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PART - A

THE ANCIENT MARINER—AN EXPOSITION

By

Sri M. V. SEETARAMAN

The poem deals with characters belonging to three distinct but mutually interacting worlds of experience – this normal world, the world of the supernatural and Heaven. The Mariner, the shipmates, the Hermit, the Pilot with his boy and the creatures of the Sea are of this earth. The South Polar Spirit, 'Life-in-death' and 'Death' in the Spectre-ship, the angels, and the two Spirits in Part VI are the denizens of the intermediate region of the Supernatural. God and Mary Queen reign in Heaven beyond the zone of the Supernatural. But then, only God has created the Earth with its human and sub-human creatures, the middle region of the Spirits and His own home of Heaven. All created beings and creatures are then children of God, the 'Father in Heaven'. The right and true relationship among the children is one of Love. God is the centre of all life and the creatures are but points in the circumference. Every man must love his fellow-creatures only because God made and loves them. Love is the Sacred law which binds the universe. The essence of Virtue is this love. Its opposite is Sin. Sin breaks the Sacred law of Love and the Sinner makes *himself* the centre of the universe and reduces all the creatures of God including *God Himself* as points in the circumference. He then considers all things and persons as existing for his sake. If any thing or person goes against his will or thwarts his purpose and causes him pain he does not hesitate to destroy it or him. If virtue springs from Theocentrism (God-centredness), Sin has its roots in Ego-centrism. But none who has violated

the Sacred law can go scot-free. According to the degree of one's Sin, one is punished by God. Virtue is as surely rewarded as Sin is punished. This punishment or reward is doled out by God either by direct intervention or indirectly through the medium of the Supernatural Spirits. His will works even through what may appear as chance to mortals. (cf. *Play at Dice* in Part III.) This direct intervention goes by the name of Grace. If ego-centrism reaches an extreme form of absolute callousness it is punished with death. If it is attended with or followed by a qualm of conscience which feels for the Sin, it can be expiated by repentance, suffering and prayer. Then the soul can be redeemed. The *Ancient Mariner* is a sinner with a conscience. Though he killed the albatross in a fit of ego-centric impulse, he feels subsequently for the enormity of the crime and therefore shows himself fit to be redeemed. God punished him through Life-in-Death and the South-Polar Spirit. When he begins to love the creatures of the sea and prays to God, He rewards him directly by sending gentle sleep and refreshing rain, and indirectly by making the good angels produce soothing melodious music and steer the ship off the dangerous waters and again by making the Hermit meet him and shrive him. Per contra, the Shipmates do not think in terms of Sin at all but only in terms of Self-gratification. According to them, the bird must be allowed to live only if it does them good. They are not at all against the killing of the bird as such. Such extreme ego-centrism which applauds the action of the A. M. is justly punished with Death. The A. M. has a moral awakening; but the shipmates are too much engrossed with themselves to think of the moral implications of the act of killing the albatross. The shipmates are introduced to represent the type of Sinner without conscience and serve as a contrast to the Mariner. The focus is certainly on the Mariner and his experience. The poem may therefore be said to embody the growth or the evolution of an ordinary impulsive sailor into a moral and finally a religious being by passing through a moral crisis and penance. 'It is a tale of crime, punishment, penance, expiation and redemption.' The central experience of the A. M.—the penance and purgation—happens in a state when the Supernatural impinges on the Natural ordinary world. So the poem moves from this world to that state when the Supernatural intervenes—we shall call it the Supernatural atmosphere—and returns once again to the ordinary world. The Supernatural is not developed for its own

sake but brought in only to make the A. M. do his penance and become fit for redemption. Once that conversion is made the A. M. and we are brought to this world. A critical analysis of the poem must show this double movement in experience and atmosphere. The movement in experience is the evolution of the A. M. The movement in atmosphere is the movement towards and from the Supernatural.

II

This movement in atmosphere—to make the Supernatural natural to bring ‘the willing suspension of disbelief which constitutes the essence of Poetic faith’—that is the problem which Coleridge squarely faces and solves. Let us see how he does it.

III

Part I is the exposition of the human drama of the poem. We are introduced here to the Ancient Mariner with his strange personality. The word ‘ancient’ is suggestive not merely of the old age of the mariner but also throws the halo of antiquity on him. He is not ‘modern’ though he lives in this modern world. He has the outlook on life and sensibilities of people belonging to the bygone past. He has a natural opening to experiences based on faith. Modernity with its rationalism has not invaded his being and therefore scepticism in regard to things occult and supernatural has neither touched him nor shut him from these hidden worlds. Again he is ‘ancient’ in his uncivilized and discourteous behaviour. He is, if you like, lacking in good manners. Does he not stop one of the three gallants unceremoniously? The mariner is not only ‘ancient’ but he is strange. His very physical features—long grey beard, glittering eye and skinny hand—bear the stamp of one who has moved in a bizarre or weird atmosphere of occult and supernatural vibrations and of one who has passed through an almost soul-shattering psychological crisis in his life. His eyes with their hypnotic power and unearthly glitter mark him out as an authentic seer of strange worlds and stranger soul-stirring experiences. To see him and hear his words—simple, bare but charged with the power of naked truth—is to believe him. Coleridge, by making the A. M. himself tell his story, has solved the problem of credibility by more than half. But

he is not content with this. He is bent upon dissolving the least shadow of resistance on the part of the reader. This he does by the introduction of the gallant wedding-guest, who is next of kin to the bridegroom. The wedding-guest is representative of a fashionable modern gentleman (a gallant) in a mood of light-hearted joviality and excitement (about to attend a marriage feast.) If this man will listen to the story and believe it, who will not? Part I shows the resistance on the part of the guest slowly diminishing and finally dissolving completely. We see this happening in three stages. In the first stage the resistance is the maximum. The guest is anxious to go to the feast and when the A. M. holds him with his skinny hand he cries 'Hold off; unhand me, grey-beard loon!'. He has to be kept spell-bound by the hypnotic power of the mariner's glittering eye. He listens to the tale not spontaneously or whole heartedly but because he cannot but do so. In the second stage the resistance has diminished to a certain extent but he has not yet forgotten his feast. For, when he hears the loud bassoon he beats his breast. Yet he cannot choose but hear. In the third stage, as the Ancient Mariner warms up and narrates the strange course of the ship, taken by a blast to the South Polar Region and the sudden intrusion of the albatross creating pangs of agony in the narrator, the wedding-guest has forgotten the wedding, entered into the spirit of the story and he even begins to sympathise with him and asks "God save thee, Ancient Mariner! from the fiends that plague thee thus!-Why look'st thou so?" Henceforward, there is a spontaneous, whole-hearted acceptance of the tale and an active participation in the moods of horror and agony evoked by the words of the A. M.

Again the gradual introduction of the Supernatural makes the reader believe in it. In Part I we start from an obscure part in the known world (a village harbour) and reach a remote or strange part of this world (The South Polar region) passing through the equatorial climate driven by a storm blast. In that strange region we see a strange bird, Albatross behaving in a very strange manner. Now, the Albatross seems to be half-way housed between this world and the world of the Supernatural. In that desolate region, it has made its mysterious appearance and acted as a kind host, a christian soul coming at the time of vespers. The bird does not belong to the human beings. It belongs to and is the favourite of the strange inhabitants of that region. Its slayer will certainly be avenged by

them. The albatross points beyond itself to the world of the supernatural and prepares us by its strangeness to the advent of stranger things and creatures.

Also, it is in this part that the crime is committed. The enormity of the crime is increased by the description of the bird as a christian soul with a sense of charity or love for fellow creatures. For the bird has come only to relieve the sense of loneliness felt by the mariners in that region and to give them a most cordial welcome. The crime, therefore, is so serious that it must move one to the depths if one has only a moral conscience.

Part II begins with a description of the attitude of the fellow-mariners to the crime (Stanza 5). They first curse the mariner for having killed the bird. But when the fog clears they feel happy and congratulate the Mariner on having killed the bird. Not the morality but the utility of a thing or action is their standard in life. This is the most extreme form of egocentrism. The shipmates therefore become worse sinners than the A. M. Sin, we must remember, is more a question of attitude than of act. Contrast the mariner who says, 'And I had done a hellish thing'. He does not justify his action. On the other hand, he feels the sense of loneliness and desperate isolation which every sinner with a conscience feels. The second section of Part II (Stanzas 6-14) gives the first stage in the punishment of the sinners. We see first the disharmony of the psychological act of sin reflected in the ugliness, awful silence of Nature. The ship is becalmed, the sea is dreadfully silent and the crew undergo by day the pain of extreme heat and unquenchable thirst and the sight of ugly slimy things (6-10). Nor are they left in peace at night (11-14). Before sleep they see the dance of death-fires and waters burning green, blue and white. And during sleep, they dream of the South Polar Spirit plaguing them by following them nine fathom deep. The mariner feels his isolation and the shipmates symbolically enough hang the albatross round his neck. Once again note how callous the shipmates are. They conveniently forget their moral ineptitude and throw all the blame on the A. M. by casting evil looks on him. They never for a moment think that the cause of their suffering may be within themselves. Earlier, they traced their suffering to a bird. Now, they hold the A. M. responsible for it. They are just incapable of thinking in terms of morality. They represent a different type of

sinner from the A. M. This prepares us for the two different kinds of punishment described in Part III. Again it prepares us by the suggestion of the strange colours for the advent of the Supernatural things and beings in Part III.

The mariner becomes totally different from his shipmates in another respect. Whereas they live on the surface without any deeper feeling, he has been stirred to the very depths of his being because of his conscience awakening and feeling for the murder he has committed. And it is a psychological fact that the more we go and live inward the more is the power of vision developed. For the inner levels of a man's being are also planes of vision. The deepest being in man is the soul or the psychic and if one succeeds in living from it one has the vision of God. But in between the deepest being and the surface being there are many number of layers. We shall call them together 'the deeper being' in man. Now this deeper being sees the occult, supra-physical beings — the denizens of the supernatural world. The ancient Mariner has an opening to this deeper being of his because of the depth of his feeling and hence his vision in Part III of the supernatural spirits. It is very significant that the shipmates with their shallow superficial life do not see anything. Mind you, this power of vision is different from the subjective fancies conjured up by a brain-sick man or his imagination. In these states of vision, the objects one sees have an objective reality. Only, they are objects belonging to a different order of existence, a different world.

The first section in Part III (Stanzas 1-13) describes the reactions in the world of the supernatural to the crime and the sinners, as seen by the vision of the A. M. Note the dramatic way of description—its gradualness. As the spectre-ship is coming from a great distance towards the scene in which the crew are, it is seen as a speck, a mist, a shape and then the shape of a sail and finally the delicate, ethereal, unearthly sails like restless gossameres. Note also the breathless expectancy and horror of the A. M. which replace his first hasty cry of joy. The queer construction and movements of the ship prepare us for its strange crew — Death and Life-in-Death and their terrible action of play at Dice for claiming the A. M. as their victim. Life-in-Death wins the A. M. Death gets the others. The second section of Part III (Stanzas 14-17) describes nightfall and the

sudden death of the crew each with a ghastly pang and curse in his eye and the souls whizzing as they pass by the A. M. The isolation of the A. M. from the world of human beings is now complete. He is living in the midst of Death. We see the supernatural in this part as agents for the punishment of sinners.

The terrible play at Dice might give the impression that it was just a matter of chance that Life-in-Death won the mariner. This would go against the argument that the sin of the shipmates deserves Death as surely as the sin of the A. M. Life-in-Death. I mean the inevitability of it or the justice of it is at stake because of this element of chance. But we have to remember that the Divine will fulfills itself in this world and others through a play of possibilities. The will of God works itself here in and through a struggle of forces. We who see only the struggle mistake it for a game of chance. And the wonder is that even the winning force does not consider the victory as God-given but self-earned. Witness the exultation of Life-in-Death by whistling. Life-in-Death is an unconscious instrument of the Will of God. And God can and does act even through our ignorance. It is good to remember in this connection that the supernatural spirits are as much ignorant of their source, the supreme Creator whose unconscious instruments they are, as human beings.

The A. M. is now in the grip of Life-in-Death. She is the Nightmare firstly because her appearance (stanza 11) is so terrifying as a female monster, secondly because of her haunting quality and thirdly because of the inescapable and gripping agony she causes. Part IV continues the description of the agony of the Ancient Mariner in the grip of this Nightmare. If in Part III she caused the isolation from the world of human beings, in Part IV she brings about the isolation from the world of Nature. True to her name, she makes him lead a life practically dead to the world around him of Nature and Human Nature.

The wedding guest, hearing the horrible death of the shipmates and gazing at the spectral figure of the A. M. naturally suspects whether the person before him is a visitant from another region, a ghost or a figure in flesh and blood. He is promptly assured (stanzas 1 and 2) of his physical reality by the A. M. who continues to describe in the next section (stanzas 3-9) his severe loneliness and the consequent agony and inner torture. The

bodies of the crew are preserved by supernatural force so that the A. M. might feel the curse in the dead men's eyes. He can not look at the sea because of the ugly creatures exuding mucus from their bodies. He cannot look to heaven and pray because his heart is dry and choked. Nor can he close his eyes and find peace because then he felt the "balls like pulses beat."

In this excruciating pain of his —physical and psychological— he yearns for an escape and likes to share the glorious motion of the Moon and the Stars in the sky (Stanzas 10 and 11). In this moment of escape there is a feeling of Beauty. With this awakening to beauty, he looks around and sees the panorama of the sea with its water-snakes (12-13). Love which is the response of the heart in man to Beauty has its birth for the first time in the Mariner's bosom. This rejuvenation of the heart makes him share the happiness of creatures and feeling the gush of love he blesses them. This movement of the heart, the A. M. rightly interprets as due to the intervention of the pity of a saint. That helps him to pray in all sincerity when the spell breaks and the albatross, the symbol of guilt and crime drops into the sea from his neck (Stanzas 14 and 15). The Saints are illumined souls and true children of God who have vowed to kindle the feeling of aspiration and love in the contrite heart which suffers agony. By the charity of these saints and the creative suffering or penance of the A. M. the aspiration is born.

The rest of the poem deals with the action of the Grace of God answering to the sincere prayers of the aspiring soul.

Part V begins the operation of Grace. Mary Queen sends gentle sleep and rain which remove all the physical sufferings of the A. M. (stanzas 1-4). The Mariner then sees magnificent scenes of violent nature — storm at a distance with lightning in the form of sheets and the Moon nestling in a thick black cloud (5-8). The ship itself is not affected by the wind, which scarcely reaches it. But it is moved by the corpses suddenly coming to life (9-12). The Wedding Guest is horrified at this and he is promptly consoled by the A.M. that the bodies were inspired by angelic spirits (13). Thus the Grace of God works to remove him from the dangerous waters. Then again Grace causes wonderful echoing melodious music of all kinds to be played (14-19). This is done obviously to remove the psychological (mental and emotional) disharmony and suffering of the A. M. The South Polar Spirit follows

seeking vengeance still. The ship stops suddenly and then making a sudden bound traverses in an electric speed sending the A. M. into a trance (20-22). In his trance he hears two spirits discussing his fate—the one claiming revenge still for his crime, the other more enlightened and standing higher in rank in the hierarchy of the spirits saying that he has more than half expiated his sin and would continue to do penance and so there is no question of revenge any more (23-26). This confirms what I said in connection with Part III about the play at dice that these spirits are ignorant of the will and Grace of God and think they can continue to have their hold on him.

Part VI continues the action of Grace. The A. M. is still in trance and hears explained to him in the form of the conversation between two voices the calmness of the atmosphere and the supernatural motion of the ship (1-15). The A. M. wakes up when the motion is retarded and feels once again the curse of the dead men and the haunting sense of sin (9-10). For what has happened in the A. M. is a rejuvenation only of his mind and heart. Sin has not only a mental and emotional base but also subconscious roots. An emergence of the subconscious is possible at any time and these roots can be uprooted only by recourse to continuous, conscious prayer calling down the Grace of God to purify the being completely. The A. M. must and does continue to perform penance for this final and total purification. This however is a life-long process. But Grace acts and a sweet wind takes him to the homely harbour cheering him with familiar sights (11-17). Now that their commission is fulfilled, the angelic spirits leave the corpses rewarding the penitent and partially purified and child like A. M. with a *darshan* of their forms of light before vanishing (18-22). But once again, Grace does not leave him in the company of the dead but causes a hermit, a pilot and his boy to row towards the desolate ship of the A. M.

Part VII opens with a description of the Hermit (1 and 2) with his purity, piety and severely ascetic life of charity and prayer. Only such a religious soul is a fit companion for the A. M., who has now become an aspiring religious soul seeking spiritual communion and Grace to wash his sin completely. The boat approaches the ship and the strangeness of the ship strikes the attention of the inmates of the boat (4-7). But the ship of the A. M. with its horrid crew—the last remnant from the supernatural world—

drops down like lead. This world can not certainly receive such a withered ship with its strange commodity. Only the A. M. has been transformed into a religious soul and therefore can be taken in and accepted as a member of the happy minority of aspiring souls. He is saved. And once in the boat, his strange spectral unearthly appearance drives the pilot's boy mad who mistakes him for the very devil (9-12). Having landed, the first thing he wants—the sincere penitent soul he is—is absolution. He asks the Hermit to shrive him. The agony of his soul and body compels him to confess his crime to the Hermit and this gives him freedom (13-15). But the need for confession is felt by him at odd hours and then he catches hold of a man and begins to narrate his tale with its simple but profound message (16-17). The sound of revelry coming from the bridal party is heard by the mariner and he refers to his essential loneliness—life-in-death—which makes him seek the company of religious souls and the place of prayer and communion with God—the church. The sight of the children of God—old men, babes, loving friends, youths and gay-maidens—recognising their Father in Heaven and with mutual charity turning to Him in loving communion and prayerful adoration is heavenly. To join in their prayer is the height of bliss a man can have in this world. Who that has once tasted this Divine Grace and Divine Love and the Peace that passeth all understanding in a state of prayer will leave it for attending the light-hearted excitement of a marriage feast? The A. M. bids farewell to the Wedding Guest but before leaving him he delivers the message extracted from his own bitter life “He prayeth well.....He made and loveth all.” (18-23). The poem ends with the moving description of the Wedding Guest to the strange tale. He first turns from the wedding house. His faculties are paralysed and he undergoes a sea-change in his outlook on life. From the light-hearted fashionable gentleman he changes into a thoughtful, serious and wise man. The Mariner's message of charity and prayer has touched the deepest chord of his being (stanzas 24 & 25).

IV

Much has been written on the moral of the poem. People of the type of Mrs. Barbourd look upon it as a pure creation of fantasy stressing primarily on the supernatural. They do not find any adequate moral at all. On the other hand, we have Coleridge's reply that the moral is too emphatic. Again there are others who consider the moral too sentimental or childish to deserve the attention of a thoughtful reader.

We have seen that the central experience of the poem is essentially moral though the state in which it happens is the supernatural atmosphere. So if at all any poem on earth should embody a moral, this one must. In other words a moral is an artistic necessity for without it the poem would be incomplete. But the moral must be in tune with the character of the experiencer.

The A. M. is 'the most simple and childlike personality possible'. He is so thoroughly unsophisticated that in him we do not find a disparity between his private life and his social life. This division is the essence of sophistication which often goes by the name of civilisation. A villain in his private or inner life may and does successfully conceal his villainy in his outer or social life and poses for the finest bred gentleman. On a lesser scale, you can not afford in civilised life to say what you feel or think about a person in his face. You have to pretend to like a man even when you hate him. We do not, in other words, care to make our outer life an expression of our inner life but suppress the inner in order to maintain the pose of the outer. Each human being is one personality in his inner life (ie. his life independent of relationship, when he is alone) and another, sometimes radically opposite, in his outer life (ie. his life in relationship). The result of this continual suppression is a gradual setting in of the incapacity to feel spontaneously or intensely. The A. M. is unsophisticated and therefore has the power of experience intact. Again he has the quality of sincerity. It is this sincerity and power of feeling which brings about the transformation of an impulsive sailor into a moral and religious soul.

The A. M. is childlike in another sense. In him the power of abstract reasoning or reflection is undeveloped. He is not a thinker moving in a realm of thoughts. Imagination, memory and emotion are the faculties he can command and command as powerfully and intensely as a child. He sees every incident in his life as a vivid picture with details of sensation and emotion. As a matter of fact, the whole poem is in the form of a series of pictures. Generally, when the rational faculty comes into its own, it dominates all the other faculties, converts every experience into a thought which is just a label and is often satisfied with that label. The rational man lives in a world of thoughts which are at one removed from experience. The development of reason more often than not stunts the growth and

restrains the working of the imagination. The A. M. is delightfully free from this vice of intellection. This explains also the absence of logical, connecting thoughts or sentences between one picture and the next. The narration of the A. M. is not the recapitulation of the reflecting mind of his experiences. But he seems to relive his past and describe it as the series of experiences it must have been. As in life, so here, it is the person experiencing and not an idea or thought which knits together all his experiences. Even the rational, sophisticated man, fortunately for him, has a life when this censoring brain-mind stops working and the need for maintaining a social pose is no longer necessary or possible. This is his life in the state of dream. Every man dreaming is just an unsophisticated, nonrational child. The 'Rime of the A. M.' evokes the dream-atmosphere. Incidentally, this evocation suspends our judging, questioning, sceptical, unbelieving intellect and brings about the 'willing suspension of disbelief'. His account has the same dream-like vividness and inconsequence.

Obviously, the moral of such a man can only be in the nature of an experience and his statement of it must be the plainest, absolutely free from any thought—ie. a logically formulated statement but coloured by unsophisticated, elemental, primary and, if you like, even primitive emotions. For 'it is not the thoughts but the extraordinary beauty of rhythm and vividness of vision and fidelity to a certain mystic childlike key that makes it such a wonderful and perfect poem'. The tone of 'the unsophisticated ballad-simplicity and ballad-mentality' of the moral passage is quite in tune with the tone of the rest of the poem. Even the sentimentalism of the 'dear God' is in tune with the character of the A. M. The moral is therefore quite appropriate in its context. Cf. Letters of Sri Aurobindo-Volume III, pp. 325 and 326.



The Forsaken Merman — An Exposition

By

SRI M. V. SEETARAMAN

Arnold has written two poems on the Merman theme. *The Neckan* and *The Forsaken Merman*. Both of them are in the form of chants involving a story. The Neckan laments the lack of kindness in human souls. The Merman bemoans the faithlessness of the mortals. The human wife in both feels that she has no christian mate. But the resemblance of the two poems stops here. For the Neckan is anxious to redeem himself whereas the Merman has no awareness of the soul at all. Again the Neckan has his wife "safe beneath the salt-sea tide". But the Merman is the 'forsaken Merman'. The peculiar state of the Merman, his wife and his children contributes to the pathos in the poem.

The Merman is half-way housed between the animal and the human nature. As an animal he feels the instinctive irresistible call of the sea, his native element. But he has the heart and therefore the emotions of the human being. Hence his ardent longing for companionship and deep grief when forsaken. He is not however a full-blown human being. The higher mental qualities are not seen in him at all. He has memory and imagination—the power of remembering and visualising. But he does not have the power of reflection or thinking. Hence his inconsolable grief. An animal when forsaken by its mate may feel the pang for sometime but soon can and will find another and seek gratification in the new relationship. For on the animal level creatures are not so sharply individualised as they are on the human level. So any one of its kind will satisfy the passion of the animal. But the emotional affinity which unites a man in love with a woman is a marriage and mating of the individually unique elements in both. So the loss of a partner becomes for a man irreparable. There is and can be no substitute for the lost individual. That is precisely the reason why a human being is affected more deeply and lastingly by grief. But the well developed man has evolved a number of escapes from grief. The higher creative imagination urges him to enter the world of Art where everything is in harmony. Even the ugly elements in life which create a discord in actual life contribute to the total harmony in the world of art. Man can forget

himself and his miseries in the pursuit of the beauty of art. Again his intellect can interest itself in the processes of nature and revel in the discovery of their truths. The world of Science is a safe refuge from the turmoil of actual life. Or the higher speculative reason takes all knowledge and all experience as its province, tries to coordinate all the ideas and constructs the temple of philosophy in whose sanctuary it can get the peace that passeth all understanding. Or the soul in man directs him to practise religion, dissolve his separative consciousness and will by communion with its Source and Creator who is also the ordainer of this world and its apparently chaotic events including the cause and occasion of man's grief. The religious mind finds consolation in the idea that man is living in a world created by God where 'His will is done'.

But the Merman is denied all the above privileges of the developed human being. He has the emotions of a man without the outlets of escape or sublimation possible on the human level. Alas! the very powers of the mind which make him half human-Memory and Imagination - only serve to intensify his grief. He tries to visualise the past in an attempt to forget the Present which is a state of conflict. But the Past pushes him back to the Present, for it is only so full of memories of the object of grief. This return to the present charged with painful memories makes the grief still more intense and irreconcilable. The Merman at the beginning of the poem is the same as at the end. The emotional conflict remains unresolved and if anything only becomes more intense at the end.

The poem progresses in three movements with three stanzas in each. The first movement describes the emotional conflict which the Merman faces in the present. The second is an attempt to travel in the layers of the Memory and find consolation which he can never get. It is a description of the past whose revival only brings the Merman back to the Present. The third movement is a more pathetic description of the Poignant Present which promises to be perennial and to repeat itself in and actually become the Future. The first stanza gives a vivid description of the call of the sea to which the animal in the Merman instinctively feels akin. The sea is now angry as it were and before it becomes impossibly turbulent he must listen to the beckoning voice of the fellow mermen and reach his cavern home in the depths of the ocean.

But then he has to listen to the equally imperative call of the affections. He can not draw his heart so easily away from the object of his love. The second stanza describes this call of the affections. He wants the children to make one last fervent appeal.

In the third stanza, we have the attempt of the Merman to resolve this conflict by an apparent and futile resolution. But the desire to have a lingering longing look at the town and the church shows how this resolution is no resolution at all and we know that the emotional conflict is unresolved and also that the Merman can not solve it by facing it. He must and does seek an escape by recollecting the past.

Thus the three stanzas in the first movement picture the sea, the woman and the fruitless action to resolve the conflict. The same pattern of arrangement is adopted in the second and third movements also for the Merman can never get beyond this vicious circle.

Thus stanza 4 gives a graphic visualised picture of the sea-home of the Merman. Stanza 5 of the woman before her departure and stanza 6 the futile action of the Merman to go and call his mate back. That the Merman has no religious awakening becomes clear by his absence of response to the Easter Church bell or the prayers at Church. He is breathless with impatience and agony at his wife's departure and complains of the long prayers they say in the world. All the symbols of religion—church, bell, holy book, priests - so sacred to those who seek communion with the Divine, leave him cold, complaining and wretched. When we come to the end of the second movement the Merman has completed his travel in the chambers of his memory and he discovers the painful emotional conflict of the present still more intensely. The second movement describes therefore the futile but inevitable attempt to bring back the past and by reliving it in imagination derive consolation at least.

Stanza 7 gives a picture of the woman alternating between a feeling of joy at the opportunities of human and spiritual fellowship in her town and a sense of agony when she remembers 'the cold strange eyes of the little

Mermaiden and the gleam of her golden hair.' St. 8 once again speaks of the sea and the home of the Merman. But now the Merman has dwelt so long on the object of his affections that he can not mind exclusively the sea. So we hear the affection and the instinct speaking in one breath and voice in this stanza. St. Nine describes the reconciliation at all possible for the Merman. He can not but come back to the shore to have a lingering loving look at the town which now houses his beloved. This he must do to give at least a momentary satisfaction to his aching heart. At the same time he must return to his element crying his lament on the faithlessness and the cruelty of 'the mortal who left lonely for ever the kings of the sea. This agony and chant must go on for ever till the end of time. Perhaps the chant in the elegiac words is the only outlet for his pent-up emotions. Hence the inevitability of the song about his pathetic lot.

The pathos of the poem arises not only from the character and conduct of the Merman but also from those of the human wife who is an epitome of the human predicament itself. The merman is incapable of realising this predicament and hence his charge of cruelty and faithlessness of the woman. The mortal has deep inlaid in the secret cavern of his inmost heart, an immortal soul which can find peace and delight only in divine love. But he has also a human heart which beats in unison with those who can reciprocate his affection. If man is a spiritual being in his essential nature he is also a being of desires and emotions on the surface and most of us live for a good length of time on the surface allowing the soul to have its perilous slumber. Our life and civilization are one long fatal attempt to smother, stifle and dullen the spirit and gratify the desires. So we love and marry those who can excite us and sensuous exhilaration or emotional delectation is the one factor which cements the life of a couple. The woman in the poem is no exception to this general rule. So she has married and has been happy in her life of love for the husband and the children. But God in his grace calls some souls so slumbering and then comes the spiritual awakening. The Church bell at Easter — a time when in his infinite love the 'Father that is in heaven' descended into this finite world of mortals, took upon himself the heavy accumulated load of collective sin dissolved it in the great Passion, prepared the way for redemption all the time being the son of man and finally gave proof of his divinity by his resurrection — gives the awakening to the woman. The call of God is

imperative and can not be weighed against any other consideration. I say *cannot* and not *should not* for when one has become the spirit one can only obey its voice. For the still small voice of the slumbering soul becomes the irresistible imperative voice of thunder when the soul wakes up. The deep seeks the deep. The awakened soul seeks the communion of saints which is the Church and forsakes the company of the rest for they can not give what it seeks. On the other hand it will lose itself and face perdition which is worse than death. The woman in such circumstances will have to renounce even a human husband whose soul is slumbering. No wonder the woman in the poem leaves the sea and the Merman and the children and sings in joy at human and spiritual fellowship. When all is said and done, the Merman is only a half human creature. The spiritual call can not brook delay and she can not wait for the merman to get a soul and then get an awakening. We have already seen how the Merman has no such awareness at all. But alas ! the woman is as much tied to her heart as she is now yoked to the spirit. So she is always having an unresolved conflict—the conflict between the call of the spirit which sings a song of joy at being with the symbols and environment for its redemption and the call of the heart in her which feels agony and heaves ‘a long long sigh for the little mermaiden.’ The pity is that the woman is neither quite happy in her home nor can she be happy back in the sea-home. Her situation is the human predicament which springs from the very nature of man who has a double and conflicting consciousness - an inner spiritual and a surface emotional. The awakened man can not afford to pass the judgment of being cruel on her but would feel the essentially pathetic situation in which she is found in the poem. Only the divine love and grace can resolve her conflict and convert her pathos into a paeon of joy.

The forsaken children in the company of a father essentially inconsolable and perpetually at grief heighten the pathos very much.

We may conclude this exposition by saying that the elegiac genius of Arnold has reached its peak point of perfection in that the music of the poem is in tune with the world of pathos created by the poet.

