterward conquered this district, which was eventually an-

¹ This battle "took place, according to Thucydides, about two hundred and sixty years before the end of the Peloponnesian War," Holm, I, 287; McCullagh, I, 72; Thirlwall, III, 95 et seq.

² Holm, Ch. XXI; Thirlwall, III, Ch. XX et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 37, 233; for the result on Corcyra, Niebuhr, II, 66 et seq.; for the economic causes and effects of this war, cf. McCullagh, I, Ch. V.

³ For the political situation in Corcyra, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 116, 278, 392.

⁴ For other Greek colonies in the Adriatic, cf. Thirlwall, II, 107 et seq.

⁵ *Supra*, pp. 37-38, Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 551-556. For an account how Psammetichus I (659-611 B.C.) employed Greek mercenaries, and how merchants from Miletus founded an establishment in the delta of the Nile, cf. *ibid.* 495-500; for the foundation of Cyrene, cf. also Holm, I, 294; Thirlwall, II, 94 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 209 et seq.; Cantu, II, 117 et seq.

nexed to Egypt in the time of the Ptolemies. Under the Greeks, prosperity was attained;¹ but the later colonists united with the aborigines and, adopting many of their customs, relapsed into semi-barbarism.

The circle of Greek influence around the Mediterranean was then complete; nor must it be forgotten that while Corinth,² Megara,³ and Phocæa⁴ were colonizing the West and the South, Miletus was sending settlers both to Egypt and to the Black Sea. Naucratis, at the mouth of the Nile, instituted about 550 B.C., became an important metropolis; from it Greek culture spread throughout the vicinity.⁵ But the special sphere of activity for the Milesians was in the Black Sea, which, although so different from the Ægean, proved nevertheless, like it, a wonderful field for the Greeks. Miletus, seconded by other Ionian cities, located some eighty towns on its coasts and drew much wealth from her trade with them.⁶ The principal were Cyzicus, Sinope, Abydos, Tomi, Olbia, Apollonia, Odessus, and Panticapæum.⁷ These districts served to furnish Greece with a large share of its cereals and food supplies; and most of these communities, dating from about the sixth century before the Christian era, played a part in history. Megara also took a prominent rôle in the work of colonization toward the east; to its inhabitants the foundation of Byzantium (658 B.C.) — the modern Constantinople — and Chalcedon, nearly opposite (685 B.C.), must be credited.⁸ As early as

¹ Cyrene is reckoned as one of the few plantation colonies in antiquity; R. and J. 29.

² For the colonies of Corinth, cf. Grote, III, Ch. XXIII.

³ Holm, I, 281 et seq.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 278 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 277 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 108 et seq.; Duncker, III, 495 et seq.; Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 495-500, 645-651, 789-793; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 73.

⁶ Pliny, "Hist. Nat." V, 29; Holm, I, 274; Thirlwall, II, 105 et seq.; Duncker, III, 490 et seq.

⁷ Most of these cities were at first mere trading-posts established for traffic with the natives.

⁸ Holm, I, 281 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 93; Cantu, II, 117. Another important Greek colony of the Euxine was Heraclea, one of the earliest of such settlements; cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 113 and Lect. 88. For its constitution, Wachsmuth, II, 137.

500 B.C. the girdle of settlements around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea was unbroken. Everywhere the Greeks were present, constantly advancing their nationality and permanently developing their civilization; they were, in fact, far more potent outside of Greece than within its borders.¹

Some account of the social, political, and commercial characteristics of this great colonizing race must now be given. The continual political feuds of the people, the numerous domestic revolutions and internal dissensions, the excessive population of their small territories, their independent spirit, love of freedom, and devotion to commerce, combined with a longing for adventure, power, and fortune,—these various causes and motives united more or less to stimulate the exodus from the Hellenic peninsula.² Almost all emigration occurred with the consent and often with the coöperation of the mother state. The prime objects in view were to dispose of the surplus of inhabitants and to inflict exile on intractable agitators.³ The aristocracies especially aimed to force out the poorer classes, who willingly agreed to migrate, knowing that they themselves would become the aristocrats in their new abodes. These circumstances constituted the chief reasons which occasioned multitudes to scatter around the Ægean, the western Mediterranean, and the Black Sea.⁴ Wherever the Greek went, he never forgot his country;⁵ he was often, indeed, a better citizen when abroad than in his native metropolis; for it is a remarkable fact that sometimes the greatest revolutionists, upon going to distant parts of the world, become most loyal. Rarely was a colony hostile to the interests of the parent city, although frequently its founders had, while at home, been active in promoting

¹ For the later day "Hellenization" of the East under Alexander and his successors, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 298 et seq.

² Von Ranke, I, 129; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 253.

³ Holm, I, 263; Thirlwall, II, 97.

⁴ Holm, I, 286. "With the Greeks the motive was generally political, and a safe home was sought where social and commercial life might have free scope for quiet development." — RAWLINSON, "History of Phœnicia," 129.

⁵ Holm, I, 272; Wachsmuth, I, 146.

discord.¹ Above all, the Greek was a patriot; for, while not bound by any political tie,—except in the case of the Athenian cleruchies,—the colonists uniformly manifested a deep solicitude for Greece itself, as their participation in the Olympic games and other fêtes testifies.²

The colonies were generally of peaceful origin. In the first instance, the band of emigrants was usually small in number and poor in means. They sought as a rule some spot unoccupied by the Phœnicians or Carthaginians, and there located; at other times they received a hospitable reception in the outposts of these very nationalities, those of other stock regarding them as homeless and poverty-stricken individuals;³ in which event their neighbors were doomed to disappointment; for they, by their natural abilities, soon obtained the upper hand. Again, they went among the barbarians, purchased the right to a little land, and then by barter and traffic laid the foundations of future cities.⁴ The adaptability of the Greek to his situation was one of his principal traits. His conquests were nearly always peaceful and without military force; only in the later period of development did war play an important rôle. Alas, too often, however, the colony was rent by civil commotion. At first, perhaps, relying for protection on the metropolis, it frequently outgrew it, and assumed complete independence.⁵ Not any struggle on the part of a Greek state to retain a possession is recorded in history; on the contrary, they lent one another aid against the common enemy, but seldom, if ever, did they come in collision with each other.⁶ The dependencies gave new birth, in remote regions, to the religion, manners, language, and philosophy of the fatherland. For those of the East, Delos was the centre of life; for those of

¹ Holm, I, 272.

² *Ibid.* I, 273.

³ *Ibid.* I, 273; Thirlwall, II, 99; Wachsmuth, I, 103.

⁴ For the relations between the Greeks and the barbarians, Wachsmuth, I, 208 et seq.

⁵ Holm, I, 273.

⁶ For a description of the relations between the mother cities and the colonies, cf. Beloch, "Griechische Geschichte," I, 172.

the West, Corinth. Miletus, Megara,¹ Chalcis, and Phocæa were also the founders of many settlements.² Athens on the other hand, notwithstanding the number of individuals who left the city in early days, abstained from any organized effort at colonization³ until after the creation of the Athenian League (479 B.C.).⁴

Then, as Holm says: "The Athenians strengthened their influence and supremacy in the allied districts . . . by planting colonies in the Roman sense of the word — cleruchies, not *apoikiai*, as the ordinary Greek colonies were called. The latter are independent towns, while the Athenian and Roman colonies are settlements of Athenian and Roman citizens in foreign countries, settlements of people who always remained in the closest dependence on the mother city, of which they did not cease to be citizens. They were to Athens what Mesenia was to Sparta, except that geographically they were not so close to the parent city, being planted in distant spots, with the intention, not only of providing subsistence for their own citizens, but also like the Roman colonies, of controlling an empire. Like the latter some of them were settled in connected districts as complete communities, and some only upon land which had to be made over by communities which continued to exist there,⁵ in which case the emigrant Athenians formed a state within the state of the already existing republic, somewhat after the fashion of the Germans in the Roman Empire at the time of the migration of peoples. In the former case the cleruchy had its special constitution like Athens herself with archons, council, ecclesia, and strategi. Some of their legal cases had to be decided at Athens. The same pro-

¹ For some account of the industry of Megara, cf. McCullagh, I, 236.

² Von Ranke, I, 129 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 256.

³ In the usual Greek sense "Athens always avoided colonization"; Holm, I, 273.

⁴ For the Athenian League, *ibid.* II, 211-220.

⁵ Citizens obtaining allotments of divided lands in a conquered or subject state were called cleruchoi; Boeckh, II, 168-180; III, Ch. XVIII; Grote, II, Ch. XLVII; Thirlwall, III, 56; Curtius, "History of Greece," III, Ch. XXXVII. Similarly the Roman colonists; cf. Polybius, II, 21, III, 40, IV, 81; Appian, "Bellorum Civilium," I, 7; Dionysius, "Ancient Rome," II, 16.

cedure had already been adopted by the Athenians at the beginning of the sixth century, when they occupied Salamis. But then they were in the immediate neighborhood of the metropolis, and Salamis may be considered as a continuation of Attica.¹ The cleruchies which concern us more closely in the history of the fifth century came into being after the unsuccessful attempt at Eion in Thrace (about 475 B.C.). . . . We may reasonably assume that the system of Athenian cleruchies influenced the Romans, whose colonies certainly date from a later period than the occupation of Salamis by Athens."² Grote, among other details, notes, "These men were Athenian citizens who still remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and whose property formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens." They certainly constituted an exception, both in the method of their foundation and in the nature of their dependency, to the usual colonial establishments of the Greeks.

The principal bond between the mother state and the colonies was perhaps religion.³ The people literally carried their worship with them; for, before departure, they took a light from the sacred fire of the tutelary deity, and this they transported to ignite the flame in some other remote temple to be erected by their hands;⁴ if perchance extinguished en route, some one was delegated to return for the special purpose of rekindling it. The Greeks paid homage to nature, and invoked its manifestations under various phases and forms.

¹ For the two periods of the system of cleruchies or "lot-holders," cf. Grote, IV, 521; VIII, 282 et seq.

² Holm, II, 220-222; for list of some of these colonies, Thirlwall, III, 57 et seq.; Holm, II, 221; according to the latter author, Duncker reckons the number of Athenians settled abroad in cleruchies at fifteen thousand, *ibid.* For their influence in the western Mediterranean, *ibid.* II, 250-257; for their maritime power, cf. McCullagh, I, 152 et seq., 160 et seq.

³ Holm discusses the bonds of union among the Greeks, and cites Herodotus as saying the things common to the Greeks were "blood relationship, or common descent, common religion, and language, and lastly, similar manners and customs," "History of Greece," I, Ch. XIX; also *ibid.* I, 272; for the elements of Greek disunion, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 147 et seq.; for those of union, *ibid.* 154 et seq.; cf. also Von Schlegel, 253; Cantu, I, 550.

⁴ Thucydides, I, 24; Thirlwall, II, 9^c.

Forests, air, sun, stars, and ocean, as well as the attributes of the human race, such as beauty, strength, courage, and wisdom, were revered.¹ No matter where they sailed, how far from home they migrated, whether they settled on hilltop, mountain side, or in the valley, on seashore, or in the plain, everywhere they perceived these same phenomena, suggestive of their gods, to remind them of their moral allegiance to their common country. All their familiar ceremonies were reinstituted in the new settlement, while the greatest ambition of the colonist was to be chosen to participate in the national festivals.² Embassies and gifts were frequently sent home on these occasions. Thus from every civilized part of the globe the Greeks congregated at the shrines of Delos, Ephesus, and Cyprus for the adoration of their divinities.³ The temple became their parliament house.

The public games likewise aroused a strong feeling of union.⁴ Not only did neighboring communities there contend with each other, but competitors for prizes came from afar. During their continuance, war was suspended and enemies at arms met as rivals in athletic sports. Cities were often reconciled and alliances sealed. Amusement was not the sole factor, but literature and music won recognition; for then it was that some of the world's famous tragedies and comedies, in verse and prose, gained for the authors their first laurels. Here wise men and sages, philosophers and wits, historians and story writers, vied with each other in friendly contest. Athlete, artist, poet, and priest fraternized; citizens, colonists, patrons, and paupers, joining in admiration, were drawn into closer sympathy. The statesman also was there for pleasure, but seldom for diplomacy. Thus not any political federation developed from these assemblies. They were national without a nation.

The Greeks, wherever wandering, preserved their own lan-

¹ Von Schlegel, 240 et seq.

² Holm, I, 272.

³ For the influence of the Delphic oracle upon colonization, cf. Holm, I, 231 et seq. and note 9 to Ch. XIX; Duncker, III, 543.

⁴ Isocrates, "Paneg." 49; Holm, I, 235; Von Schlegel, 233; Thirlwall, I, 390 et seq.; Wachsmuth, I, 159 et seq.

guage and laws.¹ This does not mean that all their settlements enacted similar legislation, but merely that they acknowledged the same fundamental principles. The medium of common speech afforded decided advantages to the widely scattered colonists; it enabled them to read the same literature and to study the same philosophy; the great number of renowned men, born, educated, and residing in the various dependencies, who became distinguished in letters, morals, history, science, and art, bears witness to this community of thought.²

The individual Greek cities enjoyed absolute political freedom with complete control over their local and foreign affairs.³ Even when entering an alliance created among themselves in certain localities, they never yielded the doctrine of home rule, and were loath to surrender to any central executive the direction of their exterior policy.⁴ The colonies, like the older states, displayed every shading in the framework of their organization. Each municipality had its own constitution, modelled by its citizens to suit their exigencies; democracies, republics, aristocracies, monarchies, tyrannies existed; in some places the government passed through several of these transitions.⁵ Nearly all the internal seditions were, at least ostensibly, to maintain and enforce duly guaranteed privileges, but unfortunately they often resulted in their overthrow. A new uprising was then deemed necessary that the people might recover their ancient rights. Syracuse presents a striking example of the ever changing spirit. Generally the establishments, founded the more directly with the coöperation of the metropolis, began as monarchies; those planted

¹ Wachsmuth, I, 103; Cantu, I, 552-553; II, 110.

² For the high degree of culture in the colonies, cf. Von Ranke, Ch. VIII; Holm, I, Ch. XXIV and XXV; II, 163 et seq.; Ch. XX and XXVI; Von Schlegel, 246; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 445. For more details at length, and especially for the Asiatic Greeks, cf. Duncker, IV, 102 et seq.; R. and J. 69.

³ Holm, I, Ch. XX and XXI; McCullagh, I, 141 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 97.

⁴ For some account of the mutual relations existing among the Greek states, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 197 et seq.

⁵ Von Schlegel, 230 et seq.; McCullagh, I, 23 et seq. On the constitution of the Greek state, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 120.

by refugees or exiles were first republics;¹ but almost universally revolutions of the populace or usurpation of power by the elected magistrates again and again overturned the recognized authorities.² In many cases there was constant ebb and flow; liberty and repression, despotism and order, were repeatedly in conflict for the supremacy. Such is the Greek story of political reforms and social reformers. Whether by reason of these circumstances or in spite of them, there was usually a steady advancement in prosperity. Civil dissensions rarely seem to have constituted an obstacle to regular development.³

The leagues were outgrowths of necessity; dread of conquest was the motive for their foundation. Wherever the federation was the strongest, the fear of invasion was the greatest. Incidentally they afforded means for the increase of trade, and offered larger and safer fields of exchange and barter to their members. But the elevation of some one city to a preponderating influence over the others was contrary to the Greek disposition, and could with difficulty be endured by these equally independent bodies politic; hence the weakness of the unions, their inefficiency, their frequent forcible or insensible dissolution, and their inability to defend themselves when outside foes finally overwhelmed them.

Separated from the fatherland by vast distances and dangerous seas, the Greek colonists were cast upon their own resources. Their innate sense of self-respect and resolute will incited them to the fullest degree of their capacity and strength.⁴ Energetic, thrifty, and skilful, they created and fostered, by their toil and industry, prosperous and flourishing communities, which thus rapidly attained the rank of respectable states and important marts of traffic. Commerce was the main factor in their growth.⁵ In every region of the

¹ Cantu, II, 110 et seq.

² Thirlwall, II, 99.

³ Holm, I, Ch. XX and XXI.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 272; McCullagh, I, 21.

⁵ For the commercial policy of the states of Greece, cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 542 et seq. He says, nevertheless, that "in several of the ancient states of Greece foreign trade was prohibited altogether," and again that "at Athens," for example, "all such trades were occupied by the slaves of the

then known world they bartered and traded with the natives, thus not only enriching themselves, but likewise indirectly augmenting the wealth and consequent power of the parent cities. The needs of mercantile intercourse were a mighty stimulus to navigation and discovery; under this potent incentive, these people opened an expanse of lands previously unexplored, their ships plied in every sea, and the name of Greece became famous in all portions of the earth. Through the opportunities prevailing in the dependencies, the poor were made rich and the ignorant became learned; for the fact is noticeable that, when Greek colonization was at its height, the intellect of man was most cultured.¹ Oratory, poetry, history, philosophy, and art then attained their zenith. Athens, Corinth, Samos, Miletus, Phocæa, and Corcyra were renowned not less for trade than for learning. Records exist proving that products from every clime reached Athens, and that many of them were there manufactured and subsequently reexported.²

The colonists who by choice, by privation, or by force, sought distant homes were, for the most part, poor and of the lower orders of society; but the existence of these conditions, not unexampled in later times, instead of a hindrance proved a blessing. Poverty and want were the mainsprings of assiduity and effort, which inspired them in the achievement of their wonderful destiny. As Von Ranke so ably portrays them: "This active and vigorous population, whose elements were as infinite in their variety as they were copious in number, followed in every situation an impulse of its own. To attempt to pursue these varieties in all their bearings would lead us too far into the explanation of local circumstances. But Greek

rich, who exercised them for the benefits of their masters. . . ." So that "it was almost impossible for a poor freeman to find a market for his work." In support of the text, cf. McCullagh, I, 12, 23; also parts of Ch. III; more especially, *ibid.* I, Ch. II, entitled, "How Industry and Freedom together grew Strong in Greece," an excellent account of the development of commerce, and likewise containing much relating to Greek colonization. If Athens were liberal, Sparta was conservative in her institutions and policy. Cf. also Cantu, II, 110.

¹ Thirlwall, II, 110-156.

² For trade and policy of Athens, cf. McCullagh, I, 93 et seq., 253 et seq., and Ch. VII.

life, in general, displays certain characteristics which can never cease to be significant. The Hellenes followed no common political aim; they cannot be compared with the great powers of which we have had occasion to speak; their provinces and towns were of insignificant extent. But the manner in which these men, with no extraneous impulse or example, lived together and ordered their public affairs deserves the most attentive consideration. Independent and self-centred, they created, in a constant struggle of citizen with citizen, and state with state, the groundwork of those forms of government which have been established in the world at large."¹

Let it also be remembered that while the Greeks were developing philosophy and art, they were likewise, through their colonies, disseminating over the remote regions of the barbarian world the life-giving, refining influences of their institutions. Without the enduring effects of these widely scattered establishments, mankind in every sense would have enjoyed a deferred and only half-formed civilization.² Their colonial policy must, therefore, be recognized as a most efficient force in human progress.³

¹ Von Ranke, "Ancient History," I, 132.

² Cunningham emphasizes the difference in this respect between Greek and Phœnician colonization: the Greek colonies "were new centres of civilizing influences," "Western Civilization" ("Ancient Times"), 72.

³ Von Ranke, I, 129.

CHAPTER V

ROMAN COLONIZATION

THE characteristic of Greek civilization was diversity, of Roman power unity. Variety in the one, uniformity in the other, was the rule; independence of the individual in Greece, subjection of personality in Rome.¹ This difference may be traced in every department of enterprise, in every branch of their respective activity; and the contrast is not anywhere more manifest than in their methods of colonization. The very words employed to designate such a settlement as is now commonly termed "colony" were in signification materially distinct. *Ἀποικία*, the Greek, implies a separation, a moving out of, a dwelling afar off; the Latin *colonia*, on the other hand, means, as is known, a "plantation," a possession in land. In the Greek expression there is not any implication of real property; the colonist is not necessarily a tiller of the soil; the idea is simply that he inhabits a distant region. The Latin decidedly stamps him by the occupation of an estate, and the question of remoteness is not involved. The definitions, in themselves, contain a forcible suggestion of the dissimilarity between the Roman and Greek systems.²

Rome had the advantage of being able to profit by the experience of her two great forerunners, Carthage and Greece. The former lost her acquisitions by detaching them too much

¹ Von Schlegel, "Philosophy of History," 250.

² Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 438, *supra* 6. It may well be said that the Greek "*apoikia*" comes nearer in meaning to the modern word "colony" than does the Latin "*colonia*," from which it is derived. The distinction between the Greek and the Roman establishments must be clearly borne in mind. It is evidenced by the fact that the latter are frequently called *cleruchies*; cf. Polybius, II, 21; III, 40; IV, 81; Appian, "*Bellorum Civilium*," I, 7; Dionysius, "*Ant. Rom.*" II, 16.

from herself, and not sufficiently blending their common interests; thus Carthage never achieved nationality. Greece, on the contrary, spread out her resources in too generous a manner and, failing in centralization, likewise perished. These opposite policies effected similar results. Rome retained her conquests through many centuries by never forgetting to bind securely every section of the empire to the life-giving heart of it, the vital centre, the metropolis. Avoiding the extremes of her precursors, the plan was adopted of drawing the outlying communities to her, rather than going to them. One typical example of the ends attained lies in the domain of literature and art. The Greek sculptors, artists, architects, orators, historians, poets, and philosophers, were scattered throughout the extensive territories of the Greek race; probably the majority of its learned men were natives and residents of the dependencies. Among the Romans this distinguished circle is found alone in the city of Rome. All flocked thither, while the greater proportion were born within or under the shadow of her walls.¹

On the other hand, Rome suffered the drawback that, of the districts then available, her predecessors had preëmpted those considered desirable. The world of that age was, for the most part, composed of states and dominions grouped around the Mediterranean. Little was known of the interior, especially toward the west, at the time when the Republic was established and during the few centuries immediately succeeding that event. The region of the Mediterranean had been apparently large enough for the ambitions of Carthage and of Greece; not much friction had arisen between them; even in Sicily, where the danger was most imminent, an agreement for division was finally made, while elsewhere there seemed to be simply a mutual understanding to avoid each other. Rome, growing stronger and stronger, but not yet able successfully to oppose her older competitors, perceived little, if any, room for development. When therefore, like other nascent empires,

¹ For striking contrast between Greek and Roman colonies, cf. Sir George C. Lewis, "Government of Dependencies," 115 et seq.

she first undertook to subdue her weaker enemies, her energies were necessarily directed against the more peculiarly Italian tribes residing in the peninsula. Thus the preëxistent occupation of the most favorable coasts by other races to a great degree explains the tendency manifested from the earliest ages. As the Greeks, surrounded by water and dwelling along the shores of a country having many inlets and bays, were from the beginning sovereigns of the sea, so Rome built inland and, with her rivals in possession of the principal islands and ports, at once became a land power.

When this state was entering upon its enterprises for conquest, it was, although feeble, a unit.¹ There was a material difference between Rome at the commencement of her history and Greece at a similar stage of its career. The latter was broken into numerous communities of more or less dissimilar ancestry, each with its petty ruler, and dispersed over a region cut up by mountain barriers and intervening streams; the former was smaller, but one city with one king. Exterior conditions and the characteristics of Roman administration fully account for the method, the system, the aim, and the results of her early colonization. This people always seem to have had the good judgment not to attempt to subjugate more territory than they could reasonably hope to retain. Thus their acquisitions were made near home, in the same locality, and in a gradual but progressive manner.² Rome thoroughly amalgamated with herself the conquered districts before endeavoring to extend her rule over other tribes beyond.

The first era of colonial activity may be divided into two periods, quite distinct in character; the one embraces the colonies within Italy;³ the other, those outside of the peninsula.

¹ "The Roman State from its origin and according to its first constitution was nothing else than a well-organized school of war, a permanent establishment for conquest." — VON SCHLEGEL, 254.

² For this reason some authorities refuse to admit that Rome had "colonies" in the modern sense, at least until the time of the Empire.

³ On the colonization of this period, Person, "*Essai sur l'Administration des Provinces Romaines sous la République*" (1878), Ch. III, and Beloch, "*Der Italische Bund*" (1880), may be consulted.

The earlier group belongs mostly to the time of the Republic, only a few of the establishments dating back to the epoch of the kings; the later policy was inaugurated and pursued under the emperors. Historians are generally agreed that the system of Roman colonization played only a secondary rôle in the affairs of the nation; still, it most efficiently served to bind the dependencies together, or, more properly speaking, to Romanize them and to transmit to posterity the civilization of that age which otherwise would never have been so widely disseminated. For these reasons it would seem that the efforts of the Romans in this respect are entitled to more credit than is usually attributed to them; they at least merit an impartial investigation.

As already premised, in this department, like in all others, the state was the moving power. Not anything was left to mere chance or to individual caprice. Rome was the master of her citizens. Few of the rich ever wished to retire from the city. There they enjoyed life, good fortune, and politics, and there they preferred to remain, believing it to be the most attractive place for residence.¹ Perhaps the lower classes would have liked to have been able to withdraw, in order elsewhere to found other freer communities with the chance of improving their position, but the government depended upon the populace for military purposes, and hence forbade the poor to leave without permission; possibly even they would not have departed so willingly, had they had the opportunity; for such men looked forward to the contingency of attaining renown in the wars, which were nearly always on hand. It was thus esteemed by every grade of society a hardship and a sacrifice to be obliged to abandon the capital. The inauguration of a colonial policy was therefore not an enterprise easy of accomplishment; for the important factor of spontaneous emigration was here scarcely to be taken into account. Such a situation would in most

¹ Many of them had their "country houses" outside Rome, but even later in the case of the "latifundia," the owner usually stayed near Rome and managed his slave farm through agents.

cases have rendered colonization futile and impossible, but in this instance it was only a means to a more perfected and more highly organized system; so that, under the prevailing disposition of involuntary individual action, Rome, in the exercise of supreme control over her people, not only was enabled to select those whom she pleased for colonists, and to fix at will the location of their abodes, but likewise could furnish the leaders and a code of laws, at the same time taking good heed that the community should discharge some useful end in the larger development of the state, and should never be tempted to disloyalty or rivalry with the metropolis.¹

From the period of the earliest conquests the senate promulgated the doctrine of confiscation of the lands of defeated foes. These estates were then distributed among Romans, preferably among the poor, upon condition that they would remove thither and till the fields bestowed upon them.² The emigrants, while thus by the bounty of their government becoming landed proprietors, lost their rights as citizens. These establishments served for Rome a double purpose. The city itself was relieved of the embarrassment and the care of numbers of its needy inhabitants, while its new acquisitions were furnished a nucleus of faithful, loyal Romans who implanted the seed of their laws, customs, and language among the foreigners around them. In the event of war they formed a trusty band of defenders, while in time of peace they supplied Rome with her necessary agricultural products and paid taxes into her treasury.³ These colonies, of the epoch of the kings and of the Republic, were not composed of old soldiers, as at a later date, but consisted

¹ The Roman doctrine of the relation of a colony to the state, as contrasted with the Greek idea, is very interesting in view of modern discussion by such men as Seeley, Froude, Lucas, Chamberlain, and others. The most advanced theory seems to be that a colony is a part of the state, *i.e.* a British colony is just as much a part of "Greater Britain" as Illinois is a part of the United States.