Arnold's aim in writing the poem is just to give a picture of the half-human pathos of the Merman and the human pathos of the human wife. In this world of pathos it will be a sacrilege to hunt for a specific moral. The

poem is the least didactic and this adds to its charm. The intellectual element in Arnold's genius does not intrude and break the beautiful crystal that the poem is.

Arnold's personality is essentially that of a man in the throes of a conflict. He has not succeeded in his life in integrating the conflicting elements and getting the peace that his soul has been longing for so that it is not wrong to say that Arnold has put himself into the poem. The central soul of Arnold has found its voice in this poem of conflict and pathos. You meet the same Arnold in ' The Scholar-Gipsy ' and ' Thyrsis '.



The Substance of Tragedy

A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LITERATURE.

I

ABHIJNANA SHAKUNTALAM

By

SRI K. B. SITARAMAYYA

“Nataka is the most beautiful of literary forms and *Shakuntalam* is the most beautiful of natakas” is a well known saying. It is perhaps useful to remember that “Nataka” in Sanskrit is not any Drama but that special variety which deals with a well-known and highly placed hero and with a theme of love or heroism. A certain high seriousness is expected and love and heroism as depicted in “Natakas” involve conflict and loss. If further more the suffering and loss bring about a regeneration and a new life we get a transcendent kind of ‘tragedy’ which is peculiar to Sanskrit Drama. In this special variety of Drama, *Shakuntalam* has been accorded the highest place. The reason is not far to seek.

Here we see a truly Indian and a complete vision of Life. We have three planes of Reality: the unfallen state of the Garden of Eden in the Kanwa-Ashrama, the ordinary world of affairs and action of the King and his court, and the “Tapoloka” of the Marichi’s Ashrama on the way to Indra’s court. Durvasa’s curse represents a great spiritual force, like the quarrels brought about by Narada elsewhere, (and even Narada is mentioned by Dushyanta in Act VI) which disturbs and destroys one kind of stability and order so that a newer and greater order and stability may be created. Indra, Menaka and other divinities take part in the great work of the founding of the new race of Bharata and as in *Uttararamacharitam* sages and divinities know from the very beginning as to how things will turn out ultimately. We see in *Sakuntalam* as in the other play a disharmony leading to a greater kind of harmony. In the process of the creation of the new harmony, in the building up of the personalities, there is much breaking down, much suffering and waste. These are not cancelled and when Sakuntala can pride herself in being the

foundress of the race, what she has suffered has not been made good. Hence, the tragic experience of the play.

The planes of the unfallen state and the sphere of action clash in the first part of the play and the clash along with the curse would have led to a sorrowful ending if a call from Indra's court had not taken Dushyanta to Marichi's Ashrama.

Dushyanta is introduced to us as hunting deer and he is engrossed in it even as the *Sutradhara* is engrossed in the "gita raga" as sung by the actress. From deer to deer-like Shakuntala (and the poet more than once brings home the parallel), from *raga* to *anuraga* the transition is easy. But we must not also miss the delicate and subtle suggestions of various kinds of conflict which do not take a serious turn till the sudden fall of the thunderbolt of the curse of Durvasa who seems to come from some unknown place and return to some unknown place.

First there is the impression of speed: the fast movement of the chariot in chase:

यदालोके सूक्ष्मं व्रजति सहसा तद्विपुलतां
यदद्वे विच्छिन्नं भवति कृतसंधानमिव तत् ।
प्रकृत्या यद्वक्रं तदपि समरेखं नयनयोः
न मे दूरे किञ्चित् क्षणमपि न पार्श्वे रथजवात् ॥

We soon pass from speed to tranquillity, not indeed the tranquillity of the Timeless; for that we must wait till the last Act. Here we have Time in a slow motion.

It is necessary to form a clear picture of the Kanwa-ashrama as presented by Kalidasa in the play fully even now. It is a place, certainly, of aspiration. Kanwa, like other seers, has powers of insight and comes to know of Sakuntala's repudiation. A divine voice, earlier in the play, tells him about the Gandharva marriage of Sakuntala and Dushyanta. The blessing of Vaikhanasas that Dushyanta will have a heroic son proves true. These are the divine powers. But in the absence of Kanwa, the Rakshasas trouble the inmates of the Ashram. Kanwa has foreseen a calamity for Sakuntala and must propitiate the gods. Kanwa, in spite

of all his detachment, is affected, at least for a moment, by Sakuntala's departure. The values that Kanwa preaches are practical and his conception of relations between father and daughter, husband and wife, is human. Life as a whole seems to be ethical and religious than spiritual and mystic.

There is also another side : the plants and birds and beasts live not "in the awe of Man " but as the brothers and sisters of the inmates of the Ashram. There is simplicity, innocence and purity and surely Kanwa Ashrama is a true Garden of Eden. It is more than the Garden of Eden. When Sakuntala gets the sex-feeling for the first time she knows it to be not proper for the place.

Sakuntala, who lives in this place, is the daughter of an Apsaraas and a King-turned-Saint who falls for a moment. Among her duties and pleasures are tending and watering of the gardens. She is also to receive guests as Vaikhanasas tell Dushyanta. We must not forget that the immediate cause of Durvasa's curse was her not fulfilling this duty. Her life, delightful to herself, appears hard even to her loving friends and of course to the King brought up in a different atmosphere.

Her friends themselves are bright intelligent girls who have known about dress from pictures and about sex from books. They, along with the plants and creepers, birds and beasts, contribute to the tranquillity and the joy of the Ashram and to the happiness of Sakuntala.

It is to such an idyllic life of aspiration, not untouched by human limitations and anxieties that Dushyanta enters. We stress this aspect of Kanwa-Ashrama to be able to understand later the nature of Marichi's Ashrama where we have fulfilment. It transcends human limitations.

Dushyanta is a great Paurava King who is the friend of Indra and who is visited by the *tri-loka-sanchari* Narada, a great Kshatriya whose intuition speaks true and who errs only when his mind is clouded by the curse of Durvasa. He respects saints and seers and is ready to protect holy life. A faithful son, a good friend, a sympathetic lover, a loving King calling himself kinsman of all his subjects, he is in all respects a perfect man. He, therefore, represents, the best of this life, the every-day world. That such a man should love an innocent girl living in a perfect Eden, though by no means wrong and from one point of view even necessary, is yet fraught with dangers and difficulties.

His intuition may not fail him :

असंशयं क्षत्रपरिग्रहक्षमा यदार्यमस्याभिलाषि मे मनः ।
सतां हि सन्देहपदेषु वस्तुषु प्रमाणमन्तःकरणप्रवृत्तयः ॥

Sakuntala's desire for Dushyanta may also be appropriate :

सागरं वर्जयित्वा कुत्र वा महानद्यवतरति ?

Yet the words of Kanwa bring out the truth better. The choice is right. There is still an element of blindness in it :

दिष्ट्या धूमावरुद्धदृष्टेरपि यजमानस्य पापक एवाहुतिर्निपतिता

And even if Dushyanta remembered Shakuntala and took her to his palace it would not be easy for her to live that artificial life unknown to her both in birth and breeding. And even if she could adjust herself to the life as promised in Kanwa's advice to her, it would be a dull and drab routine with not much life for one like her :

शुश्रूषस्व गुरून्, कुरु प्रियसखीवृत्तिं सपत्नीजने
पत्युर्विप्रकृतापि रोषणतया मा स्म प्रतीपं गमः ।
भूयिष्ठं भव दक्षिणा परिजने भाग्येष्वनुत्सेहिनी
यान्त्येवं गृहिणीपदं युवतयो वामाः कुलस्याधयः ॥

What is it, then, we see in the relations of Sakuntala and Dushyanta from all this ? One is an *Apsara-sambhava* and also a child of a *Rajarishi*. The other is a great Paurava king and friend of Indra. They are therefore born for one another. Their mutual love is not only natural but even proper. Yet the very circumstance of Sakuntala being brought up in an innocent manner amidst idyllic surroundings renders her unfit for the artificial life of the court. It is to solve this situation and it is to make Sakuntala and Dushyanta and their lives useful to themselves and to the world that Durvasa's curse comes on the pretext of Sakuntala's neglect of her duties of hospitality.

If we look upon the events thus we are nearer to Kalidasa's view than if we regard the story as a tale of crime and punishment. There is no crime or sin, nor is there any punishment. If we should speak of any punishment for Sakuntala it should be for her *praktana-karma* rather than any committed here. We can even say she pays for her father's folly. How can there be any sin in one who is not a mortal child at all? Her very association with deer makes her as innocent as they. The fact of the matter is that the divine order can be fulfilled not as things stand but after a violent shaking of all. After all, as we have seen already, Kanwa Ashrama is the seat of aspiration. For fulfilment they must be taken to Marichi's Ashrama. And Sakuntala can go there only by being lifted to the place by Menaka. And Indra must send his chariot and charioteer to Dushyanta. All this can happen only by the curse.

The early acts, therefore, serve the purpose of describing, on the one hand, the delicate life led by Sakuntala in natural simplicity and grace, and on the other hand, the artificial life with its values in its own sphere trying to interfere in and even fuse with this life.

Dushyanta is first prevented from killing the deer with significant words :

तत् साधु कृतसंधानं प्रतिसंहर सायकम् ।
आर्तलाणाय वः शस्त्रं न प्रहर्तुमनागसि ॥

When he enters the Ashrama, he does **not** enter in his usual dress :

विनीतवेषप्रवेश्यानि तपोवनानि नाम ।

From the very moment he sees Sakuntala and her friends this contrast between the natural and the artificial is fully brought out :

शुद्धान्तदुर्लभमिदं वपुराश्रमवासिनो यदि जनस्य ।
दूरीकृताः खलु गुणैरुद्यानलता वनलताभिः ॥

There is, of course, the oft-quoted stanza :

सरसिजमनुविद्धं शैवलेनापि रम्यं मलिनमपि हिमांशोर्लक्ष्म लक्ष्मीं तनोति ।
इयमधिकमनोज्ञा वल्कलेनापि तन्वी किमिव हि मधुराणां मण्डनं नाकृतीनाम् ॥

Dushyanta now tries to question if he, as a king, can marry her and so on. Her Kshatriya blood is known and he is satisfied. She may be Kshatriya-born yet not court-born or bred.

Sakuntala's friends are not without misgivings. Anasuya makes bold to say to Dushyanta :

वयस्य बहुवल्लभा राजानः श्रूयन्ते । यथा प्रियसखी बन्धुजनशोचनीया न भवति
तथा निर्वह ॥

Even Sakuntala says in an earlier passage :

अलं तवान्तपुरविरहपर्युत्सुकस्य राजर्षेरुपरोधेन ।

Yet Sakuntala and Dushyanta are brought together by Fate or whatever Force works through a large design. The king returns to his sophisticated world. Sakuntala is lost in thought about him. Now comes the proverbially easily-provoked Rishi Durvasa. The tranquil Ashrama atmosphere has been slightly disturbed by the appearance of the King and what has followed. At least what has happened is not in complete consonance with the atmosphere of the place. This, in a way, prepares us for the curse of Durvasa. The words of the Rishi are uttered in a tone belonging to another world. The possibility of a future harmony resulting from the King's recognition of Sakuntala through an *abhijnana* or token is hinted in milder tones. His disappearance is as sudden as his appearance.

It is the token of the recognition, *abhijnana* that gives the first part of the title of the play. The token has to be lost and regained if its value has to be recognized. Dushyanta must also recognize the true Sakuntala, the Mother of Bharata, the foundress of the race. So the ring gains a symbolic value.

The Fourth Act, traditionally regarded as the best act with its four great (among other) slokas, serves to bring out the tragedy of Sakuntala a being torn off from a place she belongs to. Those who speak of Pathetic Fallacy in such a scene commit the great fallacy of misunderstanding the poet's intention. Kanwa addresses the *Sannihitadevatastapovanataravah*

पातुं न प्रथमं व्यवस्यति जलं युष्मास्वरीतेषु या
 नादत्ते प्रियमण्डनापि भवतां स्नेहेन या पल्लवम् ।
 आद्ये वः कुसुमप्रसूतिसमये यस्या भवत्युत्सवः
 सेयं याति शकुन्तला पतिगृहं सर्वैरनुज्ञायताम् ॥

The deer feels (as noted already) the greatest kinship with Sakuntala.

यस्य त्वया व्रणविरोषणमिङ्गुरीनां तैलं न्यषिच्यत मुखे कुशसूचिविद्धे ।
 इयामाकमुष्टिपरिवद्धितको जहाति सोऽयं न पुत्रकृतकः पदवीं मृगस्ते ॥

Nature seems to be unwilling to leave her and she is unwilling to tear herself away from the place. Leaning on the creepers she says

वनज्योत्स्ने चूतसंगतापि प्रत्यालिङ्ग मामितो गताभिः शाखाबाहाभिः

The life she must have hereafter as visualized by Kanwa not only in the sloka quoted already (*Susrusha Swaguroon*) but in slokas like :

अभिजनवतो भर्तुः श्लाघ्ये स्थिता गृहिणीपदे
 विभवगुरुभिः कृत्यैस्तस्य प्रतिक्षणमाकुला ।
 तनयमचिरात् प्राचीवार्कं प्रसूय च पावनं
 मम विरहजां वत्से न त्वं शुचं गणयिष्यसि ॥

appears highly sophisticated. But that can never be. Kanwa's picture of *Daushyanti* (son of Dushyanta) is the usual one of a great hero. The greatness of the Act, therefore, is the tragedy of taking away of Sakuntala from her own natural home.

That she cannot belong to the court is proved by her repudiation in the next act. That Act (V) brings us face to face with court and its sophistication.

The first glimpse into that life is significantly through the experience of Hamsapadika, one of Dushyanta's mistresses :

अभिनवमधुलोलुयो भवांस्तथा परिचुम्ब्य चूतमञ्जरीम् ।

कमलवसतिमात्रनिर्वृतो मधुकर विस्मृतोऽस्येनां कथम् ॥

Dushyanta comments on the clever way in which he has been hit and perhaps, if we can use modern parlance, subconsciously remembering Sakuntala, speaks the meaningful words.

रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निश्म्य शब्दान् पर्युत्सुकी भवति यत् सुखितोऽपि जन्तुः ।
तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वं भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानि ॥

Kancuki's words of praise for the King present to us a favourable aspect. In fact, if his mind were not eclipsed by the shadow of the curse, he should not have rejected Sakuntala. Even if it is repetition it needs to be said again that Kalidasa never meant us to take either Dushyanta or Sakuntala to have been sinners or wrong-doers in any way. Their union was both right and necessary and a certain amount of shaking up was necessary to make it serve its purpose. Hence the curse; hence the repudiation in this scene. One remembers the splendid lines of Harindranath Chattopadhyaya.

“Nay do not grieve ... there is no flaw
In aught we see from sky to sod,
Far hidden, the eternal law
Of rhythm moves the world of God.”

But as we have seen in the opening section certain amount of irreparable loss and waste is caused even as “the eternal law of rhythm moves the world of God”. And Sakuntala's unjust suffering and separation here belong to that part of the tragic experience.

She has premonitions of it in the form of eye-lids throbbing etc. Dushyanta's behaviour is inexplicable to her as she is ignorant of Durvasa's curse. The King's words on seeing Sakuntala in the midst of Sarngrava and Sardvata

मध्ये तपोधनानां किसलयमिव पाण्डुपत्राणाम्

remind one painfully of his earlier words in Act I describing her beauty :

अधरः किसलयरागः

Sakuntala's heart beats fast when Sarngrava has delivered Kanwa's message to the King. “What will he say?” she asks herself. And the King's words “Kimidamupanyastam” so shock her that she speaks of his words as fire. पावकः खलु वचनोपन्यासः (There is another reading – pavanah – for pavakah – which brings in irony but takes off the force.) The King obviously does not remember having taken her in marriage. The removal of her veil has no effect. Her grief increases with every word of Dushyanta persistently denying any previous knowledge of her. Sakuntala herself begins to speak.

Addressing him in the fashion of a wife to her husband "*Aryaputra*" she withdraws that mode even before completing it. She then calls him Paurava. She asks him if he is justified in rejecting her now after having loved and taken to her kindly in the hermitage. The king, pure in thought and noble in intention, for all the rebukes of the rishi-lads, all the proofs of Sakuntala, cannot accept her. The effect of the curse can be removed by the *abhijnana* but that has fallen to the *Sachitirtha*. The king can attribute what he thinks to be a pretext to the feminine cunning. Sakuntala's righteous indignation is roused. She calls him "Un-Arya". He is a "Tricchanna kupam". Dusyanta is stupefied for a moment. Sarngrava and Saradvata can only rebuke Sakuntala now and leave her behind. Dushyanta's purohit promises to take charge of her till child-birth to see if the child will have signs of royalty confirming the blessing of the Vaikhanasas.

Sakuntala, as if she were another Sita, cries out,

भगवति वसुधे देहि मे विवरम् ।

Soon a heavenly light takes her away in the form of a woman. The King under the spell of the curse cannot remember any details referred to by Sakuntala. Yet he is plunged in grief.

But this grief is only a prelude to the great grief he soon suffers on seeing the ring and remembering Sakuntala. Act V presents Sakuntala's second painful experience, the first being her being taken away from her natural home in Act IV. The whole of Act VI deals with the fearful sorrow of the King. Before we are presented with that intensity of grief there is a splendid scene of comic relief with the fisherman who has got the king's ring and the police officers. Which means normal life goes on.

In Act VI the presence of Sanumati (Mishrakeshi in some editions) the bosom friend of Sakuntala serves as a choric commentator and presents to us the Sakuntalic point of view. The spring festival has been abandoned. The King cannot attend to his royal duties as a judge. Completing the picture (painting) of Sakuntala and her friends only adds to his grief that he has thrown her out. Even his friend Madhavya has little power in giving him much relief. The unique case of a merchant dying childless not only gives the king an opportunity to reveal his magnanimity but to make him remember the barrenness of his own life. He lost his one chance

of having a son in his repudiation of Sakuntala. His grief reaches its greatest intensity. There is no human solution for this.

Now Kalidasa with his true genius, a genius only an Indian can possess, brings Matali, the messenger and charioteer of Indra, who rouses the great Paurava to heroism by a momentary torture of his bosom friend. As we learn later Matali knows that Dushyanta will meet Sakuntala on his return journey. We see Dushyanta starting on his great mission which will ultimately redound to his own joy.

It is in Act VII we see the great Ashrama of Marichi. This is unlike the Kanwa-Ashrama as we have noticed before. Here there are no limits and limitations. A human child can be seen playing with a lion. The impossible is possible here and the incompatibles compatible. The Ashrama is far above the earth and on the way to Indra's own seat. No human beings can normally reach here. It is as was said earlier "Tapoloka". Menaka has brought Sakuntala here and her son Bharata, who is to be the first of a great race is being brought up and is growing in such a place under the great guiding hand of Marichi himself. That Dushyanta should receive Sakuntala here under the auspices of Marichi and Dakshayan, and see his own son and receive him is the best thing anybody could wish for.

Dushyanta, as soon as he lands here, feels a greater peace than in Indra's Heaven.

This deep contentment and joy not only reveals the nature of the place, it is also a premonition of the fulfilment of all his life's desires and aspirations here. His meeting Sarvadamana recalls, though in a distant way Rama's meeting Lava and Kusa. The circumstance of his touching the amulet which only the boy's parents could touch without harm leads to Sakuntala's arrival on the scene.

Sakuntala in this scene is no longer the tender girl we see in Kanwa's Ashrama. She is not even the frustrated and desparate one who called out the earth to open and receive her. She is a sober mother. First she cannot recognize her husband. Then she knows him and is contented. Perhaps it is noteworthy that in the scene she talks very little. One remembers Hermione's reaction to her re-union with Leontes. Like,

Hermione, Sakuntala, is, in a way happy. But the old wound has left a scar within her that cannot be healed. That Shakuntala refuses to wear the ring that brought her all the agony reveals the sense of waste within herself and therefore in the play. Dushyanta's prostration reveals his own pain for having caused so much disappointment to Sakuntala. In the scene where the divine design is worked out and where we have a "Divine Comedy" transcending all tragic experience, we have yet a picture of the human tragedy from a human point of view.

With the appearance of Marichi and Dakshayani and with the revelation of Durvasa's curse, there is a kind of consolation for what has happened, though it can never completely remove the tragic experience.

Marichi then speaks to Dushyanta about Bharata.

रथेनानुस्वातस्तिमितगतिना तीर्णजलधिः
पुरा सप्तद्वीपां जयति वसुधामप्रतिरथः ।
इहायं सत्त्वानां प्रसभदमनात्सर्वदमनः
पुनर्यास्यत्याख्यां भरत इति लोकस्य भरणात् ॥

Dushyanta, Sakuntala and Bharata go to Dushyanta's *Rajadhani*.

Kanwa Ashrama, the Court or Marichi's Ashrama, each by itself is only a broken arc but together make a perfect round. To Sakuntala and Dushyanta who have passed through all these, the experience is complete. They return to the earth with a newly gained wisdom to begin their life afresh on a new plane of Reality.

Thus the tragic experience of the play is completed on the one hand : what Sakuntala and Dushyanta have suffered cannot be cancelled ; on the other, the disharmony brought about by Durvasa's curse has resulted in a greater harmony. The play can end on a note of absolute Peace.

प्रवर्ततां प्रकृतिहिताय पार्थिवः सरस्वती श्रुतिमाहिता महीयसाम् ।
ममापि च क्षपयतु नीललोहितः पुनर्भवं परिगतशक्तिरात्मभूः ॥



IS THERE NOT ERRONEOUS COGNITION ?

by

R. BALASUBRAHMANYAN

Reader in Philosophy

The explanation of error is one of the controversial issues discussed at great length by all the schools of Indian Philosophy. According to the Advaitins, ignorance or avidya which is existent, beginningless and indeterminable, is the root cause of error. It is on account of ignorance that we take one thing for another in our experience. Avidya which explains the appearance of the manifold also serves to explain why we illegitimately identify one thing with another or illusorily superimpose an attribute of one thing on another. The evidence for ignorance which is of the nature of an existent is the perceptual experience: "I am ignorant." More often than not we declare ourselves: "I am ignorant," "I do not know myself or others," "I don't know the import of that scriptural text," etc. We can never account for these declarations unless we admit that there is ignorance. This ignorance which is an existent is, according to Advaita, beginningless (anadi) as well as indeterminable (anirvacaniya). So long as there is ignorance there is error which consists in coupling the true with the untrue, superimposing the nature and attributes of the one on the other¹.

6

As an Advaitin, Mandanamisra is interested in showing that there is erroneous cognition. And so he joins issue with the Prabhakaras who maintain that there is no erroneous cognition². A cognition, according to them, may be less than true, but it can never be untrue. They recognise only a two-fold classification of cognition into valid cognition and memory, and they do not admit erroneous cognition as such forming a class by itself. Mandana's refutation of the Prabhakara standpoint is thorough and comprehensive; he argues the point with great vigour and cogency.

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1. Vide Sankara's Adhyasa-bhasya in his commentary on the *Brahma-sutras*.
 2. Mandanamisra, *Brahmasiddhi* (to be called hereafter as BS), edited by Prof. S. Kuppaswami Sastri, The Madras Government Oriental Manuscript Series No. 4.

THE THEORY OF NON-APPREHENSION OF THE PRABHAKARAS

The Prabhakaras explain all cases of *bhrama* as cases of non-apprehension (*akhyati*). What is called *viparyaya* is not false knowledge. If all cognition is self-luminous (*svaprakasa*) and therefore true (*yathartha*), the consciousness expressed in the judgment: "This is silver" cannot be erroneous. They contend that, in the cognition of silver where only nacre is seen, two cognitions arise in fact, one cognition being the perception of nacre in the general way as 'this' (*idam*) and not as possessing the distinctive feature of nacreity, and the other cognition being the recollection of silver cognised elsewhere. The recollection of silver in this case is not identified by the knower as recollection; but is cognised by him merely as cognition, since the object of recollection, viz., silver is thought of merely as silver stripped of its association with the past time and the particular place where it was seen. What is called error is simply the failure to distinguish the two different elements, viz., the idea of silver and the impression of *this*. We mix up the perceived and the remembered elements in one psychosis. The so-called error is not a unit of knowledge, but a composite of two cognitions. That there are two cognitions is, however, overlooked on account of non-apprehension.³

It should not be said that nacre is cognised as silver. The object of a cognition is the thing which is presented to consciousness. When we say: "This is silver," what is presented to consciousness is silver and not nacre. Therefore, the silver which is presented to consciousness is the object of cognition and not nacre. The Prabhakaras point out that, if what is not presented to consciousness is taken as the object of cognition, it will result in the absence of certainty in knowledge. To the Prabhakaras all knowledge is true; and there is no knowledge which does not point to a corresponding object outside it. If what is presented to consciousness is not the object of cognition, we can never be certain about the nature of the object cognised by us. If what is presented

3. BS, Part II, p. 270.

to consciousness is not that which exists in the world of space and time, if knowledge does not serve as the means for determining the nature of the object that is outside us, we cannot have any confidence in our cognitions.⁴ The consciousness of silver which arises when we see the shell which is in front of us in a general way is only a case of recollection (*smṛti*). The silver is not in front of us and so the possibility of sense - object contact is ruled out. In other words, the cognition of silver here is not a case of perception. It is not possible to treat it as inferential knowledge. The cognition of silver in this case should, therefore, be treated as recollection. There are reasons to show why at the time of our cognition of nacre in a general way the recollection of silver takes place. There are common features between nacre and silver: both of them are bright as well as white. When the nacre which is similar to silver is seen in a general way, the latent impressions relating to silver which has been previously cognised manifest themselves in the form of recollection.⁵

If the cognition of the object in front of us and the recollection of silver are both of them true, how can, it may be asked, erroneous cognition arise? The Prabhakaras argue that the so-called error is due to *akhyati* or non-apprehension of the difference between the given and the remembered elements. The nacre which is in front of us is seen only in a general way and not as possessing the distinctive feature of nacreness. Had the latter been cognised, the discrimination between the perceived and the remembered would have been known and erroneous cognition would not have taken place. But the object is cognised only in a general way as something which is bright and white: it is, that is to say, cognised as "this" characterised by the features that are common to shell and silver. In the case of the other cognition, even though there is recollection of silver previously cognised elsewhere, it is not recollected as something which was seen elsewhere at some other time. But it is simply recollected without its association with the past time and the particular

4. BS, Part I, p. 136.

5. BS, Part II, p. 270.

place where it was seen. This recollection of silver robbed of its "thatness" (pramusta-tattakasmāraṇa) results on account of the obscuration of memory (smṛti-pramosa). Thus, though the perceived element "this" and the remembered element "silver" are true, there is non-discrimination of the two factors as distinct. The cognition of the object as a bright and white one, which rouses the latent impressions of silver previously cognised, on the one hand, and the recollection of silver robbed of its "thatness", on the other, are responsible for the non-discrimination of the two cognitions which are distinct.⁶

A similar explanation is given in the case of a conch which is seen yellow by a jaundiced person; only the two cognitions involved in it are perceptual. There are, the Prabhakaras say, two imperfect perceptions. One of them is the visual perception of the conch *minus* its true colour, viz., white; the other is the visual perception of the yellow colour of the bilious matter which causes jaundice (pittadravya-pitima), but here the relation of the yellow colour to the bilious substance is missed. They are two acts of knowing; but they quickly succeed each other; we lose sight of the fact that the substance, viz., the conch and the quality, viz., the yellowness of the bilious matter stand apart unrelated. Each of them is valid so far as it goes, even though it fails to grasp one or more aspects of what is presented⁷. Here also there is a failure to notice that there are two cognitions. Thus in the so-called cases of error two cognitions - either a perception and a recollection or two perceptions - arise; their distinction is missed; and the difference between objects comes to be missed for the time being. To the Prabhakaras there is no error at all. The so-called error is only partial or incomplete knowledge. It is only a case of *omission*, for there is a failure to grasp some relevant part of what is presented and not of *commission*, for there is no misrepresentation. In other words, according to the Prabhakaras, to experience is to experience validly and to err in experience is to experience imperfectly, though

6. BS, Part I, p. 137.

7. BS, Part II, p. 274.

validly, the imperfection consisting merely in non-discrimination and not in mis-apprehension⁸.

II

WHY SHOULD NACRE ALONE BE MISTAKEN FOR SILVER AND NOT SOMEOTHER OBJECT ?

The theory of akhyati advocated by the Prabhakaras cannot stand examination. If the nacre which is in front is not seen as silver or if the silver which is somewhere else is not cognised to be there in front of him, a person who wants silver will not pick it up, for it is not cognised as silver. A piece of stone is seldom picked up as silver by a person who wants it so long as it is not cognised as silver. In the same way if the person does not cognise the nacre which is in front of him as silver, he will not take efforts to seize it; in so far as he does so, it must be admitted that it is the nacre which passes for silver or that the silver which is somewhere else is cognised to be there in front of him⁹. It is no argument to say that the silver which is remembered by him at that time is the object of his endeavour, and that he takes efforts to seize it. It is true that silver is remembered by him, but it is not before him. He remembers that which has been cognised elsewhere. And so he must go to that place where it was seen by him earlier with a view to obtaining it and he should not try to seize the object which is before him as if it is silver. Notwithstanding the fact that the idea of silver is in his consciousness, he will never stoop down for the purpose of seizing the object before him as silver, so long as he knows that it is not in his proximity. But if he does, it only means that the object before him appears as silver.

8. Vide Kuppaswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic* (Varadachary & Co., Madras 1932) , p. 163

9. BS, Part I. v.115, p.137.

The Prabhakaras may argue that it is not merely because of recollection of silver at that time that the person seizes the object in front of him as silver, but because of certain other factors also. Even though he recollects silver, his recollection is not complete, for he does not remember the time and the particular place where it was seen. Thus, silver which is the object of recollection is thought of merely as silver; and that it is not in his proximity is not known by him. On account of these factors he seizes the nacre as silver. This argument, however, is of no avail. If the recollection of silver robbed of its "thatness" is responsible for his seizing the nacre which is before him as silver, he can as well seize some other object, say, a piece of stone as silver. What holds good in the case of nacre also holds good in the case of a piece of stone. The two factors, viz., the recollection of silver merely as silver and the failure to notice that it is not in his proximity, which predispose him to seize the nacre as silver, are also present in the other case. It follows, therefore that he can as well always seize a piece of stone as silver instead of a piece of shell. But no one picks up a stone as silver. Nacre, on the other hand, is not infrequently taken for silver; and the illusion of silver arises only in nacre. If a person picks up nacre as silver, it is because of the fact that he cognises silver to be there in his proximity. But silver is not actually there before him. It only means that nacre is mistaken for silver or that silver which is somewhere else is mistakenly thought of to be before him.¹⁰

Let us bring out the difficulties involved in the theory of akhyati in another way. The Prabhakaras contend that, since the nacre is seen only in a general way as a bright and shining object at a time when silver is remembered, as stripped of its association with the past time and the particular place where it was seen, it is seized as silver by a person who is desirous of it. The reason for this is that the difference between the perceived and the remembered is missed. This can be contrasted with his perception of another object with all its specific features capable of distinguishing

it from the other objects. The idea of silver may be in his memory ; but still he does not fail to discriminate the perceived from the remembered. It is clear from this that it is on account of the non-apprehension of the difference between the perceived and the remembered that the person seizes the nacre which is before him as silver.

A little reflection will show that this account, plausible as it seems, is not free from difficulties. A piece of stone, let us say, being far removed from us is not within our sight. Just as we fail to apprehend the difference between the nacre and silver, as pointed out by the Prabhakaras, so also we fail to grasp the difference between the piece of stone which is imperceptible and the silver which we recollect at that time. If the explanation of the Prabhakaras were true, we should seize the piece of stone as silver ; for there is non-apprehension of the difference between the two. We do not, however, do so. The illusion of silver arises only in nacre and not in the piece of stone. The Prabhakaras cannot argue that the piece of stone is never thought of as silver with the result that it is not seized as silver; for even the nacre, according to them, is not thought of as silver and so it should not be seized as silver. But if they are prepared to admit that the nacre is thought of as silver in order to show why it is seized as silver, they are virtually abandoning the theory of akhyati. If it be said that the piece of stone referred to above is not seized as silver for the simple reason that it is not perceptible, and that therefore it cannot be seen as silver, the same thing holds good even in the case of the nacre which, according to the critics, is not seen as silver. It is no argument to say that it is seen in a general way as a white and shining object. A person will not think of seizing the object which is before him as silver as long as he does not cognise it as silver. Just as the piece of stone which is imperceptible is not seen as silver, so also the nacre is not seen as silver; and if we never try to seize the former as silver, the latter also should not be seized as silver.¹¹

It appears *prima facie* that the comparison instituted by us is wrong. There can be non-discrimination between the perceived and the recollected. And as a result of the non-apprehension of the difference between them,

11. BS, part I, verses 118-120, p.137,

the nacre which is perceived in a general way passes for silver. Such a non-discrimination, it appears, cannot arise in the other case, since a piece of stone is not at all perceived. Only if it is perceived in a general way as the nacre is perceived, non-apprehension of the difference between the perceived and the recollected can arise. In so far as it is not perceived at all, the analogy, it appears, is unsound and the question of its being seized as silver does not arise.¹² The comparison, it should be pointed out, is quite apt in respect of the non-apprehension of difference which alone, according to the Prabhakaras, is responsible for the so-called error. What is known as non-apprehension of difference (bheda-agrahana) is *pragabhava* or antecedent non-existence. It exists of its own accord; it does not depend on anything for its coming into existence. There can be non-apprehension of difference as much between that which is not perceived and that which is remembered as it is between the perceived and the remembered. It exists as much between the piece of stone which is not perceived by us and the silver which is remembered as it exists between the nacre which is perceived in a general way and the silver which is remembered. It is not as if that it will arise only when what is remembered is not discriminated from what is perceived. *Irrespective of the sense-contact with the object*, there can be non-apprehension of the difference between the two, between the perceived nacre and the remembered silver or between the unperceived piece of stone and the remembered silver¹³. If so, a person should seize a piece of stone as silver. This is, however, not borne out by experience. It is only the nacre which is seized as silver; and this will be possible only if it is seen as silver.¹⁴

III

NATURE OF SMRTI

It is necessary in this connection to refer to the nature of recollection (smṛti). Recollection by its very nature is such that it always differentiates its object from what is perceived. An object which is remembered is always

12. BS, part I, p.139.

13. BS, part II, p.272.

14. BS, part I, verses 121-133.

thought of as something different from an object which is perceived; this is on account of the inherent nature of *smṛti*. It follows, therefore, that recollection is different from erroneous cognition (*viparyaya*). Though this is the truth about *smṛti*, the Prabhakaras can neither accept this fundamental point nor reject it. The acceptance of this view is detrimental to their theory of *akhyati*. And by rejecting it they only invite difficulties which they cannot resolve so long as they swear by the theory of *akhyati*. The Prabhakaras must either say that the nature of recollection is such that it differentiates its object from what is perceived or that its nature is such that it can only present an object to consciousness without, however, differentiating it from what is perceived. If what is presented to consciousness by *smṛti* always stands apart from what is perceived, how can there be non-apprehension of difference between what is perceived and what is recollected? In other words, the Prabhakaras are totally mistaken when they say that it is on account of the non-apprehension of the difference between the perceived and the remembered that a person seizes the nacre as silver, since *smṛti* being what it is the object which is remembered is always thought of as something other than what is perceived.¹⁵ If this alternative is not acceptable to them as it entails the abandonment of their fundamental standpoint, it is open to them to subscribe to the other alternative and say that what is remembered is not always discriminated from what is perceived on the ground that *smṛti* is incapable of differentiating its object from the perceived. Here arise several difficulties for which the Prabhakaras have no satisfactory solution. If the remembered is not always discriminated from the perceived, it should uniformly result in error and there should be no exception to this. Our experience, however, does not testify to this. We find that sometimes the non-discrimination between the remembered and the perceived results in doubt (*samsaya*) and not in error (*viparyaya*). There is, for instance, an object at a fairly long distance. Its specific feature is not grasped and it is cognised only in a general way as an object which is tall. When it is thus cognised in a general way, the ideas of a lamp-post and of a man are in memory. Here there is non-discrimination between the remembered and the perceived, for recollection, it is admitted, does not differentiate the remembered from the perceived. But the non-apprehension

15. BS, Part I, v. 124, p. 139.

of the difference between them results in doubt as embodied in our judgment that the object before us is a lamp-post or a man¹⁶. If the failure to discriminate the remembered from the perceived is a limitation characteristic of *smṛti*, it should always result in error and never should it lead to doubt. But non-discrimination, as in this case, sometimes, leads to doubt. And there is no explanation in the theory of the Prabhakaras to show why it sometimes occurs in this way.

It is no explanation to say, that, when only one object is remembered, there is non-discrimination between the perceived and the remembered resulting in error and that, when two objects are remembered, the non-discrimination between them leads to doubt. Even when two objects are in memory at a time when the object which is in front of us is apprehended in a general way, there arises sometimes error and not doubt.¹⁷ This only shows that the explanation offered by the critics is not satisfactory. It is, therefore, incumbent upon them to accept that (i) it is the nature of *smṛti* to differentiate its object from what is perceived and (ii) that *smṛti* is different from error (*viparyaya*). Error arises on account of the defect in the sense-organ, etc., (*indriyadi-dosa-visesat*) and not on account of the non-apprehension of the difference between what is perceived and what is remembered. Defect is many-sided and the error which it gives rise to is not restricted to one particular form, but assumes protean forms. If the nacre is cognised as silver or if the silver which is somewhere else is cognised to be in our proximity, it is on account of the defect in our sense-organ. The object in front of us can be cognised in a general way and two objects, viz., a lamp-post and a man, can be recollected at that time; but still there may arise error, one of the two objects which are remembered becoming predominant on account of the peculiar nature of the defect (*dosa-visesat*). It may also be the case that, when the object which is before us is cognised in a general way, only one object is remembered. It is not possible in this case for doubt to arise, since there is no recollection of two objects. It cannot be said that error, under these circumstances, is bound to arise. It may or may not arise. If there is defect in the sense-organ, it

16. BS, Part II, p. 273.

17. BS, Part I, verses 125-126, p. 139.

will arise ; and in the absence of any defect, it will not arise at all and we simply ignore the object which we see in a general way, notwithstanding the fact that something is remembered at that time¹⁸.

The Prabhakaras may argue in this way in order to overcome the difficulties which we have pointed out. Smṛti, it is admitted, discriminates its object from the object which is perceived. But it fails to do so, when its object is not remembered with all its specific features which serve to distinguish it from other objects. In this respect it can be likened to perception (pratyakṣa). Perception is capable of apprehending an object with all the specific features which characterise it. But when an object is too far away, it apprehends it only in a general way. It is the distance that serves as a limiting factor here. In the same way, though it is undoubtedly the nature of smṛti to differentiate its object from what is perceived, it apprehends it only in a general way being disabled by the overwhelming power of a defect in the mind. Like the distance which is a limiting factor in the case of perception, the defect in the mind (manodosa) limits the powers of recollection.¹⁹ When it thus fails to recollect its object with all its specific features, there arises non-discrimination between the object which is perceived in a general way and the object which is remembered in a general way. If only the object is remembered with the specific features which characterise it, it will certainly stand apart as different from the object which is before us, despite the fact that the latter is perceived only in a general way. In the light of this account of the nature of smṛti and the limitation which it is subject to, it is possible, so it may be argued, to meet the difficulties in a satisfactory way. The object which is at a distance may be cognised in a general way and two objects (a lamp-post and a man) may be remembered with all their specific features at that time. Nevertheless, there does not arise doubt (saṃśaya) for the obvious reason that the remembered objects are discriminated from the perceived. If one object alone is remembered at that time, there is no chance for doubt to arise. Error (viparyaya) also cannot arise then, since the object, being remembered with all its specific features, is differentiated from the object which is perceived in a general way²⁰.

18. BS, Part I, p, 139.

19. BS, Part II, p.275.

20. BS, Part I, p.141.

Even this argument cannot stand examination. We may grant for the sake of argument that the foregoing explanation of *smṛti* is valid. It fails, however, to explain how sometimes error arises when two objects are remembered with all their specific features at a time of the perception of an object which is at a distance in a general way. On their account error, under these circumstances, should not arise at all. This inadequacy apart, the very assumption that the object of *smṛti* is sometimes recollected without the specific features which characterise it is unfounded. When we recollect an object, the specific features, along with which it was perceived earlier, are not left out, but they are also recollected in association with the object which they characterise. When in *smṛti* silver is presented to consciousness, it is thought of as an object characterised by the specific feature of silverness and not merely as an object. So the basic assumption that *smṛti* sometimes recollects its object in a general way is wrong²¹.

Could it not be said, then, it may be asked, that the recollection of an object along with specific feature which characterises it is not enough to avoid the non-apprehension of the difference between the perceived and the remembered, but the recollection of it in association with the time and the place where it was seen earlier is necessary to discriminate the remembered from the perceived? We see an object, say silver, at a certain place and at a particular time. If it is remembered at a later time as silver in association with the time and the particular place where it was seen, it can be discriminated from the object which is perceived in a general way; but if it is remembered merely as silver, stripped of its association with the past time and the particular place, where it was seen, it cannot be discriminated from the perceived object²². In short, time and place (*desa-kala-viśeṣa*), it may said, are the two factors which, when remembered, cause the remembered object to be discriminated from the perceived one.

This explanation too is open to serious objections and so it has to be rejected. An object which was seen once can easily be remembered in association with the past time and the particular place where it was cognised and it can, according to the foregoing explanation, be discriminated from the

21. BS, Part I, p.141.

22. BS, Part I, v.132, p.140.

object which is perceived. But if the object which is remembered happens to be one which was cognised in a number of places at different times, it is not humanly possible to recollect it in association with all those places and times. The result is that it cannot be discriminated from the perceived object and that *bhrama* should always arise under these circumstances. This is, however, not true. It was contended that an object which is remembered in association with the two factors of time and place alone can be discriminated from the perceived one. What would happen when an object is recollected in association with *one of the two* factors alone? It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which an object is remembered by a person in the same place where he saw it earlier. In this case there is difference of time, but there is no difference of place. Since the object was cognised at an earlier time, it is possible for him to recollect it in association with the time; time, that is to say, is a factor which is involved in his memory. The question of its recollection in association with the place does not arise here, for he recollects it remaining in the same place where he saw it earlier. Since the object is recollected not in association with the two factors of time and place, but in association with only one of them, viz, time, it cannot, on the account of the critics, be discriminated from the perceived object and this should lead to error. Experience, however, does not seem to corroborate this.²³

We shall now consider another argument which may be put forward by the critics. An object, say silver, which is simply remembered cannot be discriminated from the nacre which is perceived. But if the person who remembers it knows that it is an object of recollection, he can discriminate it from the perceived one. The lack of such knowledge causes the non-apprehension of the difference between the remembered and the perceived to arise and this, in its turn is responsible for his seizing the nacre as silver. In short, the recollection of an object at the time of the perception of the object which is in front should be, according to this argument, followed by another cognition to the effect that he recollects the former, and it is this *after cognition* (anuvyavasaya) which gives rise to the discrimination between the perceived and the remembered.

This argument also is unavailing. It suffers from a basic confusion between *smṛti* and the after-cognition which follows it. It fails to bring out the real nature of recollection. Silver, let us say, is presented to consciousness by the cognition known as *smṛti*: silver, that is to say, is the object of recollection. In the next moment there arises, let us say, the knowledge that silver is recollected. The silver which is remembered first is *known to be remembered* subsequently. The first is the cognition of it in memory, the second is its after-cognition, and the two are distinct. If the remembered comes to be discriminated from the perceived, it is, so it was contended, the work of the after-cognition which follows *smṛti*. This is indeed a bare assertion born out of ignorance of the nature of *smṛti*. The *smṛti* that takes place is not incomplete in any respect. It has done the work of recollection perfectly well. It has not failed to grasp any aspect of the object which is recollected. It does not depend upon the after-cognition to complete its work. Even as it takes place it has a completed nature. It should, therefore, be admitted that it is the nature of *smṛti* to discriminate its object from the perceived one. If so, how can there be non-apprehension of the difference between the perceived and the remembered?²⁴ It should not be said that, what the *smṛti* fails to do, the after-cognition is able to do. If *smṛti* is really incompetent to bring about the discrimination between the perceived and the remembered, there will be no after-cognition at all to the effect: "I remember that."²⁵ Only if it is admitted that *smṛti* by itself discriminates its object from the perceived one, the after-cognition can follow on its heels and a person can say in respect of the silver which is recollected: "I remember silver."

It can even be shown that in spite of this after-cognition there arises sometimes erroneous cognition. There is the well-known case of delusive re-cognition (*prātyabijna-bhrama*). X, let us say, has seen two individuals A and B. When he is asked whether he knows A, he replies in the affirmative and adds: "I remember him very well." But when he is taken

24. BS, Part I, verses 133-134, p.140.

25. BS, Part II, p.277.

"sa eva 'smarami' iti vivekah smṛteḥ svavisayaavivecakatve sati na syadityarthah."

to B, he identifies him as A. This is a case of delusive re-cognition. This takes place in spite of his affirmation that he remembers A. If really the after-cognition as embodied in the judgment: "I remember so and so" serves to discriminate the remembered from the perceived, the delusive recognition should not have taken place at all. In so far as it takes place, the explanation of the critics stands condemned.²⁶

Finding that the above explanation does not hold good, the Prabhakaras may try to account for the non-discrimination between the perceived and the remembered in other ways. It may be argued that the remembered object which is not in proximity is thought of to be in proximity, and that as a result of this there arises non-discrimination. But this will only lend support to *viparita-khyati*. If it be said that the failure to apprehend the remembered object as not being in proximity (asannidhyagrahana) brings about the non-discrimination, it is incumbent upon the critics to show how this failure takes place. They could attribute this to a defect in the mind (*mano-dosa*) and it is the only explanation available to them. This explanation, it should be pointed out, is ill-conceived. It is totally inapplicable here. In the case of dream-experience it could be said that the defect in the mind accounts for the failure to apprehend that the objects which are experienced in that state are not in proximity. The *bhrama* which we are dealing with is one which is caused by the sense-organ. The mind is not incapacitated by any defect. It is in a perfect condition (*svastha-manasa*). But the defect in the sense-organ presents the object as other than what it is. If what the critics say were true, such an illusion should not arise at all, for the mind is not overwhelmed by any defect. But it does not take place and so the explanation which could be given in terms of the defect in the mind is untenable²⁷.

There are also other difficulties in the theory of the Prabhakaras. We all know very well that there is only one moon. Notwithstanding the fact that this idea that there is only one moon is in our memory, we perceive sometimes double-moon due to *timira-dosa*, etc. If what is known as error is nothing but the failure to discriminate the remembered from the perceived,

26. BS, Part I, v.134, p.140.

27. BS, Part I, verses 135-136, p.140.

the delusive cognition of double-moon should not take place at all. What is remembered being the oneness of the moon, the non-discrimination between the remembered and the perceived should not, on any account, lead to the erroneous cognition of double-moon. That such an error takes place cannot be denied²⁸.

It is no explanation to this to say that any illusion cannot arise in any object, but only certain illusions can arise in certain objects being governed by the principle of similarity. Similarity may be the basis of error in certain places as in the case of the nacre which is mistaken for silver. If the nacre is seized as silver, it is because of the fact that it is cognised with certain features which are similar to those possessed by silver. It should not be generalised from this that similarity is at the basis of all error. While we can admit that illusions do not take place in an arbitrary way, we can never agree with the view that illusions arise only with regard to similar objects. A conch which is white is seen as yellow by a jaundiced person. There is no similarity here between whiteness and yellowness. It should be pointed out here that the explanation given by the Prabhakaras to show why a conch which is white is seen as yellow is totally wrong. The Prabhakaras, it will be remembered, argue that in this case two imperfect perceptions arise, the one being the visual perception of a conch as such, its real colour being missed, and the other being the visual perception of the yellow colour of the bilious matter which causes jaundice (pitta-dravya-pitima), the relation of the yellow colour to the bilious substance being missed. This argument proceeds on the assumption that the bilious matter which is in the eye (netragatam) can be seen. Objects which are outside the eye can be perceived; but there can be no visual perception of that which is in the eye. Just as the black pigment applied to the eyelashes (anjana) or the dark part of the eye (krsnima) cannot be directly seen by the eye in the same way as an object which is outside it can be seen by it, even so the yellow colour of the bilious matter cannot be seen by the eye; for like the black pigment applied to the eyelashes and the black part of the eye, the bilious matter is in the eye (netrastham). Starting with an unwarranted assumption that the bilious matter which is in the eye can be seen, the Prabhakaras argue

28. BS, Part I, verses 127-128½, p.139, for another example.

that the distinction between the two perceptions – the perception of the yellow colour of the bilious matter and the perception of the conch *minus* its true colour – is missed and hence their objects also happen to be undiscriminated for the time being. The whole explanation is thus rendered fallacious by the underlying assumption which is unfounded²⁹.

IV

ERROR AND THE SUBLATING COGNITION

We can bring out the untenability of the Prabhakara view in yet another way. The Prabhakaras cannot intelligibly account for the sublation by a subsequent cognition, which the erroneous cognition suffers. The nacre which is in front is first cognised as silver and we say: "This is silver." Subsequently we realise that it is not silver, but only nacre and the correction which takes place is conveyed by the negative judgment: "This is *not* silver." Correction involves negation and the implication of negation is that what is negated should have been the content apprehended, though falsely. If what is negated by the sublating cognition has not been the object of cognition, correction involving negation cannot arise at all. What alone is obtained as an object of cognition can be rejected; and it should be obtained as an object of erroneous cognition and not as an object of valid cognition. Error is only a form of false thinking which unhesitatingly claims to be true; it is only an appearance of knowledge (*jñanabhasa*).³⁰ That is why it admits of sublation. And whatever is sublated subsequently should have been presented to consciousness earlier. The sublating cognition as embodied in the judgment: "This is not silver" implies that the silverness which is denied of the "this" should have been previously predicated of it. Only if the "this" which is in front is cognised as silver, it can suffer contradiction to the effect that it is not silver, at a subsequent time. The difficulty with the theory of *akhyati* is how, if its explanation of what is known as erroneous

29. BS, Part I, verses 129-131, p. 140.

30. Vide Joachim, *Nature of Truth*, (The Clarendon Press, Oxford) p. 142: "Error is that form of ignorance which poses, to itself and to others, as indubitable knowledge; or that form of false thinking which unhesitatingly claims to be true, and *in so claiming* substantiates and completes its falsity."

cognition were true, the sublating cognition can arise at all. Without admitting the existence of error in a positive sense, the Prabhakaras, we saw, argue that the so-called error consists in the failure to distinguish between the presented fact and the memory-image. There is no mis-apprehension of what is given as something else, but there is only non-apprehension of the difference between presentation and representation. What is known as error is thus a negative non-distinguishing of the two experiences, the failure to realise their distinction and numerical duality. The theory of akhyati is fatally weak in that its explanation of error is in terms of non-apprehension of difference. Non-discrimination (*viveka-agrahanam*) is an *abhava*; it is the absence of discrimination (*viveka-grahana-abhava*), which can not claim anything for its content. Apprehension can claim a content; it makes known an object which is its content. But non-apprehension can claim no content; nothing can be made known by it, for it is *abhava*.³¹ If, as the Prabhakaras say, there is but non-apprehension of difference at the time of the shell-silver illusion, there is no content which is apprehended at all, for non-apprehension cannot claim anything for its content; and if there is no content apprehended at that time, there should be no sublating cognition at a subsequent time. The cognition of the object in front as silver, however, suffers contradiction to the effect that it is not silver. And this sublation will remain unexplained in the theory of akhyati.

Such a difficulty does not arise in the case of *viparita-khyati* according to which the object which is in front appears differently from what it is. If the nacre which is in front is cognised as silver or if the elsewhere and elsewhen silver is thought of to be here and now, it is a case of misapprehension, which, unlike non-apprehension, makes known a thing, though differently, and the error is rectified by the sublating cognition as embodied in the judgment: "This is not silver³²." It is true that the Prabhakaras in their explanation of illusion in terms of non-apprehension of difference refer to two cognitions, viz., perception and recollection. It is also admitted that in each cognition there is a content which is apprehended. The nacre which is in front is perceived as a generic "this" and silver,

31. BS, Part I, p. 143;

"na khalu agrahanam kasyacit prasanjakam; abhavo hi sah."

32. BS, Part I, v.140, p.142.

according to them, is the object of recollection. Each cognition, that is to say, makes known a certain object as its content. But the objects presented by them are not sublated by the subsequent cognition. The correction that follows is not in respect of the "this" which is in front; nor does it involve the rejection of "silver" as such. The sublating cognition, on the other hand, denies the silverness of the "this" which is in front; or it denies, to put the same idea differently, that the silver is in front. If what is denied is the silverness of the "this" or the here-and-now-feature of silver, there should have been a prior cognition to the effect that the object which is in front is silver or that silver is in front. This is no other than the viparita-khyati according to which the object which is in front is cognised differently from what it is. So long as this point is not conceded by the critics, they cannot account for the sublating cognition.³³

The Prabhakaras cannot argue that what is rejected by the sublating cognition is the non-apprehension of difference, the negative non-distinguishing between the perceiving and remembering or between the perceived and the remembered elements, as it is open to two objections. The rise of knowledge causes the removal of ignorance. Any cognition (jnana), as it takes place, cancels the prior non-apprehension (agrahana). Without causing the disappearance of the non-apprehension of a pot, its cognition cannot take place. The apprehension of a pot is *ipso facto* the cancellation of its non-apprehension. This is the very nature of cognition. What is claimed for the cognition as expressed in the judgment: "This is not silver" should be claimed for any other cognition. If the cognition: "This is not silver" cancels the prior non-apprehension, even so is it the case with regard to every other cognition; for every cognition, we pointed out, involves the cancellation of the prior non-apprehension. Just as the cognition as embodied in the judgment: "This is not silver" is on the face of it a sublating cognition (prasaktapratishedhadhih), so also the cognition of a pot, since it causes the cancellation of the prior non-apprehension, should be of the nature of a sublating cognition (prasakta-pratishedhatma). When we apprehend a pot, our cognition of it should assume the form: "That is not a pot," as in the other case the

33. BS, Part I, p.143.

cognition finds expression in the form : “ This is not silver ”; for in both of them there is the cancellation of the prior non-apprehension. The Prabhakaras dare not draw this conclusion as it is palpably absurd, even though the consistent application of their view that the sublating cognition negates the non-apprehension of difference would lead them to that position. We pointed out the absurdity to which we would be led if we take their explanation to be true and pursue it to the bitter end. It should be pointed out that the explanation which we are examining here is *prima facie* far-fetched and arbitrary. We should interpret the cognition that takes place as it is without twisting and torturing it. What is evident from the cognition as expressed in the judgment : “ This is not silver ” is that the “ this ” which is in front is not silver, that silverness is denied of the “ this ”. Any other interpretation in the context is not warranted³⁴. The Prabhakaras would only expose themselves to the charge that they deliberately falsify what is made known by the cognition as expressed in the judgment : “ This is not silver,” if it is construed as involving the cancellation of the non-apprehension of difference between the perceived and the remembered elements³⁵.

In order to free themselves from the difficulties pointed out earlier, the Prabhakaras may put forward an entirely different explanation. According to this explanation what is referred to as the sublating cognition is only a cognition which causes discrimination (*viveka-vijnana*) and not a sublating cognition (*prasakta-nisedhadhih*). What is lacking originally is discrimination between the perceived nacre and the remembered silver ; and the deficiency has been made good by the cognition as expressed in the judgment. “ This is not silver,” which arises subsequently, for it causes discrimination between the nacre which is perceived and the silver which is recollected. This explanation, in short, tries to set at naught the charges levelled against the theory of *akhyati* by maintaining that the subsequent cognition which arises in the case of what is called the shell-silver illusion is not a sublating cognition, but a cognition which causes discrimination.

34. BS, part I, verses 141-142, p.142.

35. BS, Part II, p.278.

This explanation, it appears, is remarkably ingenious. It cannot, however, stand examination. We cannot subscribe to the contention that what is referred to as the sublating cognition is a cognition which causes discrimination. If it is really a cognition which causes discrimination, it should assume a form different from the one which we find it assumes. Originally there is, it is said, non-discrimination between the nacre which is the object of perception and the silver which is the object of recollection. If the subsequent cognition makes good the deficiency by causing discrimination between them, it should find expression in one of these two ways: if subsequently both the nacre and the silver are seen so vividly at the same time that the one can be discriminated from the other, the cognition which causes the discrimination to arise should find expression in the judgment: "These are nacre and silver;" if, on the other hand, they are seen vividly, but one after another, the discrimination that arises should be conveyed by the judgments: "This is nacre," and "That is silver." It is in one of these two ways that the discrimination which arises subsequently should find expression, if it is, as the critics contend, the cognition which causes discrimination. But it finds expression in the judgment: "This is not silver;" it assumes, that is to say, a form which is totally different from the one it should assume, if it were the cognition which causes discrimination. The explanation of the critics should, therefore, be rejected. In so far as the cognition finds expression in the judgment: "This is not silver," it should be admitted that the silver is first cognised in unity with the "this" which is in front, that subsequently it suffers contradiction and that the correction involving contradiction is expressed by the judgment: "This is not silver". In other words, the cognition which finds expression in the judgment: "This is not silver" is only a sublating cognition and not a cognition which causes discrimination³⁶.

We can adduce another reason to show the untenability of this argument. A cognition which causes discrimination and makes known the nature of the object will not be of the nature of a sublating cognition. This will be quite evident if we consider the following example. A person cognises the nacre which is in front of him in a general way; silver at that

36. BS, Part I, verses 142-144, p. 142.

time is also in his memory. At first he is not able to discriminate the object which is before him from silver, since his vision is not clear; still he does not misapprehend it as silver. Subsequently, his vision becoming clear, he is able to cognise the object with the specific feature which characterises it and say that it is nacre. In the first stage when he cognises the nacre which is in front of him in a general way as the "this", there is no cognition of it as silver, notwithstanding the fact that silver was in his consciousness as a memory-image. Nor does he doubt at that time not knowing whether it is shell or silver. Doubt can arise only when two things are remembered at a time when the object which is in front is cognised in a general way. Since he remembers only silver at that time, he does not have doubt. He does not cognise the silver in unity with the "this" which is in front; nor does he think of it as something different from the "this" which is in front. In short, in the first stage when he cognises the object which is in front of him as the "this" keeping silver in his memory, his apprehension is so nebulous that there is neither misapprehension nor doubt nor discrimination. But in the next moment, his vision becoming clear he is able to gain insight into the nature of the object and declares that it is nacre. His cognition of it as nacre in the second stage is what we call *viveka-jnana*, the cognition which causes discrimination and makes known the nature of the object which is its content. It finds expression in the judgment: "This is nacre." One can say on the face of it that it is not a sublating cognition. It does not take place by denying that the "this" which is in front is silver. That would be possible only if the "this" is at first cognised as silver. We have already pointed out that the person does not cognise it as silver. That is why the cognition that takes place in the second stage does not find expression in the judgment: "This is not silver," but it is conveyed by the judgment: "This is nacre." It is, therefore, the cognition which causes discrimination and makes known the nature of the object, and not the sublating cognition. Just as the cognition which arises here is not of the nature of a sublating cognition, for it is a cognition which causes discrimination, so also the cognition which arises subsequent to the cognition of the nacre as silver should not be of the nature of a sublating cognition, since it is, according to the construction put upon it by the critics, *viveka-jnana*, the cognition which causes discrimination. This is, however, not true. The cognition as it takes place there does not warrant this interpretation. A cognition which causes discrimination and makes known the nature of an

object cannot assume the form of a sublating cognition ; and whatever is of the nature of a sublating cognition is *ipso facto* not a cognition which causes discrimination. It follows, therefore, that the cognition as expressed in the judgment : “ This is not silver ” is not *viveka-jnana*, the cognition that causes discrimination. On the other hand, it is only a sublating cognition.³⁷

V

EXPLANATION IN TERMS OF VIPARITA-KHYATI

We have shown that the explanation of illusion in terms of non-apprehension is not satisfactory. If non-apprehension of the difference between the nacre which is perceived and the silver which is recollected cannot satisfactorily account for the fact why the nacre is seized as silver, it can be supplemented, it may be argued, by another factor in order to make the explanation satisfactory and intelligible. There are *two* factors which determine why a person seizes the nacre as silver. One of them is the non-apprehension of the difference between the nacre and silver. The other factor is the cognition of the elsewhere and elsewhen silver as “ here and now ”. To put the second factor differently, the silver which is not in proximity is cognised to be so. It may, therefore, be said that on account of these two factors the object which is in front appears as silver or that silver is thought of as being “ here and now ”. In this explanation, it may be claimed, the sublating cognition which arises subsequently becomes quite intelligible.

We have to consider first of all what this explanation amounts to. Silver which is not in our proximity at this moment is cognised to be just in front of us coming into contact with our visual sense. The cognition of the here-and-now-feature of an object which is not really here-and-now is an instance of viparita-khyati. The explanation of illusion along these lines would take the critics to the enemy’s camp which they desperately try to avoid.