² Rosscher and Jannasch, VIII. "Wheresoever the Roman conquers, he inhabits. The natives of Italy, allured by pleasure, or by interest, hastened to enjoy the advantages of victory." — GIBBON, "Roman Empire," I, 260.

³ Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 438, 446.

for the most part of civilians drawn from the lower orders of life. Sometimes the vanquished natives were also admitted to membership. To replace the drafts made on the population of the metropolis, the subjugated people, or at least some of them — generally their principal men — were transported to the capital and there given homes.¹ By this procedure enemies were often deprived of their chief counsellors, and these latter themselves were frequently inspired with the desire to adopt Rome as a foster city. This skilfully executed system of colonization and amalgamation, going hand in hand, in due course successfully Romanized the greater portion of Italy.² The victories by the sword were thus most ably seconded by the policy of absorption applied to the conquered tribes.³

A *senatus consultum* (decree of the senate) or a law of the people was required to authorize the creation of a colony.⁴ The territory was accurately described, as well as provision made how the land should be allotted, how many colonists there should be, how much ground should be assigned to each individual, and, finally, how the community should be governed, it being even indicated how many persons should constitute the administration. After the necessary legal sanction had been granted, the citizens elected the members of the commission to whom the formation of the settlement was to be intrusted; their number varied,⁵ according to its importance, from three to twenty. The most eminent men at times competed for positions on such boards, esteeming not less highly the honor than the attendant power, which often lasted several years.⁶ Numerous officers, architects, artisans, mechanics, laborers, and servants were next chosen to accompany the official representatives to the previously selected site.

¹ Dion. Hal. VII, 439; Cicero, "Agrar." II, Ch. XXVII.

² For the salutary effect of Italian colonies on the social state of Rome, cf. Mommsen, "History of Rome," I, 391 et seq.

³ The last colonization within Italy proper occurred at the end of the sixth century A.U.C.; Mommsen, III, 312 et seq.

⁴ Livy, XXXIV, 53; XXXV, 40.

⁵ *Ibid.* IV, 2; VIII, 16.

⁶ Cicero, "ad Attic." II, 6; Quintilian, XII, 1; Dion. Cass. XXXVIII.

When all was ready the colonists were drawn up in military fashion, and the entire troop, with the commissioners at its head, marched forth to the sound of martial music.¹ Upon arrival at the determined destination, the outlines of the proposed city were traced by a plough, the whole company following the furrow thus made. Sacrifices then being offered to the gods, the work of construction began.² The limits of the adjacent region were also fixed in a similar manner. The ceremony of defining the boundaries was, however, only practised upon the organization of new municipalities. Whenever the Romans occupied a captured place, they simply entered the town, took possession, and apportioned its public property among themselves as directed by the decree voted for the occasion.

The colonial dependencies of Rome were divided into three groups, known respectively as Roman,³—or maritime,—Latin, and Italic.⁴ Residents of the Roman or maritime colonies,⁵ so called, seem to have preserved all their legal rights and obligations, as instituted for citizens of Rome. These communities, mostly situated on the coast, were required to furnish men for the legions. In the Latin colonies⁶ the inhabitants enjoyed merely the liberties of Latium, thus being deprived in part of the prerogatives accorded by the laws of the metropolis.⁷ The recruits, also, whom they supplied, only served in the auxiliary forces. Persons could not be obliged to go to them; but the greater share of land assigned to such emigrants constituted a strong attraction to the poor.⁸ The Italic colonies appear to have had fewer privileges than either of the

¹ Plutarch, "in Gracch." 839 et seq.

² Dion. Hal. II, 75; Varro, "de L. Lat." IV; Cicero, "Phil." II, 40, 42; Livy, V, 48.

³ Livy, XXXIX, 55.

⁴ The other system of division is technically more exact, i.e. into municipia, colonia, præfecturæ, civitates, foederatæ, etc.; for discussion under these heads, cf. Becker and Marquardt, III, 7-37; 51-53.

⁵ Mommsen, I, 42 and 48; B. and M. III, 34.

⁶ Mommsen, I, 135 et seq., 439; B. and M. III, 31 et seq.

⁷ Cicero, "pro Cæcina," 33.

⁸ Concerning the rights of the Latin colonies authorities are divided; cf. Marquardt and Mispoulet.

two preceding classes. They were rarely founded, and then only, apparently, under the emperors and outside of Italy.¹ Very little is known of them. Another division of these possessions was into plebeian and military;² the former were those in which the people belonged to the indigent and poverty-stricken orders; the latter, as their name indicates, were created for the reward of old soldiers, and to afford them a retreat and residence.³ Sylla, turning over to his adherents the estates confiscated from the partisans of Marius, was probably the first regularly to inaugurate such settlements;⁴ although a century previously, at the end of the second Punic war, the senate had already prescribed a distribution of the soil among the veterans.⁵ Julius Cæsar imitated the example of Sylla in later times.⁶ But prior to undertaking any account of the second period of colonization, brief mention must be made of some enterprises under the earlier system.

Legend credits Romulus with the establishment of several towns, but Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, is the first of any subsequent importance settled by the Romans. This city is reputed to have been commenced in the days of Ancus Martius, and undoubtedly owed its origin to the necessity felt for a sea-port.⁷ Three other places seem to have rightly attributed their foundation to the kings, and they were followed by numerous others, organized before the second Punic war, so that more than forty colonies of Rome might then be counted in Latium, Campania, and other regions. Among them were Signia and Circeii, both erected by King Tarquin; Norbæ, the walls of which still stand; Antium, the earliest of the Roman or maritime group; Satricum, Cales, Fregellæ, Saticula, Nequinum,

¹ Pliny, III, 3, 21.

² Velleius Paterculus, I, 14, 15.

³ For quite a concise description of Roman military colonies, cf. Niebuhr, "Roman History," II, 386 et seq.; Livy "Epit." LXXXIV; Sallust, "Catil." 11.

⁴ For Sylla's colonies, cf. Mommsen, III, 541 et seq.; B. and M. III, 329, 330.

⁵ Livy, XXXI, 4, 49.

⁶ For Cæsar's colonies, cf. Mommsen, V, 131, also V, 98, 422 et seq.

⁷ For settlement of Ostia, Livy, I, 3; B. and M. III, 18, citing Madvig, 265; Mommsen, II, 2.

Venusia, Pæstum, Brundisium, Vibo, Valentia, Cremona, and Placentia.¹ From 218 to 201 B.C., the Romans were so busily engaged with the Carthaginians as not to have had any opportunity for further development. Immediately after the close of hostilities they again resumed their work of colonization. Some thirty-five additional communities were created before the rise of the Empire; among them are included Croton (reestablished), Thurium likewise, Bononia (Bologna), Potentia, Parma, Pisa, Lucca, Mutina (Modena), Aquæ-Sextiæ (Aix-les-Bains), Tarentum, Carthage, on the site of the ancient city, and Narbo Marcius (the modern Narbonne). The full achievement of the regeneration of Carthage was, however, left to the Cæsars. Meanwhile Rome had occupied a few of the minor islands of the Mediterranean, planting towns in the Balearic Isles and in Corsica; but Sicily had never received a Roman colony.²

Two facts are noticeable in the later activity of the Republic: the tendency to send out larger bodies of people, and to locate them at a greater distance from the capital; the boundaries of Italy were even occasionally overstepped. Of many of the cities of this age, not only the name, but also the municipal existence, has endured to the present. The so-called Roman or maritime colonies — which were not always on the coast³ — counted at the end of the Republic thirty-five, while the Latin colonies were at that time also of equal number. Not any of the latter were subsequently founded, on account of the difficulty of securing recruits willing to renounce their privileges and rights as Romans. Hence practically all settlements thereafter made obtained for their inhabitants the concession of full citizenship.

The disposition of the senate toward colonization was

¹ Livy (XXVII, 9, 10) says that at the time of the second Punic war there were thirty Roman colonies in Italy, but he probably underestimated the number. For complete list up to about this time, cf. B. and M. III, 18; also Cantu, III, 24 (note) et seq.

² Livy mentions almost all the places colonized by the Romans in this early period; cf. also Tacitus, and R. and J. 9.

³ For inland "maritime" colonies, cf. Mommsen, "History of Rome," III, 26 et seq.

decidedly modified about 130 B.C., which date may be said to mark the close of the first era. The custom had been to exempt from certain taxes and burdens the tracts allotted emigrants, while those remaining public property yielded to the state a fixed and considerable income. The inauguration of so many colonies in the past had gradually restricted the extent of these domains. After the defeat of the Carthaginians, Rome perceived herself with vastly increased possessions, and enormous debts and expenditures. It was therefore resolved that the entire national territory, both actual, and that which might be acquired for some time to come, would be needed to replenish by its revenues the exhausted treasury of the state and to furnish the supplies necessary to defend the conquered regions.¹ It was also then desirable to retain all citizens at home, thus rendering the metropolis more populous, and harboring its strength; for Rome was beginning to fear the growing power of some of its own dependencies as possible rivals.² Hence it was determined not to distribute any more lands, nor to create any further settlements.

The second era commences with the emperors, and its effects fall outside of Italy.³ Julius Cæsar himself reënforced the inert colony already instituted by Caius Gracchus on the site of Carthage,⁴ by sending thither twenty thousand persons;⁵ but the enterprises of his successors were mostly to partake of the military character.⁶ The triumvirate, for want of any other means to reward the old warriors who had helped to overthrow the Republic, deprived many of the citizens of Italy of their estates and divided them among the veterans. Augustus alone located numbers of such establishments in all portions of his dominions.⁷ Entire legions, officers and privates, were frequently settled in the districts which they had

¹ Cicero, "ad Attic." II, 16.

² Velleius, I, 15.

³ On the imperial colonies, cf. Halgan, "L'Administration des Provinces Senatoriales sous l'Empire Romain" (1898), Liv. II, Ch. II.

⁴ Velleius, I, 24.

⁵ Suetonius, "in Jul." 20.

⁶ Pliny, III, 5; Seneca, "ad Helviam," 8; Niebuhr, "Roman History," III, 76, 105.

⁷ Especially those in the East; cf. Mittei, "Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den Ostlichen Provinzen des Römischen Kaiserreichs" (1891).

conquered.¹ In other instances, the colonists were taken indifferently from various organizations.² This latter plan, however, was not popular; for army men in those days, even more than now, were clannish, and liked to maintain associations with their comrades in arms. During the prosperity of the Empire, this system of colonization was uninterruptedly pursued.³

After twenty years of fatigues the Roman warrior found prepared for him a haven of repose and relief from hardship. The lands of the locality where the legion had perchance so many years been stationed were allotted among its members. The veterans laid down their arms and took up the plough, they marked out the site for the city, and designed the forum, the senate house, and the temples. They drew around themselves a commercial and an industrial class; merchants, bankers, manufacturers, followed them. They erected another Rome in miniature, exercised the rights of citizenship, chose a delegate to the imperial capital to care for the interests of the new community, frequently married native women of the neighborhood, and had posterity to whom they transmitted the Roman blood, language, customs, and laws, as well as their own respect for the metropolis.⁴ The colonists, while thus constituting a civil municipality, served also as frontier garrisons; for in the event of stubborn war they were subject to recall under the eagles. More than all else they formed a nucleus of Roman life in their respective regions.⁵ Here were the places of worship, the theatres, the schools, the halls of

¹ Tacitus, "Annals," XII, 32; XIII, 31; XIV, 31 et varii. "A nation of Romans was gradually formed in the provinces by the double expedient of introducing colonists and of admitting the most faithful and deserving of the provincials to the freedom of Rome." — GIBBON, I, 259.

² Tacitus, "Annals," XIV, 27.

³ "It is in the agricultural towns of Africa, in the homes of the vine-dressers on the Moselle, in the flourishing townships of the Lycian mountains, and on the margin of the Syrian desert, that the work of the imperial period is to be found." — MOMMSEN, "Provinces," Introduction 5.

⁴ "Carteia (on the Bay of Gibraltar), the first transmarine urban community of Latin tongue and Italian constitution, was founded in 583 A.U.C. from the multitude of camp children of Roman soldiers and Spanish slaves." It was made a Latin colony; MommSEN, "History of Rome," III, 214, 215.

⁵ For a description of the military colonies under the emperors, cf. B. and M. III, 335-341; Gibbon, I, 260; also Champagny, "Les Césars," II, 65.

justice; here were also the objective points of many of the great roads constructed by Roman skill; here they ended, met, or crossed, and each such junction was a strategic citadel. The importance of these well-built, enduring highways in national development must never be forgotten.¹

The Roman colonies carried civilization afar inland into the mountain fastnesses and along the mighty river courses of Northern Europe. Like the tentacles of some tenacious vine, they never released from their grasp the spot where once they struck root. Rome, even in her splendor, needed them; they were her bases of supply; thence along the routes leading to the capital rolled the grain, the meat, the wine, the fruit, the vegetables, necessary to the maintenance of her inhabitants; and not the less from them were procured her luxuries, as well as her mineral and metallic riches.² The dependencies were the producers, while Rome was the consumer; for in all the centuries of her existence this city was never an industrial centre. Rome, not a commercial nation in the broader sense of buying and selling for other peoples, limited her trade by her own demands; but nevertheless, on account of her multifarious wants and her vast wealth, considerable traffic must have occurred, of which her numerous outposts were the natural channels.

The most remarkable characteristic of Roman colonization, so centralized in its methods, was the result achieved in the diffusion of nationality.³ At the present day, the sojourner on the European continent everywhere perceives the manifest and enduring memorials of this activity. Masterpieces in architecture, sculpture, road building, and many other monuments of industry and skill, testify to its intensity and strength. At Cologne, at Nîmes,⁴ at Lyons, at Narbonne,⁵ at

¹ For description of the Aurelian Way, and the cities and fortresses along it, cf. Lenthéric, "La Provence Maritime," 29 et seq.; an interesting old book on Roman roads is "L'Histoire des Grands Chemins de l'Empire Romain," by Nicolas Bergier (Paris, 1622).

² *Supra*, p. 133 notes.

³ "Les Césars," II, 72.

⁴ For Roman remains in South France, cf. Lenthéric, "La Provence Maritime."

⁵ For the antiquities of Narbonne, cf. Lenthéric, "Les Villes Mortes du Golfe de Lyon."

Merida, at Bologna, at Toulouse, at Cordova, at far-away Corinth, and — not to mention other places on the mainland — even at London, and across the Mediterranean in Africa, the traveller finds cities sprung from Roman settlements.¹ Not less do governments, languages, literatures, philosophies, arts, and sciences show the impress of Roman thought and influence. The culture of Rome was through her colonial establishments bequeathed in some degree to all European nations west of the Russian frontier.²

From these widely scattered fountains, supplied from the one source, modern civilization has bountifully drawn. The capital city planted these pickets on the borders of her realm. The colonists transported thither the germs of national life, so that, many centuries after the imperial authority fell, their descendants still served to perpetuate its traditions and to consummate by those silent, but unerring, laws of association the conquest of barbarism. These little Romes, in the image of the metropolis, accomplished for the welfare of humanity far more than their common conquering parent; but Rome founded or reestablished them all, and by that fact the credit is due her. The consequences are now known, but how much less important and valuable would the victories of Rome have been to posterity had not her troops been followed by, or rather transformed into, the permanent occupants of the lands which they won! The greater achievements of Rome were not by the sword, but by the plough. Her soldiers were far more for the empire and for the race as property owners than as successful invaders. To the later as to the earlier colonization effected by her, Rome applied a well-defined plan of organization. By these means she vastly increased her own durability and the perpetuity of her institutions. The spontaneity of the Greeks was entirely lacking, but because of this difference the system of the one or the other should not be condemned. The results

¹ Tacitus mentions several of these establishments.

² As to methods of Romanizing a country, cf. Mommsen, "History of Rome," III, 79 et seq.

attained by Rome bear testimony not less to the ability of her citizens as colonists, than to the wisdom of her rulers as colonizers. By their combined efforts they performed a stupendous work destined to excite the admiration of future generations.

PART II

THE MIDDLE AGES

CHAPTER I

FIRST MEDIEVAL COLONIZATION — AMALFI — PISA

UPON the disintegration of the Empire of the West, Italy, as is well known, was rent into numerous small states; several were by their subsequent commercial and political activity to attain importance; through them the best of the Roman heritage was transmitted to posterity; they were the caldrons in which Roman and barbarian were fused. The history of the Italian republics of the Middle Ages, in certain respects, recalls the similar experiences of the Greek cities, during ancient days, in their struggle for preëminence. Politics were apparently the sole occupation of the inhabitants; in many of them, between the civil dissensions within and the foreign conflicts without, there seemed little time or thought for anything else. Nevertheless, some of these communities did make notable records in other fields of effort.¹ Their development in art, literature, and science cannot be here discussed; these successes are of interest indirectly only as incidental to their colonial empires; but their commerce, as more closely related to the present topic, is a proper subject of consideration. Florence, Genoa, and Venice are the principal cities to which attention must be directed. A few words will fully suffice for their predecessors — erstwhile rivals — Amalfi and Pisa.

The colonization of this epoch, it should be at once stated, is in its main features essentially different from any other. In the first instance, municipalities originally without tributary

¹ Cf. Hodgkin, "Italy and Her Invaders," III and IV; Sheppard, "The Fall of Rome," Lect. 3-11; Dahn, "Urgeschichte der Germanischen und Romanischen Völker," I and II; Simonde de Sismondi, "Histoire de la Chute de l'Empire Romain," II, 232; and V. Duruy, "Histoire du Moyen Age," 219, 274.

territories were its promoters; trade was its sole object; the wars waged and the conquests effected were believed to be its necessary accompaniment; they were simply auxiliary. The emigrants, leaving the metropolis, were absolutely limited to the number required to conduct the business in the locality whither they were bound; the establishments created were thus, in the majority of cases, scattered outposts, and exclusively consisted of merchants residing in a distant town. The political or social influence exerted by the colonists in the region of their abode was minimum and temporary. The existence of these dependencies was entirely for the advantage of the parent state, which, while compelled by events to defend them incessantly against inveterate foes, expected to draw from them a profit far greater than would be merely commensurate with the cost of their maintenance.

The earliest place in the Italian peninsula to become famous for commerce combined with foreign possessions was the picturesquely situated Amalfi.¹ Probably a Roman colony of the time of the emperors, it was, in the ninth century,² the fifth city in the kingdom of Naples³ enjoying locally a republican form of government. Just before 1100 its population approximated 50,000 inhabitants, besides its 500,000 subjects dwelling in the neighboring districts. Its navy was accorded the highest rank in Europe; not only had its ships repulsed the Turks, but they had also brought home from the Holy Land a considerable band of Norman crusaders. The Amalfitans had likewise developed a new system of laws to replace the former Rhodian code⁴ and their commercial

¹ Hallam, "Middle Ages," III, 310 et seq.; de Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 158, 162 et seq.; Cantu, V, 556; also Robida, "Les Vieilles Villes d'Italie," Ch. XIV; Gibbon, "Roman Empire," V, 645 and 663, who cites "de Republica Amalphitana" in Henry Breneman's "Historia Pandectarum."

² It was during this century that a league between Naples, Amalfi, and Sorrento forced the Moslems from Gaeta. This contact with the East opened the way for the revival of the power and the riches of the Greek cities of southern Italy; Hunt, "History of Italy," 13-14.

³ The Norman conquest of southern Italy temporarily destroyed this greatness.

⁴ The island of Rhodes was in antiquity one of the greatest and most prosperous maritime and commercial communities. Its metropolis of the same

representatives had founded numerous colonial stations throughout the East. Constantinople, Alexandria,¹ Tunis, Bagdad, Cyprus, and Jerusalem had granted Amalfi trading privileges;² in every one of these centres its citizens were living, protecting and fostering its interests. After a lengthy period of strenuous warfare against the Sicilians, Amalfi finally capitulated in 1131 to Roger II.³ Four years later, while its own fleet was absent aiding the conqueror in his attack upon Naples, the Pisans, then becoming formidable on the sea, strongly invested it; surprised, however, by the unexpected return of the Amalfitans, they escaped only with severe loss. Twelve years subsequently they again came back, and without the least struggle enforced complete submission. Thus the prestige of Amalfi perished.⁴ In the twelfth century part of the coast lands were washed away, and in 1348 an extraordinary storm consummated the material destruction of the maritime works and a large portion of the walls. This previously important city is at present a mere village.⁵

Pisa was, in chronological order, the next state notable for colonial establishments;⁶ standing now in her antiquated and deserted streets, it is scarcely conceivable that in this same once densely crowded and wealthy metropolis the rulers of many peoples dwelt. That Pisa, six miles inland, on a comparatively small stream, should ever have been a naval

name was the market-place of many nations, and numerous mercantile laws and customs were due to the initiative of its citizens; cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," Lect. 87; also *supra*, p. 94.

¹ Alexandria in the tenth century was frequented by Amalfitans, Venetians, and Genoëse.

² In the eleventh century Amalfi had a factory in Constantinople. She also had a foothold in Antioch, and tried to settle in Jerusalem. Her Egyptian trade was most successful, Heyd, "Histoire du Commerce," I, 114 et seq. For Amalfi in the East, cf. Prutz, "Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge," 382-383.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 190 et seq.

⁴ Cantu, VI, 304.

⁵ For the condition of Italy in the twelfth century, cf. Huillard Breholles, "Mem. sur la Situation de l'Italie au XII^{ème} Siècle" (Mem. de l'Académie des Inscriptions, XXVII, 2^{ème} partie, 1873).

⁶ For brief history of Pisa, cf. Hallam, I, 424 et seq.; also III, 309, 311; De Sismondi "Italian Republics" contains full history in its various chapters; cf. likewise Villani, "Cronica."

power seems the extreme of inconsistency. A review of her annals well illustrates the ease with which false beliefs may be inculcated by deceptive appearances. The Roman colony on this site dated from 180 B.C.; but all traces of whatever early prominence may have been attained are lost. Not until about 1000 A.D. did the place assume any special part in history;¹ at that time quite populous, it enjoyed a monopoly of commerce on the Arno and in adjacent waters; the Arabs being then in control of Sardinia, the native Christians were taking refuge within its gates. Urged by these exiles to action, Pisa, uniting with Genoa and some private individuals of Spain, invaded and subjugated both Sardinia and Sicily, the former island being divided among the victors (1050).² This city is also less noted for having vanquished its neighbor, Lucca,³ in the first war waged during the Middle Ages between Italian republics (1033). The Pisans participated in several crusading enterprises and planted colonies at Jean d'Arc, Constantinople, Tyre, Antioch, and in Syria.⁴ Corsica, Elba, and the Balearic Isles⁵ also fell under their dominion. For nearly two centuries their merchant marine and naval forces were only rivalled in the western Mediterranean by those of the rising Genoese. From her foreign possessions Pisa attracted inhabitants of every race and clime, who came thither to sell their wares and to buy their supplies of manufactured articles. A strong and steady current of wealth flowed over the seas into the hands of her citizens. Some of her nobles did not shrink from fitting out, even on

¹ In the tenth century Pisa waged a war with the Mussulmans of Sicily, Spain, and Africa; Amari, "*Storia dei Mussulmani in Sicilia*," III, 1 et seq.

² Cantu, V, 556; VI, 304; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 224, 231.

³ Lucca was a centre of the wool manufacture as early as the ninth century. In the thirteenth century Aldebrand and Lucas of Lucca had large merchant houses in London; Cunningham, "History of English Commerce and Industry," 185; Rot. Hund, I, 405.

⁴ At the epoch of the crusades Pisa had establishments at Antioch, Tyre, Constantinople, on the Black Sea, and at Tunis; Noel, "Histoire du Commerce du Monde," I, 191-195; Cantu, VI, 720; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 231, 234; III, 62.

⁵ Villani incorrectly puts the date 1118; they were in fact captured 1113-1115, cf. Villari, "History of Florence," I, 103-105;

their own personal account, vast commercial expeditions to distant lands. Her supremacy extended along the coast from La Spezia to Civita Vecchia. The famous group of world-renowned edifices within her walls but feebly attests the riches and power of the past.

This prosperity was not, however, long unchallenged; for, to the northward there was a new aspirant destined to become her conqueror—a city which in the future was to surpass her on the domain of the deep. About 1119 the first collision between Pisa and Genoa occurred.¹ Thenceforward a stubborn, irregular, intermittent, but frequently vigorous contest, lasting two hundred years, was maintained.² A quarrel concerning the procedure of a Pisan judge, charged with mistreating some Genoese settlers in Corsica, was the final occasion—eagerly sought by both parties—again to vent their ancient hatred on each other. After great preparations had been made on either side, and several battles fought without result, Pisa in 1284 sent against Genoa a fleet of seventy-two galleys, which was met off the island of Meloria by fifty-eight Genoese vessels. A general engagement ensued, in which the Pisans were utterly routed; they lost sixteen thousand men, eleven thousand of whom were taken prisoners; and their twenty-nine surviving galleys were captured.³ Hence the proverb arose, “To see Pisa you must go to Genoa.” This fatal day sounded the death knell of the city; Sardinia and the other colonies were in a few years abandoned, and with them all maritime trade vanished. After its disastrous defeat the navy was extinct, while to the interior numerous old-time enemies quickly seized the favorable opportunity for their own profit.⁴ Eventually, betrayed in 1406 by

¹ De Sismondi, “Italian Republics,” I, 240.

² For Pisa in the East and her strife with Genoa there, cf. Prutz, “Kulturgeschichte,” 378–379.

³ Cantu, VI, 720–721; De Sismondi, “Italian Republics,” III, 63, 69, and authorities quoted by him; Vincens, “Genoa,” I, 204; Hallam, I, 425; G. Villani, Bk. VII, Ch. XCII; Duruy, 482.

⁴ By the treaty of 1299, between Pisa and Genoa, Pisa ceded a part of Sardinia, also the territory of Bonifacio in Corsica, and agreed not to have ships of war for fifteen years. The Guelph enemies of Pisa threw themselves upon her after this disaster. In their trouble, the Pisans elected as their captain for ten

her own rulers to the arrogant Florentines, Pisa then ceased to exist as an independent community.¹

years Ugolini de la Gherardesca, who made peace by ceding a part of their territory; Lavissee and Rambaud, "*Histoire Générale*," III, 514.

¹ Many Pisans in 1406 went into voluntary exile and with them went the glory of their city, Hunt, 93; ninety years later Charles VIII freed her from her rulers, but she was again subsequently conquered; cf., generally, Hallam, I, 426; De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," VI, 90, 100; M. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. CII.

CHAPTER II

FLORENTINE COLONIZATION

WHEN Pisa had one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, Florence, likewise situated inland and on the same river, Arno, about fifty miles higher up in the mountains, had already developed into a still greater metropolis;¹ and even prior to the final overthrow of the Pisans by the Genoese, in 1284, was aspiring to the leadership of central Italy.² Tracing its origin³ back to the Roman colony, established on the site about 60 B.C., this place did not attract any attention before the opening of the eleventh century;⁴ but one hundred years later was indeed the most important state of the region. Then came the period of civil dissensions between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines,⁵ followed by the Whites and the Blacks.⁶ Nevertheless, the city constantly increased in authority until, in 1406, it finally obtained possession of its much coveted neighbor, Pisa;⁷ its glory and influence were thenceforth steadily augmented till the death

¹ For History of Florence, cf. De Sismondi, "Italian Republics"; Villani, "Cronica," and Guicciardini, "Istoria"; especially for early times, G. Villani, Bk. I, Ch. LXXXVIII et seq.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 63 et seq.; G. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. LX and LXIII, also Ch. XCH and XCIV.