There is also another point in the foregoing explanation which we have to consider. It is not possible to agree with the contention that the

37. BS, Part I, p. 143.

two factors, viz., (1) the non-apprehension of the difference between the perceived nacre and the remembered silver and (2) the cognition of the elsewhere and elsewhen silver as being "here and now" determine why the nacre is seized as silver. Of the two, *agrahana* or non-apprehension is negative, and for the very reason that it is negative, it ceases to be a condition capable of giving rise to an illusion. The other factor, viz., the cognition of the here-and-now-feature (*sannidhi-graha*) of the object which is not really so is positive, and it is unquestionably the cause of illusion. It is not difficult to show how the illusion is caused by it. When it is realised subsequently that what has been in sense-contact is not silver, but only nacre, the illusion disappears along with its conditioning factor. The cognition of the elsewhere and elsewhen object as being "here and now" and the realisation of the truth that it is not "here and now", but something else (*viveka-graha*) are opposed to each other. In the absence of the latter, the former gives rise to the illusion. When there is the realisation of the truth, it suffers contradiction and stands cancelled. It alone is responsible for the illusion and not non-apprehension, which being negative is impotent to be the cause of it³⁸.

It can be shown on other grounds also that the theory of *akhyati* is indefensible. The Prabhakaras refuse to accept that in illusion one object is mistaken for another. Illusion, according to them, is simply a case of non-apprehension - the failure to note the distinction between the perceived and the remembered elements. In the place of mis-apprehension, they bring in non-apprehension of difference, and illusion comes to be characterised as an imperfect experience, the imperfection consisting in non-discrimination. What is the cause, according to them, of this non-discrimination, which is in their vocabulary a synonym of what is known as illusion? The answer is obvious: it is, according to them, non-discrimination which is responsible for the failure to distinguish the one from the other; and this is the only answer which is available to them. To put it plainly, the cause of non-discrimination is non-discrimination. One and the same non-discrimination cannot be the effect as well as its own cause. It is this absurdity which emerges from the Prabhakara theory of *akhyati*³⁹.

38. BS, Part I, pp. 143-144.

39. BS, Part I, verses 148-149½, pp. 142-143.

DREAM EXPERIENCE : REFUTATION OF THE PRABHAKARA VIEW

Further, the theory of akhyati breaks down when it is applied to dream experience. In dream experience there is the illusory cognition of objects which are not really there. Illusion, according to the Prabhakaras, arises on account of the non-apprehension of the difference between the perceived and the remembered elements. In dreams, however, such a non-discrimination cannot arise at all for the simple reason that there is no second object which is perceived other than what is remembered. It follows, therefore, on their account that there is no bhrama in dream experience, a conclusion which is palpably untrue⁴⁰.

The Prabhakaras are not without any explanation to meet this difficulty. It is necessary in this connection to refer to their explanation of dream. Dreams, according to them, are memory without the consciousness at that time that they are so. Let us see how dreams are treated by them as memory. The Prabhakaras argue that memory (smṛti) is a peculiar cognition. Its peculiarity consists in the fact that, unlike the ordinary cognition, it is the representative cognition of the already cognised (grhita-grahanam). Whereas in the case of perceptual cognition the object which is out there comes into direct contact with the visual sense, in the case of recollection the object is only represented in consciousness as a memory-image. Recollection, thus, is the cognition of the previously cognised by representation. Dreams are memory in that objects already cognised are recollected in them. But there is no awareness at the time of the dream experience that the dream-objects are but memory-images; and this is on account of the defect of the mind (mano-dosāt). As a result of this defect, objects which are only recollected are thought of to be really there in front at that time. It is forgotten at that time that there is *representative* cognition. When the representative element in that cognition is lost sight of as a result of the defect in the mind, what remains is cognition as such and it appears, therefore, at that time that the objects are there in front, and that they are directly apprehended. When the dream experience

40. BS, Part I, p.144.

is over, there is the realisation that dreams are but memory, that the dream-objects are but objects of recollection, even though there was no consciousness at that time that they were so⁴¹.

The Prabhakaras claim that the difficulty which we pointed out earlier can be overcome by this explanation. The cognition of objects which get illumined in dream experience to the effect that they are really there admitting of direct apprehension is what passes as *bhrama*. Therefore, the charge that in the Prabhakara theory there would arise the absurd conclusion that there is illusory cognition in dream experience should be withdrawn. Nor are they open to the objection that they have admitted by this explanation *anyatha-khyathi*. They *do not* maintain that in dreams objects are seen as other than what they are. On the other hand, due to the loss of representative element in the cognition that takes place there, memory-objects are seen simply as objects. The deficiency is made good and the lost element is restored, when there is the realisation of the truth: the waking experience brings back the consciousness that the objects experienced in dream are only objects of recollection. In short, this explanation does not make an opening for *anyatha-khyati*, since in dream experience there is *omission* of some relevant part of what is given.

A little examination is enough to show the difficulty involved in this argument. What is sought to be maintained by this argument is that dream is memory which recollects objects merely as objects stripped of the "recollectedness" in them, that the cognition of objects as objects to the exclusion of "recollectedness" which is a relevant characteristic of them is *bhrama* and that it suffers contradiction at a subsequent time when it is realised that they are recollected objects. The fundamental question which is involved here is whether a cognition becomes illusory just because there is a failure to note a relevant characteristic of the object apprehended. Is it correct to say that the cognition of objects in dream experience is illusory on the score that the objects apprehended are grasped incompletely, the incompleteness consisting merely in the omission to note the "recollectedness" which is a relevant characteristic of them? Obviously not. Let us elucidate by means of an illustration. When we see a person from a fairly long distance, we are able to apprehend him merely as an individual without noting his

41. BS, Part II, p.280.

complexion and other characteristics which he may possess. It is distance which prevents us from noting all these features. But when we are near, we are able to cognise the characteristics which he possesses and say that he is fair, etc. Are we to say that the cognition of the person merely as a person stripped of his association with the relevant characteristics like fairness, etc., which he actually possesses is illusory for the mere reason that there is a failure to note the characteristics of the person? It is true that what has been lacking originally has been made good by the subsequent cognition. But do we say on that account that the earlier cognition is illusory and that it suffers contradiction by the subsequent cognition? Commonsense tells us in unmistakable terms that the earlier cognition of the person merely as a person without the relevant features which he possesses is not illusory; nor is it correct to say that it stands contradicted by the subsequent cognition. If, as the Prabhakaras say, the cognition of objects in dreams is illusory, since there is a failure to note at that time the "recollectedness" which is a relevant characteristic of them, it should be said in the interests of consistency that the cognition of the person merely as a person robbed of the relevant features which he possesses is illusory. One can vote for this conclusion only by flying in the face of commonsense. The Prabhakara theory which seeks to show that the cognition of objects in dream experience is illusory on the ground that there is a failure to note the representative nature of the objects cognised at that time should, therefore, be rejected⁴².

42. BS, Part I, p.144.

The Importance of Commercial Co-operation and peaceful understanding in International Relations, explained with reference to Americo-Canadian Relation

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Reader in History and Politics

The aim of this paper is to consider the attitude of Wisconsin, one of the constituent states of the U.S.A., during the civil war period, as throwing some light on the importance of commercial cooperation and peaceful understanding in international relations.

Geographical position was a central factor in determining Wisconsin's interests in foreign trade during the period 1854-1865. Bounded by Lake Superior, Lake Michigan, and the Mississippi River, Wisconsin had many opportunities for direct trade with foreign countries. Situated within the zone of direct border influence of Canada, whose agricultural and industrial conditions were of great importance, this Mid-Western state had a boundary of seven hundred miles of navigable waters and direct water connection with the Atlantic and with the Gulf of Mexico. The Fox-Wisconsin River route connecting the Mississippi with Lake Michigan drew Canadians into Wisconsin for purposes of fur trade.

Economic strength resulting from the contributions of immigrant farmers, the states' favourable agricultural conditions, and the development of meat packing and tanning industries contributed to the development of exportable surpluses. As early as 1839, Wisconsin farmers around Milwaukee produced enough wheat to warrant export, and in 1841 Canada imported that surplus.¹ Meat and beef canned in Milwaukee were exported

1. John Giffin Thompson, *Rise and Decline of the Wheat-Growing Industry in Wisconsin* (Madison, 1909), 24, 32.

to foreign countries.² It was the interest in exports that motivated Wisconsin's producing areas and exporting centers in their active concern for harbour improvement and increased transport facilities.³ Finally, as the state's most important export center, Milwaukee competed with Chicago for leadership as a world market for wheat.⁴

A rich grain producing state like Wisconsin with more than fifty percent of her occupational groups consisting of farmers and farm-labourers⁵ and whose farm area was increasing at a very rapid stride could not be indifferent to the problem of foreign trade. But if she hoped to overshadow Chicago, her only hope was her wheat market. Milwaukee wheat, having earned a solid reputation in European markets, enabled that city to attract more and more grain from the Mid-West.⁶ Eventually Wisconsin farmers devoted themselves almost exclusively to raising wheat, and by 1860, Milwaukee rejoiced that Chicago was in danger of relinquishing its supremacy. Fired by this and similar indications of success, Wisconsin eagerly increased her exports, particularly to Canada and England, and developed her transport facilities as well.⁷

Improvements in transport and communication which were essential for the growth of foreign trade attracted the attention of Wisconsinites even during the Territorial period. One project which received wide support was for a trans-continental railroad which would stimulate trade

2. Bayrd Still, *Milwaukee* (Madison, 1948), 186.

3. Milwaukee *Sentinel and Gazette*, August 3, 1846; May 26, 1847; *Law of Wisconsin*, 1850, pp. 240-241, p. 244; Wisconsin *Assembly Journal*, 1854 Appendix; Wisconsin *Senate Journal*, 1854, Appendix.

4. A. C. Wheeler, *Chronicles of Milwaukee* (Milwaukee, 1861), 208.

5. W. F. Raney, *Wisconsin: A Story of Progress* (New York, 1940), 142.

6. The Mineral Point *Democrat*, November 26, 1845; Milwaukee *Advertiser*, January 28, 1837; John G. Gregory, *History of Milwaukee* (Chicago, 1931), I: 287; Still, *Milwaukee*, 62-63, 198.

7. *Annual Reports* of the Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, (hereafter cited as *Annual Reports*), 1857, pp. 4, 27; 1859, pp. 6, 27; 1860, p. 8; 1863, p. 8; Milwaukee *Sentinel*, January 30, 1849.

with the Pacific Northwest and the Orient. Although this dream did not materialize, various groups continued to agitate for the development of adequate transport facilities. Miners, lumbermen, and the exporters of breadstuffs sent frequent petitions to Congress, stressing the importance of improving transport.⁸

Improved waterways for fast and cheap transportation of the state's agricultural products to Eastern and European markets was also of great concern to the Wisconsin Legislature during the period 1848-65. The Legislature sought improved navigation on the St. Lawrence River, hoping to subordinate the Erie Canal route, suggesting that a ship-canal be constructed around the Niagara Falls so that vessels could sail directly to Europe without breaking bulk. It was Wisconsin's primary intention to establish direct commercial contact with European cities, which were the preferred markets among English traders. Milwaukee's private citizens also desired direct communication with England as they wanted to raise their city from a secondary position to the front rank in American foreign trade. ⁹It was for all of these reasons that Wisconsin was zealously interested in foreign trade and eager to facilitate it by means of developed and improved transport and communication.

The most immediate source of foreign trade for Wisconsin was Canada. Geographically contiguous, each used land and waters of the other for trade, transportation, and communication. Moreover, Canada was a lucrative market for Wisconsin's enormous wheat surpluses during the

8. Herbert William Rice, "Early History of the Chicago Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1938), 19; Railroads Correspondence (1856-1884), Box 1, series 1-1-3-2. (MSS. in possession of the Archives Division, Library of the Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison.)

9. Wisconsin *Assembly Journal*, 1854, Appendix; Wisconsin *Senate Journal*, 1854, Appendix; *Laws of Wisconsin*, 1850, pp. 240-241; 1858, p. 244; Milwaukee *Sentinel*, April 15, 1863; May 29, 1863; August 4, 1864; July 13, 1865; August 15, 1865.

period of 1846-70¹⁰. Wisconsin's interest in Canada also sprang from the rivalry between Milwaukee and Chicago. Interested in preserving its reputation in Canadian and European wheat markets, Milwaukee, with the encouragement of the government of Wisconsin, arranged for the importation from Canada of new and superior varieties of grain seeds to be distributed among local farmers to ensure the state a more generous yield of better quality wheat¹¹.

Furthermore, the Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce stressed the importance of commercial contact with Canada. It tried to put an end to the Northwestern trade monopoly of New York and Boston by diverting trade through Canadian canals and the St. Lawrence. Realizing that the ship-canal in Canada were extremely valuable for Wisconsin's foreign trade, Milwaukeeans preferred Montreal to New York as the great breadstuff depot and market for Wisconsin. The Mississippi trade, amounting to between four and five hundred million dollars per annum, also stimulated Wisconsin's interests in Canadian canals. For the flow of trade from the Mississippi to the East through her port to continue, Milwaukee needed additional transport facilities in the Canadian waters.¹²

Milwaukee favoured the Canadian canal route via the Ottawa River which would take its products from Milwaukee to Montreal in about five days, one-quarter of the time required for transport to New York. Together with the savings in time was the advantage of reducing the cost of shipment by two-thirds. Canada's railway connections as well as her waterways were useful to Wisconsin. Milwaukeeans hoped for a railroad which would connect them with Montreal, Toronto, and London (Canada), considering this project of great importance to their city.

10. Ray Hughes Whitbeck, *The Geography and Economic Development of Southeastern Wisconsin* (Madison, 1921), 60-62; Donald C. Masters, *The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854* (London, 1936), 73.

11. *Transactions of the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society*, IV, p. 17.

12. *Annual Reports*, 1857, p. 3; 1862, p. 32; *Milwaukee Sentinel*, February 5, 1863; August 26, 1863.

Wisconsin's Canadian interests became particularly important during the Civil war period. It was in 1862 that Milwaukee received and exported larger quantities of wheat than Chicago and became the largest primary wheat market in the world. When during the Civil War Wisconsin met renewed practical obstacles for direct intercourse with England, due to the unsettled state of foreign exchange, Canada was again able to help as middleman between the exporters and importers. The Canadian assistance was of substantial benefit, as the producers of Wisconsin wheat and breadstuffs sought to recoup in Europe the loss of the Southern market. Also the producers, in order to avoid the risk of capture by Southern raiders, preferred to send a considerable portion of their exports by way of Canada. Thus, despite unfavourable circumstances for direct European trade during the Civil war, Milwaukee, through the help of her own Chamber of Commerce and Canadian co-operation, was afforded considerable hope of realizing her commercial ambitions.¹³

Canada's interests in Wisconsin were not less important than those the state had shown in her. Of the British North American Provinces, Canada West alone produced a surplus of wheat, as ninety percent of the country's total land area was unsuited for profitable farming.¹⁴ For this reason and because of the low price of Wisconsin wheat in Canada East as well as the superior quality of the Milwaukee Club, Canada was interested in the import of Wisconsin's grain. Therefore, Canada shared Wisconsin's desire for a developed commercial relationship, in particular hoping to attract the state's trade through the St. Lawrence. It had been the long-standing ambition of the Canadians to divert the export of breadstuffs from Wisconsin and other western states to the St. Lawrence route.¹⁵

13. *Annual Reports*, 1857, pp. 4, 27; 1862, p. 32; 1863, p. 3; 1864, p. 3; 1866, p. 3; Masters, *The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854*, 185.

14. John MacCormac, *Canada: America's Problem* (New York, 1941), 223.

15. Masters, *The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854*, 6, 195; *Annual Reports*, 1859, p. 7.

Thus during this period Wisconsin and Canada, each in a position advantageous to the other, found their relationship stimulated and determined by commercial ambition and mutual benefit.

In February 1850, the Wisconsin Legislature memorialized Congress to secure the right of free navigation on the St. Lawrence River, pointing out to the need for means of exporting directly to Europe.¹⁶ The House Committee on Foreign Affairs responded by concluding that free navigation of the St. Lawrence be secured either by treaty or by reciprocal legislation.¹⁷ While these efforts were in progress, there was agitation in Canada for a reciprocity agreement with the United States. Finally in 1854, the United States and Britain on behalf of her Canadian colony concluded a reciprocity treaty which provided American shippers, among other things, free exchange of farm products and free access to the St. Lawrence River and the Canadian canals,

The decade following the conclusion of the treaty was most important for Wisconsin's foreign trade. Thus on the eve of the Civil War her wheat production led every other state in the Union except Illinois. However, heavy local traffic, together with increasing receipts from other states and the arrival of greater numbers of cattle and hogs for export to England rendered Milwaukee's storage facilities hopelessly inadequate. Moreover, having provided herself with a number of large new vessels to accommodate the expansion in foreign export trade, Wisconsin found herself and her chief port in an unusual and somewhat difficult position. Surrounded by a vast expanse of territory almost unlimited in productive resources naturally tributary to her and equipped with harbour facilities unequalled on the inland waters of a continent, as well as a road system of unprecedented magnitude and comprehension nearing completion, Milwaukee nevertheless had to depend on foreign trade to maintain her

16. *Laws of Wisconsin*, 1850, pp. 240-242.

17. Alex. W. Buel, *Report on Free Navigation of the St. Lawrence* (32 Congress, 2 session, Reports of Committees, House of Representatives. no. 4, Washington, 1853).

economic prosperity.¹⁸ If the domestic prosperity of Wisconsin was to be maintained and if Milwaukee was to continue her development and achieve her ambitions, a marked increase in facilities for transportation of products to foreign markets was essential. For this Wisconsin had to rely on the Reciprocity Treaty.

But in practice the treaty did not prove quite so beneficial as prophets had expected. Financial problems, coupled with protectionist feelings in Canada East, brought tariff reforms in Canada and increased duties on imported American manufactured goods.¹⁹ Moreover, to Wisconsin's distress, Canada showed indifference to improving the St. Lawrence waterway. Deriving enormous benefits from free trade with America, Canada did not care to rely upon the uncertain half-years' navigation of the river as an outlet for her surplus productions.²⁰ As a result, the development of direct trade with Europe was seriously impeded.

In 1858, Wisconsin again memorialized Congress, this time for the construction of a ship-canal around the Niagara Falls, but there was no action.²¹ The consequences of the Civil War, particularly the economic dislocation, the crowding of East-West railroads with government shipments, and the closing of the Mississippi, further aggravated the situation. As Anglo-American sympathy diminished the general hostility toward Canada mounted. This situation, coupled with the increased need for revenue in the Union, made Congress look more closely at the Reciprocity Treaty.

18. *Annual Reports*, 1862, 1863, 1864; *Transactions of the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society*, VII, pp. 58, 59.

19. James Morton Callehan, *The Alaska Purchase and Americo-Canadian Relations* (*West Virginia University Studies in American History*, 1908), 11, 12.

20. Israel T. Hatch, Report on reciprocal trade with Canada (36 Congress 1 session, House Executive Document No. 96, vol. 13, Washington, 1860); *Annual Reports*, 1862, p. 32.

21. *Laws of Wisconsin*, 1858, p. 244. Wisconsin's interest in the Niagara ship-canal for commercial purposes continued even after the Civil War. See her Senator Howe's arguments for it in *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 session (1865-1866), 3455-3460.

In 1861–62, the Eljah Ward Committee approved the continuation of the treaty with some necessary modification, but in December, 1863 J. S. Morrill of Vermont introduced a resolution requesting that the President serve notice on Great Britain for termination of the Treaty. During the session immediately preceding the presidential election, opposition to the treaty was strongly aroused by national hostility toward Great Britain. As a result of the St. Albans raid in October 1864, Congress grew irate over the South's use of Canada as base of operations and the decision of a Montreal magistrate discharging the raiders from all warrants. Finally, on December 13, 1864, the House passed a joint resolution giving the President authority to terminate the treaty.

Throughout the deliberation, Wisconsin had consistently worked for the drawing up of a new treaty. Senator Timothy Otis Howe of Wisconsin emphasized the importance to the United States of Canadian reciprocal trade, and objected to referring this purely commercial matter to the Foreign Affairs Committee rather than the more appropriate Committee on Commerce.²² A correspondent of the Milwaukee *Sentinel* wrote that there could be no real objection to the appointment of commissioners to work with those of Great Britain for a revision of the treaty²³. The ardent activities of the Wisconsin State Legislature, the enthusiastic efforts of the Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, the earnest speeches and actions of the state's representatives in the Congress, and the views of the public in general, demonstrated that Wisconsin viewed the problem of Canadian reciprocity purely from a *commercial* standpoint and tried her best to improve Americo-Canadian relations at a commercial level, avoiding unneighbourly actions likely to provoke political animosity. But all this was of little avail.

22. Hugh H. Keenleyside, *Canada and the United States* (New York, 1929), 143–144; *Congressional Globe*, 38 Congress, 1 session (1863–1864), 9, 19, 134, 1387, 2298, 2333–2338, 2364, 2452, 2453, 2478, 2482, 2502, 2508–2509; *Ibidl*, 2 session, 31–35, 71, 204–213, 226–234, 265, 267, 276, 277, 291.

23. Milwaukee *Sentinel*, March 21, 1864.

Motivated during the Civil War by commercial interests as well as a desire to preserve the Union, Wisconsinites favoured a policy of peace with the British. They showed concern over the prospects of an Anglo-American conflict, held unprejudiced views on crucial international issues, and made efforts to develop a temper of peace. The Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce indicated that even the apprehension of war with England had a depressing effect upon the wheat market, the very basis of their economy.²⁴

The Wisconsin press worked hard to maintain good relations with the British. The Wisconsin *State Journal* was emphatic in declaring, "We want no war with England; such a collision would be most deplorable"²⁵. Wisconsin editors, realizing the absolute necessity for peace, tried to develop that temper in Anglo-American relations. Thus they strove to erase war panic among the people of the state, reporting only those matters which would foster good relationships with the British and exposing and condemning anti-British propagandists. The press endeavoured to convince the public that England would not interfere in American affairs.

Wisconsin representatives in the Congress and delegates to conventions undertook, with the press, the task of discouraging a public panic at the prospect of an Anglo-American war. In 1862-63 when there was a loud outcry in the Congress against Canada, and several members brought forward canal schemes on grounds of military necessity, Wisconsin's representatives unanimously opposed the measures and alleged that there was no danger of war with England.²⁶

24. *Annual Reports* 1862, p. 11.

25. *Wisconsin State Journal*, December 17, 1861.

26. *Reports of Committees* (37 Congress, 1 session, Document No. 114 vol. 4); *Congressional Globe*, 37 Congress, 2 session (1861-1862), 742.

In addition, the Wisconsin newspapers, the Milwaukee *Sentinel*, Wisconsin *State Journal*, Racine *Advocate*, and Manitowoc *Pilot*, continuously and extensively published articles from British journals, speeches of the House of Commons, lectures of private British citizens, and views of the Established Church and the British clergies, in order to convince readers of England's sympathy toward the Northern states. These editors offered calm and candid reviews of the causes of irritation between the two countries, a fair statement of the errors on both sides, and intelligent conclusions as to existing feelings and probable future relations.²⁷

Thus during the Civil War the Wisconsin press and public leaders favoured a policy of peaceful understanding in Anglo-American relations.

But Wisconsin's commercial approach and her policy of peaceful understanding in Anglo-American relations had been of little avail. Instead, political considerations prejudicing many Americans ended Canadian reciprocity. In addition, there developed both a widespread Anglophobia and the bogie of annexing Canada, with the result that considerations of a commercial convention with the United States and her northern neighbour became impossible.

The British attitude during the Civil War contributed greatly to the deterioration of Anglo-American amity. Besides their recognition of the Confederate belligerence over the protests of U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward, the British were charged with laxity in allowing the escape of the *Alabama*, with naval blockade-running, and general sympathy for the Southern states.²⁸ These and other abuses contributed to the Union's resentment of the British.

27. Milwaukee *Sentinel* January 19, 1863; February 7, 1863; March 25, 31, 1863; February 8, 25, 1865; March 19, 1865; April 3, 11, 1865; Wisconsin *State Journal*, April 30, 1861; December 18, 1861; Racine *Advocate*, December 9, 1863; Manitowoc *Pilot*, February 12, 1862.

28. Keenleyside, *Canada and the United States*, 138.

In response to these provocations, Union leaders and newspapers maintained a policy of promoting the already widespread Anglo-phobia. Thus, such leaders as William H. Seward, Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, and Congressman, Isaac Arnold, fanned the flames of anti-British sentiment. Other responsible members of the Congress, such as Francis P. Blair of Missouri, Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, and Theodore M. Pomeroy of New York, urged the defense of northern lakes and cited the dangers of the Canadian canal policy. If these men had had their way, they might have precipitated an Anglo-American war.²⁹

Throughout the Civil War period the New York *Herald* and the Chicago *Tribune* contributed their considerable share to the anti-British campaigns. The former went so far as to ask the Congress to authorize the President to declare war on England if she dared even one overt hostile act. Pro-Northern Britishers blamed the New York *Herald* for the tense atmosphere, and even the American minister to Britain, Charles Francis Adams, feared that the *Herald* would foment war and felt it his duty to counteract the insidious influence of that paper. No less vigorous in their editorial campaigns were the Cleveland *Leader*, the Boston *Traveler*, Philadelphia *Inquirer*, and the St. Paul *Press*. The atmosphere created by the northern newspapers was anything but conducive to the sober, dispassionate consideration of issues relating to the British colonies.³⁰

29. J. M. Callahan, *Agitation of Lake Defenses during the American Civil War* (Johns Hopkins University Studies, edited by Herbert B. Adams, 1898), 136-167; *Congressional Globe*, 37, Congress, 2 session (1861-1862), 3030-3033, 3056, Appendix, 312-314; *Ibid.*, 3 session, 772, 903, 1546; 38 Congress, 1 session (1864), 1247.

30. William Clark, *Less Than Kin: A Study of Anglo-American Relation*, (London, 1957), 16-17; New York *Herald*, May 21, 1861; June 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 30; 1861; July 1, 9, 14, 23, 1861; October 10, 1863; New York *Tribune*, December 31, 1863; New York *Times*, July 27, 1861; November 25, 1861; January 21, 1862; December 15, 16, 1864; The Boston *Traveler*, December 20, 1861; Robin W. Winks, *Canada and the United States: the Civil War Years* (Baltimore, 1960). 223-224; Philadelphia *Inquirer*, December 14, 15, 1864; Masters, *The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854*, 138.

Besides the strong anti-British sentiment, there was a growing desire to annex Canada. Doubtless, the press agitation had influence on the American politicians, though they were already imbued with expansionist ideals. Secretary Seward's conduct since the conclusion of the Reciprocity Treaty with the British led many, including the British minister to America, Richard B. P. Lord Lyons, and the Colonial Secretary Henry Pelham Newcastle, to conclude that he favoured the annexation of the British Provinces. Seward was not alone in supporting annexation: the Canadians even saw symptoms of an expansionist spirit in the Senate Chaplain's prayer at the commencement of the session.³¹ Regardless of the expansionists' motives—to secure the Irish vote, or individual popularity, to achieve internal improvements through a war fright, to transfer the control of foreign policy from the executive to the legislature, or to retain a Republican majority after the Civil War—all the expansionists did their best to create a war psychosis.

In this atmosphere, an impartial and purely commercial approach to the question of a reciprocity treaty became impossible for most of the Americans who were to decide the fate of the agreement. Although mutually advantageous to Canada and the United States, the treaty, whose imperfections were not beyond correction, especially in view of Canada's willingness to compromise, fell victim to the political forces engendered by both wartime animosity and annexationist agitation on the part of influential Americans.

Those years of political considerations and threats of war were no less vital to Canada, which was then in a period of significant political evolution. During the Civil War period, leading Canadian statesmen of all parties strove diligently, but without success, towards confederation. Hampered by conflicting interests among the various Provinces, racial and religious prejudices between the English and French elements, and the lack of transcontinental railroads, as well as lack of popular support, the Canadian confederation movement hung in the balance.³²

31. Winks, *Canada and the United States*, 24, 57, 99–100.

32. C. G. D. Roberts, *A History of Canada* (Boston, 1897), 344–347.

Whether a real or imagined threat, the American attitude created an atmosphere of anxiety which favoured promotion of confederation, and served as a prime factor in bringing the Provinces together in a final surge for union.³³ Thus American hostility, threatening as it did in the midst of controversy and deliberations in forming a Canadian union, played a role of great importance in the constitutional history of the country. The antagonism with which the United States abrogated the Reciprocity Treaty and her politically motivated indifference to repeated Canadian efforts toward a new treaty, not only justified and strengthened Canadian fear, but provided the advocates of confederation with additional opportunities for vigorous propaganda.³⁴

America's attitude toward reciprocity drew the Provinces together, looking to each other for new avenues of protection from economic chaos as well as from the dangers of an American menace. It considerably strengthened the British North American federation movement with results opposite to those expected by the United States annexationists.³⁵

In the context of such circumstances, Wisconsin's attitude of commercial cooperation and peaceful understanding with the British during the Civil War period was worthy of consideration with reference to what "might have been" had the United States adopted such a policy in relation to Canada.

33. Winks, *Canada and the United States*, 338, 347.

34. J. H. Stewart Reid, Kenneth McNaught and Harry S. Crowe, *A Source Book of Canadian History: Selected Documents and Personal Papers* (Toronto, 1959), 192; Keenlyside, *Canada and the United States*, 142.

35. Among the works emphasizing the effects of American attitude on Canadian federation, the following are important: J. M. Callahan, *Alaska Purchase and Americo-Canadian Relations*, 29; Joe Patterson Smith, *The Republican Expansionists of the Early Reconstruction Era*, 99; Fred London, "The American Civil War and Canadian Confederation," *Royal Society of Canada Transactions*, series 3, XXI: 55-62 (1927); W. B. Munro, *American Influences on Canadian Government* (Toronto, 1929), 7-8; John Hamilton Gray *Confederation* (Toronto, 1872), 290-304.

Wisconsinites were not unmindful of the strained Anglo-American relations during the Civil War, the result of American resentment of what was considered premature recognition by Great Britain of the South as a belligerent nation ; they were not unaware of a pro-Southern attitude in official England ; nor were they blind to the fact that public opinion in Canada, too, was somewhat anti-Northern. But, for them "there was no friendship in commerce." Rather it was a satisfactory adjustment of conflicting interests. When old relations became suggestive of modifications new ones were to be sought, as profit and accumulation might suggest.³⁶ It was the hope of Wisconsin that the increase of commercial connections and intercourse between Canada and herself, and, in general, between Canada and the United States, would entirely and permanently unite them for peaceful co-operation in the grand work of developing the almost infinite material resources of both countries.³⁷ Influenced by her interests in foreign trade and advantageous geographical position, she did her best to maintain peace at the international level and develop her commercial intercourse with the British.

Although annexation of Canada would have been of commercial benefit to Wisconsin, the Badger State realized that a policy of coercion would only defeat the purpose. Her merchant John Johnston's exposition of that policy had become so famous as to find a place in the Derby Report on Reciprocity, submitted to the United States Government, wherein the author stressed a policy of conciliation rather than retaliation.³⁷ The *Milwaukee Sentinel* announced the general Wisconsin press attitude of peace when it stated, "We are in no hurry to annex Canada."³⁸

36. *Report of Joint Committee* of the two Houses of the Wisconsin Legislature, on the resolutions in regard to eastern transportation. *Senate Journal* (Wisconsin) 1863, pp. 545, 546.

37. Memorial by the Eastern Transportation Committee, May 1, 1863 in Wisconsin Expositions, Box 1, series 1-1-15-3. (MSS. in the possession of the Wisconsin State Historical Society Library, Madison.)

38. On May 24, 1865, the *Milwaukee Sentinel* stated: "We are in no hurry to annex Canada. We can only now advise them to study the theory of our Government and learn the lessons of genuine working practical honest democracy, if they have any desire to unite their fortunes with ours."

Similarly, there were in Canada many, who wished to co-operate with the United States in matters of trade, suggesting that if Britain became involved in a war with the United States, a policy of neutrality should be established.³⁹ Some were desirous of political union with the United States.⁴⁰ But an antagonistic policy of annexation and coercion, enforced in an atmosphere of fear and at a time when the Canadian confederation movement was in need of a force competent enough to rouse national sentiments, had been well utilized by men of talent as Macdonald and Galt. Employing America's attitude as a political lever, they were able to harmonize the various prejudices and local interests that stood in the way of confederation.⁴¹

In such circumstances, during the Civil War period, in place of a policy of coercion and retaliation a purely commercial approach to the Canadian question uninfluenced by animosity and political motives—as the one demonstrated by Wisconsin's attitude—might have brought about different results in the history of Americo-Canadian relations, by weakening the strong forces of fear and commercial necessity that expeditiously contributed to the growth of Canadian confederation.

39. J. M. Callahan, *The Alaska Purchase and Americo-Canadian Relations*, 15.

37a. E. H. Derby, *A preliminary Report on the Treaty of Reciprocity* (Washington, 1866).

40. New York *Sun*, January 14, 1893.

41. *Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces*, 8 Provincial parliament of Canada, 3 session (Quebec, 1865), 6-9, 32, 53, 64, 117-118, 173, 466, 531, 650, 833.

COMMERCE EDUCATION

IN

INDIAN UNIVERSITIES*

Dr. M. O. MATHEW

Head of the Department of Commerce

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, members of faculties and friends :

It gives me very great pleasure to address such a distinguished gathering as this, on the occasion of my taking charge of the Commerce Department of this University. I consider it my special privilege and honour to head this department when it is granted independent status and I thank the University authorities for giving me this opportunity. My difficulties and problems of running this department are very much lessened because it has already taken shape under the able guidance of Professor K. S. Sonachalam on whose friendship and guidance I can count in discharging my responsibilities.

When I was asked to deliver my inaugural address within a fortnight of my taking charge I was a bit puzzled because this practice was quite unknown in the University I am coming from, and because I was not sure whom I was to address and because there was no specified subject on which I was asked to talk. On an occasion like this, I am reminded of the famous inaugural addresses made by the Presidents of America when they assume charge of their exalted office. Anyway, I welcomed this as a good opportunity to know one another in this campus.

After a little thinking I decided to talk on "Commerce Education in Indian Universities".

* - Inaugural address delivered by Dr. M. O. Mathew on the occasion of his taking charge as Head of the Department of Commerce at the University.

Growth of Commerce Education :

In tracing the growth of Commerce education in India I shall confine myself to University education in Commerce as distinct from Institutes and Schools meant for special training in Secretarial or specific skills and other routine operations normal to the conduct of business affairs. It is not intended to include a description of University curricula in my talk.

The special Committee on Commerce Education, 1961, gives a ready-made narrative of growth of commerce education in India. Commerce education began in India as early as 1886 when the first commercial school was started in Madras by the Trustees of the Pachaiyappa's Charities and round about the same time the Madras Government instituted examinations in commerce. Government of India started a School of Commerce in Calicut in 1895. In 1903 Commerce classes were started in the Presidency College, Calcutta. Between 1903 and 1912 commercial institutions were also started in Bombay and Delhi and provision was made for training in typewriting, shorthand, letter-writing and business methods. Commerce education at the Collegiate or the University level began with the establishment of the Sydenham College of Commerce and Economics in Bombay in 1913. The subsequent years saw the spread of commerce education both at the school and college levels all over the country.

By 1961, Commerce had become a special subject of study in 35 Universities in India apart from the many Secondary Education Boards in India and non-university institutions of a professional character like the Indian Institute of Bankers, Institute of Chartered Accountants, Institute of Cost and Works Accountants of India etc.

The extent to which commerce education has grown in India during recent years can be seen from the fact that to-day as many as 4,00,000 persons are either taking instruction or appearing for some type of commerce examinations. The 35 Universities and their colleges which

teach commerce as a subject have an annual intake of about 22,000 pupils for B.Com. and 2,000 for M.Com. courses. Thus it will be seen that commerce education in this country has a fairly long history. But when compared with other faculties like Medicine, Engineering, Law etc., commerce education has only a late development because of the fact that until recent years, trade was simple and required few specialised techniques. Production was the main problem and therefore the emphasis was on industrial and technical education.

Definition :

Now I shall try to define Commerce education. Commerce education in its early days consisted of the study of shorthand, typewriting, book-keeping and allied subjects. The changed character of business enterprise gave a new orientation to this branch of knowledge and now it is considered an important branch of technical and professional education. Here it is worth quoting Mr. Nichols. According to him "Commerce education is a type of training which while playing its part in the achievement of the general aims of education on any level, has for its primary objective the preparation of people to enter upon a business career, or having entered upon such a career to render more efficient service therein and to advance from their present levels of employment to higher levels."

Aims :

What is Commerce education aiming at producing? The Report on University Education by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says that the objectives of the commerce course in the Universities are not clear. Whatever be the branch of education, according to President Radhakrishnan "the aim of education should not be just to produce people who are better informed and more skilled. The products of good education should be better human beings. Education should have both breadth and depth." In other words, "commerce education should lead to the cultivation of the mind, develop the capacity to

distinguish between valid and fallacious reasoning, impart a sense of social responsibility and functional integrity." A very broad statement that, Commerce education is aimed to provide for a successful business career subject to the same limitations as apply to the casual relationships between University education and success in life. What makes a good business man is not really education in commerce; this may make him better than he otherwise may be, or keep him from being bad; or at least the prospect of success in a business career is raised and what is equally significant, the causes of business failure are purposefully understood, if the businessman has had a course of university education in commerce. In other words a commerce degree is not a guarantee of a successful business career. It only gives the correct background. Much depends on the individuals concerned.

Whatever may be the outcome, the students of commerce are expected to develop knowledge of the principles and practice of commerce, to understand and analyse the structure and operation of the world of business, understand specific business and economic situation and arrive at well informed judgment. This means that the commerce student has to develop his personality, the art of handling people and the power of communication. A bare statement of the aims and objectives is enough to show the great importance of commerce education.

In view of the increasing importance of commerce, there has been a tendency in Indian Universities to develop the Commerce Department as a distinctive Department or faculty and offer specific degrees in Commerce. There seems to prevail a great similarity in curricula of different Universities, though the title of certain subjects may be different sometimes.

Here it may be mentioned that the developments at the British Universities indicate diversity in the relative importance of commerce as a distinctive faculty and as a distinctive branch of knowledge.

It is desirable to develop distinctive commerce curricula at the Indian Universities, so that the training of responsible businessmen may not be outweighed by more traditional branches of knowledge, without losing the basic characteristics of University education, namely, amenability to systematic analysis and useful generalisations and ability to stimulate intellect rather than place a premium on the faculties of memory and repetition. A good commerce course should be a combination of good economics, social and institutional structures and a good quantum of empirical studies.

Practical Bias :

It is not possible to arrive at this ideal exclusively by class room lectures. Commerce is essentially a field that extends from the University into the business world and the University cannot give that part of knowledge and experience which the student must and should gain from his practical experience. In other words, commerce education is incomplete without a dose of practical training.

I will add only this much. If commerce education has an ideal, it is to train a person in the art of decision-making in relation to business, by providing for a proper synthesis of knowledge and by equipping him with thorough analytical ability. It may be argued that every student of commerce does not become a decision maker and that many potential decision makers may have to start from subordinate positions. However, the training in the field of decision making develops the commerce student into a more responsible businessman. How this practical training is to be provided is a separate issue by itself and I do not intend discussing it at the moment.

Research :

Another point I want to emphasise is research. When compared to Science and Technology, the Faculty of Commerce does not attract many for research in India. Perhaps it may be lack of opportunities, or facilities or due to late developments. It is wrong to think that there is nothing much to do in the field. It is wide and if only one has the aptitude and fervour, much can be done. Hence the faculties of commerce must

develop far greater research mindedness than what exists to-day; and it must be realised that even abstract subjects like accountancy provide sufficient scope for theoretical analysis. This ensures that the teachers improve themselves as time rolls on by keeping themselves abreast of not only current literature but also modern techniques of analysis and presentation. Further, the student gets the impression from the lectures of research minded teachers that the latter carry conviction in their points, and they get inspired by the depth of thought underlying the lectures in the classes. This needs aptitude for research, all facilities like library and so on.

Seminar :

Further the seminar type of instruction must be developed. The commerce students will gain more from it specially because it is in the nature of their specialisation that they have to work in committees, and groups, understand the 'other man's point of view' and come to conclusions. This will encourage the students to exchange their ideas, express their views and finally come to a conclusion. Further, the best academic atmosphere will be developed among the teachers themselves in the preparation of empirical studies etc. It may be mentioned here that the existing structure of instruction in most commerce faculties in India tend towards repetitive exercises in certain subjects and an undue description so far as the other subjects are concerned.

Social Responsibility :

I have to add only one more point before I conclude. While talking about the aims of commerce education I made mention about socially responsible business man. I shall attempt to clarify that point very briefly. Man is a social being and if he is true to his society he has to take social interests first and then his private interests. Though this is true in all walks of life, this is of particular significance to the business man and so to a product of any commerce faculty. Social responsibility refers to the obligations of business man to pursue those policies, to make those decisions or follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of objectives

and values of our society. The individual business man often fails to realise fully the connection between his private life and public life. He knows that his business represents only a small portion of the total economy. But he fails to realise at times that added together the decisions of business men, big and small, in a large measure determine such important matters as the amount of employment and prosperity, the rate of economic growth, the distribution of income, organisation of trade and industry and so on. In other words, the businessman in his anxiety to fulfil his obligations and responsibilities to his shareholders should not only concentrate on declaring the highest rate of dividend or maximise the share value in the stock exchange but also on social obligations. Of course this is his prime duty for which he is paid ; but in doing so the other aspect of it, namely his social responsibilities should not be overlooked. That is, a business man when he takes a decision should consider along with his own interests some of the following questions at least :

1. What will this decision mean in terms of standard of living ?
2. Is it consistent with economic progress ?
3. Does it promote economic stability ?
4. Is it good for personal security ?
5. Is it just ?
6. Is it good for the community ?
7. Is it honourable ?

It will be out of place to go into the details of each one of these points. But I shall touch upon only the last one viz. Is it honourable ? Personal integrity is a virtue all should possess, more particularly the business man. He should maintain high standards of honour in all his activities and transactions by being true in advertising, observing contracts, being fair in relation to his competitors, avoiding financial manipulations, complying with taxation laws and so on. In short, he should consider it his bounden duty to adhere to the "rules of the game" in letter and spirit.

This is what society expects of a true businessman and assuming that most of the products of the commerce faculty are going out into the business world in some capacity or other the responsibilities of the department and the University are very great.

Well gentlemen, I was trying to present very short description of commerce education and some of the ideals we should aim at in executing our obligations. I shall, in my capacity as Head of Commerce Department of this University, endeavour to do my best to uphold the high traditions of this University and bring up the department to a high standard.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN OF URDU AND HINDU POETS OF THE URDU LANGUAGE*

BY

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I am grateful to the authorities of the Annamalai University for having invited me to deliver a course of three lectures connected with Urdu and Hindi languages and literature. I have selected for my theme to day a short History of the origin of Urdu and 'Hindu Poets of Urdu language.' My purpose is inter alia to focus the attention of my noble listeners on the fact that Urdu is as much the language of the Hindus, at least in North India, as it is of the Muslims. It is a common heritage of these two great communities and others living in our Motherland and both of them have contributed in no small measure to its growth and development. My second lecture will be on 'A short survey of the growth of Hindi and 'Muslim Poets of the Hindi Language.' This is intended to bring out the fact that Muslims had taken quite seriously to the native language and contributed to its growth and richness. They had realized that, after all, languages were a sign of God and did not, and shall not lead to unhealthy differences. Man was heir to all human achievements, in all the fields of progress and learning, scientific, technical or linguistic. My third lecture will be on 'Iqbal, his poetry and philosophy.'

Now, for the origin and development of the Urdu language and literature. The word Urdu is of Turkish origin and denotes 'Camp' or 'Bazar in a Military Camp.' Its origin was not a result of any movement or even a planned effort, 'Necessity is the mother of invention and that was true of this language also as we shall notice presently.

The main source of Urdu is Brij Bhasha, which, in turn, was the language of Brij – the fertile land of Mathura, Gwalior and its environs. Long before the Aryans came to India, Brij Bhasha was spoken all over

*The substance of a course of special lectures delivered at the University.

North India, When the Aryans came, they brought with them the Sanskrit language. The Aryans came as conquerors and therefore, quite naturally called their language Sanskrit which means 'the elegant, the pure, the refined and even sacred.' Philologists tell us that the word 'San' stands for 'the Perfect' and Kṛit means 'that which is made.' Thus Sanskrit came to connote, the pure and perfected language. In contrast to this, the languages that were already in vogue before the advent of the Aryans, came to be called 'the Prakrit.' Thus Maghadi (Pali) Sor Seni, Maharashtari etc. are known as Prakrits. The word 'Prakrit' means, that which is natural, that which comes out without an effort. In course of time, words of Sanskrit origin got into the Prakrits of the land with the result that the Prakrits appear like daughters of Sanskrit and follow very closely the grammar and syntax of the Mother language. Even Sanskrit, despite efforts to keep up its pristine purity, did not escape the natural laws governing languages of people who live together.

But the rise of Shakyā Muni, the founder of Buddhism, brought about a mighty revolution. He rose from the Magadh Des and began to preach in the Prakrit of that country, the Magadhi. The Buddha had to deal with the masses and therefore he elected to address them in their native tongue. His fiery speeches and irresistible logic carried conviction to the heart of his listeners and Buddhism spread like wildfire. It swept every thing before it including Sanskrit. In a short time, the tables were turned and Magadhi had replaced Sanskrit in every walk of life. The servant maid had become the Queen, and the queen became a fugitive in her own realm !

But change is the most unchanging phenomenon of life. Fifteen hundred years after the great Buddha, there arose Shankarachariya who by his tireless efforts, resuscitated Brahminism and brought back Sanskrit to its original glory. The reign of Vikramaditya gave a great impetus to the Sanskrit language. To this age belongs also that immortal Poet Kalidasa, who, by his epoch-making work, Sakuntala, brought back permanently the glory of the Sanskrit language. Sanskrit was again to be the language of the learned and Prakrit, the language of the common man.

Towards the end of the tenth century of the Christian Era, when Raja Bharat ruled over north India, Brij Bhasha was the Prakrit of the land, whilst Sanskrit continued to be the language of the learned. It was at this time that another mighty change came about in the political firmament of the land. It was the advent of Islam into India. It ushered into existence when revolution which affected, among other things, the language of the country as well. The laws governing the growth of languages are far more imperative than the laws that govern men. The laws that had operated between Sanskrit and the Prakrits of the land now also began to operate between, Arabic, Persian and Turkish, which the newcomers brought with them and the Prakrit that was spoken by the people of the land. And since the Muslims settled in the north where the people spoke the Brij Bhasha, the interaction between the languages of the newcomers and that of the earlier settlers become a paramount necessity. Thus it was that this fusion went on apace between the Brij Bhasha, the Prakrit of the land and the languages, which the newcomers brought with them.

Let us briefly examine this fusion. The names of things that the Muslims brought with them naturally got into the Prakrit, Brij Bhasha viz. Payjama, Kurta, Romal Shawl, doshawla, Burqah (Dress) Chapati, Pulav Khorma, Hammam, Sabun, Musk, Namaz, Roza, 'Id, Khazi, Dallal, Vakil Purdah, to name a few from a myriad, got into the Brij Bhasha, laying the foundation of Urdu. The Brij Bhasha therefore is the mother of the Urdu language, whilst Arabic, Persian and the Turkish, contributed enormously to its richness and variety. It will not be untrue to say that the body of the Urdu language was moulded with the earth of Brij Bhasha which, in its turn, was enormously influenced by Sanskrit. Mark the Sanskrit words in Urdu :—

1. Gruha — Ghar (Urdu) — House
(Sanskrit)
2. Ata (Sanskrit) Atta (Urdu) — flour
3. Chander (Sanskrit) Chand — Urdu — Moon
4. Dugdh (Sanskrit) Dud (Urdu — milk) — Milk,
and a host of others besides.

This fusion was further accelerated by the emergence of a talented poet on the scene. This was no other than that prince of Poets, the Silver-tongued Amir Khusrow who flourished during the Sultanate period at Delhi and died in 1325 A.D.

He wrote voluminously and all his works were directed to accelerate the fusion of these languages. He is rightly called the father of the Urdu language, its veritable Chaucer. His famous book Khaliq Bari running into several volumes is an attempt at giving equivalents of Arabic and Persian words in the Brij Bhasha. He was a Muslim Mystic and I shall notice his contribution in greater detail in my second lecture, under Muslim Poets of Hindi.

Amir Khusrow set a model for others similarly inclined. The end

کبیر سریر سرائے ہے کیوں سو سکے چین

کوچ نگار اسانس کا باجے ہے دن رین

of the fifteenth century saw the birth of that great poet and Mystic, Kabir Das, whose poetry contributed immensely to this fusion. He was the disciple of Guru Ramanand. He uses Arabic

and Persian words freely in his poetry. I shall also reserve Kabir for my next lecture.

Baba Tulsi Das Brahman who flourished in the seventeenth century earned undying name and fame by his Hindi Ramayana. He freely draws upon Arabic and Persian words in his Ramayana.

مایا کو مایا ملے کر کر لے ہاتھ

تلسی داس گریب کو کوئی نہ پوچھے بات

His contemporary Sur Dasji who was a great Bhakta of Sri Krishna

also freely draws upon Arabic and Persian words in his lyrics devoted to his beloved Sri Krishna. He says .

لیجئے پاراتا رسور کوں ہماراج برج راج
نن کرت کھت پر بھوتم سوں سہ گریسج نوا

Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh faith has contributed not a little to this linguistic fusion: here is a Dohra:

ساس ماس سب جیو تمہارا تو ہے کھرا پیارا
نانک شاعر اے کھت ہے: سچے پروردگارا

And when Hindu Saints and seers used Arabic and Persian words freely in their poetry it may be imagined how much the common man must have been attracted to these new forms of expression, leading to the ultimate fusion of Brij Bhasha with Arabic and Persian. This fusion culminated finally in the emergence of the Urdu language.

This fusion of Brij Bhasha with Arabic and Persian reached its high water mark in the reign of Shah Jehan. He was a great builder. He built New Delhi with its Red Fort, and called it Shah-Jehan-abad. It was here that a gamut of races and professions was brought together to live in the New City. The stage was set for the emergence of a new language. The fusion of Brij Bhasha with Arabic and Persian had already been carried on for the last three hundred years and more. The new language took its birth officially in the vast Imperial camp at Delhi and was christened Urdu—a Turkish word for a camp!

As in the earlier centuries, so in later years; if there is a Ghalib whose Muse directed him to write immortal verses in Urdu, there is among the Hindus Har Gopala whose poetic pen-name was Tufta who wrote elegant verse in this language. Ghalib calls him 'the full Moon of the

dwelling of the heart.' If

Abdul Haleme Shara wrote his celebrated Novels who

can deny the position of Pundit Ratan Nath Sarshar who wrote his Monumental work in Urdu prose 'Fasanai Azaq' besides several other works. Indeed the study of Urdu literature would not be considered to be complete unless one has studied this epoch-making work of Pundit Ratan Nath. I shall notice below just a few of the Hindu Poets and prose writers who have left their indelible impressions on the language and literature of Urdu. And these are only a few from among a myriad :—

Tilok Chand (born 1885) wrote under his poetic name Mahroom and has a voluminous Divan (anthology) of Urdu verse to his credit. He is known through out India not only for the beauty and elegance of his verse, but also for the didactic nature of his poetry. The famous Urdu poet Akbar Allahabadi writes about him :—

ہے داد کا مستحق کلام محروم
لفظوں کا جمال معانی کا ہجوم
ہے ان کا سخن مفید و دانش آموز
ان کی نظموں کی ہے بجا ملکیت

“Mahroom's verses richly deserve our acclamation for the elegance of his expression and the profundity of thought. His verses contain wisdom and guidance and richly deserve the approbation and popularity they have acquired in the country.” And when it is realised that poets are highly critical of one another, this appreciation of Akbar is highly significant. His equally talented son Jagannath Azad, is also a poet of high order and the

Govt. of India have appointed him as the editor of their monthly, Ajkal, issued in Urdu from New Delhi. I give below a specimen of Mehroom's verse :—

نہیں گویہ قید مکان و زمان تو زمیں پر فضائیں سر آسماں تو
کہوں کیا کہاں ہے نہیں جے کہاں تو نہاں تو عیاں تو یہاں تو وہاں تو
جدہر دیکھتا ہوں ادھر تو ہی تو ہے

“Though Thou are not encompassed by Time and Space, Still thou pervadest the Earth, the space and the sky ; what shall I say where Thou art or thou are not : Thou are manifest : Thou art here. Thou art there : Indeed wherever I look, I look to the Beatitude of Thy Glory.” Trilok Chand is the Hali of the Urdu Language, who used his verse as a vehicle of social reform and inculcation of lofty ideals.

Another celebrated Poet from amongst this vast galaxy of Hindu poets of the Urdu language is Pandit Brij Narsyan (born in 1882). His Poetic Pen-name was Chankbast. His poetry is full of pathos and his diction is characterised by purity and terseness. The originality of his lofty thoughts adds lustre to his compositions. Above all, his poetry is patriotic to the core. On the death of Bal Gangadhar Tilak he wrote :

اٹھ گیا دولت ناموس وطن کا وارث قوم مروت کے اعزاز کھن کا وارث

The inheritor of our ancient national heritage is, alas, no more ! No more is the inheritor of the Nation's wealth and Greatness.

His following verses are on the lips of all those who are endowed with any taste for the Urdu language.

درد و دل پاس و فاجذبہ ایماں ہوتا راد میت ہے ہی اور یہی انسان ہوتا
زندگی کیا ہے عناصر میں جلو رتیب موت کیا ہے انہیں اجزا کا پریشان ہوتا

Sympathy for others, loyalty and piety constitute the best part of human nature ;.....

What is physical life except the poise of pathological elements and death is another name for their getting scattered away. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru wrote about him : The poetry of Chakbast is characterised by pathos and colour.....The poet's excellence in Urdu verse is recognised by all his contemporaries."

Raghupathi Suhai (born in 1896) wrote under the pen name Firaq. He was born in Goraghpur. He was a master of the Technique in Urdu verse. He came under the spell of Gandhiji's magnetism and suffered incarceration for the country's sake. Here are some specimens of his poetry :

ویراں پڑے ہیں اشیائے
کیوں آنکھ لگی ہے ڈبڈبانے

آ رہا گلزار ہے قفس میں
تھا ذکر کرم فراق اس کا

"Half of the Garden is behind the bars: the nests are all deserted by the birds:

O Firaq: the talk merely centred round the goodness of the beloved; how is it then that the eyes swell with tears!" Mark the pathos in the lines; how well he describes the condition of the country during the days of the Non-co-operation Movement led by Gandhiji. Perhaps the beloved referred to in these lines is the Father of the Nation himself!

Pandit Brij Mohan Dattatriya (1866) wrote under the pen name Kaifi. He was a great lover of Urdu poetry which passion he had inherited from his Kashmiri forefathers. This is how he gives vent to his appreciation of what Urdu stands for. He says :

امتیاز اس کو تو انسان سے انسان میں نہیں
 حسد و رشک کا خار اس کے گلستا میں نہیں
 فرق اس کے لئے گہر و مسلمان میں نہیں
 اس کو تمیز ذرا وید میں قراں میں نہیں

As far as it (Urdu) is concerned, it does not differentiate between

man and man: its garden is completely free of the thorns of rivalries and jealousies. It makes no difference between the fire-worshipper and the Muslim; it does not distinguish between the Vedas and the Quran." Then he invites the nation to the service of the languages in the following words :

آتے ہم کریں مل جل کے سب خدمت اسکی
 کیونکہ ہے اس کی بڑائی میں وطن کی عظمت
 کیونکہ اصل اسکی ہوالات و رواداری ہے
 اسکی گھٹی میں محبت و وفاداری ہے

Then come along so that we stand united to serve it; for in its greatness lies the grandeur of our country.....For this language is born out of tolerance and co-operation. Love and fidelity are its very essence.

It is fairly evident from the foregoing discourse that the origin of Urdu was neither due to any movement nor to any deliberate plan. Necessity was its mother and usefulness was its guarantee for continuance and permanence. The very texture of the Urdu language, its very composition is such that it assimilates all languages, Prakrit and Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian and Turkish. It welcomed English, when it came to India, and today there are scores of English words that have gained currency

in the Urdu language. And I will not be surprised if the Urdu word is not derived from the Tamil word 'Tookkam' sleep. It is this spirit of synthesis in the Urdu language that gives it its variety and richness, its beauty and symphony: It is like the Taj Mahal, accepting the Red Stone from Gollkunda, Lapslaze from Italy, its designers from Persia and builders from India. Urdu is also called the Rekhta, which word connotes strength. Who can deny that the language is strengthened by so many diverse sources and materials !

اونگن

It has been noticed earlier that this fusion of Brij Bhasha and Arabic, Persia and Turkish was brought about by the joint efforts of both the Hindus and the Muslims. Amir Khusrow, Kabirdas, Tulasidas, Surdasji and Guru Nanak had all contributed to it. The same tradition was kept up during the years that followed. It has gone on till our own times: and both Hindus and Muslims freely contribute to the ever increasing richness and variety of Urdu language and literature. This language is thus the common heritage of both the communities.

There are a myriad Hindu poets of the Urdu language besides, but I should not tire out my noble listeners. I refer to printed books on the subject such as *Hindus and Urdu*, *Yad-e-Raftagan* and *Some selected Hindu poets of the Urdu Language*. Even these books give only the selected poets. There are many more who bide their time for recognition and notice. It is worthy of note that whilst the two hundred years of British rule in India could only boast of a Sarojini Naidu, the nightingale of India and Tagore who wrote exquisite English verse, the Muslim Association with this great country could produce such a vast multitude of Hindu poets of the Urdu language and is still producing it.

Of Hindu prose writers of the Urdu language, mention has already been made of pandit Sar Shar. Of the several other prose-writers, I would content myself with mentioning Muslim Prem Chand. Born in 1881 in a poor family, he was a prolific writer of both Hindi and Urdu prose. His stories and novels are a true mirror of the intricacies of human nature, and therefore have a permanent value.

Besides, the best press of Urdu for a long time was Nisal Kishore press belonging to Munshi Nival Kishore. One of the best and the most voluminous works on the History of Urdu language and literature was produced by Ram Babu Saksina, in the English language. Thus it should be abundantly clear that the part played by Hindu poets and prose writers in the development of Urdu language and Literature is immense both in quality and volume. Both the communities, by what appears to be a Divine dispensation, are the proud inheritors of this vast store-house of knowledge embedded in the Urdu language. Politics is ephemeral but literature is permanent.

I can do no better than close this lecture with the words of our beloved Prime Minister in the context of the future of Urdu in our mother land. He says. "As far as India is concerned, I do not remember the actual figures but there are not less than four crores of people speaking this language in its various forms. Besides this, vast numbers of people understand it through out the country. It is obvious that there are great possibilities of the progress of the language. This is based on the firm foundations of Sanskrit and it has deep and abiding association with Persian. Thus it can largely draws upon the treasure of both for its greatest enrichment".

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HINDI LANGUAGE AND ITS MUSLIM POETS.

In the lecture I delivered yesterday I dwelt at some length on the Hindu poets of the Urdu language. This lecture is intended to emphasize the fact that Muslims had taken to the study of Hindi as keenly as the Hindus had taken to the study of Urdu. There was such a great reciprocity and understanding among them on the issue. The result was that both the languages were enriched. Their breadth of vision had yielded good intellectual dividends.

A word about the origin and development of the Hindi language. The word Hindi itself is of Persian origin. It is also used in Arabic in that form. It means one belonging to Hind. It is suggested by some philologists that the letter 'S' of Sanskrit is interchangeable with 'H' of Persian. Thus the Sanskrit words Sindh and Sindhi are Hind and Hindi of the Persian tongue.

Etymologically, Hindi may mean any language that is spoken in India. Indeed in the Middle East Countries even peoples living in Hind are known as Hindi, whatever their race or religion. But this word generally indicates all the dialects and languages spoken in Central India, such as Avadhi, Brij Bhasha, Sorseni and others. But nowadays, the use of the word Hindi is restricted to Modern literature of that language.

As has been observed earlier, Sanskrit was the language of the learned and the ruling classes in Ancient North India and 'Prakrit' the language of the masses. This Prakrit was further divided into two dialects: one was Brij Bhasha (i.e. the language spoken in the land of Brij which is another name for Mathura) and the other 'Porabi Bhasha' (the language of the Eastern regions, by which is intended the province of Oudh). Out of these two arose Hindi somewhere in the year 700 (Bikrami Samvath). This language was originally spoken in the vicinity of Delhi, Meerat Lucknow etc. but gradually it spread over the whole of Uttar Pradesh and in,

some form or another over the whole of North India. And though the language was in use ever since the 10th Century of the Christian Era or even earlier, it developed into literature only at the beginning of the 19th century. The language of the earlier period viz. the period of Amir Khusrow, Tulsi Das, Surdas and Guru Nanak is ancient Hindi, otherwise known as Avadhi and Brij Bhasha.

The first poet of the Hindi language was Chander Bardai, better known as Chander Kavi. He was born at Lahore in the year 1126 A. D. in a Bhat family but he spent his early years in the Eastern provinces where Brij Bhasha was spoken. Then he repaired to Ajmere which was the capital of that great hero, Prithvi Raj. Here his Muse was recognised and he was admitted among the courtiers of the King. Here he wrote his monumental work – Prithvi Raj' Rasa or Rasu which runs into 2500 pages and deals with the Raja's exploits, his wars, his hunts, the constitution of his Kingdom, its laws and other details including the spring season and the Raja's magnificent gardens. He also uses some Arabic and Persian words in his work, but the book is predominantly Hindi. Chander Kavi is rightly considered as the father of Hindi poetry.