³ For origin of Florence, cf. Villari, I, 65-67; Mommsen assigns its foundation to the colony established in the time of Sulla.

⁴ As to Florentine dependence on the Countess Matilda, in the eleventh century, cf. Villari, I, 83-91, 94.

⁵ The first official mention of Florentine Guelphs is made in 1246. The annals first use Guelph in 1239 and Ghibelline in 1242, Villari, I, 178-232.

⁶ For origin of Blacks (Nera) and Whites (Bianca) cf. Machiavelli, Bk. II, Ch. IV.

⁷ Hallam, I, 404 et seq.; De Sismondi, VI, 100; M. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. CII; Machiavelli, Bk. II, Ch. IV; *supra* pp. 147-148 and notes.

of Lorenzo de' Medici, in 1492—almost coincident with the discovery of the New World. Florence was then without any rival in Italy other than Venice, which was entering on its decline. The people were wealthy, powerful, and united, not only renowned for their political constitution and their cultivation of the arts, but also for their commercial and trade supremacy. For the rôle taken by them in local history during the Middle Ages they certainly deserve more praise than any of their competitors. While both Genoa and Venice exhausted their strength and their policies in enterprises beyond the sea, this republic, by reason of its location, kept aflame the zeal of the Italians for liberty.¹ Frequently associated with Venice,² Florence accomplished a work on land very similar to that which her ally effected on the deep. By their efforts, separate and combined, commerce and trade were revived, and through these agencies riches were amassed for their citizens.

In the days of Florentine prosperity the mercantile classes of the community were divided into those engaged in the greater and the lesser arts;³ of the former there were seven guilds, the principal being those of the wool, cloth,⁴ and silk workers; of the latter there were twenty-one unions, and still many of the artisans were unorganized. All these associations had some part in the government.⁵ The industry which was in

¹ Florence was identified with the Guelph cause. The first shock between Guelphs and Ghibellines was October 4, 1260, in the battle of Montapetti, in which Florence alone lost twenty-five hundred men. Dante was a Ghibelline, Oscar Browning, "Guelphs and Ghibellines, Essays," 17; cf. also De Sismondi, IV, Ch. XXXII and XXXV; VI, Ch. LVII.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VI, 362 et seq.; G. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. XLIX and L.

³ Only the greater guilds had risen to political importance in 1260; for an excellent account of Florentine commercial interests, cf. Villari, I, Ch. VI; also his article in *Politecnico* of Milan, June-July, 1867; for the government of the Calimala guild, cf. Villari, I, 233-239; and for the statutes of the guild, cf. Gindici, "Storia dei Municipi Italiani" (appendix); and Fillippi, "Il Più antico Statuto dell' Arte di Calimala."

⁴ The cloth of Florence was celebrated as early as the twelfth century, Lavisso and Rambaud, II, 133.

⁵ Hallam, I, 404; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," III, 89 et seq.; G. Villani, Bk. VII, Ch. XVI; Duruy, 482.

time to raise the city to importance and wealth seems from the earliest ages to have been centred here. Large quantities of raw wool and woollen fabrics were long imported from England and Flanders.¹ The crude material was cleaned, washed, combed, and curled, then woven and dyed. Special skill was shown in the process of coloring. In 1338, 80,000 pieces of cloth of great value were manufactured. Prior to 1340 this trade employed 30,000 individuals in 200 establishments.² While these goods were the chief staple, the admirably brocaded silks, unexcelled by any in the world, must not be forgotten; for velvets and products of the goldsmith's skill Florence was also famous.³ In every market her textiles competed with Asiatic commodities, so that even in the East they found a ready and immense sale.

Foreign articles passing through the hands of the workmen of this city likewise acquired an increased valuation. Not only did the Florentines themselves, by their own ships, dispose of a due share of their merchandise, but a considerable amount was sold to the Venetians and distributed throughout the Orient by means of their numerous colonies. Not the East alone, but the West also, purchased their cloths,⁴ the demand throughout both France and England being strong. The first-named country, it may be incidentally stated, was mostly supplied

¹ Florentine merchants, as early as 1114, came to England for wool; in 1275 there were woollen factories established, *Rot. Hund.* I, 353; II, 4; Cunningham, I, 185-186; already in 1284 many monasteries in England had agreed to sell wool, Peruzzi, "Storia del Commercio e dei Banchieri di Firenze," 70; Ashley, "English Woollen Industry," 35.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 193 et seq.; G. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. XCIV.

³ The guild of Por' Santa Maria originally was a wool guild, but in the thirteenth century the silk branch amalgamated with it. Silkworms are supposed to have been brought into Constantinople in the sixth century, concealed in the staffs of two Persian monks, Villari, I, 323.

⁴ Florentine woollen textiles went to Rome, Naples, Sicily, the Morea, Constantinople, Broussa, Pera, Gallipoli, Schio, Rhodes, and Salonica. In 1470-1492 Florence had eighty-three factories for silks and gold brocades, and produced more than Venice, Genoa, and Lucca combined. It had warehouses and banks at Lyons, Bruges, London, Antwerp, Avignon, Geneva, Marseilles, and in Provence. Most of the raw silk was imported from the East; cf. the "Cronaca de Benedetto Dei" (1470-1492), partly published by Pagnini, "Della Decima," II, Appendix.

by them.¹ They had warehouses in Bruges, Antwerp, and London, in Paris and Venice; owned merchant vessels on the seas and equipped a fleet for their protection.² The nobility as well as the plebeian classes participated in business, for to be active in it, instead of being a degradation, was considered a mark of distinction. Everything was subordinate to commerce and industry; the entire community contributed to their maintenance and extension, so that even politically the favored party was that the most devoted to these interests.³

The Florentine system of trade was prohibitive as against other states.⁴ In economic principles, as understood in the Middle Ages, not any people had a higher development. The theory of monopoly was anxiously and carefully guarded; not the least rivalry was tolerated. To annihilate competitors, where they could not be peaceably suppressed, was the policy not only of Florence, but of all the Italian republics. Numerous wars⁵ were fought for these restrictive dogmas; so that, first by force of arms and finally by virtue of wealth, their efficiency was in practice sustained. Taxes were levied on goods imported and exported. The city and its inhabitants grew and flourished at the expense of those who, less fortunate, were made to bear an undue proportion of burdens. Inequality in all matters reigned, where at the same time there was a constant struggle for equality.⁶

While thus attempting to crush out opposition, every

¹ For discussion of Italian merchants in France, cf. Pigeonneau, "Histoire du Commerce de la France," I, Ch. IV. Merchants were exempt from the *taille*, sentinel and military service, *droit d'aubaine*, and *mainmorte*. In 1294 at Paris the *taille* was paid, Ordinances of Paris, 1278 (*Recueil des ordonnances*, IV, 668); *ibid.* for 1294.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 159 et seq.; Cantu, VI, 577; Hallam, I, 478 (note), quotes Ammirato, 997, that the first merchant ship of the Florentines went to Alexandria in 1422; at that time Florence was most wealthy.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VIII, 159 et seq.

⁴ At least until the last part of the fifteenth century, when Florence adopted a system of free trade, Pöhlmann, "Die Wirthschaftspolitik der Florentinen Renaissance," 117 et seq.; Cunningham, I, 437.

⁵ For such wars between Genoa and Pisa, cf. Bent, "Genoa," Ch. IV; between Genoa and Venice, *ibid.* Ch. VIII.

⁶ In later times more liberal doctrines prevailed. Free trade treaties were

possible method, on the other hand, was adopted to procure abroad the same privileges as those which were being accorded to other places. To this end it was thought desirable to obtain permission to locate small colonies of traders in the chief marts of the North and of the East.¹ Thus Florence scattered her representatives in every land and every clime of the commercial world of that age.² They were charged, not only to sell her manufactured products, but also to secure the raw materials necessary for her factories, to unload her ships and to provide them merchandise for the return voyage, as well as to care for her financial concerns.

Out of this activity in traffic sprang still another, perhaps more important to the welfare of the state. Immense profits poured into Florence from all quarters of the globe; her merchants became extremely rich and soon exercised an influence on the conduct of the government; it was found that the possession of monetary resources was an easy road to power. Experience taught that it was cheaper to buy rivals with cash than to conquer them by the sword; of which fact the purchase of Lucca and the acquisition of Pisa are notable illustrations.³ This display of wealth aroused the attention of other cities, and, in the protracted hostilities which involved the Italian peninsula, Florence became the banker of numbers of her neighbors.⁴ But money as a rule was scarce and the

made in 1282 (during the Pisan war) with Lucca, Prato, Pistoia, Volterra; in 1390 with Faenza and Ravenna; in 1254, 1273, 1293, 1327, and 1329 with Pisa.

¹ For trade in the East during the fourteenth century, cf. "Practice of Trade," by Pegalotti, an agent of the Bardi firm, published by Pagnini in "Della Decima."

² Florentine merchants, notaries, administrators, and diplomats were universally prized. One day Pope Boniface VIII, seeing that all the ambassadors sent to him from different parts of the world were Florentines, said, "You Florentines are the fifth element in creation." Muratori, "Scriptores Rerum Italicarum"; Lavisce and Rambaud, II, 230; Villari, I, 350; II, 134.

³ Hallam, I, 424 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 164 et seq.; for the purchase of Lucca, cf. G. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. CXXX and CXXXIII.

⁴ To Florence the inauguration of banks is attributed. In the twelfth century the Florentines were experts in finance, Lavisce and Rambaud II, 133; but the exiled Guelphs of the thirteenth century first gave an impetus to the money-changer's trade. In 1306 the Modenese appealed for money to the bankers of Florence; in 1206 the Salimbeni house lent 20,000 florins to Siena;

risks were hazardous in those days; hence the Florentines exacted fabulous rates of interest, attaining at times forty per cent for six months;¹ nevertheless the superior facilities offered by them both at home and abroad soon gained an even more lucrative business. The Popes intrusted them with the collection of the revenues of the church throughout Christendom, and paid for this service a high commission.² To have charge of the finances of the Roman pontificate was in that age to handle the greater part of the funds in circulation.³ The Florentines, experts as they were in remittance and exchange, undoubtedly never missed an opportunity to line their own coffers.⁴ As an indication of their economic position may be mentioned a loan to England equal to that made by the Rothschilds to Great Britain during the Crimean War.⁵ They also generalized the use of drafts, invented at an earlier date by the Venetians. The natural reaction of these

in 1321 Peruzzi had a credit of 191,000 florins and Bardi one of 133,000 florins on the Order of Jerusalem. In 1348 the house of Alberte had banks at Avignon, Brussels, Paris, Siena, Perugia, Rome, Naples, Barletta, Constantinople, and Venice, Pagnini, "Della Decima," II, sec. III, Ch. I-IV.

¹ Cf. Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 316 et seq., who discusses fully the rates of interest then prevailing and gives authorities; also Cantu, VIII, 50; VII, 424.

² In 1233 the Tuscans were forwarding remittances to Gregory IX. The Babylonian captivity was the Florentine opportunity, Villari, I, 330; Cunningham, I, 186; Heyd, 114 et seq.; Schanz, "Englische Handelspolitik," I, 111; Von Reumont, "Gesch. der Stadt Rom." III, 33.

³ For description of system of papal finances and taxation, cf. Von Reumont, III, 22 et seq.; also more especially, Cenci, "Liber Censuum," and Von Ranke, "History of the Popes," I, 305 et seq., 350 et seq.

⁴ The Florentine adherence to the Guelph party was commercial as well as political; she fought with Siena, who was her rival in influence at Rome.

⁵ The Florentines were not only the financiers of Italy, but of Europe. The Frescobaldi, the Bardi, — first mentioned at Paris after 1300, — and the Peruzzi were reckoned the most important bankers of the fourteenth century. Edward III of England is said to have borrowed at Florence the sum of 1,500,000 gold florins, and his subsequent failure to repay this indebtedness caused great distress (1340-1345), Hallam, III, 321. For Florentine banking in England, cf. Stubbs, "Constitutional History," II, 560; E. A. Bond's article in the *Archæologia*, V, 28; Castelnau, "Les Medicis," I, 205; Cunningham, I, 379; Peruzzi, "Storia," 457, 461. For that in France, cf. Pigeonneau, "Histoire du Commerce," I, 252 et seq., 305, 424; Milman, "Latin Christianity," VI, 256-257; "Revue de l'Orient Latin," III, 431. Dubois advised Philip the Fair to take the riches of the Lombards instead of that of the Templars, "Mem. de l'Académie des Inscriptions," XVIII, 2^{ème} partie, 435 et seq. Dei says that in 1472 the bankers of Florence were reduced in number to thirty-three.

enterprises on Florence enabled her still more to multiply her commercial relations with foreign countries. Her vessels were seen in every part of the Mediterranean, in the Black Sea, in the Atlantic, and in the North Sea.¹ Her citizens were residing throughout the East, and were domiciled in Constantinople, Egypt, Flanders, and England;² even in Hungary there was a large colony of exiles. Two fairs annually attracted to the metropolis the representatives of all these nationalities.

But the erroneous principle of monopoly, of which the Florentines were devoted and headstrong adherents, was inevitably working the ruin of their prosperity. With the ever widening horizon of navigation Florence was unable to keep pace. This small, aristocratic community, which so long had been supreme over its neighbors, found futile and fruitless its efforts to extend this same arrogant sovereignty over the re-awakening world. The period of Lorenzo de' Medici marks the height of Florentine dominion and wealth; in the very year of his death, another Italian was making the voyage which revolutionized the European balance of power.³ The discovery of the western hemisphere left to Florence and to her sister republics only the bubble of their magnificence. The reality had fled. The scene of activity was transferred from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. The mediæval organization of trade and commerce was dissolving, never again to be revived for the profit of the Italian states. Florence still stands on the banks of the Arno, displaying to curious strangers, as mute witnesses of the past, her great cathedral, her silent bridges, her monumental architecture, and her unrivalled collections of art.

¹ By the capture of Pisa Florence obtained in 1406 an outlet to the sea; in 1421 "consuls of the sea" were appointed. Soon thereafter there was a fleet of eleven galleons and fifteen smaller trading vessels chartered by private individuals, Pagnini, II, sec. I; Sieveking, "Gesch. von Florenz."

² For trade at Constantinople, cf. Heyd, II, 336; for that of Egypt, *ibid.* II, 477, 485; for Florentine trade generally, cf. Noel, I, 195-203.

³ The chart Columbus used on his first voyage in search of the Indies had been sent him in 1474 by the Florentine cosmographer, Toscanelli, Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 354-365; Winsor, II, 103; both reproduce it.

CHAPTER III

GENOESE COLONIZATION

OF the many harbors on the coasts of the western Mediterranean, Genoa, although not the most extensive, is possibly the best. In form a vast amphitheatre, surrounded with abruptly rising hills, the port affords safe shelter for a considerable number of vessels. The white piles of edifices, majestically towering in the background on graduated terraces, well earn for the city the surname "The Superb." From the earliest ages of navigation, sailors seem to have frequented this welcome haven, for legend tells of a settlement on this site prior to the building of Rome; its situation, so near to France and Switzerland, and as the natural outlet, toward the west, of the trade of Northern Italy, has always made the place an important commercial centre. During the Roman days it was on the high road to Gaul, and became a municipality. Even the Carthaginians under Mago, in the second Punic war, thought it of enough consequence to attack and in part destroy it. After this event, it simply experienced the humdrum of a frontier station, until the time of the Northern invasions, when it suffered severe hardships under the Goth and Lombard conquerors. Charlemagne annexed it to his empire, but, upon the dissolution of the Frankish kingdom, independence was secured.¹

Genoa was at the opening of the crusades a well-located maritime republic of liberty-loving, sea-roving inhabitants. It may have been an occurrence more fortunate than apparent at first sight, that the town was stormed and pillaged by the

¹ For history of Genoa, cf. generally Emile Vincens, "*Histoire de la Republique de Genes*"; De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*"; Villani, "*Cronica*," and Guicciardini, "*Istoria*."

Saracens in 935;¹ for this disaster provoked a deep-seated hatred against the infidels and, what was more practical, led the Genoese to strengthen their fleet. In the eleventh century the citizens, realizing their inability, as the political conditions then were, to extend their territory or increase their resources inland, turned their eyes to the sea, whence they hoped to extract sufficient for their support and the maintenance of their freedom. All their energies were thenceforth directed to the mastery of that element. Their original enemies were the Saracen pirates, the struggles with whom hardened them in a rough school and associated them with the Pisans, who were then engaged in the same task. Joining their forces, — when it is remarkable that the Genoese took the secondary part, — these peoples, as related in a previous chapter, defeated the marauders and conquered the islands of Sardinia, Corsica, and Capraja;² the two latter fell as spoils to this city. In 1038 an expedition against the Mohammedans reached the shores of Africa.

The merchant marine of Genoa was likewise developing; for as early as 1064, thirty-five years before the first crusade, its trading craft had visited Joppa.³ When, therefore, religious zeal at the end of the eleventh century was inspiring crowds of the faithful to go to the Holy Land, this community in a strictly business manner took advantage of that favorable opportunity.⁴ While multitudes pursued their weary journey over the cheerless land routes to the far East, there were still many of the wealthier classes who preferred to make the less fatiguing voyage by sea. To these fanatics, coming from Western Europe, the merchants of this port offered their ships.⁵ While they themselves seldom took the cross, they became the

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," 221 et seq.; Vincens, I, 18 et seq.

² Hallam, I, 426 et seq.; in 1015 Benedict VIII granted possession of Corsica and Sardinia to whichever of them, Genoa or Pisa, should first drive out the Saracens. Bent, IV, XV; cf. Caffaro, "Annalista."

³ Vincens, I, 25 et seq.; Ingulf, "Chronicle of Croyland," anno 1051.

⁴ For brief statement of the influence which the crusades exerted on European commercial and industrial progress, cf. Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 85, also 315 et seq.

⁵ Vincens, I, 25 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 231 et seq.

principal agents of the crusaders and, besides their mere carriage, rendered them on several occasions most valuable services. From the beginning of this era the marked prosperity of Genoa dates. Long previously its vessels had carried numbers of individual travellers on their Christian mission; consequently its sailors were well acquainted with the highways of navigation. The more frequented places had also become leading centres for the exchange of commodities between the Orient and the Occident; for these brave seamen, conveying pious pilgrims on the decks, did not forget to utilize the holds for mercenary purposes; thus both by passengers and freight they profited to the greatest possible extent. They shipped the goods of the West to sell to the Saracens, and brought back rich cargoes of wares to be placed on European markets. When finally the wave of enthusiasm multiplied many fold the throng of adventurers to the East, this traffic was not by any means new to the Genoese, who simply enlarged their fleets and improved their facilities. Slight reflection on the magnitude of these movements lasting throughout two centuries, suggests some faint idea of the vast expense they involved, and what sums were to be made in the service of transporting any considerable number of those who participated. Genoa amassed wealth, not only in this manner, but likewise through the other incidental benefits realized in the development of international trade. Ships not only awaited the wayfarers at the metropolis, but were found at every point of embarkation, ready to receive the footsore wanderers. Provisions and other supplies required by the men of the North were also carried to distant ports, and there in foreign lands Genoese merchants displayed to eager purchasers familiar articles of food, wear, use, and necessity.¹ Sales were easy and profits large. Many times, had this relief not most opportunely intervened, the Christian army would have retreated, starved, famished, and without military stores.² These same vessels also performed not merely commissary duty, but frequently maintained block-

¹ Vincens, I, 27; Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 33.

² Vincens, I, 29.

ades and patrolled or attacked the seaboard while the invading forces were operating inland. In the first crusade both the Genoese and the Pisans thus assisted (1099); but the Venetians arrived only after the capture of Jerusalem. Naturally, the Genoese expected their reward, and in fact, as they were then the strongest naval power, full recognition was accorded them.

In 1101 the crusaders made an arrangement with the Genoese commander that, if his fleet would coöperate, his city should be granted one-third of the booty to be captured, and also certain places on the coast for the location of settlements.¹ Pursuant to this agreement, the Genoese, after rendering great aid, received material sums in cash, as well as important concessions for trade and colonial stations. A street in Jerusalem, another in Joppa, and a third of the cities of Cæsarea, Arsus, and Acre were set apart to them in perpetuity (1105).² Venice and Pisa likewise were given special privileges, which proved the source of prolonged and bitter animosity and later the cause of conflict among these three rivals in the Holy Land.³ The glories achieved by Genoa and the steady growth of its commerce were already beginning to arouse envy. Pisa, which until then had been the chief maritime state in Italy, was the first to be jealous of the rising star. Consequently, as early as 1070, war broke out, Genoa, on its side, being eager to extend its sea front to the southward at the cost of its enemy. As elsewhere narrated, hostilities

¹ Vincens, I, 39; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 231.

² The Genoese also received a third of all dues collected at the ports within Baldwin's realm, Bent, 32; by the Assize of Jerusalem they likewise enjoyed in Sidon, Tyre, and Acre: (1) absolute liberty of merchandise and warehouses necessary to carry on their business; (2) the privilege of their own laws, tribunals, and consuls in all except criminal cases; (3) the right of regulating weights and measures; (4) exemption from taxation; (5) a third share of the maritime dues, Bent, 92; cf. also generally Vincens, I, 39 et seq.; Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 33.

³ In 1256 the Genoese and Venetians fought for the possession of a convent built on a hill separating their quarters at Acre. The Hospitalers, Catalans, the people of Ancona, and the Pisans took the Genoese side; the Templars, Provençaux, the patriarch of Jerusalem, the king of Cyprus, were on the Venetian side. The Genoese ships were burned and their quarters stormed. The war lasted for two years, Lavissee and Rambaud, II, 344 et seq.

continued with minor interruptions until 1284, when the Pisans were finally and utterly vanquished.¹

In the interval between the first and second crusades the citizens of Genoa turned their attention, on their own account, to some Saracens nearer home; fitting out a powerful squadron, they reached Spain, and took Almeria (1146-1149)² and Tortosa (1150),³ in both which towns they inaugurated communities under Genoese laws and supremacy.⁴ The island of Minorca also fell into their possession. By this expedition their fame spread throughout the Iberian peninsula, and the Moors, as a mark of friendship, conceded them many favors. Subsequently, pushing along the Mediterranean shores to the west of their own city, they had within the century secured the mastery over the entire coast as far as, and even beyond, Marseilles.⁵ Their independence and haughtiness are well illustrated by the successful demand which they made, about 1170, upon the emperor for a large indemnity to reimburse them for their aid against the Sicilians.⁶

Without detailing in particular the evolution of Genoese authority in the East, suffice it to say that throughout the crusades it was being constantly augmented. Notwithstanding the loss of Jerusalem by the Christians in 1187, the enterprise of this people did not suffer serious check. By the exercise of persuasive methods and, when these failed, by the use of force, practically all the commercial privileges previously acquired from Christians were confirmed or admitted by the Mohammedans.⁷ The Genoese seem to have known how to trade as well with enemy as with friend.⁸ They made themselves indispensable; for, when another crusade was undertaken, they are again found performing their old-time services to the church, carrying men, weapons, armor, supplies of all

¹ *Supra*, p. 147; Vincens, I, 204 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," III, 68 et seq.; Cantu, VI, 720; Hallam, I, 425; G. Villani, Bk. VII, Ch. XCII.

² Cf. the *Annalist*, Guglielmo Pellianno, 1149.

³ Bent, 98 et seq.

⁴ Vincens, I, 66.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 59 et seq.

⁶ *Ibid.* I, 109.

⁷ *Ibid.* II, 7 et seq., 118.

⁸ Cf. the treaty of 1177 with Egypt and that of 1290 confirming it. The latter is to-day preserved in the University Library at Genoa.

kinds, and of course coming back, after obtaining further advantages, with mighty cargoes and vast riches.¹

Nevertheless, in the East, complications, eventually fatal to Genoese prosperity, were to arise. Seconded by the Venetians, the Franks conquered Constantinople in 1204, and Baldwin I, of Flanders, assumed the crown. As a reward for this support, Venice received grants of important concessions. The growing jealousy between the two rivals was thereby decidedly accentuated. The Genoese espoused the cause of the Greek claimant, and in 1261, after a protracted struggle of varying fortune, they succeeded in placing Palæologus on the throne.² Then it was that Genoa was at the zenith of her grandeur; all the prizes at Constantinople were for her citizens. The suburb of Pera³ and the port of Smyrna were their recompense; they controlled the Black Sea and, in the Crimea, established Caffa (Gazaria)⁴ as their principal trading point.⁵ This settlement, after so rapidly developing that the Turks soon called it the Constantinople of the Crimea, finally falling under the jurisdiction of the Bank of St. George,⁶—the great financial institution of Genoa,—was ruled with wonderful prudence and discretion.⁷ The government, modelled after that of the metropolis, was in the hands of a consul, as governor, assisted by other appointed functionaries, including an advisory body of twenty-four members and a privy council of

¹ Vincens, I, 177.

² Heyd, II, 427-430; various small islands were conceded to private families by the treaty of Ninfio, 1261.

³ "Revue de l'Orient Latin," IV, 63-99.

⁴ A treaty with Manuel Comnenus proves that Genoa had a colony here soon after the first crusade, Bent, 113-115; "Revue de l'Orient Latin," IV, 27-63; for register of accounts, Heyd, II, 158, 169-172, 188, 193, 203-204, 381.

⁵ Hallam, III, 312; Michaud, VIII, 1-2; Gibbon, V, 255, who also cites several authorities; Cantu, VI, 723 et seq.; VII, 426 et seq.

⁶ Hallam, III, 322; Vincens, II, 170 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 425; Macaulay, "History of England," V, 542 et seq. "From the necessities of the state and the accommodation by the Bank of St. George the latter now has under its administration most of the towns and cities in the Genoese dominion. These the bank governs and protects, and every year sends its deputies, appointed by vote, without any interference on the part of the republic." — MACHIAVELLI, Bk. VIII, Ch. VI. Was not this form of rule analogous to that of a trading company? Cf. also Bent, XI; Cantu, VI, 721.

⁷ Caffa in 1450 was reputed to be as rich and as populous as Genoa.

six. At Tana, the end of the main caravan routes of India and upper Asia, in Syria, at Cyprus,¹ on the coast of Africa, in Spain, and on many of the islands of the Mediterranean, the Genoese maintained colonies and mercantile outposts.² In the West, the overthrow of Pisa at this epoch was the occasion of additional renown. Nor were they neglectful of the cities and nations to which the wares of the Orient might be sold. France was their special care, for in nearly every important town of that country they enjoyed local privileges. England, too, was visited by their fleets, but with the Low Countries they appear to have had less intercourse.³

The Venetians looked with envious eyes on this commercial activity. Everywhere they sailed they encountered the hated Genoese, who held the monopoly of the best markets and the sources of supply in the Eastern trade. At Tyre, at Airi, at Tripoli, and in Cyprus, these two redoubtable foes fought their first skirmishes. Soon after the subjection of Constantinople to the supremacy of Genoa, the people of Venice seem to have resolved on a war to the death. Pisa was scarcely off the field before this almost new and untried opponent was to be met;⁴ but the power of the Genoese was apparently irresistible.⁵ In 1291 they destroyed a Venetian squadron of eighty-four vessels, capturing seven thousand persons, among whom was Admiral Dandolo. Then, for fifty years, comparative peace reigned;

¹ For the colony of Famagouste in Cyprus, cf. "Revue de l'Orient," IV, 99-118.