The Hindi language which is generally spoken and written today and which is adopted as the 'Lingua franca' of the country is really called "Khadi Boli". Originally spoken in the vicinity of Delhi and Meerat, it spread over the other parts of North India.

When Muslims settled down in North India, there was naturally an interaction of cultures. This was more evident on their respective languages. This is natural for several reasons: one is the new comers brought new things with them and these things have their own names in their language; and the other reason is their words and expressions peculiar to their language also came with them. If one tries to translate them, one requires quite a sentence to bring out the meaning of the original. But one word suffices if the original is used. Thus the word 'Diwan' when translated into Hindi or another language will require more words. The original is simple and brings out the idea clearly and without loss of meaning. Or, take, the word 'Dharma'. It stands for a certain concept and when you

translate it into another language, it may require more words and even then may not convey the precise concept. This simple logic of life is behind the interchange of new words and forms of expression.

Thus it was that our ancients, both Hindus and Muslims, freely drew upon the store-house of each other's languages and freely adopted new words and new forms of expression, rendering their respective languages richer in this natural process.

In my first lecture I dwelt at some length upon the celebrated poet and mystic Tulsi Das, Surdas, Guru Nanak who never hesitated to draw upon Arabic and Persian words in their writings and also upon the massive intellectual contribution of Hindu writers and poets to the Urdu language. In today's lecture I shall attempt to deal with the contribution of the Muslims to Hindi language and literature.

The most celebrated of these Muslims is that silver-tongued poet, Amir Khusrow. He flourished at Delhi in the later part of the 13th century during the sultanate period. He died in the year 1325 A. D. He was a versatile genius and wrote voluminously. He used all the existing forms of Poetry and invented new ones. He was also a singer and a composer of rhythmic forms. His one aim was to bring about a fusion of these languages. And in order to familiarize people with the language

بیابرا اور سبھائی
بیشن مادر بیٹھری مائی

spoken by their neighbours, he wrote his famous book, Khāliq Bari, running into several volumes in which he gave equivalents of Arabic and Persian words in the Brij Bhasha. To give an example:

Here the Poet has given the equivalents of two Persian words in Hindi; to wit, Brother as Bhai, Mother as Māi. And all this he did in easy verse form in order that it could be easily understood and remembered. He also adopted another form, viz. one line in Persian and another line in Hindi e.g.

شبان بھران دراز چو زلف و روز و صلت چو عمر کوتاہ
 سکھی پیا کو جو میں نہ دیکھوں تو کیسے کاٹوں اندھیری رتیاں

Here the first line is in Persian and the other is Hindi, the subject matter of both the lines is similar; it is almost a translation :

‘The nights are long and life is short
 How shall I live without seeing him
 and how shall I pass these dark nights.’

Khusrow wrote enchanting verses for women and girls as well for them to sing in the spring season. He also wrote riddles, Mukarnis and Do Sakhun, all various forms of verse of which he was the author. I give below an example of his riddles:—

بیسوں کا سر کاٹ لیا . ماما را ناخون کیا

“He cut twenty heads, but he neither killed any nor shed any blood”. The riddle is about the cutting of nails.

He was a master of his Muse and could order it about in any direction he liked. He excelled in the figure of speech called onomatopoeia in which the sound imitates the sense. Here is an example in Persian :

نان کہ خوردی خانہ برو خانہ برو . . . نان کہ خوردی خانہ برو
 نہ کہ بدست تو کردم خانہ برو . خانہ برو خانہ برو

Here the Poet imitates the sound of the Nowbat, a drum usually beaten at the palaces of Kings and other dignitaries during those times. Thus though empires have decayed during these several centuries

since Khusrow wrote, his great name challenges time. His poetry is as fresh to-day as when it was written. Chander Kavi and Khusrow are the two pioneers of the Hindi language and literature.

But the Golden Age of Hindi literature was during what is called the Bhakti period (between 1325 and 1625). Kabirdas was the most outstanding poet of this period. Born of Muslim parents, he was brought up by a Hindu weaver. His burning desire was to bring the Hindus and Muslims together. He refers to God as both Ram and Rahim (a very familiar theme of Gandhiji) but his Ram was not the son of King Dasaratha, but the formless God, the Arupi, the Anerakar, the Nirguna, the Formless. He had risen above all these differences of caste and creed and even of doctrinal religion and preached the love of God that is within the human soul. Mark his verse :

تیرا سانی تجھ میں جو پوپن میں باس کستوری کا مگ بیتو پھر پھر ڈھونڈ کھاس

Thy Lord is within thyself, just as the fragrance is in the flower :
Why then go about God outside yourself in the way the deer goes about smelling the grass in search of fragrance that is hidden within itself.

The Advaita philosophy of Shri Sankara - not two, but one-is the

concept of God in Islam, and Kabir tries to emphasize this aspect of God through his immortal lines. Here is a significant verse :

جس میں کنبہ، کنبہ میں جل ہے بھتر باہر پانی
پھوٹ کنبہ جل جل ہی سمانا یکہ ت کھو گیانی

A pot is under water, the pot is full of water. The pot breaks. Then water goes back to water. This is the truth which the God-realised man will say !

Kabir was against all rituals. Regarding the shaving of hair he declared :

سہلو کہیں کہا بگاریا جو مونڈے سو بار
من کو کیوں نہیں مونڈے جاؤ شیا و کارہ

What harm has the hair done to thee that thou shavest it a hundred times : Why not rather shave thy heart in which dwell all desires, hatred of others and other vices, and again :

مالا تو کرہ ہے پھر بے حیب پھر منکھ ہاں
غنسو اتو دس دس پھر یہ تو سمورن ہاں

The rosary is moving in thy hands,
the tongue is moving in thy mouth.
But the mind is wandering in ten

directions ; surely this is not Meditation.

He is strongly opposed to idol worship : He says :

پا سن پوجے ہری ملے تو میں پوجوں پھار
سایتیں یہ چاکی بھلی میں کھائے سنسار

If by worshipping a stone you could get to God, then I may as well worship the mountain : I may then, at least grind the eatables (by a slab cut out of it).

Then he himself indicates the way of true meditation :

ان راتے سکھ سوونا راتے میند نہ آئے
جو جل پھینکے ماچھاری تڑپیں بن بی ہائے

As long as one is really not in love with God he sleeps happily. But if one is in Love with the Divine, he keeps awake and suffers the pangs of separation from the Beloved, even as the fish does when thrown out of water.

رنگی کو نازنگی کہے ہے دودھ کو کھویا
پھلتی کو گاڑی کہے یہ دیکھ کیرا رویا

Kabir's contribution to Hindi poetry is immense. Several of his verses have passed into proverbs, such as :

An orange is colourful, but people call it i.e without colour ; the condensed milk is referred to as i. e. something which is lost ; the moving vehicle is known as which means, a thing which is stationary. Kabir wept at these vagaries of the world.

نازنگی

سٹری

It is said that when he died, the Muslims claimed him as their own; the Hindus did similarly. But when his corpse was lifted there was nothing there except some flowers. This may be a mere Myth, but nevertheless it is indicative of the high esteem in which Kabir was held by his contemporaries, both Muslims and non-muslims.

چہناں بڑی کہ بعد از مرگت عسرنی
مسلمانیت بنمزم شوید و ہندو بسوزا اند

The same idea is brought out in a Persian couplet of the great Poet Urfi :

So conduct yourself in life,
O Urfi ! that when the Final
Hour arrives for thee, the Muslim
Shall wash thee in the Sacred
Waters of the Zam-Zam and the Hindu
Would like to cremate thee.

Among the great Muslim poets of Hindi Literature of the Bhakti period is Malik Mohamed Jāyesi. Like Kabir, Jayesi also drew the attention of people to the love of God which is the foundation of all true religion. Jayesi flourished in the reign of Sher Shah Suri, about the middle of the sixteenth century. He wrote his Master piece in the Hindi language and named it Padmavat. It took him twenty years to finish his work. The theme is mystic, the poetic form is that of Mathnavi in Persian and the language is pure Hindi. It is full of artistic embellishments and is considered as one of the greatest works in the Hindi Language. It is said that Jayesi, though a master in his own mother tongue, Persian, did not use a single word other than Hindi, throughout this voluminous work. Padmavat, among other things, truly reflects the culture, civilization, mode of life, customs and ideals of the Hindu faith, apart from contributing very materially to Hindi language and literature.

The Bhakti movement which produced so many poets and divines both from amongst the Hindus and the Muslims was in itself a child of the Age. It was an Age in which not only was there interaction between the languages of the country and those that the new comers, the Muslims, had brought with them, but also between their respective cultures and religions. We have noticed how languages interacted to the enrichment of both resulting in the growth of a new Language - Urdu. In the realm of culture and thought also, this interaction was not without its very salutary effects. Islam had brought the ideal of uncompromising Unity of God and the absolute equality of man, whatever his or her birth, caste or colour. India was an ancient land of lofty philosophy and high idealism. But this was taught at higher levels whilst the soul of the common man groaned under the weight of superstition and formalism. The great Sakya Muni, Gautama Buddha, had already broken away from it and founded his own Maṛga - the path, seeking Nirvana in good deeds rather than in rituals. The time was again ripe for a change, when these two thought strains and cultures met. The result was the Bhakti movement, which was an effort at compromise, taking the essence of the two ideologies. As a result, Sufism gained currency at the religious level.

In this period (1325–1625) we find two schools of thought had emerged on the scene viz. Nirgundhara i.e. the one which advocated devotion to the Formless God (Nirguna) which was acceptable to the Muslims and a majority of others who came under the spell of the Bhakti movement, the other was Sagundhara – devotion to God who has a form. Some of the Sufis who look in their religious preceptor (Murshid) the image of God were influenced by this school of thought. But the Nirgundhara school naturally claimed most of the Muslim Sufis. This school branched off into two viz. Gnyana Marga shaka i.e. approach to God through knowledge (Irfan of the sufis) and Prem Marga shaka i.e. approach to God through love. Kabir was the founder of the Gnyana marga sakha. His verses quoted above appeal to knowledge and reason. Mohamed Jayes may be taken as the exponent of the Prem Marga sakha as is evidenced by his monumental work Padmavat, one of the greatest classics of the Hind language. Padmavat in this classic stands for divine love and Ratansen, the king of Chittoor, for the yogi who yearns for divine love, whilst the parrot, Hiranman is the religious guide – the preceptor, the Guru or the Murshid. Nagmati, the first wife, represents the world and all that it stands for. The return of Ratansen from Simhaldeep (Ceylon) to Chittoor to his first wife along with Padmavati is very significant. It means that the true yogi can live in the world, provided he does not forget God. For the seeker after truth, it is not essential that he renounces the world, but rather that he should love God, whilst remaining in the world. Jalaluddin Rumi, the celebrated Persian mystic, had said :

چیست دنیا از خدا غافل بدن

لے قماش و نقرہ و فرزند و زن

What is the world (the Maya)?
it is forgetfulness of God; not
property or wealth, not even wife
and child.

Mohamed Jayesi set a standard which became a model for several others who later wrote on this theme. Gul-e-Bakawali, Gulzar Naseem are examples in the Urdu language who followed this model, though none could excel jayesi in his sweep and cadence. Perhaps the Pilgrims Progress in

English is also remotely influenced by this Epoch-making work. Jayesi is considered as an immediate second to Tulsi Das, in his contribution to Hindi language and literature.

Yet another Muslim poet who contributed much to Hindi literature was Ras khān. He belonged to the Royal family of the Afghans. He came under the spell of the Bhakti Movement and changed his Sword for the Pen. His stanzas in Hindi were so enchanting that they were called Ras-Khan. The people would say, "Please give us Raskhan" which meant recite the poetry of Raskhan.

Abdul Rahim Khan-e-Khana, one of the nine gems (Nawpatan) of Akbar's Government was another Muslim Poet of Hindi. He was the son of Bairam Khan, the tutor of Akbar. He was an accomplished poet of the Hindi language, besides being very learned in the Arabic and Persian lore. He wrote in Brij Bhasha, Khari Boli and Porabi Bhaka. He held a high place among the Muslim poets of the Hindi language. He is the author of Rahim Satsai, Ras Panjadehyai and other works. According to Hindi critics, Rahim's Hindi poetry is of a higher order than even that of Malik Mohamed Jayesi, but this may be an over statement, seeing that Jayesi enjoys such a universal recognition.

Syed Mubarak Ali Bilgrami was another Muslim poet of the Hindi language. He was born in 1573 and he was very well versed in Arabic and Persian as well. His works, Alak Shitak, and Til Shitak have already been published.

A few other Muslims poets of the Hindi language were Syed Rahmatullah, the contemporary of the famous Hindi poet Chintamani who flourished in the reign of Aurangzeb. Abdur Rahiman wrote very difficult Hindi and was a Mansabdar of Muazzam, son of Aurangzeb. But of all these later poets Ras Liyan, whose full name was Syed Ghulam Nabi Bilgrami was by far the most important. He is the author of several Hindi

works, among which are very well

known. The latter work contains 1155 Dohas (couplets). One of his

contemporaries, writes about him thus: "despite his being a Muslim, he writes exquisite Hindi. His Dohas are full of pathos and feeling."

Towards the close of my lecture I would like to quote a Doha from an anonymous Hindi poet, if only to point out the originality of thought that characterizes Hindi poetry in which love starts from woman towards man. The poet says

کاجل ڈالوں کر کر اسرہ دیانہ جائے
ان نہیں ہیں پی بے دوجا کن سمائے

"I use eye-tex for my eyes, but my eyes can not even bear the use of it. For my beloved lives in my eyes; where is the place in them for something else? The idea is common to poetry but mark the lofty heights to which that idea has been raised in the poetry of Hindi. I am told there is a similar idea expressed in the Tirukural of that immortal poet of the Tamil Language, Tiruvalluvar. He says: I do not eat anything which is hot, lest it affects the beloved who is within me! What a delicate and lofty sentiment!

I shall close this all too brief a survey of the Muslim poets of the Hindi Language with the observation of a poet in Persian vis-a-vis the Hindus and Muslims living together in the Country. He says: They are like the two eyes, which are no doubt different, but none-the-less, they look not at things differently!

And as regards Hindi and its counter-part Urdu, the following observation by Rafiq Martharvi is at once correct and helpful. He says: The most widely known language of Hindustan is one but which is written in two scripts. When attired in the Nagari script, it is known as Hindi; and when written in the Persian script, it is called Urdu. Gandhiji had styled this self-same language as Hindustani. It is the product of Hindus and Muslims living together for centuries in amity and concord." Jai Hind.

III

IQBAL, HIS POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY.

Iqbal is the Tagore of Urdu and Persian languages, the Muslim counter-part of the poet Tagore whose centenary was recently celebrated the world over. Poets of Iqbal's stature are born once in several centuries and after Jalaluddin Rumi, the author of the famous Mathnavi which is rightly called 'the Quran in the Persian language', Iqbal is the tallest poppy in the intellectual and poetic garden of Persian and Urdu. Iqbal was not a mere poet, he was also the Philosopher *par excellence*. Indeed his philosophy eclipses his poetry, though his poetry, judged from the highest literary standards, is also of the very highest order. He is one of those rare stars who dazzle on the human firmament and take a wondering world, so to speak, by storm and give it the much needed hope and guidance. He was, Rumi, Ghalib and Goethe in one. He was universally acclaimed by the East and the West as Tagore, his illustrious counter-part was acclaimed.

Now for a word about his life. He was born at Sialkot in the Punjab in the year 1876 A. D. in a highly respected Kashmiri Muslim family. Some two hundred years ago, his ancestor who was a Brahmin, had come under the influence of a Muslim Saint and accepted Islam. Iqbal was proud of both his parentage and his religion. He gives vent to this in his famous couplet :

میر و مرزا بہ سیاست دل و دین باخته اند
جز بر ہمن بچہ محرم اسرار کجاست

Mir and Mirza (People belonging to highly respected Muslim families) have sold away their religious patrimony for a song of Politics; who is there now to interpret the secrets of faith (Islam) except this son of a Brahmin!

The fling is probably directed towards the lamented Maulana Azad, who, though belonging to the family of the prophet and a learned divine himself had given himself up to politics.

Then again :

مرا بنگر کہ در ہندوستان پوگر نہی مہنی
برہمن زادہ رمز آشنا روم و سلطاست

Look at me, for thou shalt not see another born of a Brahmin knowing both the secrets of Rumi, the Mystic and the Sultan, i. e. endowed with both spiritual and temporal knowledge. And he was abundantly correct in the estimate of himself.

Iqbal received his early education and training at the feet of his parents. Of his mother he wrote :

دفتر ہستی میں تھی زریں ورق تیری حیات
تھی سراپا دین و دنیا کا سبق تیری حیات

Thy life was a brilliant page in the Book of Existence; Thy life was a living lesson in all the varied aspects of life. He was lucky in his teacher Moulana Syed Amir Hasan who combined in himself vast learning and deep piety. Iqbal acquired his taste for the Persian language through this master of his early youth.

He was a born poet and very early in life he composed poetry and showed his poetic compositions to that celebrated poet "Dagh". Very soon the poet wrote to him to say that he hardly required any more corrections. Iqbal wrote an elegy on Dagh's demise; it shows what deep affection existed between him and his poetic Master. Here is one couplet from the elegy:

چل بسا داغِ اہمیت اسکی زیبِ دوش آخری شاعرِ جہاں آباد کا خاموش

Alas, Dagh has passed away and his bier adorns the shoulders of his admirers, the last great poet of Jahan Abad (Delhi) is silent now.

Iqbal came under the influence of the well known Orientalist, Sir Thomas Arnold, who was Professor of Philosophy at the Government College, Lahore. Deep affection grew between the teacher and the taught, so that when Arnold left for England, Iqbal also followed him. There he joined the Cambridge University and came into contact with intellectual celebrities like Dr. Mc. Tegart, a disciple of the famous philosopher Hegel, and Professor Browne and Dr. Nicholson. He took his Degree of Doctor of Philosophy both from the Cambridge and Munich Universities and also the Degree in Law. The contacts which he had made were later on very fruitful to him. Nicholson later in life, translated the book Asrar-e-Khudi

اسرارِ خودی secrets of self, of his illustrious pupil and thus

introduced him and his thoughts to the thinkers of Europe. On his return to India, at the age of 32, full of honours and distinctions he was offered high posts, but he desired to remain a free man and elected to be a lawyer.

Till he returned from Europe he wrote poetry in Urdu but on his return, he found that Urdu could not cope up with the flights of his thoughts. He chose the richer vehicle of expression viz., the Persian language.

His Mathnavi Asrar-e-Khudi was published in the year 1915. It was translated by Nicholson, who also wrote a preface to the book. It brought him great name and fame both in India and abroad particularly in literary circles in England. The poet was knighted the same year. In 1928, he delivered his famous Madras Lectures on "Reconstruction of

Religious thought in Islam.” Both the theme of the lectures and the originality and independence of his approach have rendered the work a classic.

Signor Mussolini, the Italian Dictator, was very favourably impressed by the poet's book: *Secrets of the self* and requested him to send a Message to the youth of his nation. The poet wrote to him as follows.....

“Italy is yet a young nation. If it is in search of a correct path, then it should look to the life-giving and spiritual civilization of the East, setting its face against Western civilization that is already on the downward march.”

The message created a tremendous impression in Italy; he was invited to the biggest Academy in that country to deliver lectures. Some of his works were even translated in the Italian language. His work

پیام شرق

‘the Message of the East’ done into Italian

became a byword in that country. He was invited to Afghanistan by

Nadir Shah and his famous Mathnavi **مسافر** (Musfar-the traveller)

is based on his visit to Kabul where he was received with kingly honours.

Thus full of name and fame, in his own country and abroad, the poet died in the year 1938. The Chronogram that gives this date

was couched in significant terms: **شمع شاعر نجی خاموش** The Lamp

of Poetry has been extinguished. The Persian words give the date of his death i.e. 1938.

Iqbal was a nationalist to the core, but his nationalism did not render him a Fascist. He was also International by and large. Some of his verses have become proverbial (e.g.)

مذہب نہیں سکھاتا آپس میں بیرکھنا

Religion does not teach hatred of one another.
Then again :—

شکستی بھی شانتی بھی بھگتوں کے گیت میں ہے
دھرتی کے بے بسیوں کی مکتی پریت میں ہے

Strength and Peace lies in the Poems of the Bhaktas (people who love God);

The salvation of the people of the world lies in the path of love.
He wrote about Ramachander Ji :—

ہے رام کے وجود پہ ہندوستان کو تاز
اہل نظر سمجھتے ہیں اس کو امام ہند

“India is rightly proud of her illustrious Son, Rama; the seers look upon him as the Imam (Spiritual head) of India. About Guru Nanak he declared :

پھر اٹھی آخر صدا تو حید کی پنجاب سے
ہند کو اک مرد کا ملنے جگایا خواب سے

“Then again arose from the Punjab the clarion call of the Unity of God ; India was once again awakened from its deep slumber :

About India he wrote:

سارے جہاں سے اچھا ہندوستان ہمارا
ہم بلیں ہیں اسکی وہ گلستا ہمارا

The best country in the world is our own Hindustan ; We are all its nightingales and it is our garden.

But the Poet as a Muslim also said :—

چین و عرب ہمارا ہندوستان ہمارا
مسلم ہیں ہم وطن ہے سارا جہاں ہمارا

“China and Arabia are ours and so is Hindustan ; we are Muslims and thus our home is the whole world.”

Dr. Sinha who has written a voluminous book on Iqbal, points out a contradiction between these two concepts of the Poet and says that they are irreconcilable. The learned Doctor, though generally accepting the greatness of Iqbal as a poet, has pointed out this alleged inconsistency, which deserves some careful thinking. Ruskin has pointed out four loyalties in human beings which run concurrently and are not opposed to each other, viz., (1) loyalty to God, (2) loyalty to one's own country, (3) loyalty to one's family and (4) loyalty to friends. Now these loyalties are not opposed to one another, rather they are complementary to one another. If one who is not loyal to God and his religion, what loyalty may he have for his country? There may be exceptions, but

they only prove the rule. Thus, when Iqbal writes as a Muslim, he gave out the concept of Islam which preaches the ideal of one world and one family, the Human Family.

Thus Iqbal wrote as quoted above: We are Muslims and the whole world is our Native land. And when he wrote as an Indian, he said :

Our Hindustan is the best country in the world. Islam places a high premium on the virtue of patriotism. Indeed the Holy Prophet had declared: **حب الوطن من اليمان** "The love of one's own country is

a part of Faith." True to his beliefs and convictions about patriotism also he sang the praises of the Motherland. I really fail to see any contradiction or inconsistency in the Poet which Doctor Sinha has pointed out. Our beloved Prime Minister is a Universalist and his general outlook is International, but that does not affect his position as a Patriot par Excellence! One can be National and International at one and the same time.

Iqbal wrote voluminously. His small poems besides, some of his more important works are :

1. 'Asar Khudi Rumuz Bekhudi where he discusses his philosophy of life'
2. Payame Mashing (The Message of the East) which is in reply to the German poet, Goethe.
3. Zarbe Kalim.
4. Arumughane Hijaz.
5. Bale Jibrail.
6. Javid Namah, which he wrote for his son Javid Iqbal.

An anthology of his Minor poems which include his famous

شکو و جواب شکوہ were published under the name Banga-Dira, in 1924.

An Anthology of his Persian poems was published separately, under the

name Zabur-e-Ajam. The poet took three years, versatile and as he was like Milton, to finish his Javid Namah and though it bears his son's name, it is Universal in its appeal and is considered as a reply to the Italian poet Dante's *Divine Comedy*. He also wrote his famous Persian Mathnavi

پس چہ باید کرد اے اقوام شرق

"What then shall the Eastern Nations do?" This book, as is usual with all the Poet's works, is both interesting and highly informative. Among his works, the last to be published was Arumughan-e-Hijaz (1938). This book

contains the Poet's last Urdu Poem **حضرت انسان** written about two months prior to the poet's death.

Apart from his lectures delivered in English at Madras, his letters, under the Caption : **اقبال نامہ** (Iqbal Namah) have also been

published and they throw a flood of light on the several situations of the poet's life, besides elucidating certain concepts of the poet.

Iqbal sets his face against a philosophy which, instead of giving a lead to action, throws the reader into intricacies of thought and enmeshes him in intellectual cobwebs. Thus in his zarbe-kalim, he criticizes Hegel and Bergson

ہیگل کا صدف گہر سے خالی
ہے اس کا طلسم بخیالی

Hegel's mother of pearl is devoid of pearls. His writings arise from the head and not from the heart.

His philosophy of 'Self' is couched in his book 'The secrets of self'. It lies strewn in his other poems also. It is on this work that the poet's title to international reputation lies.

The Khudi or self that Iqbal advocates is not born of pride or self importance or Egoism. It is there embedded in man's nature. The voice comes from within: 'I am' This Khudi - or 'I' in man is not of man's creations but there is some one who has created it. It is God. Iqbal uses the analogy of an ocean for God and man's 'I' is a drop - or even less than a drop, in comparison to the ocean. But nevertheless this drop of a man, this individual 'I' has an existence, the individual drop has the position of a dazzling pearl. It has its own individuality in God's knowledge. Iqbal is opposed to the Sufi idea that man merges his 'I' in the greater 'I' which is God. Iqbal believed that this individual 'I' has a purpose in God's Master-Plan and therefore should not lose its identity and get merged in the dei. This, according to him, is defeating the very purpose and intention of God, vis a vis man's creation. According to Iqbal, man has no existence when compared to God, but is everything in relation to God's other myriad creatures. He is the best in God's creation, the tallest poppy in God's Garden. He is the vice-gerent of God, charged, to carry out and interpret God's intentions in the Universe. It is in this ecstasy that Iqbal puts these words in the mouth of Man, and wherever man is mentioned woman is always included. Man is made to say by the Poet :

تو شب آفریدی من چراغ آفریدم
 تو راغ آفریدی من باغ آفریدم
 تو سنگ آفریدی من این آفریدم
 من آنم که از آهن آئینه سازم

O' Lord, thou created the night, I created the light; thou created the dense Forests, I created the Gardens; you created the sand, I made glass out of them; I am he who can make mirror out of steel.....
 O Lord I am not an inactive Agent of thine !

But this does not mean that Iqbal's philosophy of self makes man defiant of God. Far be it from him. It only indicates that, under God's special grace, Man has been endowed with certain faculties that render him the best of God's creation. This individuality is man's own and he must preserve it and carry out the responsibilities that devolve upon him under God's Master-Plan.

The Poet says :

"One sweep of love finished the whole story ; I had imagined that the Earth and the Sky were boundless." How true is the sentiment, looking at the achievements of Man that is encircling the earth now seventeen times in twenty five hours !

And again :

ترے مقام کو انجم شناس کیا جانے
کہ خاک زندہ ہے تو متابع ستارہ نہیں

What will the astrologers understand man's position in the Universe ; Man is creative Earth' and is certainly not subservient to the movements of the stars. According to Iqbal, the Ashta Graha, the combination of the stars through which we passed recently, cannot retard man's progress, much less harm him. Man's destiny is higher than that of the stars.

It is in the creation and dynamic philosophy that Iqbal's title to name and fame lies. His message has an irresistible appeal which is Universal in its concept. His Message is for all the Homo-sapien - the human race.

Iqbal's private life was simple. He was himself the **مرد قلندر**

the Yogin that he describes. Though he was very much in the world, yet, he never lost his journey's end. He always had God before him and he, true to his philosophy, always carried out God's Plans vis-a-vis himself. He never aspired for honours, though they came to him in their abundance.

Once people wanted to collect a couple of lakhs of rupees for him so that he could live without anxiety, but he admonished them and continued to live the poor man he wanted to be. He never wanted to die a rich man; perhaps he thought that it was a sin to die rich. It is interesting to note what he thought of a Kafir – a word which is very carelessly used by Muslims. He wrote :

میں تری نظر میں کافر تو میری نظر میں کافر
ترا دین نفس شماری مرادین نفس گذار

I am a kafir in thine eyes and thou art Kafir in mine ; Thy religion is to live aimlessly and my religion is ceaselessly to strive !.

Just when the final hour approached him and he felt his end to be near, he said :

نشان مرد مومن با تو گویم
چو مرگ آید تبسم بر لب او

“shall I tell thee the sign of a true believer in God ; when death draws near thou shalt discern a smile on his lips.” And then, as if in a reminiscent mood, he sang :

“The song that has passed away may not return ; the morning breeze of the land of Hijaz (Arabia) may waft or may not waft. This poor faqir was the essence of a whole age ; the knower of secrets may again come or may not come.” And who can deny that he was the very essence of an age ; it was a title he richly deserved. And it will be long before the void created by his death will be filled.

A Note On Scribal Practice*

by

Sri R. RADHAKRISHNAN

I want to make two points here. First, Stockwell and Barritt's citation of Tamil scribal practice in their article¹ is not quite appropriate. Secondly, there may be strong structural reasons for writing allophones by the native speakers, which do not seem to have been included in their conditions.²

Stockwell and Barritt cite Tamil scribal practice as evidence for using different symbols to represent the allophones of one phoneme. They refer to Murray Fowler³ for their source regarding the Tamil examples. Fowler explicitly states in his article that the dialect he is analyzing is a spoken variety. No spoken dialect of Tamil of the present day has been committed to writing in the traditional script, except for the adaptations made of spoken dialects in novels, short stories, and the like. Even if we assume that Stockwell and Barritt make their reference to such adaptations, their citation is not clear evidence to show that the present day writing practices in Tamil are consistent *in writing the same allophone with the same letter*. For example, in words like 'maṇṇan' (king) and 'vennir' (hot water), the nasal consonant is represented by different letters, even though the point of articulation is the same in both the items cited above. Even if it be granted that the distribution of allophones of /n/ stated by Fowler was correct (which I doubt for any Tamil Speaker of Madras, unless he is giving citation pronunciation according to the rules prescribed by Tamil grammarians), and if some sort of juncture could be posited in 'vennir'

* Originally written for the South Asia Language and Area Center of the University of Chicago, in 1961.

1. Robert P. Stokwell and C. Westbrook Barritt, "Scribal Practice: some assumptions," Lg. 37. 75—82 (1961).
2. Ibid. p. 76.
3. Murray Fowler, "The Segmental Phonemes of Sanskritized Tamil," Lg. 30.362—3 (1954).

between the two nasals (for which I see no phonetic basis of any sort), still the assumption that the Tamil writing practice uses two letters to represent two allophones of /n/, consistently, has only dubious validity. There are other Tamil speakers in Madras and elsewhere for whom the allophonic distribution of /n/ is as follows: interdental when it precedes interdental stop; otherwise alveodental or alveolar. Fowler's article would indicate that the interdental allophone occurs before the interdental stop and in stem initial, and the alveolar allophone occurs elsewhere. But irrespective of these differences of the allophonic distribution, all Tamil writers alike use the same spelling. This only confirms that writing practices in Tamil are more prescribed by tradition, as in any other language which has been committed to writing for a considerable period of time. In earlier periods of Tamil, the two symbols now used rather inconsistently to represent two allophones of one phoneme of /n/ were used to represent two distinct phonemes. (Incidentally, Stockwell and Barritt's symbolization of the alveolar allophone of /n/ as [n] in reference to Tamil is misleading, at least for those who are familiar with Tamil, for the symbol ɳ is usually used to represent the Tamil retroflex nasal phoneme. Fowler uses [ɳ] to represent the alveolar allophone of /n/.