² Vincens, II, 9 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 294 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 428 et seq.; Gibbon, V, 255 et seq. In later times (fourteenth century) Genoa exercised official control over her colonies by means of the *Officium Gazariæ*. This body regulated traffic, directed navigation, commanded the armies, and was a final court of appeal invested with full jurisdiction over the dependencies. In many respects it was subsequently imitated by other nations, Heyd, II, 173 et seq.

³ Vincens, II, 9 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 429. They aided, too, in military matters, as in 1316, when they sent a contingent to Edward II, and in 1347 to Edward III. At Crécy Genoese archers fought on the French side.

⁴ Hallam, I, 428; Vincens, II, 19 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, Ch. XL and XLI; Cantu, VI, 727 et seq.; G. Villani, Bk. VI, Ch. LX; Bk. VII, Ch. XXIV. The first real war between Venice and Genoa broke out in 1206 over the possession of Crete; cf. *post*, p. 176.

⁵ G. Villani, Bk. IX, Ch. XCVIII, says that in 1321 the Genoese were the richest and most powerful among Christians and even among Saracens.

but, as the event proved, the Venetians were only temporarily vanquished. In 1346 hostilities again broke out; each party won a victory; the Genoese nevertheless suffered the most, for they soon thereafter sought the protection of the Duke of Milan; a truce of nearly thirty years followed,¹ preparatory to the final struggle.² Genoa, in the interval, aroused all the enemies of her formidable competitor—and they were numerous³—to come to her own aid, hoping thus to overwhelm forever the Queen City of the Adriatic. In 1378, after several more engagements and the utter rout of the Venetians in open battle, the allied fleet arrived before the city.⁴ The advance posts were stormed and an embassy was sent to ask peace; but the Genoese, determined to take the place, would not grant any terms other than abject submission,⁵ for they believed that they held Venice securely in their grasp, since not only they themselves controlled the sea, but their land auxiliaries had closed every approach from terra firma. The citizens, undaunted and bent upon one desperate effort, manned and equipped every available boat. Meanwhile the besiegers, after seizing Chioggia by assault, steered their course in through the lagoons behind it to a point of safer anchorage. The move was fatal, for the Venetians, promptly sinking old hulks in the channel, entirely blocked egress; still another passage was likewise obstructed, and the only opening left for escape was held by them. As a result of these manœuvres, the Genoese, caught in a trap at a vast dis-

¹ Peace of 1355, by which Venice abandoned her Black Sea commerce; cf. *post*, p. 180.

² During this time the Genoese were active elsewhere. In 1346 they conquered Chios and Phocæa, in 1374 Cyprus. These enterprises are notable because they were conducted by veritable trading companies, the types of the greater organizations which two hundred and fifty years later were to follow in the North; cf. Heyd, "Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter," I, 588 et seq.; II, 408 et seq.

³ Among others Padua, Hungary, and Friuli.

⁴ Hallam, I, 428 et seq.; Vincens, II, 93; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," V, Ch. L; Cantu, VII, 431.

⁵ Doria threatened to bridle the horses of St. Mark. The Venetians in their despair even thought of abandoning Venice and seeking a new territory, Bent, 170-176; cf. *supra*, p. 152, note 5.

advantage, found, when they wished to attack, that the available space was too narrow to permit their formation in line. Thus hemmed in, starvation forced their surrender, and their whole fleet, so proud a few months previously, was lost. A compromise treaty (1380) was signed; to Genoa Venice yielded the small island of Tenedos, and to the allies nearly all her possessions on the mainland. This peace, though not immediately disastrous, marks the beginning of Genoese decline.¹ Civil discords soon broke out; it was impossible to reorganize the navy on its former scale; the contest with Venice was resumed, and spasmodically continued until the middle of the fifteenth century, at the end of which Genoa relinquished most of her territories and fell under a foreign yoke. By the heroism of Andrea Doria the republic was reëstablished, only as the shadow of itself.² Its glory had departed; the colonists had revolted or were conquered; commerce had fixed on other channels.

Genoa, however unfortunate in the later years of its career, must be remembered for the benefits conferred by it in earlier times upon its contemporaries. Through its indomitable efforts the main routes to and from the East³ were kept open during the perilous epoch of the crusades; and many of the participants owed their return to their homes and families to the diligence of the Genoese in supplying them with the necessaries of life. For these things this city should be esteemed as well as for the propagation of Western civilization in the Orient, effectuated through its numerous colonial establishments. These latter constituted a chain of enlightenment and activity among the benighted and sluggish Eastern people of that day; through them the spark of learning was kept alive, and in them were not less the centres of Christian doctrine than the marts of commerce and barter. When the circumstances of the age transferred the seat of empire to the Atlantic, Genoa inevitably crumbled, as its rival and conqueror likewise — just about

¹ Hallam, I, 431; Vincens, II, 101; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," V, Ch. L.; Cantu, VII, 432.

² Prescott, "Charles Fifth," II, 168-173.

³ Noel, I, 186-191; Prutz, 362-363, 377-378.

one century later — was destined to succumb. The development of the Northern and Eastern nations, Germany, Austria, Holland, and Scandinavia, had in a certain degree an effect on this metropolis similar to that which the discovery of the New World was in the next cycle to exert on Venice. The fall of Genoa was only one more illustration of the mutual dependence between the currents of trade and the sceptre of power.

CHAPTER IV

VENETIAN COLONIZATION

PECULIARITY is always attractive; an event or a characteristic contrary to a well-defined rule or principle arouses interest and frequently affords a topic for serious and well-merited discussion. Judged by this standard, all study relating to Venice is wonderfully tempting and creditable; for in it are reviewed the experiences of a people unique in origin, institutions, and situation, while not the less renowned for the influence which their politics, commerce, and colonization have had upon the growth of modern civilization.

Very little is known of the early history of the tribe which founded the city; the prevailing presumption is that in the first half of the fifth century of this era a few refugees, fleeing before northern invaders, settled on some of the hundred islands which are now occupied.¹ While on the one hand their location in the midst of the waters obliged these individuals to cultivate the science of navigation, on the other their insignificance and isolation saved them from the attack of foreign and domestic enemies, so that they long lived and prospered without becoming entangled in international or Italian affairs; freed from outer perplexities, their energies were concentrated on the promotion of their own welfare. The two cardinal objects of their solicitude were the maintenance of liberty under a republican form of local self-government and the extension of traffic, the latter primarily as a means to the supply of their necessities, and subsequently as a highway to the acquisition of wealth and fame. The political annals of Venice

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 200 et seq.; Hallam, I, 435; Gibbon, III, 197-198; V, 131; Michaud, V, 19; Galibert, "Venise," Ch. II and III.

are here of interest only so far as they may have a bearing upon her trade and colonial policy; to her commercial achievements attention must be chiefly directed.

In the beginning the inhabitants were undoubtedly mere fishermen,¹ visiting from time to time the neighboring mainland in order to dispose of their catch and to secure provisions for themselves and their families; perhaps even as pirates plundering the Adriatic coasts and secreting their booty in the hidden recesses of their ocean home, they taught themselves the first lessons in seafaring. Certain it is, their courage, their skill, and their resources gradually developed. For as early as the sixth century² they were sailing on the rivers of Upper Italy, cruising along the adjacent seaboard, and occasionally casting anchor off Greece and Asia Minor.³ Already, in 828, their ships having transferred the remains of St. Mark from Alexandria to Venice, this saint became the patron of the city.⁴ The merchant marine was also attaining importance, and was bringing to this port cargoes of Eastern wares, to be thence distributed to the towns of the interior. Venetian markets were drawing purchasers from Germany, Switzerland, and France.⁵ Salt was the great local product, and was then being sold throughout northern Italy. In the ninth century the famous glass manufacture originated, a source of untold future wealth.⁶ The trade and industry of this place were thus evidently of equal antiquity to those of Pisa or Genoa. Nominally claimed by both the rival empires but practically independent, Venice was augmenting politically not less than commercially, for several subject communities were springing up both on the islands and the opposite shores.

Exterior circumstances were also conspiring to the emolument of the nascent metropolis. Located at the head of the

¹ Cassiodorus describes the simple life of the Venetian fishermen and their journeys by land and sea, "Variarum," Bk. XII, Ch. VII.

² The Venetians aided Narses the Eunuch, who protected them in their monopoly of the Brenta and the Bacchiglione rivers.

³ Galibert, 166 et seq.

⁴ Cantu, V, 557.

⁵ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 200 et seq.

⁶ Gibbon, V, 132.

Adriatic—among mid-European harbors of any magnitude the nearest to the East—and easy of access to the principal continental peoples, Venice might, rightly anticipating the inevitable rise of the races beyond the Alps, even then weigh her possibilities.¹ Subsequent events would have justified reasonable expectations; for, as the nations of the North established themselves on a permanent basis, their demands increased; the East was still the land of luxuriant production, and the currents of mercantile exchange flowed and ebbed to and from the Orient. The routes for this intercourse, whether by land or sea, were limited; some of them have elsewhere been traced; but Venice, above all other cities, was at the junction of the most numerous, available, and frequented highways.² As time passed, from the tenth to the sixteenth centuries, these advantages were more and more accentuated. A people, sturdy in the defence of its freedom, hardened by incessant toil, expert by experience, skilful in the management of its own affairs, devoted to fixed ideals, faithful to the interests which it served, and favored by its situation, must assuredly win the highest degree of success.

Venice, in the ninth century, was then an important warehouse and had already opened those fortunate relations which, by proper care and attention, were to yield such a rich harvest; her merchants were the factors of many races, while her sailors were traversing the most remote waters of the Mediterranean.³ In the four centuries following she scarcely widened the field of her activities, but merely developed it and multiplied a thousand fold the sources, variety, and volume of her trade; and while her agents at distant ports were engaged filling her ships with precious cargoes, her workmen at home were busy

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 257 et seq.

² Galibert, 165.

³ Two contemporaries, Sagorninus and Forcarini (quoted "Archivio Storico Italiano," IV) speak of Venetian ships at Egypt, Syria, Tartary, Barbary, with the Saracens of Italy, Sicily, and Algiers, at the Crimea, Cairo, Damascus, Medina, and Tunis; cf. also De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, Ch. V and VI; Cantu, V, 558-559; Hallam, I, 436; Gibbon, V, 132.

turning out domestic products of their skill. Venice alone, of the Italian cities of the first rank combining navigation and manufacture, was by the union of commerce and industry distinguished from all rivals.¹

Possibly the instinct for territorial aggrandizement is innate in the body politic; more probably it is the form of expression of a national necessity; in states of small area, but intense energy, the desire is the more excusable. Venice, for example, had tested her capacities and found herself hampered in further growth by want of commensurate opportunities. At that time relatively weak as compared with the great powers of the day, there seemed little hope for the fulfilment of her ambitions. A series of unanticipated events, however, furnished her citizens the occasion immensely to enlarge the circle of her authority; for without the crusades, it may be surmised, Venice would have remained a mere Italian state, with a dominion restricted to the islands of her vicinity and the marshy regions of the estuary of the Po. Prior to participation in the Christian uprising for the recovery of the Holy Land, the Venetians had well established their reputation for valor and proficiency in naval warfare. Before 900 they had vanquished the Slavonians and the Saracens on the Adriatic, and had rescued from their piratical expeditions the neighboring districts. Several places had indeed acknowledged Venetian sovereignty in consideration of the protection extended them; and, thus attaining control over a considerable extent of seacoast, the Doge of Venice assumed the dignity of Duke of Dalmatia (998).² The city had constituted for itself commercial prosperity, a patron saint, an organized government, and a recognized country, for the Emperor of the East had confirmed the conquests made over other towns. To the Eastern Empire Venice gladly

¹ Galibert, 171 et seq.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 216, 218; Cantu, V, 558; Hallam, I, 436; the following towns recognized Venice as suzerain: Pirano, Omago, Emonia, Parenzo, Rovigno, Pola, Zara, Spalatio, Pran, Ossero, Arbo, Veglia, Sebenigo, Belgrado, Lenigrado, Curzola, Lesina; Sagorninus, "Chron." 95-101. Each town received a podestat or count as governor and paid a yearly tribute.

yielded homage,¹ obtaining, however, as recompense, many substantial privileges and favors; but for all actual services performed full payment was nevertheless exacted. For instance, her troops rendered efficient aid against the Normans in Calabria and, in return, an exemption from port dues throughout the imperial domains was procured.² While the people thus realized the necessity of maintaining good relations with Constantinople, then the centre of the highest civilization, they still, although bending the knee, never forgot to claim the just reward for their allegiance. Such was the situation at the opening of the crusades.

The Venetians were in a measure induced to take part in these enterprises by the same reasons as influenced the Genoese. Foreseeing vast chances to enrich themselves and to increase their power, they likewise perceived that, if they did not participate, they would risk losing to more energetic rivals the extensive fame and supremacy already attained. Material aims, much more than enthusiasm for the faith, actuated them.³ For the first crusade they fitted out a fleet of 60 galleys and 140 other vessels, mostly manned by their own citizens; for at that time they do not seem to have enjoyed foreign favor to as great a degree as the Genoese, nor were they so directly devoted to the cause of the pilgrims. Their object appears to have been more immediately selfish and for the sake of their own aggrandizement. In 1099 the Venetian forces, instead of joining the other adventurers in the operations around Jerusalem, first sailed to the island of St.

¹ By the end of the tenth century there was an equal alliance; the Venetians defended the Empire, which assured them a monopoly of traffic, Lavissee and Rambaud, II, 840.

² In return for aid against Robert Guiscard, Alexius I (1082) gave the Venetians a quarter at Constantinople, but they abused their privileges. In 1120 the Empire made a treaty of alliance with the Genoese and war broke out, Lavissee and Rambaud, II, 841; Alexius I also placed the Amalfitans under Venetian protection and made them pay dues to their protectors; Anna Comnena, 161, also document published by Marin, "*Storia Civile e Politica del Commercio de Veneziani*"; cf. also Cantu, V, 557; Hallam, I, 436; Gibbon, V, 131, 132.

³ De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," I, 207 et seq.; Hallam, III, 311; Gibbon, V, 133; Michaud, V, 20.

Nicholas, quarrelled with the Pisans about the body of the saint known by that name, and, after defeating them, proceeded to Cyprus; from there their course was directed to Smyrna and thence to Joppa, which was rescued from impending conquest.¹ Enough booty being secured to repay the cost of the undertaking, the Doge and some of his followers went to Jerusalem, which had previously fallen; after here making terms that, when Tyre and Ascalon capitulated, they should have two-thirds of the spoils,² the Venetians required the soldiers from other places chiefly to win the victories, but subsequently did not forget to collect their own dues. Meanwhile, an attack being planned upon their city by the son of the emperor, they hastily quit the Holy Land in order to return to its defence; en route, however, they captured and devastated Rhodes and Chios, seizing and plundering Samos, Lesbos, Andros, and several other islands belonging to the Empire;³ finally they reached Venice, which their presence preserved from danger.⁴ Not only ample tangible riches were the fruits of this expedition, but the body of St. Nicholas, carried off from the Pisans, was to form on the isle of Ledo the subject of another sanctuary. Nor should it be forgotten that in those days these shrines were of commercial value, as they drew throngs of visitors, who came not merely to worship, but likewise to supply their needs. Every saintly burial-place, then, meant a larger trade.⁵ The Venetians had also been granted in the Holy Land rights similar to those awarded to Pisa and Genoa—a division of glory and financial rewards which occasioned lasting jealousy among the three republics.

Venice seems to have been associated in the next two Christian movements against the infidels, in which she continued to

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 232 et seq.; Galibert, 45.

² In July, 1100, the Venetians aided Godefroy at Jerusalem for two months on condition that he guard for them a third of the cities which they should take. With their aid and that of the Genoese, Cæsarea, Acre, Sidon, and Beyrout were conquered, Lavissee and Rambaud, II, 310.

³ Lavissee and Rambaud, II, 841.

⁴ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 236.

⁵ For rivalry in trade about saints' shrines, cf. Jusseraud, "English Way-faring Life," 344.

win laurels and to amass wealth;¹ until in 1198, just before the opening of the fourth crusade, as Gibbon reckons it, this city had risen to a most enviable position.² Her authority was respected throughout the West and feared everywhere in the Orient. Constantinople, to which a nominal homage was paid, was not any longer, in the proper sense, the metropolis of the East; much more justly could this dignity be claimed by Venice. While other nations had been fighting for religious principle and for holy renown, the Venetians had skilfully profited to the benefit of their commerce and industry. The friendship of the Moors in Syria and in Egypt was valued as highly by them as that of the church in Italy, which organization strangely overlooked or forgot the society which this people elsewhere frequented. Thus morally indifferent to the choice of their allies, they determined their action by the consideration from which side they could draw the greater advantage.³

When the French and the Flemish were entering upon their fourth effort for the recovery of the Holy Land, it was natural that they should solicit the assistance of the strongest maritime state of the East. During the visit of the ambassadors despatched to Venice for the preliminary negotiations, a bargain was struck by which the Venetians agreed to transport the expedition for the price of 85,000 marks of silver and an equal share in the territories to be won.⁴ Both Genoa and Pisa refused to coöperate. Henry Dandolo was Doge; although nearly entirely blind,⁵ he has-

¹ In 1189, Isaac II gave the Venetians the establishments of the French and Germans. The Italian merchants had reduced to a minimum the profits of the Byzantine producer. The principal source of the emperor's income was cut off, for the Venetians paid no customs duties, and the Pisans and the Genoese very small sums, Lavissee and Rambaud, II, 815; cf. also Michaud, II and III.

² In 1199, Alexius III renewed the Venetian privileges and joined in an alliance against the Normans; for a brief account of the condition of Venice at this time and a short history of the fourth crusade, cf. Duruy, 305 et seq.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, Ch. XIV; Hallam, I, 437.

⁴ Gibbon, V, 133 et seq.; Galibert, 53; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 86. Duruy (p. 307) says this sum is equivalent to 4,046,000 francs or approximately \$800,000.

⁵ Dandolo was then ninety years old. The story that he was blinded when

tened the preparations so that, when the crusaders arrived, everything was in readiness.¹ But then it was found that 34,000 marks of the covenanted amount were lacking. The Venetians finally engaged to accept, in lieu of this deficit, the first suitable conquest.²

The fleet³ raised anchor and proceeded without any remarkable occurrence as far as the city of Zara in Dalmatia—a rebellious fief of Venice—which was overwhelmed.⁴ Alexius, the son of the exiled Emperor of the Orient, came hither to seek aid to restore his family to the throne. Dandolo, appreciating the glory to accrue from the fall of Constantinople, contrived by his influence to turn the adventurers in that direction. The Byzantine court had of late been favoring Pisa in matters of trade, which fact alone was sufficient to arouse the energy of the Venetians. Alexius, in the name of his father, pledged the submission of his subjects to the Roman Church. All was satisfactorily arranged and the squadron sailed.⁵ Constantinople was soon reached, attacked, and taken, the Venetians performing prodigies of valor in the sea operations.⁶ The usurper fled and the old blind Emperor Isaac was reinstated in power, but soon thereafter died. Events rapidly followed each other; Alexius, who

ambassador at Constantinople, in 1173, is disproved by the statement of Villehardouin; Buchon, "*Recherches et Matériaux*," Pt. II, 47, 223.

¹ The Venetians were discontented at their treatment by the Empire; the massacre of 1182 rankled in their minds, and they sought the opportunity to avenge their pride and their commercial losses, Finlay, "*History of Greece*," II, 252; Kugler, 267.

² De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," II, 88 et seq.; Gibbon, V, 136 et seq.; Michaud, V, 20 et seq., 30; Galibert, 53; Duruy, 307.

³ It carried 4500 horsemen, 9000 squires, 30,000 infantry, and stores for nine months. The galleys were never less than 80 feet in length, sometimes 110 by 70. Pagnini, "*Della Decima*," II, 7 et seq.; Romanin, "*Storia Documenta di Venezia*," II, 156–157.

⁴ De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," II, 92; Gibbon, V, 137; Michaud, V, 32; for this action the Venetians were excommunicated; Galibert, 53; Finlay, IV, 82; Wilken, "*Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*," V, 159–163, 335.

⁵ De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," II, 93 et seq.; Gibbon, V, 137 et seq.; Michaud, V, 35 et seq.; Galibert, 54.

⁶ De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," II, 96 et seq.; Hallam, I, 436; Gibbon, V, 139 et seq.; Michaud, V, 58 et seq.; Galibert, 54; Constantinople fell July 18, 1203.

had succeeded to the throne, was assassinated; whereupon Mystillus usurped the reins of government. Then quarrels arose between the Latins and the inhabitants.¹ Not any amicable agreement for the payment of the indemnity nor for the execution of the promises made by Alexius could be effected. War was declared once more; the city suffered a second siege; it was again captured and this time pillaged and sacked,² the new ruler meeting with the same fate as the previous pretender.³ Dandolo of Venice might have been elected emperor, had not his advisers proclaimed that the magistrate of a republic could never be the sovereign of an empire. The imperial dignity therefore fell to Baldwin of Flanders (1204).⁴ But the Venetians, not unmindful to obtain their full share of the prizes of victory, vastly increased their colonial domain. Trained by their long experience and exercising remarkable wisdom in the selection of their portion of the spoils, they refused the more extensive conquests because of their relatively small advantages in comparison with the expense entailed. Besides their three-eighths of Constantinople and the territory of Roumania the most important of their acquisitions were in the Black Sea; here Lazis, Nicopolis, Heraclea, Ægospotami, Rudosto, Nicomedia, and Gallipoli came into their hands; Adrianople in Thrace, Oreos and Caristos on the island of Eubœa; Ægina, Megalopolis, Calona, and Methona in the Greek Peloponnesus were allotted to them. Divrachium on the coast of Dalmatia, Patras, and all the islands of the Ionian Sea from Zante to Corfu became Venetian property. To complete their supremacy at Constantinople, they purchased for cash the additional quarter of that city assigned to the Marquis of Montferrat; Crete was also secured from the same nobleman for the sum

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 103 et seq.

² Wilken, "Geschichte der Kreuzzüge," V, 301-317; the Venetians were paid their 50,000 marks from the spoils, *ibid.* 319.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 111 et seq.; Gibbon, V, 152 et seq.; Michaud, V, 92 et seq.; Galibert, 56 et seq.

⁴ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 116 et seq.; Kugler, 284; Gibbon, V, 163; Michaud, V, 121 et seq.; Galibert, 58; Duruy, 308.

of 10,000 marks.¹ Thus the brilliantly gifted Doge, Henry Dandolo, by his energy and tact acquired for Venice a veritable realm of colonial possessions. He himself, invested at Constantinople with power second only to the emperor, died there after a brief period passed in the enjoyment of the fruits of his foresight and prudence.

The predominance of the Venetians on the Bosphorus assured them the freest intercourse with Black Sea ports, whence the numerous products of many tributary regions were brought to the West; they treated with the nations of the great valleys, the river courses of which empty into that sea. Nor did they, while in close relations with Syria, Bulgaria, Servia, Hungary, Persia, Armenia, and Mesopotamia, overlook Egypt, from which land supplies of lumber, skins, silks, cotton, sugar, fruits, nuts, and slaves were drawn.²

The Venetian republic, with less than two hundred thousand inhabitants in the municipality, had in 1206 extended its dominion over a line of establishments stretching from its own immediate neighborhood to the eastern extremity of the Black Sea,³ and including within their boundaries a multiplicity of races. Through them its influence was felt everywhere along the shores of the eastern Mediterranean and those of adjoining waters.⁴

All the new territories save Adrianople were on the coast, a fact which necessitated the maintenance of a formidable fleet for their subjection and protection; so that, although the navy of Venice was then recognized to be of the first rank, equal in strength to the maritime forces of any European country of that age, her regular men-of-war were still

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 118; Cantu, VI, 725 et seq.; Hallam, I, 432; Gibbon, V, 165 et seq.; Michaud, V, 125 et seq.; Galibert, 59 et seq.; Duruy, 308.

² Cantu, VI, 726; Galibert, 165 et seq.; for the slave trade, cf. Noel, I, 170; in 960 the Pope forbade the Venetians selling Christian slaves to the Saracens, Finlay, I, 421 (note 1).

³ For Venetian trade in Russia, cf. Noel, 150.

⁴ Cantu, VI, 726; Michaud, V, 161; about 1208 the Sultan made a treaty with Venice by which her trade with Alexandria and the Nile Valley received a great impetus, Kugler, 305.

inadequate for the task. Hence, three years after the fall of Constantinople, the senate granted to all Venetians the privilege to effect by private corsairs the reconquest of such of the acquisitions as might be rebellious,¹ on condition that they should be held as fiefs of the state; Crète² and the islands of the Ionian Sea alone were excepted. Venice thus made the ambition and cupidity of her people serve the public welfare, for her rich and noble citizens did not hesitate to stake their wealth on the possible chance of renown and landed possessions.³ While numbers of such privateering expeditions were organized and despatched against various distant and scattered points, the republic itself, in spite of Genoese opposition and intrigue, pacifying Corfu and Crete, established permanent colonies on both.⁴ Communication was successfully kept open with the far East and the wares of the Orient imported from Tana⁵ and Trebizond introduced luxury into the city.⁶

A brief account of the political relationship existing between Venice and her dependencies must now be given. The colony at Constantinople was governed by a podestat named by the Doge and grand council. This magistrate was assisted by two councils, six judges, several financial agents, and a captain of the fleet, all sent from the metropolis. Such was the usual type of administration.⁷ The soil of Crete after the great insurrection was distributed into equal shares among the republic, the church, and the colonists. A duke,

¹ Finlay, IV, 98 et seq.

² *Ibid.* IV, 272; cf. Hopf, "Gesch. Griechenlands," for a full history of Crete. He gives a list of the owners of the island subsequent to 1204; cf. also "Urkunden und Zusätze zur Gesch. der Insel Andros," 7.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 353; Galibert, 59.

⁴ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 354 et seq.; in 1207 Dandolo and Premarino defeated the Genoese corsair *Vetrano* and took Corfu, Canale, "Cronaca Veneta," §§ 65, 66.

⁵ Heyd, II, 171 et seq., 181.

⁶ The Venetians in 1225 debated the feasibility of removing the seat of their government to Constantinople, De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 353; Heyd, I, 300, 317.