The second point is that at least one more assumption could be added to those stated by Stockwell and Barritt under which native speakers would not spell the phonemes only, if they had the freedom to spell according to their "feel" of their language. Such an assumption would be when there is contrast between sounds made at different points of articulation in one type of sound (e.g., stops) and when such contrast is lacking in another (e.g., nasals). This could be exemplified from Tamil scribal practices, when Tamil was first committed to writing. *Tolkāppiyam* (2nd century A. D.), a Tamil grammar written in Tamil, (which refers to earlier practices of writing, etc.), lists six letters (the same six used by earlier writers) to write the nasal sounds in the language. They are transliterated in Roman as m, n, ṇ, ṇ̄, ṇ̅, and ṇ̆. According to *Tolkāppiyam* the first five nasal sounds listed here are in clear contrast, but ṇ̆ is not. But the corresponding set of six stops (p, t, r, ɕ, c, and k) are in clear contrast. Here we can assume that the pattern set for the non-nasals might permit the native speakers to recognize a similar set of units for nasal sounds also. This would justify the fact that ṇ̆ was treated as an independent unit even though it was not in contrast with other units.

Empty Morph And Sariyai¹

By

Sri R. RADHAKRISHNAN

Sariyai is a term used in Tamil grammatical writings. This term was first used in *Tolkāppiyam* whose date is fixed about the second century A. D. This term refers to a series of morphemes which are syntactically irrelevant. These morphemes are enumerated in Sutra 119, the chapter entitled *Eḷuttatikāram*, "phonology".

Empty-morph is a term, used in modern linguistics by some authors. C. F. Hockett (1957 : 14) in his article "Problems of Morphemic Analysis", has dealt with the conception of empty-morph at length. He redefines and alters the relation between a morph and a morpheme. Before this alteration every morph in an utterance is an allomorph of one of the morphemes, i.e., the number of morphs in an utterance is the same as that of the morpheme in that utterance. After the alteration this is no longer necessarily true. The number of morphs could be more or less than the number of morphemes in an utterance. If the number of morphs exceeds that of the morphemes then empty-morphs are established. (If the number of morphemes exceeds that of the morphs, then the portmanteau morph is established.) The empty-morph has no meaning, so it belongs to no morpheme and is sub-morphemic. Empty-morphs should be predictable in terms of other morphemes (non-empty-morphs).

The assumptions underlying the conception of *Sariyai* and empty-morph are analysed below and to clarify these, material from modern written Tamil is taken for illustration. The analysis of the following items is in conformity with the traditional analysis of Tamil grammarians, hence the *sandhi* rules formulated by them will apply here.

1 Originally written for the South Asia Language and Area Center of the University of Chicago, in 1960, and appeared in *Anthropology Tomorrow*.

1. maram + attu + ai = marattai tree (accusative form)
2. kuḷam + attu + ai = kuḷattai tank (accusative form)
3. iṇam + attu + ai = iṇattai group (accusative form)
- 3a. avan + ai = avanai him (accusative form)
- 2a. kay + ai = kayyai hand (accusative form)
- 3a. kal + ai = kallai stone (accusative form)
4. paṭi + t + aṇ + aṇ = paṭittanaṇ "he read"
5. kaḷi + t + aṇ + aṇ = kaḷittanaṇ "he subtracted"
6. veḷu + t + aṇ + aṇ = veḷuttanaṇ "he washed"
- 4a. paṭi + t + āṇ = paṭittāṇ "he read"
- 5a. kaḷi + t + āṇ = kaḷittāṇ "he subtracted"
- 6a. veḷu + t + āṇ = veḷuttāṇ "he washed"

In the above examples the morphs /attu/ and/ aṇ/ are designated sāriyai morphemes according to Tamil grammatical tradition. They are tactically irrelevant at the syntactic level. With slight modifications of the allomorphic shapes of some morphemes it is possible to designate the same morphs—namely, /attu/ and/ aṇ/—as empty-morphs, applying modern linguistic methods. All these empty-morphs (and possibly more) have no meaning now, though they may have had historically, and hence they belong to no morpheme; they are predictable in terms of other morphemes; they are tactically irrelevant. These statements are true in terms of the procedure outlined by Hockett (1957.)

Like Fox and Nootka. Hockett illustrates the principle of empty-morph with examples from languages. It seems that these languages do not exhibit morphology and syntax as levels of structure. But if we analyze languages like Tamil in which the grammatical system of that language is better analyzed into morphology and syntax, then we should decide whether "tactics" as used by Hockett refers to tactics at the morphological level, at the syntactic level, or both. Since the empty-morphs are sub-morphemic, they should be irrelevant tactically even at the morphological level, and it follows that sub-morphemic empty-morphs could not enter the syntactic level. We should note that this situation arises only after fundamentally altering the relation between a morph and a morpheme. Also, may be an additional level between morphemics and phonemics has to be introduced, or

how else can we take care of the empty-morphs? Is it not possible to treat these so-called empty-morphs as irrelevant at the syntactic level only? It seems it is possible. Then this would not necessitate a fundamental alteration of the relationship between a morph and a morpheme. To illustrate this point some Tamil utterances are examined.

7. ku₁attai veṭṭiṇāṇ (ku₁am + attu + ai + ...) "he dug a well"
8. kayyai mūrittāṇ (kay + ai + ...) "he twisted the hand"

Both these utterances are comparable at the syntactic level. Both of them could be analyzed as consisting of two pieces at the syntactic level, a nominal piece followed by a verbal piece. Both the nominal pieces could be analyzed, as shown above, as consisting of a nominal stem and a case suffix following it; but example 7 has the form /attu/ between the nominal stem and the case suffix. As we have shown it, the form /attu/ could be treated as an empty-morph. As far as the syntactic structure is concerned, the presence or absence of the so-called empty-morph /attu/ is irrelevant, since "ku₁attai" and "kayyai" — one with the segment /attu/ and one without it — are replaceable in a syntactic frame; i.e., they belong to the same sequence-class (cf. Wells 1947.)

Also we could show that the segment/ aṇ/, underscored in the examples 4, 5, and 6, is an empty-morph form and it is syntactically irrelevant: 4, 5, and 6 and 4a, 5a, and 6a all belong to the same sequence classes. we also note here that both/ attu/ and/ aṇ/ are morphologically predictable and phonologically conditioned. The form /attu/ occurs between the nominal stem and the case suffix; the form /aṇ/ occurs between the tense-suffix (past and present) and the person suffix (masculine and feminine); we could predict the empty-morphs in terms of morphology. But the conditioning is phonological because /attu/ does not occur between all nominal stems and case suffixes: /attu/ occurs only when the nominal piece is formed from a noun ending in a bilabial nasal consonant. So also the form /aṇ/ which occurs only before the person-suffix having a short vowel as the initial phone. Though these forms are conditioned phonologically they are not phonologically predictable,

because the form /attu/ does not occur after all bilabial nasals and the form /aṇ/ does not occur before all short vowels.

Alternatively if we employ the IA method of description, for example, the first three utterances given above will be analyzed as follows :

1. mara + tt + ai = marattai
2. kuḷa + tt + ai = kuḷattai
3. ina + tt + ai = inattai

Now we have to state that the empty-morph /tt/ occurs after a nominal stem ending in a short vowel immediately followed by a case-suffix.

To summarize: the presence or absence of an empty-morph is irrelevant at the syntactic level. They are conditioned phonologically ; but predictable only at the morphological level. Also we should note here that the presence or absence of empty-morphs is not optional but compulsory.

We often define a morpheme as a meaningful unit. Then a morpheme is meaningful not because it is distributionally a significant sequence of phonemes, but because it forms part of an utterance which is meaningful. In analyzing such an utterance which carries the meaning load as a totality, it is not convincing to analyse the utterance into units among which one (or more) is not meaningful. That is, it is not convincing to define some units as morphemes and others as sub-morphemic, especially those so-called sub-morphemic empty-morphs which are compulsory wherever they occur, and which are predictable only at the morphological level. We must conclude that the so-called empty morphs are relevant at the morphological level and hence meaningful and not sub-morphemic.

Alternatively, we might define a morpheme, purely on a distributional basis, as a significant sequence of phonemes having a distribution which could be defined with reference to syntactic frames. What we mean by a significant sequence of phonemes here is that in speech sequence, the phonemes "will have stated positions" and such sequences "are found to be highly restricted" when "the distribution of phonemes is considered over long stretches of speech". (Harris 1957 : 156) If we adopt such a position, then we need not define a morpheme as a meaningful unit. Meaning is not considered at all in the analysis, since our purpose is to define the

morpheme in terms of its distribution. Still we will be able to show the correlation between a significant sequence of phonemes (morphemes) and the semantics, which we conceive of as objects, actions, and relations at the semantic level through such a correlation may not satisfy us completely. Empty-morphs could be shown to have a significant distribution. And so if we fail to assign any semantic meaning which will fit in the system at the semantic level, we need not be unnecessarily disturbed by it.

What we usually do in morphological analysis is to take into account both semantic and distributional meaning. Thus, it is not necessary to attribute some definite meaning to the empty-morph as long as we can define its distribution. This distribution, which is compulsory wherever it occurs, is its meaning or function. So it is more convincing to treat the so-called empty-morphs as *empty-morphemes* until some more suitable term is found. They have definite function (distribution) at the morphological level but do not enter a syntactic construction directly, as we showed earlier. This could be the justification for calling them empty-morphemes. Now we need not alter the relationship between a morph and a morpheme as was originally suggested by Hockett. Also these empty-morphemes could be treated as "markers" at the morphological level since they could be considered as not entering into any IC construction (Hockett 1954).

In describing a marker, Hockett uses this expression " ... as a marker of the construction in which nearby forms stand." The Tamil word "Sāriyai" means very much the same as this term. It could be translated as "that which is leaned upon". Also, it is worth noting here that though Tolkappiyār did not postulate an empty-morph or rejected such a notion, it is significant that he made a statement that all morphemes are meaningful ("ellāccollum poruḷ kurittanavē"—Tolkāppiyam sutra 640).

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AN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

by

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யாதும் ஊரே; யாவரும் கேளிர்,
தீதும் நன்றும் பிறர் தர வாரா;
நோதலும் தணிதலும் அவற்றோரன்ன;
சாதலும் புதுவது அன்றே; வாழ்தல்
இனிது என மகிழ்ந்தன்றும் இலமே; முனிவின்;
இன்னாது என்றலும் இலமே; மின்னொடு
வானம் தண் துளி தலைஇ, ஆனாது
கல் பொருது இரங்கும் மல்லல் பேர் யாற்று
நீர் வழிப்படுஉம் புணை போல், ஆர் உயிர்
முறை வழிப்படுஉம்' என்பது திறவோர்
காட்சியின் தெளிந்தனம்; ஆகலின் மாட்சியின்
பெரியோரை வியத்தலும் இலமே;
சிறியோரை இகழ்தல் அதனினும் இலமே!

—கணியன் பூங்குன்றனர்.

To us all towns are one, all men our kin

Life's good comes not from others' gift, nor ill

Likewise pains and pains' relief are ones own

Death's no new thing; nor do our bosoms thrill

When joyous life seems like a luscious draught.

Nor in hate condemn it ill, we seem

This much-praised life of ours a fragile raft

Borne on the waters of some mountain stream

That fights the boulders mourning fin vain

Tho' storms with lightnings' flash from darkened skies

Floating the raft stays on as laws ordain

Thus have we seen in vision of the wise!

We marvel not at greatness of the great;

Still less despise we men of low estate.

This is a poem from Purananuru, one of the Sangam classics (Poem. No. 192). The English translation of the poem by Dr. G. U. Pope is adapted here with such modifications as are necessary to convey the correct meaning of the words used by the poet, Kanian Punkuntranar.

Even a cursory reading of the poem will reveal that here is a search for the truth of life and the ultimate aim of human existence. The author of this poem Pūnkuntranar unlike other poets was interested neither in wars, heroic deeds of monarchs and feudal chiefs nor in their munificence. The poets of his time were mostly immersed in the problem of sex life, its subtleties and sublimation. Pūnkuntranar had a different outlook. The truth and meaning of life as formulated by the great men of his country and their declaration of universal love as the ultimate aim of human existence attracted him most.

The poet is not giving us his personal views on the problems of life but speaks to us in the 1st person plural 'We', as a spokesman of his country men. He has the confidence and conviction that he is interpreting the Philosophy of life of his ancient land correctly and has the courage to speak for the country as a whole.

He starts the poem with the declaration of the ultimate aim of life as 'யாதும் ஊரே யாவரும் கேளிர்' and the interpretation of the mystery of life is pushed down to the bottom. The thought structure of the poem rests on the simile of a stream and a raft which we find almost at the end of the poem. To comprehend the thought and reasoning of the poet we have, therefore, to begin from the end of the poem and analyse this simile first.

Perhaps the rendering of the simile in English does not bring out its full and correct meaning. As the thought expressed in the simile is vital for the correct comprehension of the poem, we have to forego the beauty and pleasure of the rhyme and cadence of a verse form. The simile may be rendered into simple English prose as follows :—

With lightning (மின்னெடு) the clouds rain (வானம் தண் துளி தலைஇ). The rain does not abate (ஆனது) and a formidable fertile stream (மல்லல் பேர் ஆறு) dashes against the boulders with a mournful noise (கல்பொருது இரங்கும்). Like a raft appearing in the water of that stream (நீர்வழிப்படுஉம் புனைபோல்) precious human life (ஆருயிர்) emerges (in the stream of evolution of life) by an inexorable law of evolution (முறைவழிப்படுஉம்).

The word முறை means order, law, system, or regularity. The commentator interpreted முறை as fate, an interpretation which Dr. Pope has

adopted. This word has now been taken to mean 'law' and interpreted as the law of evolution.

The simile compares human life to a raft in the stream. This is quite simple and understandable. This does not however stop with the simple comparison but extends to the lightning, clouds, rain and the dashing against the boulders which have no bearing on the comparison. This extension constitutes a metaphor added to the simple simile to explain the origin of human life on the analogy of the clouds rain etc. which cause the stream. The comparison here is of rain water with the stream of evolution of life. The lightning, the clouds and the rain constitute the antecedent natural causes and their effect is the stream. Likewise there are natural and antecedent causes of the stream of evolution, here the causes are not as apparent as in the cases of the rain and its stream. We have here two sets of comparison: (1) that of the stream of water with the stream of evolution and (2) that of the raft appearing in the stream of rain water with human life appearing in the stream of evolution. These two streams are both mighty and fertile (மல்லல் பேர் ஆறு). No one can stop their formation and growth and both have been going on for ages (ஆனது).

The raft which appears in the stream may be swept away by the stream but there are no indications to this effect in the poem. The poet does not speak of the stream descending into the plain or proceeding further than dashing against the boulders nor does he state that the stream has broken through the boulders. The helplessness of the mighty stream unable to break through the boulders is well brought out by the poetic term இரங்கும் which means mourns in pitiable murmur. The noise which it makes by dashing against the impediment is so dolorous that the poet has described it as இரங்கும். It may be noted that the word used is இரங்கும் and not இறங்கும். பொருது indicates fighting. If the stream coursed on fighting successfully, the poet would have said கல்பொருது ஆர்க்கும் or கல்பொருது இறங்கும் and not இரங்கும். The primary meaning of இரங்கும் is mourning. (நீர்வழிப்படும் நீரிடத்துத் தோன்றும் which means appears in the water. படும்-தோன்றும் c. f. இசைபட வாழ்தல், குறள் 231. வழி-இடம் c. f. வழி சிறந்து-அவ் விடத்தில் சிறப்பெய்தி-மலைபடுகடாம். 565.)

Like the stream of rain water, the stream of evolution has also been thwarted. Evolution of life has culminated in the evolution of man. Man has been on this planet for nearly a million years according to modern biology and there has been no evolution of another species beyond man for all these million years except perhaps a change in the browridge or chin or the shape of head of the early man.

The theory of evolution was not unknown to the ancient Tamilian. Tolkappiam, the most ancient work now extant, traces the evolution of life from the simple vegetable organism to man, the most complicated organic being. According to the author of this work, the evolution of life starts with the development of the primary sense of touch and gradually evolves in stages commensurate with the development of sense perceptions. The sense of touch gradually evolves senses of taste, smell, sight and hearing in the order in which they are stated here and life develops with these five sense perceptions added to it one by one in that same order in the evolutionary process (தொல்., மரபு, 27.). As the last in this process of evolution man emerges with the sixth sense, the sense of mind with which the evolution culminates. There is growth, adjustment and evolution of form and life, in perfect coordination with the evolution of the senses. The author says those who have investigated and understood them correctly have formulated them in this order (நேரிதின் அறிந்தோர் நெறிப்படுத்தினரே). He classifies the entire organic beings under the six categories stated above as sense evolutes (தொல்., மரபு 28-33).

It is clear, therefore, that as early as the 5th century B. C., the author of this work was aware of theory of evolution and that the order of evolution of the five senses formulated in those ancient days is in perfect accord with the conclusions of modern biology. By the words 'முறைவழிப்படும்' the poet Punkuntranar meant the regular order or law of evolution of life which was pictured as a stream in poetic language.

THE RAFT.

Raft in Tamil, புணை, means two or more pieces bound together. Man is also an aggregate of matter and spirit bound together. The raft has quite followed the current and it cannot swim against it. It occupies the top

most place in the water of the stream because it cannot do otherwise than keep afloat. Similarly man did not choose to be born and he cannot also avoid being born. He has followed the current of evolution and occupies the topmost place in the natural course of evolution.

The poet has not adopted the regular steps of reasoning as a philosopher should. He is evidently averse to such reasonings. One set of reasoning always begets a counter 'as sure as Newton's law of motion' and each such counter is always equal and opposite. The logic and reasonings of the Naiyayika, the Vaiseshika, the Mimamsaka, Jains and Buddhists have all created a regular labyrinth, from which there is no hope of finding a way out. As a poet he is content with a fair analogy and does not step into the causal flux, reasoning or logic, lest it should drown his poesy. He is, however, conscious that his analogy is too slender to sustain his proposition and resorts to the divine vision and revelation of the great sages of his land (திறவோர்க் காட்சியில் தெளிந்தனம்). The theory of vision, revelation, has been accepted as a valid means of knowledge by all the systems of Indian thought or Darsanas except the Charvakas.

The raft being at the top of the waters need cause no wonder; nor need the other constituents of the stream be despised because they are below the raft. The poet concludes "therefore we marvel not at those who are born great; still less do we despise those born low. "ஆதலின் மாட்சியிற் பெரியோரை வியத்தலும் இலமே; சிறியோரை இகழ்தல் அதனினும் இலமே; (மாட்சி-இயல்பு, தொல். மரபு, 94. மாட்சியிற் பெரியோர் = Those born naturally great).

ATTITUDE TOWARDS LIFE

Having explained how man came into this planet the poet proceeds to explain how he should take to the life in this world into which he has been pushed. The great Buddha considered life as misery, dukkha, and propounded his four verities (1) dukkha (misery) (2) dukkha samudaya (cause of misery) (3) dukkha nirodha (removal of misery) (4) and dukkha nirodha marga (the way for the removal). Mahavira also considered life as misery. The upanishads did not propound any one system of thought. Scholars hold that there are passages which extol life and also passages which condemn it as misery. Almost all the systems of thought, Sankya, Vedanta, Jainism and Buddhism share this idea of misery though the last

two emphasise it most. They are all one in urging the loathsome character of the constituents and contents of the body, the harmfulness of temptations prompted by the sense feelings and the necessity of extricating the soul from the body. They uphold renunciation and ascetic practices as the means of liberation. Jainism advocates even self-mortification.”

We find in this poem a different solution altogether. Life is not condemned as misery, and renunciation is not advocated. The poet states “**வாழ்தல் இனிதென மகிழ்தன்று மிலமே; முனிவின் இன்னாது என்றலும் இலமே**”. “We do not take life as one of pleasure and rejoice in it nor do we hate it and consider it as misery.”

We find here a different approach to the problems of life and a different mode of thought. Life is not considered as one of pleasure as did the Charvakas, nor is it a round of miseries as most schools of Indian thought consider. Truth lies between these two extremes. Misery is the child of those two extremes. As observed by Plato in *The Laws*, giving too large a sail to a boat, too much food to the body and too much authority to the mind always leads to disorder and misery. Therefore the best solution of the problems of life lies between these two extremes, the golden mean of Aristotle, an even balance between them. This is not passivity or indifference to pain and pleasure or utter resignation but a balance to be achieved in a dynamic life. **வாழ்தல்** itself means a life dynamic and not passivity. It embraces all the aspects of life sexual, intellectual economic, social and political, in a word, all the dynamic aspects of life dealt with later in the famous work *Tirukkural*.

Man is not a brute. He is endowed with a brain to reason out his way of life and a will for direct action and self control. The eager lust of youth, the exuberance of love, the avarice of the capitalist, the craze for power of the politician have all to be controlled and balanced. In the balanced life there is a wholesome affirmation of life and not its negation. Man feels a compulsion by nature and a will to live and when he lives an integrated and balanced life and avoids the wantonness of excess, misery flees away from him. If one sees misery in life it is the creation of his pessimistic outlook. It is the mind that makes a hell or heaven of this world.

The implications of the simile of the raft are pursued. The raft cannot manage to get out of the water. It cannot be immersed either. It

is drenched; part of it is in water and part above it to the extent necessary to keep it safe. This is the model for man who has been thrown into the stream of life, to keep a proper balance even as the raft does.

Death is not a new phenomenon (சாத்திலும் புதுவதன்று). Buddha considered that misery consisted not in the felt inconveniences of life but in the very life itself. Death was considered as a misery. Our poet takes a different view. Death is nothing new; it is as old as the world itself and it is a necessary part of the scheme of evolution. Buddha did not adopt logical reasoning, deductive or inductive, to prove this theory of misery. In his first sermon at Saranath after his enlightenment, he demonstrated this theory of misery only by means of an analogy. Just as there are ills (heya), their causes, their cure and a way for the cure, there are miseries their cause, their cure and the way of cure. No doubt Buddhism abounds in too much abstruse metaphysical thoughts and reasoning, but critics hold that they are all of later growth. They doubt whether even the theory of twelve links of causation which is generally attributed to Buddha, was formulated by him at all. This theory of causation or law of dependent origination is too recondite to be understood by the multitude to whom his sermons were meant. It is remarkable that Punkuntranar followed the same mode of analogy as was adopted by Buddha and did not resort to logical reasoning.

HUMAN FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

Consistent with this attitude towards life, the poet ascribes complete freedom of action or free will for man and casts on him the full responsibility for all his actions in this life. He states “நன்றும் தீதும் பிறர் தரவாரா ; நோதலும் தணிதலும் அவற்றோரன்ன.” Good and evil are not bestowed by others. Pain and relief do not also come from outside. If no outside agency bestows good and evil upon man, he becomes entirely responsible for all his actions which yield good and evil to himself or to the world. He has full freedom of will either to do good or evil. If he suffers misery or pain or is relieved of it, it is not due to others. He has to take full responsibility for whatever befalls him and whatever he does. Man thus becomes the centre from whom all actions radiate and he has

to shoulder full responsibility in every aspect of his life, moral or intellectual, social or political. He should not seek shelter from dangers under fate, or seek allies in life's battle in providence but be fearless in facing them and dependent upon his own strength.

Here is another view which manifestly differs from the traditional theory of Karma held by almost all the systems of Indian thought and also raises the philosophic problem of fate and free will.

With the exception of the Charvakas, "all the Indian systems agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual it leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to ordain for him his joy or sorrow in the future, according as it is good or bad. When such fruits of actions cannot be enjoyed in the present, the individual has to take another birth".¹ But this poet expounds quite an opposite view. He makes man fully responsible for his actions in this life. *செந்தர வாரா* excludes altogether Karma or fate or any other agency outside man to be responsible for his joys or sorrows, for the good or evil which befalls him in this life. In the stream of evolution man appears as a result of natural causes. Even if these causes are taken to mean Karma or fate or something akin to it, the poet admits of no influence of these causes on his present joys and sorrows, good and evil which are entirely due to his present deeds.

The problem of fate and free-will which the poet has raised here is as old as Philosophy itself. The Greeks did not believe in fate in the height of their glory and power. They conceived of growth and evolution even as Punkuntranar did. When the Spartans destroyed Athens and Alexander razed to the ground the great Thebes, their outlook on life changed altogether. They came to believe in a dark fate which ruled gods and men alike. A tired civilisation construed its fatigue and defeat as destiny.

Fate, destiny or karma or whatever it be, appeared in European philosophy with the new name of determinism. Locke's conception of mind as a clean slate on which sensations wrote, a passive wax shaped and reshaped helplessly by external things, started the game. It has ever since been scoring high and low. The arguments of Will Durant in support of

free will are worth quoting. He states "The determinist modestly fails to take account of himself. He supposes once more that life is the passive product of external forces; he neglects (if we may use a pleonasm) the very vitality and liveliness of life. We are not merely our ancestors and circumstances; we are also wells of transforming energy. We are parts of that stream of directive force of capacity for adaptive choice and thought in which our forefathers moved and had their being. These ancestors are in truth living and acting within us but the will and the life that were once in them is in each of us now creating 'the spontaneous me.' Freedom is narrower and wider than was imagined of old; it is subject, no doubt, to ancestral and environing limitations of a thousand kinds, nevertheless it is as deep as life and as broad as consciousness. It grows in scope and power with the variety of experience, the breadth of perspective and clarity of thought".² Bertrand Russell, the great modern philosopher, whatever his view may be on this vexed question, goes to the extent of admitting a free will even to an atom. He states in *The Analysis of Matter*, "So far as quantum theory can say at present atoms might as well be possessed of free will, limited however to one of several possible choices."³

The poet by the analogy of the stream already explained, does admit of natural causes, heredity or environment or whatever the other constituents of those causes may be, so far as the development of physical form of man and the development of five sense perceptions in him are concerned. This causal factor does not extend to his moral or inner existence. There is no physical necessity in this inner existence and no natural causation which links up the parts. Good or evil relates to the moral nature of man. Morality is in no physical sense an outer object. It is not derived from sense experience or accounted for by physical causes. It relates to the inner life of man which should shape his actions in this world. Here man has, according to the poet, an absolute free will not fettered by any outside agency and an inescapable responsibility. They grow in their scope and power with the development of moral existence.

This theory of unbounded freedom of man and the responsibility from which he cannot escape almost borders on the concept of freedom and responsibility of modern existentialism, except of course its crisis,

anxiety or despair. Jean Paul Sartre, one of the leaders of this movement states "I am abandoned in this world not in the sense that I might remain abandoned and passive in a hostile universe like a board floating on the water but rather in the sense that I find myself suddenly alone and without help engaged in a world for which I bear the whole responsibility, without being able, whatever I do, to tear myself away from this responsibility"⁴. The coincidence of almost a similar comparison to express the responsibility of man, adopted by the two authors, ancient and modern, is remarkable. According to the interpretation of Jean Paul Sartre the stream of Punkuntranar becomes a stream in which responsibility is also involved, out of which Man can in no way get out even as the raft which is caught in the stream.

THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF LIFE.

After emphasising the freedom of action and the responsibility of man, the poet proceeds to explain his relationship with the world and the end to which his freedom of action should be directed. He states that all places are our own and all men, our kith and kin "யா தும் ஊரே யாவரும் கேளிர்",

This trite saying which is quoted often, defines the nature of the relationship which man should have with the world into which he has been ushered. There are certain obligations which man has to accept if all men are to be considered as his own kith and kin. He has to love them all and feel one with them in their joys and sorrows. He has also to render all possible help as far as he could as one related to them should do. Otherwise there is no meaning in considering all men as one's own kith and kin. This is a responsibility which this relationship casts upon man. He has to love every place in this world equally well as he would love his own. His love should transcend all frontiers, national or geographical, make no distinction of race, caste, creed or colour. His love should be an active, creative love which will benefit all mankind, as it will benefit his own kith and kin. His responsibility thus becomes one for Universal love and his freedom of action or free will should be directed to achieve this ultimate object.

This world view and the relationship of human beings to this world have been well brought out by Albert Schweitzer in the following words:

“As a being in active relation to the world he comes into a spiritual relation to it by not living for himself; but feeling himself one with all life that comes within his reach. He will feel all that life’s experience as his own. He will give it all the help he possibly can, and will feel all the saving and promotion of life that he has been able to effect as the deepest happiness that can ever befall to his lot”.⁵

The raft adds its own significance here. It is of no use to itself but helps others to ferry across. It has lost itself and it is there only to serve others. Similarly man should not live for himself; his very existence is for service to others. His individual ego should vanish and his aim in life should be to help others even as the raft does. This is a responsibility from which he cannot escape. The raft is serviceable to anyone who needs it without any distinction of race, country, caste, colour or creed. To achieve a similar end, the noble maxim, “யாதும் ஊரே யாவரும் கேளிர்” should guide man at every step. A selfless devotion to humanism is the vital and final suggestion of the simile.

The poet has expounded here no pet theory nor pious wish of his own. As was expressed in the beginning the poet has taken upon himself the duty of explaining the Philosophy of life of his country as indicated by the use of the first person plural ‘We’. That the ultimate object of life expounded here was actually the ideal of life lived upto in those ancient times will be apparent from the following quotations.

“Men who could not support those who love them and those who could not make their fellow men happy and rejoice with them in their happiness are those who are really poor”⁶ said Pūtharathanar. (Aham 151) He should feel ashamed if others feel helpless,⁷ (பிறர்கையறவு தான் நாணுதலும்) said llaveyini, the woman of the hillfolk. (குறமகள் இள எயினி) “The world exists because of the achievements of those who live not for themselves but for others”⁸ said the great Pandian who died young in the sea (Puram 182).

Here is an interesting account given by Nakkirar of a lady who wonders at the transformation of her husband: “Know thou not, my dear,” says she, “My husband used to dress my hair, arrange my curls, adorn me with flowers, beautify my forehead with Thilakam, will not quit his bed even during the day. Lo! what a transformation! He is

off from home to seek wealth, to relieve the distress of the poor humanity, he delights in procuring them new riches. He feels at heart he is not aloof from the vast humanity”⁹ (புலம்பில் உள்ளமொடு).

Tiruvalluvar deals with this aspect of the ancient life brilliantly well in chapter 22 of his Kural, “knowledge of oneness or equality” (ஒப்புரவு அறிதல்.)