⁷ For the organization of the Venetian colonies, cf. Noel, "Histoire du Commerce du Monde," I, Ch. III; Waraen, "Origine des Etablissements Consulaires"; Prutz, "Kulturgeschichte," 384-393

whose term was for two years, acted as governor-general; under him various officers, similar to those at home, were charged with the executive duties. The lands of the colonists were divided into two parts — one for the nobles and the other for the squirès; to the individuals of each of these classes allotments of ground were made, and they in turn were expected to furnish a certain number of soldiers for the common defence. In later times a doge, a vice-doge, and other subordinates after the model of Venice were appointed. The Saracens, incited by the Genoese and aided by the frequent invasions of the Greeks, always rendered the situation precarious.¹

The growth of Venetian dominion vastly augmented the patronage of the Doge, who had the nominating power to so many important posts; and in the exercise of this prerogative he likewise collected a large personal revenue. Those who went out to the colony in the employ of the state also began to constitute a separate party. Sometimes they themselves, upon their return to Venice, but more often the relatives whom they had left behind, by means of their increased wealth and prestige, succeeded in elevating themselves over the other inhabitants.² A schism thus occurred and an aristocracy unconsciously sprang up. Services rendered abroad were the pride of the actors and the envy of their opponents. Rival heroes became hostile to each other; their adherents took sides; and thence feuds, intrigues, and civil dissensions. Subsequently, during the great war with Genoa, the grandees usurped the right to elect the Doge; the high council claimed the privilege to fill its own vacancies, and this dignity gradually became hereditary. When participation in trade and commerce was by law forbidden to the nobles, these latter avenged themselves by declaring that they only were eligible to hold public office. Then, as

¹ Cantu, VI, 726; Daru, "Histoire de Venise," I, 352; throughout the cities of the East, wherever there were Venetian establishments, this people, entirely independent of the local authorities, enjoyed their own government and institutions; cf. Heyd, "Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter," I, 172.

² Cantu, VI, 727; Hallam, I, 437; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 345, 347 et seq.; Gibbon, V, 133; Galibert, 68, 70, 74 et seq.

time passed and all legal procedure to secure justice became unavailing, the people had recourse to plots and conspiracies. The response of the nobility was the creation of the famous bloody Council of Ten,¹ invested with arbitrary jurisdiction over the government and its officials, as well as over the property and life of every citizen. In 1350 even the authority of the Doge had vanished into the hands of this limited body of autocrats.² The chain of evidence is complete. The extension of the supremacy of Venice beyond her fondest hopes was the death knell of her free and independent institutions. Domestic liberty was exchanged for foreign empire. Wealth and preferment supplanted moderate fortune and political equality.³

One of the strangest results of Venetian policy was the desire exclusively to control Adriatic commerce. This city established an imaginary line from Ravenna to the Gulf of Fiume, and proceeded to assess a heavy duty upon foreign vessels engaged in trade to the north of it; even those owned along the coast were not exempt from this arrogant regulation.⁴ The inhabitants of Bologna challenged it in vain, for their resistance, as well as that of others, was speedily quelled.⁵

Meanwhile the fifth and the sixth crusade took place.⁶ Both Venice⁷ and Genoa, coöperating, were realizing vast wealth and advantages; but the tension between them was becoming extreme, and encounters were more and more frequent. Genoa, formerly acknowledged as the superior on the sea, could not

¹ Leo, "Geschichte von Italien," III, 66; for a short general account, Symonds, "Renaissance, Age of the Despots," 4.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VI, 19; Cantu, VI, 726 et seq., also Ch. XXII; Hallam, I, 440; Gibbon, V, 133; Galibert, 80; Duruy, 481; Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 141.

³ Gibbon, V, 166; Cantu, VII, 430; Galibert, 71.

⁴ For the ad valorem duty, cf. Romanin, II, Bk. VII, Ch. I; Hazlitt, II, 276.

⁵ For war with Bologna, Canale, Secs. 288-309; cf. also Galibert, 181; Cantu, VI, 724 et seq.

⁶ Michaud, V and VI; Duruy, 309.

⁷ In 1284 Venice agreed to furnish, at the Pope's cost, twenty galleys, at her own, five, for the service of the crusaders, Hazlitt, II, 316.

brook the intolerable insolence and ambition of the Venetians.¹ The proximity of their foreign possessions likewise naturally precipitated many trade disputes, for both powers now had extensive colonies around and beyond the Dardanelles; each was anxious to exclude the other and seize the monopoly. How Genoa joined in the scheme to replace the Greek imperial family on the throne of Constantinople;² how in 1261, after defeating the Venetians, this purpose was accomplished; and how, for a time, the Black Sea was effectually closed to the latter, — have already been recounted; after which events it was only the more to be expected that the Greeks would prefer the Genoese in the distribution of favors.³ These blows, so disastrous for Venice, were regarded by her citizens as good reason for renewing their efforts to regain the supremacy and humble their rivals.⁴ Nor did they wait long; for in 1262 they won a bloody fight off Sette-Pozzi, and again, in 1264, in a terrible combat near the Sicilian shores, they annihilated the entire Genoese fleet.⁵ The emperor then accorded some few privileges to the victors, but, weakened by their own heavy sacrifices, they were not in a situation to insist upon their greater demands. Relative tranquillity reigned until 1296; then war was again declared. The Venetians, taking the offensive, entered the Black Sea and destroyed many Genoese colonial stations, but, being caught in the ice on the approach of winter, lost by cold more than half their forces (1297). The next summer (1298) the Genoese, penetrating the Adriatic, vanquished the Venetians near the Dalmatian coast;⁶ when their

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 321 et seq.; Cantu, VI, 731.

² Kugler, 298, 381; *supra*, p. 161.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 361; Gibbon, V, 257 et seq.; Galibert, 72 et seq.; Heyd, I, 427-430.

⁴ G. Villani, VI, Ch. LX.

⁵ In 1264 the Venetians, under Jacopo Dandolo, and Marco Gradenigo, between Mazara and Tragani off the Sicilian coast, utterly defeated the Genoese fleet under Lanfranco Barbarino, Leo, III, 35; Galibert, 64 et seq.

⁶ G. Villani, Bk. VIII, Ch. XXIV. In this battle the celebrated traveller, Marco Polo, commanded one of the Venetian galleys. He was captured by the Genoese, taken to Genoa, and held there as a prisoner for nearly one year; during this time he dictated his early adventures to one of his companions in distress. This narrative has become famous. With his father and uncle, he,

admiral, Andrea Dandolo, only by suicide saved himself from capture; while another Genoese squadron, after a brilliant victory off Crete, pillaged its cities. Then Venice, racked by internal dissensions, accepted (1299) a truce by which it was agreed that her ships should not sail in the Black or the Syrian sea for thirteen years.¹ Troubles, indeed, never come singly. While the republic was thus abandoning to Genoa its dependencies,² the Pope was likewise exerting himself to ruin its inhabitants. For political differences with the Holy See they were twice excommunicated, first in 1283-1286,³ and again in 1308,⁴ the last bull being reputed the most-violent in history. Instructions were issued to the governments of England, France, Aragon, and Sicily to treat them as public enemies. In these countries, and even more especially in Italy, their goods were confiscated and their lives taken with immunity; their trade was almost exterminated. At home, as remarked, there was revolution, schism, usurpation of authority. The period of gloom was dark and foreboding; the prestige of the Venetians seemed forever broken. But as soon as civil discords were healed an embassy was sent to the Pope for the confession of sins and reconciliation; thus peace was made.⁵

The beginning of the fourteenth century marked the opening of a policy by which it was hoped to offset past disasters. Venice, by never seeking territory on the mainland

at the age of seventeen years, had gone overland from Venice to the court of the Great Khan in Cathay; there he resided a number of years, only returning to his native city in 1295. The knowledge of the Orient imparted by his work, "The Book of Ser Marco Polo concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East," had a vast influence upon geography and exploration. Columbus was undoubtedly affected by it; cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 280 et seq.; for battle of Curzola (1298), cf. Hazlitt, II, 379; Bent, 161; Marin, V, 118-124; Romanin, II, 335-336.

¹ G. Villani, Bk. VIII, Ch. XXVII.

² For the treaty of 1299, cf. Leo, III, 52-53; Hazlitt, 389-391; Marin, V, 128-129; Villani, VIII, XXVII.

³ Galibert, 69.

⁴ *Ibid.* 76, 82.

⁵ In 1239 Venice made a treaty with the Pope by which she agreed not to make peace with the emperor without the papal sanction. The Pope in return gave certain commercial advantages in the countries to be conquered, Marin, IV, 223; Canale, Secs. 98-99, 100-101.

of Italy, had during the nine hundred years previous to this date (1338) held aloof from Italian politics;¹ but now, troubled at the loss of many of her maritime domains and at the inefficiency of her fleet, an attempt was made to obtain redress by the subjugation of more immediate neighbors.² An occasion was soon found. The principality of La Scala undertook to set up in the salt industry; the Venetians, in defence of their trade, declaring war, achieved the conquest of that region. Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, Brescia, Parma, Reggio, and Lucca fell.³ This success was quickly followed by the extension of their supremacy over entire northeast Italy, all rival states being reduced to abject submission.⁴

But, while winning these triumphs near home, the Venetians were elsewhere sustaining serious reverses. In 1343 they received a signal defeat at the hands of the Turks.⁵ Although several colonies were then captured, the misfortune was partially retrieved by the final treaty, according to which the victors granted the citizens of Venice commercial privileges in the ports of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt; their consul was also recognized at Alexandria. Considerable advantage was thus gained over the Genoese, whose ships, in search of similar goods were obliged to go to the extremity of the Black Sea. Hardships were, however, not yet at an end, for public calamities of another nature quickly supervened.

In 1348 an earthquake laid a large portion of the city in ruins, and a plague carried off numbers of the leading inhabitants.⁶ Introduced by way of Venice from the East, this same pest, spreading throughout Western Europe, occasioned an incredible mortality; three-fifths of the population are

¹ For the treatment of Tiepolo, son of the Doge of Venice, and its influence on Venice in joining the Lombard League (1237-1240), cf. Muratori, XV, 208; Marin, V, 222-223; Leo, II, 282, 289.

² Cantu, VII, 431; Hallam, I, 445 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 115.

³ Leo, III, 73.

⁴ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 125 et seq.

⁵ The Turks slaughtered the papal legate and many noble Venetians, Leo, III, 77; Galibert, 85.

⁶ For the pest, cf. Leo, III, 77-78.

estimated to have died of it; again in 1360 and in 1363 pestilence ravaged the metropolis. In 1348 many Venetian merchant ships were taken by the Genoese, with whom hostilities continued until 1355, when both parties having, by the lengthy and indecisive struggle, exhausted their resources, peace was effected.¹ The republic was not, however, to enjoy any long season of tranquillity; for in 1358 Louis the Great of Hungary, at the head of the Dalmatian and Croatian forces, attacking it by land, invaded its territories and soon required the Doge to surrender the sovereignty over them.² Then there seemed little to lose. Bereft of her power over most of her former distant possessions and deprived of nearly all her neighboring dependencies, Venice scarcely retained more than her own few inhabited islands and the remnant of her earlier commerce.

Her citizens, nevertheless, were, by their indomitable will and courage, to rescue the city from the shades of despair. Some few families, descended from the great merchants of prosperous days, having successfully preserved, through these disasters and catastrophes, their fortunes, were wont to display luxury and live at vast expense. On the one hand, sumptuary laws were voted to prevent such excesses, while, on the other, participation in trade, henceforth forbidden to the nobility, was reserved as the exclusive right of the plebeian classes. Retrenchment was adopted and enforced in every branch of the government. After the conspiracy of the Doge, Falieri, in 1355, had been terminated by his execution,³ an era of comparative calm lasting twenty-two years was experienced, both at home and abroad.⁴ Strength was being harbored for the desperate struggle approaching.

It has already been narrated how the fourth war with

¹ For treaty of 1354-1355, Leo, III, 82-83; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 330.

² *Ibid.* V, 4 et seq.; Galibert, 92.

³ *Ibid.* 92: Falieri's conspiracy was a rising of the lower classes against the aristocracy, Leo, III, 83-84.

⁴ During these twenty years Venice warred with Hungary. Trieste, Carrara, and Candia revolted, Muratori, XII, 429; Marin, VI, 148, 149, 162.

Genoa broke out in 1377; how Venice was besieged in 1379 by a hostile fleet and by the united troops of Hungary and Padua; how the Genoese commander, by his falsely calculated manœuvres, succumbed to the Venetians; and how, finally, notwithstanding, the Queen of the Adriatic was obliged by treaty to yield up her land dominions to the king of Hungary, as well as the island of Tenedos to her rival.¹ But the turning-point had been reached; the darkest epoch of Venetian history had passed; the series of misfortunes extending from 1261, when the Genoese obtained the supremacy at Constantinople, to 1380, when they almost captured Venice herself, was ended. Although so repeatedly victorious, they had won their triumphs at an enormous sacrifice. Immense treasure had been spent and their best blood ruthlessly shed. Genoa was utterly prostrate.²

In spite of mishaps and sufferings sufficient to overwhelm any ordinary state, Venice still showed signs of powerful vitality. Events were quickly to respond to the well-founded anticipations of her people; for within five years they, while recovering their former possessions of Dalmatia and Croatia, had established their authority over Hungary and Greece.³ Before 1404 Corfu had been repurchased, as well as Napoli in Roumania, Argos, Durazzo, and Treviso reconquered.⁴ Rapidly regaining their predominance in northern Italy and for once looking toward the westward,⁵ the Venetians, as a recompense for services rendered, secured extensive trading privileges from King John I of Portugal, granted for the ports of his kingdom during a period of one hundred years. In 1407 they bought Lepanto and Patras, while in 1412 they effected the subjugation of Schenigo. In the Mediterranean their commerce had once more attained the ascendancy. Quarrelling

¹ *Supra*, pp. 163-164, De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," V, 234 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 432; Galibert, 99 et seq.

² For peace, cf. Leo, III, 96; Hallam, I, 431; Vincens, II, 101; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," V, 260; Cantu, VII, 432.

³ De Sismondi, V, 276 et seq.; Galibert, 121 et seq.

⁴ As the result of the war with Francesco of Carrara (1405), Leo, III, 114.

⁵ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VI, 71 et seq.; Galibert, 124 et seq.

in 1416 with the Turks, they fought and whipped them,¹ freeing from their grasp the islands of Negropont and Crete, the chief importance of this victory being its influence upon the general situation. The credit of the Venetians in the Orient was reassured and all its riches were reopened to them. Their city, again arbitrator of the East, mistress of the Adriatic, and exercising in Italy supremacy greater than ever, was in 1420 at the zenith of its glory. Within forty years, after barely escaping impending invasion, it had risen to a condition unparalleled in prosperity and unequalled in power. Such a sudden political and commercial recuperation is unexampled in history.²

Throughout the fifteenth century Venice continued to add somewhat to her acquisitions. In 1423 the Emperor of the East, incapable of defending his outlying territories against the Turks, began to sell them one by one; the republic purchased Salonica,³ a very useful centre, but the subsequent defence of which cost vast sums. In 1426 the war with Milan resulted in some conquests in Italy, obtained, however, at the loss of financial prestige.⁴ The public debt was constantly growing, and between 1409 and 1449 Venetian securities dropped in quotation from seventy-nine to twenty-eight per cent of their original value. In 1453 Constantinople finally fell before the Turks, who at once loomed up, as a dark cloud, on the Eastern horizon.⁵ For a time, by treaty with other nations and by determined resistance, Venice succeeded in driving back the rising tide of their dominion, while their enmity was also the occasion of another profitable enterprise. When the last crusade, at the instigation of Pope Pius II, was undertaken, the Venetians transported the forces of the

¹ May, 1416, fight before Gallipoli.

² For Venetian prosperity, cf. Darn, II, 190; Muratori, XXIII, 946; Marin, VII, 153 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 432; Galibert, Ch. VIII.

³ Leo, III, 125.

⁴ Florence was allied with Venice. The Pope intervened and peace was made December, 1426, but war soon broke out again. In the end the sovereignty of Brescia fell to Venice, Leo, III, 126; Machiavelli, IV; Muratori, XXIII, 1086-1087.

⁵ Galibert, 144.

church to their destination; and as a reward received the gift of the island of Cyprus.¹ On the other hand, in the hostilities almost continuously waged from 1463 to 1479, the Turks captured Negropont, Lemnos, and a part of the Eubœa. The possession of Cyprus proved disastrous; for, to the pernicious tendency of Cypriote manners, soon afterward introduced into the metropolis, the decadence of Venetian character is mostly attributable.²

In 1480 Venice leased at an annual rental the isle of Veglio, and in 1483 made a similar arrangement regarding Zante. Subsequently a war broke out, in which the Venetians were pitted against all Italy, even including the Pope; they were excommunicated,³ but, being victorious, exacted the removal of this sentence,⁴ and considerably extended their Italian realm. This struggle involved great expense and rendered a further increase in the scale of port dues and import duties necessary to secure sufficient revenue, while the bonded indebtedness was largely augmented.⁵

A rapid survey of the causes of Venetian prosperity during the fifteenth century,⁶ when the city was at the height of its power, will not now be without interest; they were threefold, the magnitude of the colonial domain, the exclusive system of commerce, and the permanency of the government.⁷ Throughout the Middle Ages, Venice strove to erect her national edifice upon these foundations, which, only after several long and severe contests with aspiring rivals, were firmly established by might of arms.

The fundamental basis of success was commerce.⁸ Three to four thousand ships, manned by fifty-two thousand sailors, were engaged in navigation, and sixteen thousand men were employed in the yards and docks.⁹ The entire trade of the

¹ In 1488-1489 Cyprus was transferred to Venice by Caterina Carnoro, Leo, III, 192-193; Galibert, 151 et seq.; Michaud, IX, 36.

² Michaud, IX, 34.

³ May 25, 1483.

⁴ 1485.

⁵ Galibert, 163.

⁶ Leo, III, 197-198; V, 62-63.

⁷ Galibert, 183.

⁸ Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 143; for history of Venetian commerce, cf. Galibert, "Venise," Ch. IX; also article on Venice in McCulloch's "Commercial Dictionary."

⁹ In the fifteenth century there were 45 large galleys with 11,000 seamen, and

East was virtually in the hands of the Venetians, who supplied Europe with Oriental wares. From the vicinity of the Black Sea, from the ports of Syria, and from the remote districts of Africa, their vessels brought rich cargoes to be distributed in the West. Nearly all people were tributary to Venice, for any nation which refused to buy of her soon came to want and was compelled to submit.¹ Immense gains accrued to her citizens; on the foreign merchandise imported at the metropolis, valued yearly at ten million ducats, the gross profits were forty per cent; twenty per cent paid freight and other costs, while a net balance of equal amount remained to be added to the capital invested.²

Not only private persons and organized companies participated in this traffic, but the state also used its war galleys as merchantmen, for the benefit and convenience of the inhabitants.³ Four squadrons annually sailed: the first, which, in order to cover a wider field of operations, was divided into three sections, each taking a different route, but combined reaching all the seaboard cities of Greece, the Dardanelles, and the Black Sea; the second, which called at the towns of Syria and of Crete; the third, which, trading with the people of Egypt, bartered the products of the Black Sea—especially slaves—for Ethiopian and Red Sea commodities; and lastly, but perhaps the most important in its results, the fourth, which, cruising westward off the shores of Africa and passing through the straits of Gibraltar, turned northward along the Portuguese, Spanish, and French coasts, entered the English Channel, and visited Bruges, Antwerp, and London.⁴ On this

3000 small vessels from 10 to 100 tons with 17,000 men, and 300 big ships with 8000 men, Pagnini, "Della Decima," II, 7 et seq.; Romanin "Storia Documenta di Venezia," II, 156-157; Cantu, VII, 433.

¹ Notice particularly her wars with Genoa. For short account, "Encyclopedia Britannica," article "Venice."

² Cantu, VII, 433 et seq.

³ *Ibid.* VII, 434; Galibert, 177.

⁴ Galibert, 177, Cantu, VII, 434 et seq. Venice was at first indisposed to trade with England, but Genoese competition forced her to it, Cunningham, I, 414, 425; the regular course was Syracuse, Majorca, Spain, Portugal, England, and the Low Countries. The channel ports were frequented rather than London. The whole trade was under the direction of a commodore elected by

voyage the Venetians, coming in contact with the merchants of these industrial centres, effected mutually advantageous exchanges. The raw materials of the Orient were thus carried to ready markets, and the manufactured goods of the West, then so speedily developing, found their way, by means of Venetian ships, to the distant regions of the South and East. The Flemish squadron was, for a long time, in both directions, the most secure and most efficient method of transportation. In the far Orient and in the Mediterranean the Venetians practically controlled all supplies and furnished all demands, while to the North the members of the Hanseatic League were the chief purchasers. But the vessels, despatched by the government to every quarter of the globe, did not in the least compete with individual efforts; they only supplemented them.¹

The usual procedure was to rent the respective fleets, manned and equipped, to those who bid the highest price. The state received only this rental, occasionally increased by a percentage of the profits realized in the enterprise; all other privileges and immunities were guaranteed to the lessee, who was at liberty to sublet any portion of his concessions; not only ships, crews, and stores were provided, but likewise sufficient men-of-war were sent as an escort to afford ample protection; for, as a necessary adjunct to commercial and colonial supremacy, Venice maintained a navy unsurpassed in that age and assuring free action in every sea.²

A policy of extreme protectionism — harsher in its effects on other nationalities than any previously or seldom since adopted by a people — was at this time the principle of administration and conduct. The spirit of monopoly pervaded commercial transactions.³ Competition was not sufferable. The Vene-

the great council; each vessel had 80 archers on board for defence, and the galleys were manned by 180 Slavonian oarsmen, *Ibid.* I, 425 (note 10), quoting R. Birron, "Calendar of State Papers" (Venetian), I, LXI; a staple was established about 1490 at Pisa, but 600 sacks of wool were sent to Venice, Rymer, "Fœdera," XII, 390.

¹ Cantu, VII, 434; Galibert, 178.

² Galibert, 178.

³ Legislation of a distinctly protective character began in the fourteenth

tians, indeed, were then almost without rivals; for the other Italian cities had been crushed; neither Spain, France, England, nor Holland had yet developed; while Portugal was, in fact, the first of the Western powers to occasion anxiety. The Hanseatic League, so powerful in its neighborhood, served rather as an aid than a competitor, being always disposed to buy what was offered on its leading markets, Bruges and London. Venice so thoroughly patrolled by her war galleys the shores of the Adriatic and other adjacent waters as to annihilate in its incipency any attempt to escape her edicts. Foreign merchants only by paying double freight rates were permitted to forward their merchandise by her vessels; but could neither build nor purchase boats in any of her ports.¹

By these means Venice had created a colonial empire; for, throughout the Mediterranean every harbor was frequented by her ships. From Italy eastward she owned the coast line to the farthest extremity of that sea. Its principal islands belonged absolutely to her; many others in reality, if not in name, were also hers; at Constantinople her sway was unfettered for half a century, while in the Black Sea she held important territories. The Greek Peloponnesus was almost entirely Venetian, and in the Italian peninsula the authority of the city was unassailable. A detailed inventory of her possessions, while tedious, would not nearly so well as the activity and industry of her population confirm her claims to greatness. The Venetians were everywhere; the custom of establishing fixed colonies had been early adopted, and in the lands under their rule official governors and other functionaries, as well as considerable numbers of citizens, permanently resided.² On the other hand, crowds of natives from the dependencies were always to be seen in the metropolis, which likewise drew

century, though there are earlier cases. The theories of the mercantile system began to be put into definite shape in the sixteenth century, Adams, 286 (note 1).

¹ Cantu, VII, 436; Galibert, 181.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VII, 338 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 432 et seq.; Galibert, 168 et seq.; *supra*, p. 176-78.

its soldiers from the isles of the sea.¹ Thus there was a constant intermingling of the governing and the governed peoples, an habitual intercourse among all classes of many climes.

When the internal situation is examined the inhabitants are found enjoying much more individual liberty than generally prevailed elsewhere, while in their prosperous epochs they were moderately taxed and lightly burdened.² Other nations, subject to their monopoly, contributed largely to the municipal support; at the close of the fifteenth century the revenue from such sources was enormous.

Stimulated by their enterprises abroad, the Venetians carefully promoted their manufactures. At the time of their highest commercial success they did not forget their salt mines, fisheries, and glass factories, which still yielded vast returns. Armor, lace, leather, cordage, cloths, wax, sugar, liquors, soaps, and fine goldsmithy work were also objects on which they exerted their skill and displayed their ability. Profound mystery surrounded all their industries, of which, by the practice of secrecy, they aimed to retain their exclusive control.³ The emigration of artisans was rigorously forbidden, and if any such unfortunate, who had perchance left the place, refused to return, an emissary was sent summarily to despatch him. The city itself had a population numbering about one hundred and ninety thousand persons. The nobles charged with the administration of public affairs devoted themselves closely to politics, while the citizens were equally assiduous in their attention to commerce. The people were usually rich; there were many big incomes and the cost of living was extremely moderate. For these reasons, Venice also attracted throngs of foreigners, who came to serve her as soldiers, sailors, mechanics, or expert workmen.⁴ Here they obtained the opportunity to better their worldly position; em-

¹ Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 142.

² For comparison between Venice and Florence internally, Symonds, "Age of Despots," 215-235.

³ Cantu, VII, 436 et seq.; Galibert, 171 et seq.

⁴ Galibert, 171; *supra*, p. 187-88.

ployment was easily secured and investments safely made; here sales of merchandise were readily negotiated and profits were the greatest. Hence both for the poor and the well-to-do the metropolis offered a similar fascination. Tranquillity at home was effected through this rapid development of domestic affluence. The years lost by many of the other Italian republics in revolution and dissension were spent in perfecting trade facilities and manufacturing methods. With the capital early accumulated and with superior financial resources, the Venetians never faltered in the days of darkest despair. The National Bank became famous for its economic system; from the twelfth to the end of the eighteenth century its reputation remained unblemished.¹

Among European cities, Rome alone exceeded Venice in wealth at the close of the fifteenth century, while in actual prestige not any comparison is possible. By labor, by travel, by intercourse with many nations, and by fortune, the Venetians had become highly cultivated. Their civilization; their government, their skill, and their breadth of knowledge, although much envied by their contemporaries and frequently the occasion of their hatred, caused them to be respected and admired.² The rare gems of architecture, still standing on these isles, — so long ago deserted by the fleets of the world and now lonely in the immensity of waters, — sumptuously decorated with marble, porphyry, and precious stones, only feebly suggest to the most vivid imagination the magnificence of the past.³ The power of Venice was derived from trade. The corner-stone of prosperity was commerce, which itself rested on the broad foundations of a colonial domain. Without her colonies, Venice was a mere shadow, as she was for a brief interval in the fourteenth century and is again to-day. Shorn of them, her splendor departed.

Until the end of the fifteenth century, Venice maintained her supremacy, although after the capture of Constantinople

¹ Galibert, 173; Hallam, III, 322.

² Michaud, IX, 56; Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 126.

³ Galibert, Ch. XII.

by the Turks in 1453,¹ as already stated, they gave considerable annoyance to her merchant vessels and her Eastern dependencies; but not for fifty years did the Venetians confess themselves inferior. Time, however, works wonderful transformations. When the Portuguese, who had since 1412 been active in navigation, found the new route to the Indies, soon after the discoveries of Columbus beyond the unknown sea, the hour fatal to Venetian greatness had sounded.² Already, in 1503, Venice was obliged to sign a humiliating treaty with the Sultan, and not long subsequently France, Germany, Spain, and Italy combined against her.³ Her dominion shaken, her islands depopulated, and her riches wasted, peace was concluded in 1576; then an attempt was made to repair the losses, but interminable conflicts with the infidels followed, and at the close of the sixteenth century the Queen of the Adriatic was not yet herself again.⁴

The seventeenth century passed mostly in fighting the Turks,⁵ who were steadily making inroads on Venetian territories; one after another the colonies were succumbing to Constantinople. Venetian commerce was meanwhile losing its importance, for the general field of international trade was being so enlarged, and so many new highways were being opened, that the exclusive control of the Mediterranean was not any longer worth defending; monopoly had fallen; Venice was fast on the road to decadence; her affluence gone, her strength exhausted, the people forgot their ancient spirit. Neutrality was the first resort to escape destruction in the wars raging throughout Europe, but even this expedient without substantial friends avails little. In 1797 Venice surrendered to Napoleon, and for the first time foreign soldiers were

¹ War again with the Turks in 1499; peace finally in 1539, Leo, V, 164, 474.

² When the news first came that spices had reached Portugal direct from India, the price of such goods fell in Venice more than fifty per cent, Adams, 289 (note 1); Prescott, "Charles Fifth," III, 286 et seq.

³ The famous league of Cambray, cf. Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 125 et seq.; Galibert, 205 et seq.

⁴ For brief account of Venice in the sixteenth century, cf. Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 141 et seq.

⁵ Leo, III, 669 et seq.

received on her own soil.¹ The modern history of the city in the contests between Austria and Italy is so well known as not to bear repetition. As Samuel Rogers says : —

“ There is a glorious city in the sea,
 The sea is in the broad, the narrow streets,
 Ebbing and flowing ; and the salt seaweed
 Clings to the marble of her palaces.
 No track of men, no footsteps to and fro,
 Lead to her gates. The path lies o’er the sea
 Invisible ; and from the land we went,
 As to a floating city — steering in,
 And gliding up her streets as in a dream,
 So smoothly, silently — by many a dome
 Mosque-like, and many a stately portico,
 The statues ranged along an azure sky ;
 By many a pile in more than Eastern splendor,
 Of old the residence of merchant-kings ;
 The fronts of some, though Time had shatter’d them,
 Still glowing with the richest hues of art,
 As though the wealth within them had run o’er.”

The poet continues his description of the Queen of the Adriatic, and in some later lines draws a vivid picture of her former commercial activity : —

“ Want led to enterprise ; and, far or near,
 Who met not the Venetian ? — Now in Cairo ;
 Ere yet the Califa came, listening to hear
 Its bells approaching from the Red Sea coast ;
 Now on the Euxine, on the sea of Azof,
 In converse with the Persian, with the Russ,
 The Tartar ; on his lowly deck receiving
 Pearls from the Gulf of Ormus, gems from Bagdad.

* * * * *

Making the Imperial City of the East
 Herself his tributary.

If we turn

To the black forests of the Rhine, the Danube,
 . . . there we meet,
 In warlike guise, the caravan from Venice ;

* * * * *

¹ By treaty of Campo Formio, Venice became an Austrian possession.

Thus did Venice rise,
 Thus flourish, till the unwelcome tidings came
 That in the Tagus had arrived a fleet
 From India, from the region of the sun,
 Fragrant with spices — that a way was found,
 A channel opened, and the golden stream
 Turn'd to enrich another. Then she felt
 Her strength departing, and at last she fell,
 Fell in an instant, blotted out and razed;
 She who had stood yet longer than the longest
 Of the four kingdoms — who, as in an ark,
 Had floated down, amid a thousand wrecks,
 Uninjured, from the Old World to the New,

* * * * * * *
 . . . and with unclouded splendor,"¹

The causes for the decay of Venice were numerous. Nature, by the drifting of the sands into the lagoons and harbor, was a mortal enemy. The growing importance of Constantinople under the sultans as the Eastern metropolis; the defeat of the Venetians by the Turks on several occasions; the loss of the colonies; the steady development of manufacture in other European countries; the rise of Trieste and Ancona; the competition of the commercial nations of the West; the enmity of Emperor Charles the Fifth, who imposed duties double the ordinary on her goods, — these circumstances combined to hasten Venetian decline; but, more than all, by the practice of their own exclusive policy and by the continued exercise of their despotic control over trade, so favorable to them in earlier ages, the Venetians themselves closed the doors of Europe against their own wares and merchandise.² When navigation was limited to the Mediterranean and a little strip of water beyond it, monopoly was advantageous; but when the Atlantic spread out its vast expanse to mariners, the system of restriction collapsed of its own weight, and first crushed those who had supported it. Venice found it impracticable to enforce her arbitrary edicts, but she never desisted in the

¹ Samuel Rogers' Works, "Italy," XI.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VII, 339,

attempt. America was discovered, the Cape of Good Hope doubled; Venice was left mistress of the Adriatic, and even for a brief time of the Mediterranean.¹ But what availed this isolation? Commerce had sought other channels, other routes; there was not anything which prevented Venetian sailors sharing the glories of the New World. But, by some inconceivable infatuation, they turned not their eyes westward beyond the Straits of Gibraltar. While Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, and England were competing for rich prizes of untold value, Venice was seeking territory in Italy, and putting forth her best efforts to conquer Bergamo and Cremona, already doomed like herself to adversity. The inventions and discoveries of other nations never aroused her citizens, nor, seemingly, reached their ears. By an incredible fatuity they fought for the pebbles, while others picked up, undisputed, the pearls.

The Venetians, as Daru says, remained as stationary as the Chinese. To the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the declining metropolis endeavored to apply the same rule of conduct as to the fifteenth. Failure ensued and once more it was demonstrated by experience that progress is an unalterable characteristic of humanity, that the principle of yesterday is often to-day antiquated and worthless. In politics, trade, and commerce only that people which, constantly advancing, modifies its policies to accord with the age can retain its power and, thereby successful in its enterprises, prove its right to prolonged prosperity and national existence.

NOTE. — While the cities of Italy were propagating commerce, civilization, and Christianity in the East, those of the Hanseatic League were performing a very similar service for mankind in the countries of the North. Although separated by the natural barrier of the Alps, the representatives of these two sections early met and in time developed important relations. On the one hand, from the Genoese colony of Caffa or Gazaria, on the Black Sea, a long overland trade route stretched away across the plains, then occupied by roving bands of barbarians, to the distant city of Nov-

¹ The Venetians urged the Arabs of Egypt to oppose the Portuguese in India in every possible way; they also discussed for a moment the opening of a Suez Canal, and even the project of securing, through an alliance with the Russians, an overland route around the Turkish dominions, Adams, 290.

gorod, the most easterly of the Hanse towns; on the other, the northern fleet of Venice annually arrived at Bruges for the exchange of merchandise. While thus, and by many other channels of communication, the manufactured goods of the Mediterranean states and the more precious wares of the Orient were carried to the peoples of the Baltic and the Low Countries, and their own raw products sold to the merchants of the South, the intercourse among the cities of the North themselves was increasing.

The existence of numerous pirates and rivals on the sea caused the trade of Venice and Genoa to be conducted under the auspices of their respective governments; in the same way the hordes of robbers by land rendered some common protection necessary for those who would participate in traffic throughout the regions of Germany, Poland, and Russia. These conditions in due course occasioned the organization of the Hanseatic League; at first a society of merchants designed for the mutual protection of its members abroad, it was transformed in the fourteenth century into an association of towns for self-defence at home; henceforth the League became in a measure a state, enjoying many of the attributes of independent sovereignty; wars were waged in its interest and treaties signed in its name. The height of its power was attained about 1375, and during the next century prosperity reigned. The rise of the Scandinavian countries was the first sign of danger, the gradual evolution of England was more threatening, but the rapid advancement of the Netherlands in authority and commerce, which took place in the seventeenth century, was the final stroke to the good fortune of the League.

Among the towns Lubeck soon gained the ascendancy; there the headquarters of the association were situated, and there all appeals or disputes were ultimately decided. In early days the cities were divided into three groups—the Wendish and Saxon, the Westphalian and Russian, and those of Gothland, Livonia, and Sweden; subsequently there were four divisions, of which Lubeck, Cologne, Brunswick, and Dantzic were the capitals. As the chief object of the union was commercial, so it established warehouses, or “factories” as they were called, at various prominent centres; the principal of them were at Wisby, London, Novgorod, Bruges, and Bergen. In each of these places merchants enjoyed special privileges of extra-territoriality and immunity from local interference in the pursuit of their business. They themselves were organized as independent corporations subject only to the statutes of the League; they chose their own officers, executed their own justice, and afforded themselves mutual protection. So far these establishments bear great resemblance to those of the Italian republics in the Orient, but here the similarity ceases. In the outposts founded by Pisa, Florence, Genoa, and Venice there was a decidedly civic, or perhaps it might better be termed a national, influence. These different communities—

rivals among themselves—owed their origin and their maintenance to one or the other city; in the factories of the Hanse there was union only because of mercantile conditions. At Bruges, at London, at Novgorod, were grouped together, for the time being, traders from a dozen or twenty politically independent municipalities, some owing allegiance to the emperor of Germany, others to the king of Sweden, still others to the czar of Muscovy, the king of Poland, or some more petty potentate. Beyond the objects of commerce—however strong this tie may have frequently been—these men were not moved by any common patriotism. As the centuries passed and nations evolved by the amalgamation of the smaller principalities, the influence of lack of union became more and more apparent; in the end this fact occasioned the downfall of the organization; and it is because of it that, in spite of the vast and durable achievements accomplished by the Hanse towns in the promotion of trade, in the diffusion of civilization, and in the institution of law and order, it cannot be said that they effected any colonization.

PART III
MODERN TIMES

the colonial movement since 1815 has been toward the ascendant, with an exceedingly variable, but constantly augmenting, degree of progress. For the sake of comparison, it may be well to consider a few statistical details. The colonies recovered in 1815 included approximately:—

LOCALITY	SQUARE MILES	INHABITANTS
Asia	197	179,000
Africa	1,034	95,000 ¹
America	16,000	225,000
Total	17,231	499,000

The first effort made by France to augment her colonial domain dates from 1830; in that year the reawakening began. The conquest of Algeria was then commenced, an undertaking which was not officially concluded until 1857. In the interval between 1830 and 1860, besides making this acquisition, France also occupied in Africa the Nossi-Bé district (1841), Mayotte (1843), and the Ivory Coast (1843); in America an extension of influence in Guiana was effected, and in Oceanica the Marquesas Islands (1841), as well as New Caledonia (1854), were appropriated. In 1860, then, the possessions of France were:—

LOCALITY	SQUARE MILES	INHABITANTS
Asia	197	221,507
Africa	185,650 ²	2,800,000 ³
America	48,011	300,000
Oceanica	8,000	50,000
Total	241,858	3,371,507

¹ Not including Senegal, where both the area and population under French suzerainty were very undetermined.

² Not including Senegal, for which there are not any absolute figures at that time.

³ The population directly under French rule was about 250,000.

Between 1860 and 1880 France added to her colonial empire in Africa by the increase of her prestige in the locality of Senegal (chiefly in 1865), and by the annexation of Obok and the Somali Coast (1864); and in Asia by the seizure of Cochin-China (1861) and of Cambodia (1862). In 1880 or thereabouts, as nearly as figures are available, the French realms comprised:—

LOCALITY	SQUARE MILES	INHABITANTS
Asia	69,147	3,333,500
Africa	624,624	3,702,482
America	48,011	391,084
Oceanica	8,565	93,831
Total	750,347	7,520,897

The growth of the power of France between 1880 and 1890 was immense; in Asia large portions of Tonquin and Annam were brought under her sway; in Africa her authority was extended over Tunis, partially over the island of Madagascar, and, in a considerable degree, over the Sahara Desert and Algerian-Sahara region, besides other districts on the West coast; while in Oceanica several unimportant islands were occupied. In the year 1890 statistics showed French colonies, protectorates, and dependencies as follows:—

LOCALITY	SQUARE MILES	INHABITANTS
Asia	201,000	18,000,000
Africa	2,128,814 ¹	16,800,000
America	48,043	372,805
Oceanica	9,135	72,300
Total	2,386,992	35,245,105

Since 1890 the chief addition which France has made to her list of possessions is Madagascar, which has been finally

¹ Without Madagascar.

incorporated in the colonial system. In Africa, likewise, some new acquisitions have been won, but the aggrandizement of the past decade has been principally achieved by the steady advancement of boundary lines where a foothold had already been gained. Both in Africa and Asia this gradual development has been pursued. The dependencies under the French flag now include:—

LOCALITY	SQUARE MILES	INHABITANTS
Asia	363,027	22,679,100
Africa	3,320,488	33,257,010
America	48,011	383,750
Oceanica	9,220	82,000
Total	3,740,746	56,401,860

These figures thoroughly indicate the area and population of the regions at present subject to French rule. The next table shows, in tabulated form, the situation at different epochs of the nineteenth century:—

MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH COLONIAL POWER

LOCALITY	AREA IN SQUARE MILES				
	1815-30	1860	1880	1890	1899
Asia . . .	197	197	69,147	201,000	363,027
Africa . .	1,034	185,650	624,624	2,128,814	3,320,488
America . .	16,000	48,011	48,011	48,043	48,011
Oceanica .	—	8,000	8,565	9,135	9,220
Total . .	17,231	241,858	750,347	2,386,992	3,740,746

POPULATION

Asia . . .	179,000	221,507	3,333,500	18,000,000	22,679,100
Africa . .	95,000	2,800,000	3,702,482	16,800,000	33,257,010
America . .	225,000	300,000	391,084	372,805	383,750
Oceanica .	—	50,000	93,831	72,300	82,000
Total . .	499,000	3,371,507	7,520,897	35,245,105	56,401,860

It is seen at a glance that the greatest increase in the colonial empire of France has occurred within the past twenty years; since 1880 the extent of her foreign establishments has multiplied fourfold and their population more than eightfold. These facts are significant. France now ranks second among the nations of the world in this sphere of activity; it is indeed a wonderful achievement to have attained this distinction and to have constituted such a wide domain of influence within seventy years, especially when the exhausted state of this people in 1815, together with the subsequent foreign wars and internal revolutions of the past century, are taken into consideration. It is well worth the labor to investigate how these results have been accomplished. With this end in view the thread of the narrative must be resumed. But, before entering upon the detailed history of the French colonies in recent times, it now seems convenient to cite the latest available statistics which indicate their respective conditions. The following tables¹ give the particulars of date of occupation, as well as present area, population, and trade:—

COLONY	YEAR OF ACQUISITION	AREA Sq. MILES	POPULATION
Asia :			
India	1679	197	279,100
Annam	1884	88,780	5,000,000
Cambodia	1862	40,530	1,500,000
Cochin-China	1861	23,160	2,400,000
Tonquin (with Laos)	1884-93	210,370	13,500,000
Total of Asia		363,027	22,679,100

¹ These tables are adapted from the "Statesman's Year Book" for 1900

COLONY	YEAR OF ACQUISITION	AREA Sq. MILES	POPULATION
Africa :			
Algeria	1830	184,474	4,430,000
Algerian Sahara		123,500	50,000
Tunis	1881	50,840	1,500,000
Sahara Region		1,684,000	2,500,000
Senegal	1637	120,000	2,000,000
Soudan	1880	300,000	2,500,000
Ivory Coast, ¹ etc.	1843	100,000	2,500,000
Dahomey	1893	50,000	1,000,000
Congo and Gabun	1884	425,000	12,000,000
French Guinea	1843	48,000	1,000,000
Obok and Somali Coast	1864	5,000	22,000
Réunion	1649	970	173,200
Comoro Isles	1886	620	53,000
Mayotte	1843	140	11,640
Nossi-Bé	1841	130	9,500
Sainte Marie	1643	64	7,670
Madagascar	1896	227,750	3,500,000
Total of Africa		3,320,488	33,257,010
America :			
Guiana	1626	46,850	22,710
Guadeloupe and Dependencies	1634	688	167,100
Martinique	1635	380	187,690
St. Pierre and Miquelon	1635	93	6,250
Total of America		48,011	383,750
Oceanica :			
New Caledonia and Dependencies,	1854	7,700	53,000
Other French Establishments	1841-81	1,520	29,000
Total of Oceanica		9,220	82,000
Grand total		3,740,756	56,401,860

¹ France also claims as a sphere of influence under the Franco-German agreement of February, 1896, the region of Bagirmi, with an area approximating 65,650 square miles and a population of 1,000,000.

IMPORT TRADE OF PRINCIPAL FRENCH COLONIES

COLONY	YEAR	IMPORTS FROM FRANCE	IMPORTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES	TOTAL IMPORTS
Algeria ¹	1898	\$ 45,107,080	\$ 12,904,861	\$ 58,011,941
Tunis ¹	1898	7,759,547	4,789,389	12,548,936
Senegal	1898	1,700,000	1,900,000	3,600,000
French Soudan	1898	864,000 ²	1,296,000 ²	2,160,000
French Congo	1898	254,873	713,974	968,847
French Guinea	1898	290,680	1,513,295	1,803,975
Dahomey and Dependencies	1898	390,700	1,608,200	1,998,900
Ivory Coast	1898	160,000 ²	800,000 ²	960,000
Madagascar (including Nossi-Bé and Diego Suarez)	1898	3,406,000	922,200	4,328,200
Réunion	1898	2,419,215	1,533,839	3,953,054
Mayotte and Comoro Isles	1898	45,389 ³	33,073 ³	78,462 ³
French India	1898	720,000	55,542	775,542
Indo-China	1898	8,883,157	11,605,712	20,488,869
St. Pierre and Miquelon	1897	586,620 ²	604,380 ²	1,191,000
Martinique	1898	2,628,560	2,245,200	4,873,760
Guadeloupe	1898	1,774,889	1,945,155	3,720,044
French Guiana	1897	1,266,800 ²	600,000 ²	1,866,800
New Caledonia	1898	1,005,385	945,176	1,950,561
French Oceanica	1898	140,620 ⁴	446,140	586,760
Approximate annual total		\$ 79,403,515	\$ 46,462,136	\$ 125,865,651

NOTE.—The figures in this and the next table are obtained by dividing the amounts in francs by five, which is sufficiently exact for the present purpose. Of the total imports 63 per cent came from France.

¹ Algeria and Tunis are not officially reckoned as "colonies."

² Approximately.

³ For ten months only.

⁴ From France and French colonies.

EXPORT TRADE OF PRINCIPAL FRENCH COLONIES

COLONY	YEAR	EXPORTS TO FRANCE	EXPORTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES	TOTAL EXPORTS
Algeria ¹	1898	\$44,890,259	\$3,529,741	\$48,420,000
Tunis ¹	1898	6,560,194	3,882,736	10,442,930
Senegal	1898	3,868,000	1,732,000	5,600,000
French Soudan	1898	600,000 ²	140,000 ²	740,000
French Congo	1898	297,577	843,110	1,140,687
French Guinea	1898	84,145	1,475,850	1,559,995
Dahomey and Dependencies	1898	435,580	1,072,160	1,507,740
Ivory Coast	1898	500,000 ²	500,000 ²	1,000,000
Madagascar (including Nossi-Bé and Diego Suarez)	1898	373,400	618,600	992,000
Réunion	1898	3,733,900 ⁴	71,671	3,805,571
Mayotte and Comoro Isles	1898	149,067 ²⁸	20,000 ²⁸	169,067 ²⁸
French India	1898	560,000	2,407,347	2,967,347
Indo-China	1898	5,839,757	19,270,906	25,110,663
St. Pierre and Miquelon	1897	3,552,667	1,776,333	5,329,000
Martinique	1898	4,077,446	391,516	4,468,962
Guadeloupe	1898	3,317,904	215,187	3,533,091
French Guiana	1897	1,332,000	100,000	1,432,000
New Caledonia	1898	699,553	647,791	1,347,344
French Oceanica	1898	20,235	498,760	518,995
Approximate annual total		\$80,891,684	\$39,193,708	\$120,085,392

NOTE. — Of the total exports 67 per cent were to France.

¹ See other notes on preceding page.

CHAPTER XIV

LATER FRENCH COLONIZATION IN THE OLDER DEPENDENCIES

THE former realms of France, recovered after the restoration of Louis XVIII, — to mention them more in detail than heretofore, — were: in America, Guiana, the islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and the latter's dependencies, as well as the two small isles of St. Pierre and Miquelon; in Africa, Senegal, Gorée, the islands of Bourbon and Ste. Marie de Madagascar; and in Asia (India), Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanaon, Chandernagore, and Mahé, together with their adjacent districts.

Throughout the turbulent Napoleonic epoch, all the colonies in America, as elsewhere, whosoever happened to be in possession, suffered most grievously. The attempt to free the slaves by parliamentary decree, in some places enforced and in others without effect, the loss of markets, the capture of their own territories, and the consequent transformation of their political institutions by foreign powers, precipitated ruin and despair.¹ Even after the reinauguration of French rule a considerable period was required to enable the dependencies partially to regain their bygone prosperity and to adjust themselves to the newly existing conditions. The situation in the Antilles and Guiana was pitiable. Two problems were, by the necessities of the times, urgent. Measures for the rehabilitation of industry and commerce and for the liberation of the negroes were in these regions preëminently the subjects of the day. Unfortunately, the French were unequal to the task, and neither one nor the other of the questions was solved until 1845. These communities there-

¹ *Supra*, p. 401 et seq. and notes.

fore languished. Upon reëntry into them the Crown revived the laws in force prior to 1789, which for the next thirty years formed the basis of colonial legislation. Some progress was made by the negotiation of reciprocity treaties, by the reform of the monetary system, and by regulations protecting real estate titles. In 1825 the mother country took upon herself the expenses incidental to the defence of the colonies against external enemies, and obliged them, on the other hand, to provide for the support of their own domestic administration.¹

Between 1830 and 1840 numerous statutes were passed by the home authorities for the purpose of ameliorating and improving the surroundings of the slaves, with a view to their ultimate, but slow, manumission. Efforts were redoubled to elevate their social and educational position; but the colonists vigorously opposed such enactments, and even their magistrates refused or neglected to apply the laws. In spite of these protests the cabinet, seconded by the best sentiment of the nation, proceeded to adopt final measures. By their obstinacy the planters unwittingly renounced the benefit of the intermediary steps taken for their own advantage, as well as goaded the parent state into more severe provisions. At first even in France the prevailing disposition was to devise some method by which the gradual enfranchisement of the blacks could be accomplished within ten to twenty-five years. Many such propositions were discussed. Hardly any one had anticipated immediate and abrupt action, but the unexpected occurred; the Revolution of 1848 hastened the issue. One of the most important proclamations of the provisional government was its emancipation decree.² An endeavor was made to modify its results by certain limitations relative to the care and future employment of the negroes; some economic and land projects were also voted as supplementary acts necessary to maintain the social equilibrium. Eventu-

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 220 et seq.; for a very brief account of the French West Indies, cf. Payne, 364 et seq.

² For the abolition of slavery in the French colonies, cf. Tourmagne, 346-365.

ally, about one year after the abolition of slavery, the planters were in part reimbursed for their losses to the amount of a hundred dollars per head for each freed person. The effects of these laws were varied, but not the less grievous, in the different colonies.¹

In Martinique the distress connected with this reform being only transient, prosperity was in time regained. In Guadeloupe and Guiana the blow was almost mortal. The sugar interest was naturally the most menaced. In 1850 the output of the cane-producing regions was only fifty per cent of the average quantity in earlier years. The exigencies of the situation nevertheless occasioned material improvements in the methods and implements employed in planting and manufacture, so that before another decade had passed the total of sugar exported was far in excess of what it had ever been. Such was the general outcome—beneficial in its entirety. Of the Antilles, Martinique flourished, as likewise, in the East, Réunion; but Guiana never recovered.²

The principal solicitude of the colonists after the freedom of the slaves was the requisite supply of labor. Not more than a quarter of the freedmen remained with their old masters, or even would engage on the plantations. The deficiency had to be filled elsewhere. With this end in view, immigration was fostered. The government sought relief for the colonists by attracting laborers from East India, China, and Africa.³ Special companies were organized for this purpose, made contracts in advance with these individuals, transported them, and then, upon their arrival, assigned their allotted time to private parties. The results of this practice were not fortunate; morally and socially many evils were introduced. When the planters found it possible to replace their former serfs they seemed pleased to do it. Not only were the latter unprotected, but they were exposed to direct competition. Although failure to screen the feeble, simple-

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 222 et seq.

² *Ibid.* 226 et seq.

³ For immigration of laborers into the French colonies, cf. De Lanessan, 786; especially for that of the coolies into Guiana, Norman, 196.

mind creatures was a crime, the whites regarded their mistreatment merely as a sort of revenge. Many negroes were turned away from their old homes to wander in the woods and loaf in the cities, under which conditions not a few of them fell into a state approaching barbarism. A well-grounded hatred sprang up between the blacks and the immigrants; feuds, riots, and uprisings were of frequent occurrence.

The colonies again soon saw themselves suffering from an excess of laborers. An exaggerated immigration had taken place; but, more than all, the capacity of the newcomers was limited. Twenty imported Africans, Indians, or Chinamen did not accomplish one man's work; wages were low, so that a large number more or less did not seemingly matter, but in fact their pay was dear. The residence of these aliens was for the most part temporary. The agreement made with them included their return to their native land at the conclusion of their period of service. Transportation was expensive, and the proportion of them who died en route was considerable; then those leaving after the prescribed interval usually carried back to their distant homes almost the entire sum of their earnings, for in frugality and economy these foreigners excelled. Their departure thus left the colonies so much the poorer. The ignorance of these contract employees and their want of skill precluded any serious advancement in the science of cultivation; but in the branch of manufacture numerous modifications were made; in the division of labor progress was the greatest. Sugar growing and the processes of refining it became more and more distinct industries.¹

The most momentous transformation, only secondary in importance to the emancipation of the slaves, was the gradual dissolution of the so-called "Colonial Compact,"² which finally became extinct in 1861; by it the earlier systems of colonization are distinguished, and its absence indeed is, in a negative sense, the characteristic of the newer policy. How, by legis-

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 228 et seq.

² For a discussion of the "Colonial Compact," cf. Rambaud, "Civilisation Française," II, 254-255.

lation, France reserved to herself the sugar raised in the plantations, how within Canada in olden days her people had the exclusive right of sale of French wares, and how the colonists could ship their products only to the parent state, are facts already recited. In some degree this same rule applied to all colonial traffic. France alone had the privilege to buy from her dependencies and to sell to them.¹ Time and circumstances caused the first breach in this doctrine. As far back as 1763, after the loss of Canada, the theory was unavoidably relaxed; thenceforward, for a few articles of absolute need, the Antilles were allowed to continue to trade with this region — although a British possession — and with the other English settlements on American soil.²

In 1784 and 1826 a larger possibility for intercourse with foreign peoples was given by permission to purchase certain prime necessities elsewhere than in France. Thus little by little the colonial compact was being broken. In the one industry, however, which formed the essential wealth of the Antilles, the metropolis was loath to make concessions. The old restrictions would undoubtedly have been longer maintained in their vigor had not the peculiar circumstances of the nineteenth century's economic progress intervening thwarted every hope of prosperity — not less for France than for her colonies — without a decided change in attitude. Since 1828 the sugar problem has been the most persistently unsolvable question in French politics; as long ago as 1791 the same subject was attracting attention. The legislative branch of the government, beginning in that year to busy itself with the matter, has scarcely ever failed in activity concerning it. The West Indies, and indeed all tropical regions, not only French but British and others, have seen their fate depend on the action taken in respect to sugar by their European sovereign states; for nearly a century this topic has been as pressing to them as it has recently become to Europe itself.

¹ For a discussion of the harm worked by the restrictive colonial policy, cf. Norman, 295 et seq.; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 465 et seq.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 234.

Under the influence of enormous import duties the cultivation of the beet was introduced by Napoleon into France. It was the opening of trouble.¹ The home production of sugar nevertheless remained unimportant until 1830, when it assumed prodigious proportions. Although this competition was paralyzing to the colonial staple, the ensuing struggle was not without its benefits. The reaction was felt in the Antilles; the planters awoke from their inertia, and prepared, by the adoption of modern appliances and methods, to place themselves on a more favorable basis for trade.

The French authorities devised various schemes to assure an equal market for both cane and beet products, always with varying success, now to the advantage of the one, then to that of the other. In the dilemma of impartiality legislation was thrown into chaos; its revision was almost as frequent as the seasons. The effort to retain the colonial monopoly and to protect the French farmers was heroic, but uncertainty was the curse. In the long run the colonies suffered; to what extent may be imagined, when it is stated that at one period, in 1860, not a single French vessel was in the ports of Guadeloupe. It should also be recalled that France had not merely promoted a domestic manufacture to their ruin, but had likewise, since 1850, admitted on the same terms, as their exports, the sugar of Cuba and Java. Finally, in 1861, the appeals to the government became too importunate to be resisted. Want of prosperity in the dependencies involved a drain on the national strength. Following the example of other countries, absolute freedom under any flag and with any people was decreed to all commerce. The colonial compact ceased to exist. Coupled with this emancipation of trade was the grant of the privilege to the respective communities to vote their own customs laws; but at the same time the obligation of self-defence was imposed upon them. The French establishments thus attained nearly complete liberty.²

The principal effect of these modified conditions was a ten-

¹ Merivale, 67; McCulloch, "Commercial Dictionary," 1195.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 235 et seq.

dency to multiply the number and kinds of products. Under the old system the fascination of sugar growing was irresistible; under the new policy coffee, cocoa, cotton, and indigo were equally, or still more profitable. Kitchen gardening even made progress, and the colonists saw finally removed the contingency of a scarcity of vegetables, such as they had often experienced in the past. From the economic standpoint the change was decidedly beneficial. Small landowners commenced to be more numerous. The Antilles began to be prosperous, not so much by reason of their output of one article, but rather because of the variety of their crops. A more general distribution of wealth accompanied the higher development of agriculture. Opportunity of trade with other countries speedily revived the languishing state of these islands; but, in spite of this marked improvement, the share of France in their commerce lessened.

Geographical location, the natural laws of supply and demand, as well as facilities of transportation, inevitably aided the intercourse of the French colonies with other nations more than with the metropolis. Notwithstanding the prevailing satisfaction, the planters felt severe distress, being for some years unable to obtain a price sufficient to cover their costs. These two circumstances—the loss of French trade and the decline of the sugar industry—induced, in 1884, a practical return to ancient doctrines. At the suggestion of Mr. Felix Faure—then Under-Secretary of the Colonies, afterward President of the French Republic—the local councils adopted a discriminating tariff in favor of French manufacturers, and France on the other hand voted an import bounty on colonial commodities.¹ Since this legislation little has occurred affecting the situation of the Antilles.²

Guadeloupe and Martinique each are represented in the French Parliament by one senator and two deputies. Guadeloupe itself, with an area of 583 square miles, has now a

¹ "Annual Cyclopædia" (1884), 804, 805.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 240; for later details, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" for recent years.

population of 170,000 people, and the dependent islands, with 105 square miles, count 24,000 inhabitants. The exports in 1898 amounted to \$3,533,090, of which \$3,317,904 was to France; the imports were valued at \$3,720,044, of which sum \$1,774,889 was in French goods. The local budget in 1899 was for \$1,339,852. Martinique, with an area of 381 square miles, has a total of 190,000 persons; its trade in 1898 was, exports \$4,468,962, of which \$4,077,446 was to France; imports \$4,873,760, of which \$2,628,560 was from France. The budget in 1899 reached \$1,309,160. Both these islands are still chiefly devoted to sugar growing.¹

Guiana, in this century the most unfortunate of all French colonies, claims, in some respects, special attention. Soon after the restoration of Louis XVIII a second attempt at forced colonization was made. Madam Jahomey, a nun, endeavored, in the colony of Mana, to demonstrate that the experience of De Choiseul, in Kourou, was not necessarily final. Great subsidies and much private charity united in the hope of assuring the success of her enterprise, but in vain, for after five years it was abandoned to its fate of decay.²

The continuance of a cumbersome and absurd land system, the abolition of slavery, and the deportation of criminals thither have combined to plunge French Guiana into despair and transform it almost into a desert. Fine forests for lumbering and beautiful meadows for pasturage abound, but, for want of proper official consideration, advantage has not yet been taken of them.³ The reputation of this whole district, climatically, morally, socially, and politically, was long ago lost and has never been regained. Local self-government scarcely exists.⁴ In the general administration of the colony the home authorities were, until 1879, absolute; they alone had the exclusive right to decree the amount and scale of tariff duties, as well as to collect and expend the public rev-

¹ For further statistics, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 577 et seq.

² Rambaud, 726; Norman, 196; Leroy-Beaulieu, 221.

³ Guiana is the least productive of the French colonies.

⁴ Rambaud, 727-730, 740, 741.

enue. Most of the governors of later times, chosen from the military or naval service, have had very brief terms of office; only two years, indeed, has been the average period of their sojourn. Stability has thus been entirely wanting, as every arriving chief magistrate has manifested a desire to revise or modify the scheme of taxation. Of recent years a colonial council has been inaugurated, and a township organization has been adopted.¹

Since 1853 Guiana has been the most celebrated as a penal station. In February of that year the privilege of deportation was offered to all convicts sentenced to hard labor; in 1854 their transportation to Guiana was rendered compulsory.² At first scarcely anything was done to ameliorate the condition of the malefactors, or to protect the society in whose midst they were placed. Although the law said that they should be kept apart from the other residents, as a matter of fact they enjoyed, in most cases, complete liberty. The effect on the community may be easily imagined. After 1860 efforts were made, not only more fully to seclude the criminals, but at the same time to elevate their moral and social surroundings. A certain portion of this region was then set apart for their occupation, while serious measures were undertaken to make them industrious, to give them homes, and to educate them. Finally, in 1864, French philanthropists protested against the inhumanity of sending even felons to these marshy, pestilential places, where death was sure to follow soon after their arrival. Guiana has thenceforth been reserved for negro and Arab miscreants — now numbering forty-five hundred — from other colonies, and the whites have been shipped to the more healthy island of New Caledonia.³

The latest event in the history of Guiana was the arbitration

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 519 et seq.

² For a discussion of the French system of penal deportation, cf. De Lanesan. 857-874. Prior to 1864 Guiana was the only penal colony of France; by the law of 1863 New Caledonia likewise became such an establishment.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 524 et seq.; Payne, 365. The policy was slightly changed by the law of 1884; cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1884), 343. For New Caledonia, cf. *post*, p. 456.

of the boundary line between the Dutch and the French possessions; the umpire, the Emperor of Russia, decided in favor of the former. There is still an open dispute with Brazil as to the demarcation of its frontier.¹ Industry and trade are at a very low ebb. Gold mining, pursued on a limited scale, is the only remunerative labor; the quantity exported in 1899 was 81,715 ounces. The area is 46,850 square miles; the population does not exceed 30,000, of whom the free whites number not more than 1000. In 1898 the local budget was for \$605,550; the home government spent \$1,379,812 additional, of which \$1,090,110 was for the penal settlement. The imports in 1897 amounted to \$1,866,800; the exports to \$1,432,000; one deputy is sent to the French Parliament.²

Of St. Pierre and Miquelon, those little islands of the North, the sole remnants of the earlier realms of France in North America, mere mention may be made.³ Their area is 93 square miles, and they are peopled by 6350 individuals. The value of the catch of cod, their single avocation, reaches \$2,500,000 to \$3,000,000 in value per annum. In 1899 their local budget was for \$100,000; the expenditures of France \$56,500; the imports in 1897 were \$1,191,000; the exports \$5,329,000.⁴

The island of Réunion, — formerly known as the Isle of Bourbon, — lying in the Indian Ocean, has, by reason of the affinity of its cultures and inhabitants, experienced during the century crises very similar to those occurring in the Antilles. The abolition of slavery naturally disturbed the sugar business; but, more fortunate than other colonies producing this staple, Réunion, by its situation, was soon able to replace the negroes by emigrants from India.⁵ The planters, also show-

¹ For the boundary question between French Guiana and Brazil, cf. Ramband, 734-736.

² Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 577 et seq.

³ They are nevertheless of immense importance to the French, De Lanessan, 667, 678; especially for the fisheries, cf. Ramband, 766-771.

⁴ Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 578, also "Annual Cyclopædia" (1899).

⁵ By the convention of 1860 England agreed to allow as many East India-

ing a most laudable disposition for progress, made large purchases of new and improved implements. Radical reforms in cultivation soon revived the industry, and the island was within a few years more productive than ever. Under such favorable influences even the price of land materially advanced. In Réunion, nevertheless, like in the West Indies, the influx of the coolies from India and China, coming under contract only for temporary residence, had evil social and moral effects. In this foreign element crimes were frequent, while many corrupt practices were thus introduced into the character of the colonists. The old slaves were woefully neglected. The ultimate excess in the numbers of the working class also caused a reaction. Development in the methods of agriculture and manufacture ceased. Labor became cheaper than machinery, with the attending distress to individual laborers.¹ Réunion, however, maintained the lead among French sugar-growing colonies. In all the fluctuations of this article, and in the varied legislation of the century relative to it, this island has been deeply concerned. The gradual increase in the quantity of the beet output has been the most serious menace to its prosperity. In 1861, upon the rupture of the colonial compact, Réunion suffered the vicissitudes elsewhere prevailing. The consequences were vital. While the trade with other nations indicated only a slight loss, that with France at once declined to the extent of fifty per cent. Since the adoption of the differential tariff there has been some improvement in the transactions with the parent state.² Réunion has an area of 970 square miles and a population now approximating 173,000 people. The imports in 1898 amounted to \$3,953,053, and the exports to \$3,805,571. With the desire to foster the commerce of this colony, the government has lately expended considerable sums in harbor and railway construction.³ Three other small islands in the

men as were necessary to emigrate to Réunion, Rambaud, 359, 360; *supra*, p. 426 and note 3.

¹ For agriculture in Réunion, cf. De Lanessan, 353.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 233, 234, 246.

³ Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 568.

Indian Ocean belong to France: Mayotte, 140 square miles, 11,640 inhabitants; Nossi-Bé, 130 square miles, 9500 individuals; and Ste. Marie, 64 square miles, 7670 people; as well as the Comoro group, 620 square miles, 53,000 inhabitants.¹ Madagascar, to which further consideration will subsequently be given, is the most recent French acquisition.

The difference between French and English colonization is aptly illustrated by the respective situations of Réunion and Mauritius, the latter, during this century, an English possession. While in Réunion prosperity has always been doubtful and progress inappreciable, on the neighboring island, under British rule, where the natural conditions are nearly the same, commerce and trade have quadrupled within the past hundred years.

The questions of the day in the Antilles, Réunion, and the other islands, are practically identical. Their welfare depends upon the degree of success attained by the plantation system. Sugar is the great staple. Unless its future can be assured and some constancy be given to the demand, all must necessarily languish. The main problem of the adjustment of social and political relations between races of different color is extremely serious. The solution the most conducive to internal tranquillity has been the voluntary withdrawal of the white population from any participation in civil affairs; but is this attitude to be perpetual? And will it inure to eventual stability? Is it possible for white men to live and advancement to be achieved in localities where the blacks predominate in number, but are deficient in education? Such are the pressing topics of policy and fact in these colonies.

The only other remaining vestige of the earlier colonial empire of France consists of her few surviving establishments in India, — Pondicherry, Yanaon, Karikal, Mahé, and Chandernagore, — with their immediate suburbs, embracing 197 square miles of territory and 287,000 inhabitants, of whom

¹ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900); also for further statistical tables, *supra*, Ch. XIII.

about 1000 are Europeans.¹ The imports in 1898 amounted to \$775,542, and the exports to \$2,967,347. The former are mostly French products, while about one-sixth of the latter are shipped to France. The local budget in 1899 approximated \$231,840.² Prior to 1870 the administrative régime of these dependencies was very defective and gave occasion to well-grounded complaints on the part of their people. Representative government in domestic matters was entirely lacking; but since that date general and local councils have been instituted. Public works, which were once absolutely neglected, are now receiving due attention. One senator and one deputy constitute the representation of India in the French Parliament.³

¹ For concise statements about these possessions of France, cf. Rambaud, 441-480.

² For further statistics see tables in Ch. XIII; "Statesman's Year Book," and "Annual Cyclopædia" (1899), 294, 861.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 553, to whom the author takes this opportunity to acknowledge his indebtedness for many details stated in the present chapter. "In regard to their forms of government," Alleyne Ireland says, "the French tropical colonies may be divided into two classes—those in which government is carried out to some extent by the passage of laws, and those in which all matters are settled by the simple decree of the governor. To the first class belong Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Réunion; to the second class all the other French tropical colonies. In the first class of colonies the principal subjects to which the passage of laws is applicable, are the exercise of political rights, the regulation of contract matters relating to wills, legacies, and successions, the institution of juries, criminal procedure, recruiting for naval and military forces, the method of electing mayors, municipal deputies, and councillors, and the organization of the local councils general. In regard to all other matters of importance all the French tropical colonies are on the same basis of legislation, that is, government by decrees issued by the governor or the minister of the colonies. The governor of a French colony has very wide powers. . . . In his administrative capacity, he has absolute authority to regulate nearly all the internal affairs of his colony, and he is above the law. . . . The governor is to some extent guided by the advice of two bodies, the privy council, which is a nominated body consisting of official and unofficial members, and the general council, which is made up of councillors elected by the votes of all male persons over twenty-five years of age who have resided for more than one year in the colony."—"Tropical Colonization," 70-72. This statement practically applies to all French colonies except Algeria and Tunis. The former is considered a part of France, the latter is under the direction of the department of foreign affairs.

CHAPTER XV

EXTENSION OF FRENCH COLONIZATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

AMONG the present territories of France on the African continent, Senegal is, strictly speaking, the oldest. Although Frenchmen took formal possession of these regions in 1637, they have only in very recent years endeavored to extend their sphere of influence.¹ At the end of the eighteenth century the commercial relations with France were already quite important, but the chief traffic of the whole district was then the slave trade. Under the Restoration strenuous efforts were made to found here, as in Guiana, an agricultural settlement; for similar reasons failure ensued. Want of foresight, the unpreparedness of the soil, and the insalubrity of the climate effectually prevented permanent results. After the first unsuccessful attempt, Senegal was again disregarded until 1887-1888.² In 1860 the total population of this colony proper was 115,000; in 1876, 195,190; in 1887, 135,000; and at this time, including the entire domain directly under French protection, it is about 1,180,000 people. Of this number not more than 2000 individuals are Europeans. St. Louis, the principal town, has 20,000 residents.

The uppermost thought in the colonial policy of the French in Africa has been directed to the extension of their activity in Senegal, the Congo, and adjoining localities, until, on the north, their occupation should reach to the frontiers of Algeria, while on the west it should comprise all the Upper Niger.³

¹ For a discussion of the early French policy, cf. Lucas, III, 102.

² "Annual Cyclopædia" (1887), 305.

³ *Ibid.* (1890), 335, 336; for statistics, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 569 et seq.

Under the impulse of British competition they have put forth their best energies.¹ Thus inspired, they have built up a vast realm in the heart of Africa, with countless millions of inhabitants over which they at least claim to have the right to exercise sovereign power. Unfortunately, climatic conditions are a decided hindrance to the accomplishment of any real, genuine colonization. White men will always be few in these unhealthy latitudes, where the natives still slumber in barbarism, varying only in degree. Education and justice are the two potent instruments by means of which France is striving to lift up the aborigines out of intellectual darkness, and to strengthen her own authority. The task is long and arduous. Perhaps after its reasonable measure of achievement and the inauguration of sanitary improvements, colonists may be drawn thither to gather the inexhaustible riches which there abound.²

As the situation now is, besides Algeria and Tunis, France administers in Africa the regions of Senegal, with an area of 80,000 square miles and a population estimated at 1,180,000; the western Soudan (area 120,000 square miles, with a population of 2,000,000); the French Soudan (area 300,000 square miles, population 2,500,000);³ French Guinea (area 48,000 square miles, population 1,000,000); the French Congo (area 425,000 square miles, population 12,000,000 to 15,000,000); the Sahara region (area 2,000,000 square miles, population 2,500,000); the Ivory Coast (area 100,000 square miles, population 2,500,000); Dahomey (area 50,000 square miles, population 1,000,000); Bagirmi (area 65,650 square miles, popula-

¹ Under date of March 30, 1892, Lord Salisbury wrote to the British ambassador at Paris: "The colonial policy of Great Britain and France in West Africa has been widely different. France from her basis on the Senegal coast has pursued steadily the aim of establishing herself on the Upper Niger and its affluents. This object she attained by a large and constant expenditure and by a succession of military expeditions. . . . Great Britain, on the other hand, has adopted the policy of advance by commercial enterprise." — "Parliamentary Papers," Ch. 6701, 92.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 533 et seq.; for French progress in Africa, cf. Lucas, III, 149 et seq.; Johnston, 143-145.

³ For the recent plan for the government of the Soudan, cf. summary in the *Nation* of January 25, 1900.

tion 1,000,000); Obok and the Somali coast (area 5000 square miles, population 22,000).¹ The trade of Senegal and its dependencies annually amounts, for imports, to about \$3,600,000, and for exports \$5,600,000; in the former instance France controls about one-half, and in the latter two-thirds, of the total. The local budget for 1899 was nearly \$875,000; the expenditure of France in 1900, \$1,137,241.²

Concerning the French Congo there is little special to write. This district, along the coasts of which French adventurers sailed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, was not finally and authoritatively taken under the guardianship of France until 1884. Since then its utility as a colonial station has materially increased; according to the most recent available statistics, its annual commerce approximates \$2,107,534 in value, of which \$966,847 is for imports and \$1,140,687 for exports. Of the former about one-fourth, of the latter slightly more than one-third, is in the hands of the metropolis.³

Of the other West African dominions the Ivory Coast was acquired in 1842;⁴ its trade is yearly, imports \$960,000, exports only a trifle more; in the former the share of France is one-sixth, in the latter one-half. The western Soudan was annexed in 1880;⁵ Dahomey was subjected to French rule in 1893;⁶ its imports are stated annually to be worth \$2,000,000, and its exports \$1,500,000; in the former France controls about one-fifth, in the latter a little less than one-third. Of French Guinea the imports are \$1,800,000, the exports \$1,500,000; they are for the greater part with countries other than France.

¹ For brief account and statistical data of each of these regions, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 569 et seq.; at the best, however, all estimates of population are mere approximations. In this connection it should also be observed that, with the exception of Tunis, there is not a French possession which is self-supporting, Johnston, 145; "Annual Cyclopædia" (1899), 295 et seq.

² Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 570.

³ *Ibid.* More particularly for the French Congo, Johnston, 219; Rambaud, 316 et seq.

⁴ Rambaud, 286 et seq.

⁵ For French progress in the Soudan, cf. Rambaud, 208 et seq.; for the Fashoda affair, cf. "Annual Register" (1893), 33, 159-171.

⁶ For details concerning Dahomey, cf. Lucas, III, 150; Rambaud, 298-306.

Bagirmi was occupied first in 1895; Obok¹ and the Somali coast have been held since 1864.²

These territories in their characteristic features have a general resemblance. All are in the tropics, burdened with a more or less unhealthy climate, inhabited by rude races in a savage or barbarous state, enjoying great natural resources and vast possibilities of wealth, when only the existing obstacles shall have been overcome so that white men may, with reasonable safety, reside in them. Public works are still to be constructed and immense sums expended by the government or by authorized organizations, before these districts can be considered habitable. They are now merely strategic outposts; the commerce transacted is accomplished under the protection of armed forces; while constant warfare and frequent uprisings are factors with which France must still contend for long years.³ In many respects the actual situation in Western Africa recalls the attitude of the French in America during the seventeenth century. The influence of wild, uncivilized regions has always exerted a potent sway over this people. The spirit of exploration, adventure, and military prowess has already won immense realms for the French flag; but, as vividly portrayed by history, the prudence, assiduity, perseverance, and judgment have usually been lacking to maintain the position so brilliantly gained.⁴ The problem to be solved is whether the French of to-day, by the application of advanced methods to trade and colonial policy, will be more fortunate than their forefathers in the achievement of permanent and enduring success in the treatment and defence of their foreign possessions. For the sake of the nation which is so grandly making this second supreme effort to colonize and civilize such extensive domains, it is to be hoped that the fates may evince a more kindly disposition in the future than

¹ For Obok, cf. De Lanessan, 312-319; Norman, 256 et seq.

² For statistics, cf. generally "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 569-572.

³ For some account of the wealth of these French territories and a description of their military form of government, cf. De Lanessan, 322, 326, 329, 330; Rambaud, 260, 268, 279.

⁴ *Supra*, Ch. X.

in the past. If the evident plans of the French are consummated, they will, in time, own the northwestern quarter of Africa.¹

This diversion on the western coast immediately suggests Madagascar, which, as a field for French enterprise, is not so very different from the localities just described. Postponing, then, for a few moments any mention of the most important colony of France, — Algeria, — attention is now to be briefly directed to that recently acquired island. Madagascar has the unique distinction of being reckoned among the first colonial stations of France, and yet being only of late years conquered. It is at once recollected how Richelieu, in 1648, authorized the establishment of a settlement, and how, in 1686, Madagascar was formally annexed to the Crown.² Want of perseverance and instability of character caused the French of those early days to abandon the fatal struggle with climate and savages. The greater charms of East India so enchanted them that they went thither to found their ephemeral empire. After the beautiful, but theoretical, projects of Colbert had ended in ruin, the island was seemingly forever deserted as a worthless and inhospitable land. Nor, strangely, did the English approach it with any serious designs until 1810, when a part of its shores fell into their hands. Although eight years subsequently, in consideration of the abolition of the slave traffic by King Radama,³ the British withdrew their claims of sovereignty, still, since then, until very recent times, not only the English, but even Americans, have had a larger share than the French in this trade. France, nevertheless, always pretended to the titular rights of a patron state without ever making any vigorous effort to enforce them. French diplomatists, for several generations, viewed the island as an objective point of national policy,

¹ Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, 546 et seq.; for the problems confronting France in the Soudan, cf. Rambaud, 281-283.

² *Supra*, pp. 404, 405.

³ For some account of this ruler, cf. Rambaud, 378; subsequently, in 1829, an expedition was made against Queen Ranavalona; cf. Johnston, 268; Rambaud, 380.

whenever the proper opportunity should occur, or in the event that any other people should try to seize it. In 1846 Louis Philippe, thinking the hour had come, was preparing for an offensive campaign, when some unexpected turn in domestic affairs deterred him.¹

Thenceforward, until 1883, France took little, if any, action in Madagascar further than ever stoutly maintaining the equity of her historical prerogatives. At this last-named date, to redress some wrongs done to French settlers and a friendly tribe called the Sakalavas, the cabinet sent a naval force against the Hovas, who constituted the ruling race. After two years' hostilities, peace was restored at the close of 1885 on a compromise basis. The Hovas paid France \$2,000,000 as an indemnity, surrendered the northern part of the island, known as Diego Suarez, for a French colony, and agreed to receive at their own court at Antananarivo a French resident as adviser of the nation.² In spite of this arrangement, the friction with the Hovas tended to increase; in all trade matters Englishmen and Americans were openly or surreptitiously favored. If Frenchmen secured privileges, the prevailing prejudice was such that they could not find the necessary workmen. One of the *causes célèbres* growing out of these strained relations was the concession by the Malagasy government of 225 square miles of land and one-half the rubber traffic to the former United States consul, John L. Waller.³ Then boundary disputes between the French and the Hovas relative to the district granted in 1885 broke out. Finally, in September, 1894, a special commissioner was despatched from Paris to Antananarivo with a proposition involving complete submission and the acceptance of an absolute protectorate. These

¹ As a protest against the expulsion of foreign traders the English and French had in 1845 made a joint bombardment of Tamatave and an unsuccessful attack by land, Johnston, 269; Rambaud, 380; for a brief history of Madagascar, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1883), 506, 507.

² For this war and the events preceding it, cf. Johnston, 269-275; Rambaud, 384-397; Leroy-Beaulieu, 450 et seq.; Ricaud, "L'Expansion Coloniale," 99-159; also "L'Année Historique"; "Annual Cyclopædia" (1883), 507; (1884), 458-461; for the treaty of peace, *ibid.* (1895), 565; (1896), 516-518; (1897), 452.

³ "Annual Cyclopædia" (1894), 449, 450.

terms being rejected by the Hovas, France declared war in the following November. Her troops arrived in Madagascar in April and, after an unbroken series of victories, entered the capital on September 30, 1895. Thus terminated the thirty-second campaign which the French had fought in that island since 1645, the year of their first occupation. The treaty promptly signed after the capture of Antananarivo provided a strict protectorate, the exile of the prime minister, who was also the husband of the queen, and deprived the Hova authorities of all powers, both general and local, recognizing in every respect French supremacy.¹ In August, 1896, the formal annexation of the territory to France was proclaimed; in February, 1897, the queen was deposed and soon thereafter deported to the island of Réunion.² After a protracted strife of two hundred and fifty years the French now seem firmly fixed in Madagascar.

The area of the island is 228,500 square miles; the population is between 3,500,000 and 5,000,000. Prior to the last war the entire number of whites did not exceed 500. In 1898 the imports were approximately valued at \$4,328,200, and the exports at \$992,000,³ the share of France in the former being more than three-fourths, in the latter about one-third. In 1900 France is expending about \$5,000,000 for administrative purposes, while in 1899 the revenue amounted to \$2,227,200, including \$360,000 as a subvention from the home government. To judge from analogy, the French will in due course raise Madagascar to the rank of their most important and prosperous establishments, thus bringing to fruition one of their most ardent and longest cherished dreams.⁴

It is now time to consider that colony wherein France has achieved her greatest success in policy and administration, and

¹ For the final conquest of Madagascar, cf. Johnston, 276-277; "Annual Cyclopædia" (1895), 432-434.

² "Annual Cyclopædia" (1896), 442, 443; (1897), 494; (1898), 414.

³ Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 562-566.

⁴ For the value of Madagascar to France, cf. Ricaud, 160 et seq.; De Lancesan, 135-149.

in which her fondest hopes are centred. Algeria is unqualifiedly an acquisition by conquest. Not the less it marks the opening of the epoch of modern French colonization, inasmuch as its territory was the first field of national endeavor — after the restoration of the Bourbons — for an extension of the colonial realm.¹

The period of Turkish preponderance in the regions of Algeria runs back to the days of the famous Aroudj or Barbarossa.² In the fifteenth century, this adventurer, coming from the island of Mitylene, set up the standard of the crescent at Algiers, which thenceforth became the headquarters of piracy and corsair ships. In 1659 the Turkish pasha was, after a revolution, bereft of power, and in 1710 the representative of the Sultan was formally banished; from the latter date the Dey of Algiers exercised absolute control not only in fact but in name. Little by little the Algerines, by their reckless daring and their disregard of the accepted laws of warfare, built up such a reign of terror in Northern Africa and on the Mediterranean ~~as~~ to have become a menace to the legitimate trade of civilized nations; to these unprincipled marauders all peoples were yielding tribute. Even Charles V having failed to subdue them, Spain was ultimately forced to surrender most of its strongholds on their coast.³ France, about 1635, began to undertake disciplinary measures; the first efforts made under Louis XIII were without results, but Louis XIV, at intervals during twenty-five years, sent against Algiers several expeditions which caused the city great damage. After the Treaty of 1689 was signed comparative peace between the two countries prevailed until

¹ Paul Leroy-Beaulieu has written a special work entitled "L'Algérie et la Tunisie." In his "Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes," he devotes 135 pages to the problems connected with Algerian administration. The study of all details concerning French colonies on the north coast of Africa should be of peculiar value to those interested in the development and government of tropical dependencies.

² For some account of this pirate, cf. Rambaud, 49; Réclus, II, 21-22; Roy, "Histoire de l'Algérie," 103-111.

³ For the Spanish expeditions against Algiers, cf. Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 411; II, 229-241; Roy, 109-135.

1830. In 1694 the Algerines deeded certain portions of their shore-line to France and granted other concessions.¹

The series of events leading to the final occupation of Algeria commenced in 1793. At that time the French government, in need of grain for the support of its army, was obliged to turn to the Algerines for relief. By permission of the Dey, two prominent Jewish merchants opened an account with France. The transactions, covering a considerable term, were manifestly large and were subject to an arrangement for credit; in the end there was a material difference as to the amount due. For twenty years or more attempts were made to reach a settlement. Finally, in 1819, an agreement was concluded by which France promised to give \$1,400,000 in full of all indebtedness, it being provided that the right was reserved to offset any claims outstanding against Algiers. Remittances were to be forwarded, beginning from 1820, in twelve annual instalments.² Everything seemed amicably closed, when some citizens of Marseilles presented a counter demand for \$500,000. The French authorities, paying the balance of \$900,000 to the Algerines, held the sum said to be owing their own parties in escrow, pending judicial decision.³

The Dey of Algiers naturally resented this proceeding as a wilful avoidance of the signed compromise. In April, 1827, at an official reception of the diplomatic corps, he and the French consul-general became involved in an altercation, when hot words were passed, and, finally, he slapped the latter in the face. There is little doubt but that the French had for years been looking toward Algeria as a fine locality for the extension of their domains. In the matter of the negotiations concerning the adjustment of the debt, they certainly had not been without fault. This gross outrage to their representative now afforded a plausible excuse for action. Friendly relations being at once suspended, a fleet was soon blockading Algiers. For three years the situation so continued.⁴

¹ For the early relations between Algiers and France, Roy, 139-152.

² *Ibid.* 153-162.

³ *Ibid.* 162-163.

⁴ Rambaud, 50 et seq.; Réclus, II, 25; E. Hamel, "Histoire de la Restauration," II, 672, 695-698, 704-706; Roy, 163-203.

The Dey was obstinate, declared war on the French, and defied them to injure him; they, vexed by the delay, resolved to act resolutely. On June 14, 1830, a well-organized army disembarked at Sidi Ferruch on the African coast; on July 5 Algiers capitulated; the Dey was taken prisoner, and soon afterward exiled. This triumph, however, was not conclusive nor comprehensive. The other governors in the different provinces, as well as the chiefs of the various tribes, ambitious to succeed the fallen potentate, refused to yield submission. France found herself drawn into protracted hostilities to assert and obtain the recognition of her sovereignty. Campaign followed campaign, expedition after expedition, during a period of twenty-seven years, until all the pretenders had been vanquished;¹ before 1857 Algeria was not effectually pacified.² Subsequently, in 1871 and again in 1881, serious insurrections occurred.³

The extent of territory over which France at last imposed her authority measures about 620 miles in length from east to west, along the Mediterranean, and stretches some 250 miles or more inland. The area of Algeria is 184,474 square miles, while the Algerian Sahara to the southward, which undoubtedly also in due course will be brought entirely under control, includes 125,000 square miles. The population of Algeria itself is at present 4,430,000, and of the Sahara 50,000 people. Of the total 318,000 are French.⁴ The subject races comprise the Kabyles, inhabiting the mountains of the coast regions; the Arabs, the earlier conquerors of the country; the Moors, meaning the Arabs residing in cities, the Turks, and the Jews. Over this heterogeneous mass the French have finally established their supremacy. The Kabyles were the last to be subdued. Prior to 1857 they had never abjured their independence; and since that date they have constantly been a menace to peace and tranquillity.⁵ Of the details of the mili-

¹ For Abd-el-Kader, cf. Rambaud, 52-54; Flathe, 342 et seq. (Oncken, IV, 2); Guizot, "History of France," VIII, 357-359.

² For this period of warfare, Roy, 234-348.

³ Rambaud, 55-56.

⁴ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 556 et seq.

⁵ For some account of the Kabyles, cf. De Lanessan, 19 et seq.; Rambaud, 71.

tary operations, of the numerous conflicts and stout sieges forming the record of the conquest of Algeria, it is not the purpose here to speak. Suffice it to know that the French were seeking some opportunity for the rehabilitation of their bygone colonial grandeur. Domestic conditions required a field for the display of military prowess, exterior events favored it, and the government availed itself of the propitious conjunction of circumstances.¹

Algeria not only became French by force of arms, but even yet is being more and more modernized and civilized by the absorption of ideas, education, and customs common to the paramount state. Through the gradual, slow-working, but not the less effective, process of fusion, this colony is being strongly welded into the body politic and social of France. It is in this phase of the transformation of the inhabitants from pirates and freebooters into a law-abiding community, that the most interest is felt. How has the task been accomplished? At the time of its occupation the country presented several peculiarities in respect to the possibility of colonization. The method of its acquisition, as well as the existence of a people enjoying a form of civilization, an organized mode of life, a highly developed religion, a system of agriculture, and a theory of landed property, were facts considered as constituting obstacles to the admission of a foreign class assuming to itself the absolute mastery and dictating its decrees.² The French have overcome all these hindrances by a long series of persistent, unremitting efforts.

In the earlier years of the invasion, until 1860, the military power was supreme.³ This rule was marked by incredible severity toward the natives, and by unprecedented cruelty in the warfare waged against the unsubjugated tribes; from 1860 to 1871 was a period of transition, during which

¹ For a French view of the conquest of Algeria contemporaneous in date with this first occupation, cf. De Sismondi, "Pol. Econ." II, 141 et seq.

² For some account of Algeria and its people at the time of the conquest, Roy, 204-233.

³ For a criticism of the early military policy of the French, cf. De Lanessan, 28 et seq.

civil government was introduced in many pacified districts while the latter date signalizes an entire change of régime on the part of France.¹ Upon that occasion a regular administration was inaugurated throughout Algeria, and the military jurisdiction was subsequently limited to the Sahara regions. The policy since then has been little by little to incorporate this whole territory, so far as feasible, into the republic. The French do not any longer regard it as a colony, but rather as an integral portion of the nation.² Algeria is now divided into three departments, each one of which is represented in the French Parliament at Paris by one senator and two deputies; for executive purposes a governor-general lives at Algiers.³

As in other similar French enterprises, immigration was at first placed under official direction; not only were the qualifications exacted of colonists, such as materially to restrict their number, but the procedure adopted was chiefly aimed against voluntary settlers. In 1855 the European residents in Algeria are said not to have exceeded 150,000; thenceforth they increased more rapidly, for in 1865 they were estimated at 235,000. After the Franco-German conflict many Alsations removed thither,⁴ and now the white population of this dependency does not fall far short of 600,000. The Spanish compose the second most important factor. As sanitation progresses throughout the country the proportion of foreigners is destined to augment. In former years the excessive rate of mortality was a serious drawback to extended colonization; but as the new arrivals are becoming better acclimated, and public works are being constructed, this danger is inevitably minimized. For success a large European contingent is not absolutely essential. The French have always evinced the ability to fuse aboriginal races into their midst; in this instance it is the same story. If the Kabyles and

¹ Rambaud, 84-87; De Lanessan, 43-44.

² "Annual Cyclopædia" (1891), 313; (1893), 328.

³ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 556.

⁴ De Lanessan, 43-46; Johnston, 49.

Arabs can be brought, as already in a certain degree accomplished, into a peaceful, tranquil state, taught the customs and habits of life in civilized communities, and instructed in the necessity and reward of systematic labor, then a very small body of whites will suffice for the tasks of organization, supervision, and management. Such are the ultimate conditions which France wishes to see prevail. The happy mean of commercial and economic prosperity will be attained by the skilful amalgamation of the European and indigenous elements.¹

One of the greatest difficulties to be solved by the French government, after its occupation of Algeria, was the land question. The only parcels of the soil strictly at its disposal were the confiscated estates of the exiled Dey. All other property, belonging to the tribes, was more or less under cultivation. Still, on the other hand, individual ownership did not exist; hence acquisition by purchase was well-nigh impossible. An explanation of the solution of this problem would be tedious and impracticable; a method at once equitable to the natives and advantageous to the French has nevertheless been found.² The significance of the result is evidenced by the statement that the colonists engaged in agricultural pursuits count more than 200,000, not to mention the 3,400,000 Algerians likewise employed.

The speedy development of Algeria may be judged from the following figures: In the year after the conquest the total value of foreign commerce was \$1,600,000; in 1850, \$2,600,000; in 1860, \$31,400,000; in 1870, \$60,000,000; in 1880, \$78,400,000; in 1890, \$99,000,000; and in 1898, \$117,600,000 in round numbers. The principal products are grain, wine, fruit, and vegetables; cattle raising is also a leading industry. As may be presumed, most of the transactions are with France. More than three-fourths of the import and eleven-twelfths of the export trade (\$58,011,941 and \$48,420,000 respectively) is

¹ Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Algerie et la Tunisie."

² For details, cf. De Lanessan, 50; Leroy-Beaulieu, 357-386; the French legislation in this particular is modelled after the Torrens Act of Australia, cf. *post.* II, Ch. XXI.

with the parent state. Algeria has cost the metropolis enormous sums; from 1830 to 1890 the disbursements for this colony were \$1,000,000,000, while at present it still receives about \$15,000,000 per annum. The budget for 1900 shows approximately revenue \$11,000,000; expenditures, \$14,400,000. Since 1860 the larger share of the disbursements has been for the erection and extension of public improvements. Highways, railroads, and telegraphs have been built, harbors deepened, lighthouses constructed, and cities sanitarized. The length of railways in Algeria exceeds 2000 miles, and there are more than 5000 miles of telegraph lines. In the matter of intellectual advancement, France has been equally attentive. A thorough course of graded instruction has been elaborated. About 1000 primary schools exist, and the entire educational system is crowned by a Franco-Arab college at Algiers. The judiciary is also well organized, and the policy of local self-government is fostered.¹

Generally speaking, the native races within Algeria proper are now completely pacified. Regular and lucrative employment has worked its inevitable effect on the former nomadic tribes. The control of 3,275,000 fierce, proud, strong-minded, courageous people has not been an easy task, but France accepted unflinchingly the labor, and may now justly claim, after a period of seventy years, to have accomplished her purpose. Many have been the moments of irresolution, vacillation, and despair; still, in the end, the triumph due to perseverance, energy, wisdom, and self-sacrifice has been won. This colony may now be cited as a model dependency; an establishment which, indeed, merits its incorporation into the national domain; for, in spite of the prosperity which it has already attained, it is yet only on the threshold of its career. To France of the future its importance and value, both in an economic and political aspect, are incalculable.

Tunis, which forms to the eastward the natural prolongation of Algeria, has an area of 51,000 square miles, and a

¹ For further statistical data, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 556-560.

population approximating 1,700,000 inhabitants. Its territory includes the site of ancient Carthage, which subsequently became the granary of Rome. The history of the region, as one of the Barbary States, is, prior to this century, not dissimilar to that of Algiers; but in more recent times, under the pressure of the European powers, the Bey endeavored to introduce reforms in the government, as well as in the conduct of his subjects.¹ After the conquest of Algeria, French influence was predominant, although the opportunity for creating a closer relationship, more tangible in its nature, did not for many years arise.² Finally, in 1881, France, ostensibly with the sole intent of securing an indebtedness, forced the Bey to acknowledge her protectorate.³ This change practically signaled the transformation of Tunis into a French colony. The administration is, in fact, in the hands of a cabinet composed — with a single exception — of French representatives, who act under the direction of a bureau of Tunisian affairs at Paris.⁴ The aim steadily held in view is the eventual annexation of Tunis on a plan resembling that applied to Algeria.⁵

The country, by reason of its former unity, and because of its vast agricultural resources, bids fair to be much less expensive and more valuable than its neighbor. It was in the first instance peaceably acquired. Until the present not any advances have been made on its account, while, on the other hand, considerable profits have been realized from its commerce. From the period just preceding the inauguration of French rule to the year 1896 the annual trade increased three-fold. The total of all transactions — mostly with France — was in 1898 nearly \$23,000,000, of which a little more

¹ Among other things he renounced piracy and Christian slavery, cf. Rambaud, 435.

² For the gradual growth of French influence in Tunis, cf. Norman, 276.

³ Rambaud, 140; Norman, 284; for the treaty in full, "Annual Cyclopædia" (1881), 309; (1883), 358-359; (1896), 297.

⁴ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 573 et seq.

⁵ For a comparatively brief account of affairs and conditions in Tunis, cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, 467-518.

than \$12,500,000 were for imports, and nearly \$10,500,000 for exports.¹

In Tunis France found a docile, patient people, many of them well educated and ready to accept whatever benefits the protectorate could bestow upon them.² Under these conditions the modification of the system of government, the construction of public works, and the reorganization of the judiciary, the finances, and public instruction, have not been very difficult. Compared with the record in Algeria, progress has been much more rapid. In fifteen years (1881-1896) almost as great results in moral and civic development had been achieved as during fifty years in the adjoining possession. The future of this region is manifest. In the course of time, incorporation with France, under the style of one or more departments, is unavoidable, when there will be for Tunis a common equality of rights, privileges, and obligations with Algeria, and for France another inalienable stronghold to round out her realms in North Africa.

Before abandoning the consideration of modern French colonization to the southward of the Mediterranean, let it finally be remarked how many lessons may be drawn from these experiences. Algeria presents an unique example of colonial effort. Tunis promises to offer enlightenment upon the method of foreign administration under the form of a protectorate. The details in both cases deserve the attention of those concerned in semi-tropical climes. Were it not for want of space, a thorough study of their varied economic, social, and political aspects might here be practically made; to the full appreciation of the obstacles encountered and the task accomplished, such an investigation is highly essential. In this general outline, however, it is only possible to encourage those interested in the subject to its further and more scientific examination.³

¹ For statistics, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 573 et seq.

² For a description of the inhabitants, cf. Rambaud, 159-162.

³ For French form of government in tropical colonies, cf. Ireland, "Tropical Colonization," 71 et seq.; partially quoted, *supra*, p. 436, note 3.

Napoleon III was always chagrined at the insignificance of French power in the Orient. Inspired by the desire to acquire for France dominions sufficient to indemnify those lost in India during the previous century, he was constantly on the watch for a favorable chance to execute his designs. In 1858 the occasion arose. The Christians had been established in Cochin-China since the seventeenth century, but, after the accession of the Emperor Tu Duc to the throne of Annam, had, because of his personal spite, been subjected to extreme cruelty. Persecution had become habitual, and many massacres had occurred. France and Spain united in 1858 in sending an expedition to the defence of these tortured and terrified believers. Some little success was gained, but, the war with China intervening, the decisive blow to Tu Duc was not given until 1861.¹ At the close of these hostilities France retained several provinces under the name of Cochin-China. In 1863 this territory was extended by the occupation of Cambodia;² in 1883-1885 by the subjugation, after a hard struggle, of Annam;³ in 1884-1893 by the seizure of Tonquin and Laos; and, at length, in 1896 by the annexation of a portion of Siam.⁴ In all probability French influence in this locality is destined to still greater growth. As conditions now are, Cochin-China has an area of 23,160 square miles, with a population of 2,323,499 people; Cambodia, 40,530 square miles, with 1,500,000 inhabitants; Annam, 88,780 square miles, with 2,000,000 to 6,000,000 individuals; and Tonquin (including Laos — a part of Siam), 210,370 square miles, with 13,500,000 residents. The entire area under French control is 363,027

¹ Rambaud, 482-483.

² For the protectorate over Cambodia, cf. Rambaud, 484; De Lanessan, 93-112.

³ The treaty signed at Hué, August 25, 1883, established a French protectorate over Annam and Tonquin, Rambaud, 497; De Lanessan, 112-135; for a brief historical review and an account of the French expedition of 1883, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1883), 763-770. Chinese opposition, however, developed and the campaigns of 1884-1885 followed before the French were in unmolested possession. The final treaty was dated June 9, 1885; cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1884), 137-143; (1885), 24-31, 171-173.

⁴ For the war of 1893, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1893), 687-690; for the convention of 1896, *ibid.* (1896), 702-703.

square miles, containing 22,679,100 human beings. The total commerce of these dependencies amounted in 1898 to approximately \$45,600,000, of which \$25,100,000 were for exports and \$20,500,000 for imports. Of the former the share of France was more than one-quarter, and of the latter less than one-half. The British and the Germans are the leaders in the import trade, while the export business and domestic transactions are largely handled by the Chinese.¹

These colonies, essentially acquisitions by conquest, are properly commercial outposts. Their characteristic feature is the absence of French settlers; for example, in Cochin-China, with its 2,000,000 inhabitants, there are scarcely 3000 Frenchmen; and the most of them are official functionaries or soldiers. As in the olden days, France finds it well-nigh impossible, notwithstanding every effort, to induce her children to emigrate. In Cambodia, Annam, and Tonquin the form of rule is a protectorate; they, together with the colony of Cochin-China, were in 1887 united, under the designation of Indo-China, into a customs union, with a governor-general, residing at Saigon, *as the chief delegate of French power.² Each of these possessions is also represented in the French Parliament. The prime object of the administration is to promote mercantile relations with France. As evident from the figures already cited, these attempts have thus far failed.

The French government, by its assiduity in opening these regions to foreign intercourse, is performing a Herculean task. In time the rewards of this labor will probably be reaped; but even if it happen that the direct returns escape France, the nation will, for its energy, still merit the thanks of mankind. Railroads, transport lines, and industries of all kinds are being rapidly introduced and developed. The fertility of the country is extraordinary. Rice, Indian corn, tobacco, vegetables, and tropical fruits are staple products; cotton, tea, coffee, and sugar are also cultivated; mines of coal, antimony,

¹ For statistics, cf. "Statesman's Year Book (1900), 553-556.

² For the history of the Indo-Chinese union of 1887, cf. Rambaud, 561; "Annual Cyclopædia" (1888), 351.

and precious metals abound.¹ The prospect therefore for material progress is most flattering. The two great problems which France must solve are the maintenance of tranquillity among the native populations, and the necessary immigration of her citizens in sufficient numbers properly to promote and manage the vast resources which these districts contain. As in Algeria, likewise here, the administration has formulated plans of immense magnitude for the construction of works of public utility, as well as for the organization of the local judiciary, instruction, and finance. Every element of success exists; the framework is there in detail, only the principal actors are lacking. It remains with the French people to decide whether they will accept the magnificent present prepared for them. In the event of their apathy, the authorities must determine by experience whether they can advantageously sustain these enterprises without the active coöperation of the masses; or if this mighty fabric, like so many others erected in the past, must ultimately crumble. Much will naturally depend upon international politics. If France continues at peace with the world, she may be able to hold in check the wonderfully varied races of her widely dispersed realms; if, perchance, by an untoward contingency she should engage in some European war, she might once again be despoiled of all these territories. Situated in every part of the globe, and as sparsely inhabited as they in fact are by individuals of French blood or descent, scarcely the most formidable army and navy could in any outbreak of general hostilities retain them against foes within as well as without. Again, lengthy consideration might be given to the methods, means, aims, and results attained by the Republic in the different branches of colonial policy and system as applied to Indo-China; but mere reference can here be made to the many particulars of theory and practice elaborately described in the numerous works relating to French colonization.²

¹ For some account of the industries, minerals, and commerce of these regions, cf. Rambaud, 583-588.

² For brief account of the French establishments in Indo-China, cf. Leroy-

The other dependencies of France are scattered throughout the seas. The colonies in Oceanica embrace the Marquesas Islands, occupied in 1841; New Caledonia and its appendages, settled in 1854; Tahiti and Moorea (1880); Tubuai and Ravai-vai (1881); Tuamotu and Gambier Islands (1881); the Wallis Archipelago (1887); and some few others of even less consequence. The main purpose in the acquisition of rights in most instances has been to secure suitable naval bases and coaling stations; only New Caledonia and Tahiti have any significance. The total area of French Oceanica is 9220 square miles, with a population of 82,000 souls. New Caledonia has 7700 square miles and 57,000 people. Tahiti and Moorea together measure 650 square miles, and count 12,755 inhabitants. All the others comprise 1060 square miles, and have only 15,580 residents. The commerce of New Caledonia annually amounts to a trifle more than \$3,000,000, of which three-fifths are imports and two-fifths exports; France participates to the extent of one-half. The trade of the remainder of French Oceanica yearly reaches only \$1,100,000 in value, almost equally divided between imports and exports, and in which France has a share of not quite \$160,000.¹

New Caledonia is chiefly noted as the principal penal settlement of France after the partial abandonment of Guiana; but prior to 1870 the number of criminals here exiled was limited; in that year they included 2302 individuals. In 1871 it turned out that the group was selected as the point of transportation for the communists, of whom nearly 4000 were condemned to deportation thither. This event gave a strong impulse to immigration; the whites have since then constantly increased, and now exceed 20,000, nearly all of whom are French or of French descent. These islands still serve as the place of punishment for certain classes of miscreants.* The climate is salubrious and pleasant; the soil, while not

Beaulieu, 556-568; more at length, Norman, "People and Politics," 71-124; and especially De Lanessan, "French Colonization in Indo-China."

¹ For statistics, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 579-581.

² The offenders are divided into three classes, officially known as "trans-portés," "relégués," "déportés," Rambaud, 614.

highly fertile, is productive; the mines are especially rich,¹ and the opportunities for trade are favorable. The question of the day and of the future is the management of the convicts alongside of the free inhabitants; it is the one problem upon the solution of which depends the prosperity of these regions, as well as the happiness of several thousand unfortunate human beings.²

Thus the story of French colonization closes. What judgment can be given? Indeed, the verdict on modern French enterprises is not yet written. French rule over foreign lands may well be said to be for the most part in the transitory stage. In America the record is complete. Little, if anything, can be done by France to revive her prestige on this hemisphere. In Africa good progress has been achieved, while in Asia scarcely the beginnings have been made. The importance of French possessions of every kind at the present moment may be judged from the circumstance that Great Britain alone is superior in the extent and population of her dependencies. The superficie of all French territories outside of Europe, as stated, measures 3,740,756 square miles more or less, and their inhabitants in the aggregate approximate 56,401,860. The annual trade of the colonies, exclusive of Algeria and Tunis, reaches \$116,527,000 in round figures; \$55,305,000 being for their imports and \$61,222,000 for their exports; of the entire amount the share of France is \$55,978,000, of which her imports are valued at \$29,441,000 and her exports at \$26,537,000. Including Algeria and Tunis the total volume adds up \$245,951,000 (\$160,295,000 for France), of which exports \$120,085,392 (\$80,891,684 to France); imports \$125,865,651 (\$79,403,515 from France). It is worthy of note that the larger proportion of French colonial transactions, strictly speaking (without those of Algeria

¹ Rambaud, 620; for results accomplished in New Caledonia, cf. De Lanèssan, 659-665.

² For some account of French Oceanica and New Caledonia, cf. briefly Leroy-Beaulieu, 568-583; Payne, 367 et seq.; and other works already cited; for statistical data, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" and "Annual Cyclopædia" for recent years.

and Tunis), is under the control of competitors — a palpable proof of the fact that capital, when properly managed and wisely directed, is now a more potent element in newly opened districts than the mighty armies of the ancient world.¹ Money is playing a great rôle in the development of vast realms and in their retention under a permanent, peace-abiding administration. In 1900 France estimated the expenditures for the colonies, aside from those for Algeria, at the sum of \$19,000,000, and expected to receive \$940,000 from them.²

To have effected these results since 1830, in view of the few dilapidated fragments of the former colonial domain, then recently recovered, is certainly a work of which the French people may be proud. While these achievements are not yet by any means final, the foundation is well laid for the subsequent erection of the superstructure. The remarkable method and tact of France during this era are peculiarly exemplified by the representation in the national Parliament granted to the majority of the colonies. It is a prophetic sign; it demonstrates that the prevailing policy aims at the federation of the weaker members of the body politic around the predominant state, rather than the utter subjugation of vast territories and numerous races to the autocratic dictatorship of some distant and unsympathetic power.³

Whatever be the opinion of the details of French rule, it must be conceded that the doctrines of to-day constitute a decided improvement over the theories of the old system. North Africa, Madagascar, and Indo-China are now the principal centres of French influence. With the exercise of due skill, prudence, perseverance, and intelligence these regions should, by their progress, become typical reproductions of France. Time alone will determine; let it not be forgotten that even thus in the middle of the eighteenth century,

¹ The statement should nevertheless be made that the percentage of the total trade of all the possessions controlled by France is gradually increasing.

² Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 550 and "Annual Cyclopædia" (1899), 294.

³ *Supra*, p. 436, note 3; Ireland, "Tropical Colonization," 73 et seq.

France had in North America and East India visions of absolute empire. How they faded! What catastrophe within fifty short years fell upon the nation and its possessions! It must be with deep regret that French statesmen of this age reflect upon the disasters of the past. May it be with the wisdom gained from the experience of their forefathers that they weigh the difficulties of the present and approach the perplexities of the future. Liberty and exemption from paternalism are the crying needs of French colonization. Let France have the courage to remodel the administration of her colonies, to liberate them from red tape officialism, and to give them their local independence. With these essential reforms, drawing in their wake so many minor ameliorations, permanent prosperity will be assured.

NOTE.—In April, 1898, China leased to France for ninety-nine years the Bay of Kwang-Chau-Wan, on the Lien-Chau peninsula, opposite the island of Hainan; in November, 1899, two islands at the entrance of the bay were included in this arrangement. All are under the jurisdiction of the governor-general of Indo-China.—“Statesman’s Year Book” (1900), 458.