He states “Benevolence as duty to humanity seeks no return. What does the world give back to the clouds which immensely benefit it” (Kural 211)

“He alone lives who knows that he is one with all. The rest have their place among the dead.” (Kural 214)

If ruin will be the result of benevolence to humanity better court it even by offering yourself for sale (Kural 220). A more emphatic way of insisting upon humanism or universal human love cannot be thought of.

Hundreds of passages can be quoted to this effect. Dr. M. Varadarajanar has dealt with this aspect of ancient life in his scholarly lectures called “Ova cheythi.”

It can be seen from the Sangam classics that the ancient domestic life was so planned as to lead naturally to this universal human love. We do not find in the sangam classics a hankering after a life hereafter or any attempt to liberate the soul of all actions, feelings or ideas. There was no pursuit of Nirvana. There was no attempt to liberate each individual soul and make it perfect to live for all eternity in endless plurality. Nor do we find in those classics any human endeavour to attain Mukti by realising that he is no other than the Brahman himself or to become united with God so as to become one with him or to be with him in everlasting dual relationship. We find on the other hand a serious and strenuous attempt to become one with humanity. In the perfection of this universal love individual ego dropped off, and there was a merger with the Supreme, the love infinite.

It was this humanism which was the chief ideal of life which made Tirumular, the great mystic to conceive of God as love and love as God, He wrote ;

"The ignorant think that love and Sivam (God) are different. They do not know that love becomes God. After knowing that love becomes God, they rest themselves in that condition of love in which love has become God." ¹⁰

Tagore says "this feeling of perfection in love which is the feeling of the perfect oneness opened for us the gates of the world of the Infinite one who is revealed in the unity of all personality" ¹¹. "Any profound world view is mysticism," says Albert Schweitzer, "in that it brings men into a spiritual relation with the Infinite." ¹²

We find here a rational empirical, and ethical approach to the problems of life and the ultimate goal of human existence. This provides an abiding value to individual effort in promoting human happiness and also satisfies the voice of the spirit. Apart from the spiritual value of effacing egoism and promoting the much sought-for union with the infinite, its efficacy for a life in this world cannot be overlooked. The efficacy of this ancient principle of life has been so well expressed by Pitirim A. Sorokin, a philosopher of love at Harvard, that it is worth quoting in extenso. He sums up "our studies also show that this unselfish creative love about which we still know very little, potentially represents a tremendous power. (a) It can stop aggressive inter-individual and inter-group attacks. (b) it can transform inimical relationship into amicable ones; (c) love begets love and hate generates hate; (d) love can tangibly influence international policy and pacify international conflicts. In addition to these effects an unselfish and wise (adequate) love manifests itself (e) as a life-giving force necessary for physical mental and moral health. (f) altruistic persons live longer than egoistic individuals, (g) children deprived of love tend to become morally and socially defective; (h) love is a powerful antidote against criminal, morbid and suicidal tendencies against hate, fear and Psycho-neurosis, (i) love performs important cognitive and aesthetic functions (j) it is the loftiest and the most effective educational force for enlightenment and moral ennoblement of humanity; (k) it is the heart and soul of freedom and of main moral and religious values; (l) its minimum is absolutely necessary for the durable existence of any society and especially for a harmonious social order and creative progress; (m) finally

at the present catastrophic moment of human history an increased “production, accumulation and circulation of love energy” or a notable altruization of persons and groups, institutions and culture especially an extension of unselfish love of everyone for everyone in mankind is a necessary condition for the prevention of new wars and for the alleviation of enormously increased inter-individual and inter-group strife.”¹¹

Albert Schweitzer said long ago “ my impression was that the fire of its (mankind’s) ideals was burning low without anyone noticing it or troubling about it.”¹⁴ In his books ‘The Decay and restoration of Civilization’ and ‘Civilization and ethics’ he has emphasised that “ the only possible way out was for man to adopt a world view which would bring him once more under the control of the ideals of civilization which are contained in it.”¹⁵ The ancient wisdom has now been recharged and revitalised by a modern Finnish philosopher of love and a great humanist of our times, the philosopher musician of south African jungles. Their utterances are perhaps the signposts which indicate that the intellectual world after its rambles into rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism, realism, idealism, logical positivism, existentialism, nihilism, agnosticism, monism, dualism, pluralism, pluralistic realism, sufism, Taosism, Shintoism and other ‘isms’ is veering round to the ancient humanism of Confucius and the ancient Philosophy of universal love expounded by the astronomer, philosopher and poet Kaniyan Pankuntranar. Those who are in search of ways to redeem and recreate the culture of mankind had heard the ancient muse sing to them again the grand old song “ யாதும் ஊரே யாவரும் கேளிர் ” in a new tune :

“ The world is my country
All mankind are my brethren
To do good is my religion ”.

-Thomas Paine.

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(8, 9) relevent portions of the poems cited
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அன்பே சிவமாவ தாரும் அறிகிலார்
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LAND AND ITS PROBLEMS

IT is interesting to study the origin of the institution of tenants, tenancies and their subsequent developments. Dr. Rhys David observes: The rural economy of India at the coming of Buddhism was based chiefly on a system of village communities of land owner or what in Europe is known as Peasant Proprietorship so that Mr. Hamilton could with gusto say, 'The Rayat is India, and India is the Rayat.' The village was the base of socio-economic structure of India; and it has been the cradle of the ancient civilisation of this country.

To ascertain how far people are interested in land, the classes into which the rural society is divided may be studied. Mr. Tarlok Singh divides rural society into two classes namely Peasant Society and Non-peasant society. But his classification is too wide. The agricultural population of the district can be mainly divided as follows:— (1) Absentee land lords, i. e. landlords who live mainly on rent alone, the big mirasdars who never till the land but enjoy the fruit of the land after paying a small proportion of the produce to their tenants, (2) the cultivating owners cultivating their own lands and taking on lease more lands or sometimes giving a part of their land on lease. They sometimes work under big mirasdars as agricultural labourers in order to supplement their living, (3) tenant cultivators who take land on lease either for short or long periods. There are very big lessees who for practical purposes are big mirasdars for they never cultivate the lands, but they sublet the leased land to agricultural labourers, (4) agricultural labourers who work for wages given by the mirasdars.

LAND TENURE - SOUTH ARCOT

The system of land tenure in the district has been ryotwari. Small holders have increased in number on account of sub-division of land by inheritance or by sale of pieces to discharge debts. The tenure is known as ryotwari because each land holder or occupant who is locally known as mirasdar holds his land direct from Government and pays his revenue dues direct to the village officers who represent the Government.

LAND REVENUE SYSTEM OF SOUTH ARCOT

Before the acquisition of South Arcot by the British, the ancient village system and the village revenue system prevailed throughout. The village assembly was a powerful body exercising its authority over the whole village and its property. This assembly dealt with the sales and exchanges of land, executed deeds in the name of villagers and acted as arbitrator. The Royal Commission upon Decentralisation in India has remarked as follows:- "Throughout the greater part in India, the village constitutes the primary territorial unit of Government Organisation and from the villages are built up the larger administrative entities - thasils, subdivisions and districts." It is clear that the village system and the village land revenue system were the solid foundations of Government, Hindu as well as Mohamedan. If only they had been kept intact, the present superstructure built by the British Government on them during the last 150 years would have been on solid foundation without the top - heavy expenditure of the present day. When once they started breaking up the village system and the unity of the inhabitants and lay new foundations on the ryotwari individual system on one side, and the zamindari system under the permanent settlement on the other, the process of disintegration commenced at once.

During the Muhammadan period, the whole village made itself liable for the entire revenue and the same was continued in the early part of British rule. After some time the British administrators introduced village settlement and in giving effect to this, land revenue was fixed on the village as a whole. As between themselves, each villager was liable for his share of the demand on the village community, but the British revenue official did not recognize this new individual responsibility. This continued even after the appointment of collectors for district administration, until the ryotwari system came in. This in short is the land revenue system that was prevailing at the time of first settlement made by the first Collector of South Arcot.

The first survey was made by the Manager of the Nawab of Arcot who fixed three rates of assessment: one for kar crops (kadir), one for first crops (kai) and a third for second crops (puvasi). He adopted the amani system of revenue administration; i. e. he required the

ryots to pay their dues direct to the Government. The first collector Captain Graham, in his settlement for 1801 reduced the assessments by 30% in view of the oppressive assessment made by the manager of the Nawab. But the East India Company in 1803 sent Mr. Garrows who raised the assessments to as high a figure as was ever reached under the Mussalman Administration. But in 1805 Major Melod who succeeded Garrows found that the assessment was very excessive and at last Mr. Ravenshaw (1805-1806) made a survey which classified the land into cultivated waste and not cultivated, and divided lands into fields to which names were given. It brought to light 146209 kanis (1.33 acre) of arable dry land and 16,757 of arable wet, more than had been shown in the old accounts. The settlement classified and valued the produce of each field according to the best information to be obtained and with reference to soil (no less than 26 varieties of dry soils, 18 of them wet, and 16 of garden being distinguished) and then fixed an assessment on it on the general principle of an equal division of the crop between government and cultivator. Thus the history of the early revenue settlements is rather confusing. It is indeed as Baden Powell says "a record of a series of experiments in assessments, reductions and enhancements, changes in one direction and another following each other in somewhat bewildering order. "Between 1808 and 1822 village leases, first triennial and then decennial, were tried in Nellore, Ceded District, North and South Arcot, Tanjore, Tinnevely and Trichinopoly. During the first years of British rule, the maximum revenue was raised by "Collectors newly appointed to newly acquired territory, unfettered by judicial regulations, at a distance from control excited by the hope of raising the Public Revenue and establishing their own official reputation"¹ and those assessments formed the basis of new settlement. The decay of village community and of the feeling of village solidarity which had already begun, must also have prevented the village leases from functioning efficiently. The village leases worked under unfavourable circumstances of overassessments, lack of cooperation between the authorities, adverse seasons, and depressed state of agriculture and industry. The village leases were not actually what they had been in former times and what the Board of Revenue intended them to be i.e. settlements with the

1. Letter from Revenue Board to Government 23 Jan. 1812.

village through the headman or body of headmen who would be responsible and substantial men of the village and who worked merely as representatives of the people and not for profit. The new renters appointed by the British Government often belonged to other villages and were poor men intent on squeezing out from the villages in their charge. In other words the leases thus in practice turned out to be a semi - zamindari system with smaller units and without the benefit of the tradition of landed aristocracy which might act as a break to oppression. In vain the Revenue Board protested that the ill success of the village leases was due not to any inherent defects but to the excessive rents based on 'fallacious data' of the previous ryotwari collections. When Munro returned as Governor the ryotwari system superseded the village system. Since the village revenue system which was formerly predominant disappeared, tenancies divided themselves into those under ryotwari and zamindari landlords. In the ryotwari areas, the different kinds of tenants became merged into one class i. e. that of tenants at will. The ulcudis (semi-landlords) lost their rights of occupancy and their rents became liable to enhancement at the expiry of their term. Their interest thus ceased with the harvest and hence they had no inducements to improve the land. In inam lands tenants who cultivated the same lands for some generation enjoyed tolerable security, but in general the position of under tenants was that of porakudi pykaris.

The injurious effects of high rates on ryots and on cultivation were apparent from the beginning of the century and even earlier. In 1795 Munro wrote "Were we to abandon our oppressive mode of taxation the country instead of rice and dry crops would be covered with plantations of betel, cocoanut, sugar and cotton". The fundamental prerequisite of his ryotwari system was a reduction of the assessment by 25%². When the Ryotwari system was introduced in Madras province between 1820 and 1827 the land revenue demand was fixed at one third of the produce payable as a fixed sum of money, irrespective of the annual yield or the prevailing prices. "For thirty years," says R. C. Dutt, "the province of Madras became the scene of oppression and agricultural distress unparalleled even in India in that age."³ The assessments had to be revised many

2. Report to Mr. Read on the Lease Settlement, 31st July, 1296.

3. Ec. History of India in the Victorian Age, P. 68.

times during these thirty years, but on the whole to quote Mr. Dutta again, "Modern history scarcely furnishes a parallel to such an arrangement under which a large industrious and civilised population were rendered incapable of improving their condition of acquiring agricultural wealth by a system of assessments which was kept to the highest paying capacity of the country from year to year." Coming to the present position, the twin principle of assessment on land, not on crops grown except in the case of wet land where it includes charge for irrigation and the principle of estimating of the net profit of each cultivator. It is worthwhile stressing the recent tendency in almost every village for owners to cultivate less and less either with their own hands or with the help of paid farm servants, and for more lands to be let either on the system of share tenancy or fixed rents.

We may now proceed to consider briefly the incidence of varam and kuttagai i.e. share tenancy and fixed rents the two most important systems of lease so far as South Arcot is concerned. In the case of grains particularly paddy, the varam is generally fixed at half of the gross produce. Some advance is paid by some mirasdars for purchasing cattle, free of interest. If seed is lent it is recovered after the harvest with an addition not so much by way of interest as to make up for loss in dryage of fresh grain. The system of kuttagai is a pucca lease in which the rent is fixed either in kind or in cash. The rent is in the case of grains generally in kind, being so many kalams per acre whatever the actual yield, while in case of commercial crops easily marketable like cotton or groundnut the rent is fixed in terms of cash as so many rupees per acre, what might be the actual yield on the price of produce. These terms are not however always strictly enforced. If crops fail, for instance, due to adverse seasons there are few who insist on the payment of stipulated rents. The varam tenancy is on the decline in this district while kuttagai is on the increase. This is in short the tenancy of the district.

The Composition of Rural Society in the Investigated Villages.

Total No. of fami- lies in the village	Village	Taluk	Absentee landlords.	Owners who cultivate their own only.	No. of owners who cultivate a part, rest on lease.	Owners who take lease in addition to their own.	No. of tenants
699	Panampattu	Villupuram	23	242	16	182	236
500	Sattukudal	Vridhachlam	3	79	18	210	210
536	Periperian- kuppam	Cuddalore	4	32	26	240	300
328	Parampattu	Chidambaram	-	126	12	102	38
314	Vadagarai- thayanoor	Tirukoilur	10	45	5	99	175
200	Kondamur	Tindivanam	6	75	-	54	65
230	Pakkam	Gingee	13	60	5	60	92
400	Virachola- puram	Kallakurichi	18	102	22	100	138

Size of holdings:— Having considered the tenancy problem, let us go to the most important factor which affects the character of returns from farming to the size of holdings. The word 'holding' has been defined by Floud Commission as 'a parcel of land or an undivided share thereof held by a ryot or an under ryot and forming the subject of tenancy'⁴ But the definition of economic holding has raised a controversy among Indian Economists. The controversy mainly centres round the question whether production or consumption is to be adopted as the criterion in defining the term. Those who have the first criterion in mind define it as a holding which can be managed with a pair of bullocks and the latter as holding which will provide for an average family at the minimum standard of life. The author of the thesis prefers the latter because it refers to the cultivator and his family who are supported by it. The income from a piece of land will depend upon a number of factors such as the nature of the soil, crops, climate, marketing facilities, and so on. It will also depend upon the practice of irrigation and intensive cultivation. Taking all the pertinent factors into consideration and assuming the

average size of a family at 5 persons, 7 acres of wet or 15 acres of dry would be the proper size of an economic holding for this district. But the following study made by the author in the district would show the average size of the holding of the cultivator's family is not sufficient to provide for an average family at the minimum standard of life.

Village	Taluk	No. of families taken up for study	Total cultivated area	Average size.
1. Panampattu	Villupuram	70	269.15	3.83
2. Sattukudal	Vriddachalam	70	526.66	7.49
3. Periperian- kuppam	Cuddalore	114	433.2	3.7
4. Parampattu	Chidambaram	62	84.14	1.37
5. Vadagari- thayanoor	Tirukkcoilur	88	406.86	4.67
6. Kondamur	Tindivanam	36	76.8	2.1
7. Pakkam	Gingee	45	139.6	3.1
8. Virachola- puram	Kallakurichi	80	569.9	7.1

In a district so largely agricultural and already so thickly settled it is natural to expect holdings to become more and more uneconomic with an increase in population and without other avenues of employment. The system of equal inheritance of land among all sons of a family has its evil here as in other countries where land is scarce for the population; they are aggravated by the practice of dividing each of the scattered plots of land into fragments of which a holding is ordinarily composed. Still further, attachments of bits of land for the redemption of debt adds its quota to the existing confusion. There has been in all the villages studied a definite increase in the number of holdings, if the growth in the number of pattas is an indication. The tendency to the increasing sub-division of holdings is due to the system of Hindu law governing inheritance. Of this fact there is no doubt if we turn over the pages of land revenue records we can find fragmented holdings further fragmented by the heirs of diseased landholders. The average size of an holding in Parampattu (Chidambaram taluk) was 3.9 acres in 1930 and in 1945 it decreased to 1.37.

On the question of fragmentation of holdings, the average size of plot is smaller in wet lands usually growing paddy than in dry lands growing a variety of crops. It is almost less than 1.5 acres in the former while it is about 3 to 4 acres in the latter. Pakkam in Gingee taluk is an exceptional village because three-fourths of the holdings are not all fragmented while about 70 holdings have only two plots each. Most of the other 30 holdings have between 2 to 5 plots each. The system of parivarthanai or voluntary exchange of lands to secure contiguous plots has become rare. Though there is no system of parivarthanai, the ryots usually pay more than the prevailing prices to secure contiguous plots. Out of 70 families I studied in Sattukudal in Vriddhachalam taluk 17 have secured contiguous plots by paying more. Another point that I noted in my study is that the rich landlord would not part with any plot to oblige a poor neighbour while the latter disposed theirs to the former and became landless. The overwhelming majority of landowning families have very small holdings. There is a large number of families who do not own any land at all and therefore find it all the more difficult to earn a living. It is estimated for whole of India that the average size of holding has come down from 40 acres in 1871 to 7 acres in 1914-15. In the 8 villages that I studied, 58% of holdings are below 5 acres and there are thousands of toy holdings of 1/160 acre to 30¼ square yards. My study concurs with "The Hindu" which pertinently pointed out "...very large number of right holders' holdings in Madras province which are under 2 or 3 acres and the proportion of holdings under one acre seems to be high. An investigation in a Malabar village is that 34% of holdings were under one acre. The number of cultivated acres per cultivator is but 4.91 in our province.⁵ Again, Dr. P. J. Thomas observes: "There is room to think that the position has worsened in the last 20 years. The average size is smaller in wet lands than in dry lands."⁶ There has been no attempt to make consolidation of holdings. In the face of the present man land ratio in the district and the incontestable fact of uneconomic holdings there is no real remedy. Dr. B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu has suggested two proposals for making the Peasant holdings more economic, viz. consolidation of holdings and introduction of primogeniture.⁷

5. 'The Hindu' dated 13th Feb. 1946.

6. Indian Agriculture, p. 379.

7. Some South Indian Villages, p. 340.

But the principle of equal inheritance which is part of the social foundation of our rural economy is by no means confined to India. It has been followed in almost every predominantly agricultural community east and west of Suez. In the absence of other avenues of equal employment, it is natural that land should be divided among different sons. The principle of primogeniture is certainly not acceptable to peasant owners and ryots anywhere in India. As Tarlok Singh observes: "The ryots are the heart and substance of the tradition and the civilisation which the village community represents to this day. They are our most efficient cultivators and repositories of much of the knowledge and experience of agriculture which has come to us from our ancient past".⁸ It is only by recognizing them along new lines that we can solve the problem. Tarlok Singh believes in joint management. He stresses the need for combination among peasants. The cultivators should work their own fields but the crops which grow should be prescribed by the community would be best solution. The Royal Commission on Agriculture examined various remedies proposed for solving the evils of subdivision and came to the conclusion that no practical suggestions of value have been suggested.⁹ They proposed Cooperative Society for consolidation of holdings. Further they pointed out the usefulness of cooperative society in Punjab. On Punjab model one consolidation society was started in South Arcot district at Tirupachanur under the name "The Tirupachanur Cooperative Consolidation of Holdings Society in 1938." The Society consolidated 35 acres in one village under its jurisdiction. Owing to lack of cooperation the society is not functioning now.

As Tarlok Singh points out, cooperative farming is 'little more than a phrase' which is seldom defined and is vaguely understood. According to the recent authoritative statement in cooperative farming by

8. Poverty and Social Charge, p.48.

9. "Fragmentation of holdings in many parts of India is one of the most important factors tending to prevent agricultural improvement. There seems to be common agreement that its evil effects are so great that the state propaganda should explore the whole situation". Report, p. 142.

the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research", each cultivator would retain the rights in his own land but cultivation operations would be carried on jointly. The expenditure would be met from a common fund and deducted from the gross income. The net income would then be distributed among the cultivators in proportion to the land belonging to each." What we need is a system of joint farm management which provides rights in the soil but utilization of all land, labour, resources in the interests of community. The various legislative measures adopted by different provinces for consolidation of holdings, especially the very recent one adopted by the Bombay Province imposed restriction on the right to divide the land beyond certain limits. The Bombay Bill provided for the compulsory introduction of a scheme of consolidation where the two-thirds of the holders of plots and not less than half the number of owners of land in the area concerned agreed to do so. As already indicated the cooperative method of Punjab does away with the element of compulsion. As the name indicates, cooperative method has to rely on persuasion and propaganda. The permanent solution lies in the development of joint farm management which takes the entire peasant village as a unit and retains the principles of ownership.

Agricultural Labour. Let us now look a little closely into the economic position of the Agricultural Labourers, the humbler members of the rural society. It is assumed, nay even asserted, that throughout the centuries, the agricultural labourer was little better than a beast of burden, that his environment is terrible, his social condition degraded, his prospects hopeless. Agricultural labour is not organised like industrial labour. The structure of the agricultural population is much more intricate. At the one extremity there is the large scale employer and next to him the peasant or farmer of a moderate sized farm who probably never had to contemplate working for another. These two groups form the aristocracy or plutocracy of agriculture. It is said that in India landless labourers have increased from 7½ millions in 1862 to 33 millions in 1941.

In every district in the presidency agriculture largely predominates among the occupations of the people but in none of them is this preponderance so marked as in South Arcot. The number of Harijans and other cultivating classes is exceptionally great and the statistics of the census shows that a large proportion of the people of the district live by occupations directly connected with the land. The

number of landless labourers and their proportion to the total population is definitely on the increase in all the eight villages that I have investigated. The agricultural labourers may be classified into three distinct groups: field labourers, ordinary labourers and skilled labourers. The castes which are traditionally field labourers by occupation, such as Harijans and others have in South Arcot been generally able to obtain and farm land of their own. Frequent instances could be cited in Chidambaram taluk in which these people have made their first start with savings earned by a few years in Penang or Ceylon or in Tindivanam with capital put by, bring a spell of labour on the kolar gold fields; and once started they appear to have no difficulty in going on. Secondly, hired agricultural labourers are of two kinds—those who are engaged for the year, and those who perform occasional labour when extra hands are required during harvests, transplanting etc. Women were largely employed as agricultural labourers from Harijan caste. They were chiefly occupied in weeding, transplanting and cutting. The skilled labourers are artisans—the village carpenters, masons, blacksmiths, barbers etc. Though they are not regular agricultural labourers they are employed in agricultural work. They get wages in kind. There are signs to show that artisan class is slowly destroyed and they take to agricultural work. The increasing subdivision of holdings gives less scope to labourers because the farm family becomes more or less self sufficient in labour except during harvesting. The bigger landholders have *pannaials* or farm servants. The peasantry with petty holdings compete with the landless labourers. There is inter-district and inter-taluk migration of labourers. The labourers from Cuddalore go as far as Salem for groundnut picking. They invariably return home during Pongal and the Tamil New Year. The recent Great war provided an escape from a life of ceaseless toil and scanty reward¹⁰. The landless labourers and small landholders accept their employment and under employment as a part of normal order of things, bear their lot with the fortitude born of the dismal conditions which their meagre income make inescapable and suffer in silence. In all the eight villages that I have studied, the landless labourers have increased since 1901. Of every 100 persons engaged in cultivation one-third are labourers.

10. Page 2, *Transition from War to Peace* by Gianchand.

Year 1945.

Village	Taluk	Total families.	Land-less.	No. of landless men. (Military)
Panampattu	Villupuram	699	236	13
Sattukudal	Vriddachalam	500	210	4
Periperiankuppam	Cuddalore	536	300	26
Paranpattu	Chidambaram	328	88	3
Vadagaraihayanoor	Tirukoilur	314	175	8
Kondar	Tindivanam	200	65	—
Pakkam	Gingee	230	92	3
Viracholapuram	Kallakurichi	400	138	7

The above table indicates the high proportion of landless labourers in the rural society. It is no wonder that Prof. K. C. Ramakrishna points out that for every 1000 persons engaged in the cultivation in the Madras Presidency the following charges are noticed :—¹¹

	1901	1911	1921	1931
Cultivating landholders	484	426	381	390
Labourers	345	340	317	429

Agriculture, as an occupation, is peculiar in that it affords seasonal work for casual helpers. The Royal commission on Agriculture has rightly pointed out "that by far the greater number of Cultivation have at least from two to four months absolute leisure in the year."¹² In this district Padayachis are pre-eminently a class of agriculture labourers next to Harijans and they account for about one-fifth of the total population. The pannaials are usually from both communities of Padayachi and Harijan. They are bound to the landlord. They are maintained by them. Each is given a hut, an allowance of grains and also a small plot where he is allowed to cultivate. He is given seeds, the cattle of his master to plough his plot. Another feature in the district is the existence of a set of agricultural workers who till the land on lease where most of them are share-croppers or metayers contributing their own labour and at best a pair of cattle and the land owner contributes

11. Paper read by K. Ramakrishna in Agri. Soc. of Eco. 1944 (p. 158)

12. Report, p. 566

seeds, manures, which are paid for from the heap of harvest. This is called varam. The fixed lease in cash or in kind is called kuttagai.

Wages:— The wages of agricultural workers differ according to category. The wages have risen by 150% during the last three years. It is presumed that the increase of wages has raised the standard of living of landless labourers. But the study of the villages clearly reveals that it is far from the case.¹³ Before the war, the permanent labourers or pannai servants were paid in grain of various kinds the amount of which varied between 10 to 45 Madras measures a month. In Chidambaram taluk they are paid in paddy. They are also given the midday meal of kanji free, a cloth at Deepavali and Pongal, loans free of interest, help in the shape of grains at child births, deaths and marriages and percentage called kalavasam on the crop reaped. Temporary labourers were getting from 6 to 7 annas a day for men and 4 annas for women in the prewar days. Wages are lowest in Kallakurichi and highest in Chidambaram taluk. Wages are generally lower in dry than in wet land areas. The wages usually vary from taluk to taluk, village to village according to the supply of labour. Between 42-45 the wages were increased from 6 to 12 annas and 3 to 6 annas. The system of payment in kind is slowly giving place to cash owing to the high price of food crops. Formerly two Madras measures of paddy were paid for a day and now it has been increased to 3 Madras measures a day. For a pannai servant 22½ Madras measures a month, and one meals a day. The landless labourers in the Vadagaraithayanoor in Tirukkoilur taluk are not in any way benefitted by the rise in the price of paddy. In Parampattu in Chidambaram taluk the wages are paid in cash, not in kind unlike the former one. They were paid between 5 annas to 8 annas before 1942 and now increased to 8 to 12 annas. For women labourer, the wages have increased from 2½ to 4½ annas. The hired ploughing has increased from 6 annas

13. "Family budgets".

to 12 - to 14 annas. In the bannana and tobacco fields the labourers were paid Rs. 7/- a month which has increased to Rs. 15 a month. In Sattukudal in Vriddhachalam taluk wages are paid still in kind as before and they are paid weekly 3 Madras measures a day. The Padiyals are paid weekly. The cash wages are between 12 to 14 annas. In Panampattu in Villupurem taluk 30 Madras measures and two meals every day is provided for pannai servants. The cash wages are between 8 to 10 annas. In Periperiankuppam of Cuddalore taluk, there are no wages in kind. The village is a completely dry village and cashew nut forms the main crop of the village. The labourers are paid Rs.15 a month for cashewnut work.

What are apt to be lightly described as agricultural labourers, wages afford one of the most difficult economic problems connected with the land. Agricultural labour was till now neglected by the state. Only recently the Government of India have introduced a bill to provide for fixing minimum wage in agriculture i.e. "in any form of farming, including the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairy farming, the production, cultivation, growing and harvesting of any agricultural commodity, the raising of the livestock, bees or poultry and any practice performed by a farmer or on a farm as incidental to or in conjunction with farm operations."¹⁴ The question of wages outweighs all other questions which arise in the course of the agricultural worker's life. The economy of the district nay of India is not yet directed towards a systematic development of wages system. The minimum wage bill recently introduced by the Government is the first of its kind. The chief difficulty arising in a study of agricultural wages is the formal incomparability of agricultural wage - rates as they vary from one village to another village, from one taluk to another taluk, from one district to another district and one province to another. Then, how is it possible to fix minimum wages in Agriculture. A choice has to be made of only one rate for each province. This severe selection is essential in the interest of both labourer and landlords. Australia is having a combined representative wage i.e. rates for a variety of agricultural occupations and index figures for agricultural wages in general. Again in Sweden we find a carefully constructed wages system. In U.S.A. and Canada we have a uniform wages system for farm workers without distinction. The payment of wages in kind is one of the characteristic features

of agricultural wages. This is common in every agricultural country. The extreme difficulty of securing cash resources as agriculture pursues its tasks are well known. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that no employer in agriculture ever has the cash he really needs. But in recent years, owing to the rise in price of agricultural commodities, there is a tendency on the part of landlords to pay wages in cash. But there is a reluctance on the part of farm workers to receive it in money owing to the scarcity and high price of food stuffs. Though this is not largely noticeable in this district as in Tanjore, this tendency was noted in some of the villages that I have studied. The change to the cash system has been long due in agriculture and would certainly assist in the understanding and control of agricultural wages. Moreover the handling of cash income is very educative and informative and would permit the labourers to distribute his spending more according to his choice. It would expose the state of agricultural wages in all their nakedness and this would be a good thing (6 annas in Periperiankuppam in Cuddalore taluk per day even now). The most depressing feature about agricultural wages is their low level.

As Howard rightly observes "agricultural wage rates seldom attain much more than one half, are often only one half, and occasionally even only one-third of an average industrial wage."¹⁵ It is true that wages have increased within the last three years. But the agricultural labourer is not getting real wages as in European countries i.e. wages in relation to prevailing cost of living or in other words to what agricultural worker can buy.¹⁶ The bargaining power on the side of agricultural worker has not been really effective. There is no reinforcement either by trade union or by Government backing. Of late, Kisan Sanghas organised by communists are trying to fight the battle against the low wages especially in Tanjore and Chingleput districts. Habit and tradition still play a dominant part in the agricultural economy. The very idea of the adaptation of wages to changing economic condition is modern, and it is not surprising that this idea of fluctuating payments should be repugnant in some quarters; custom seems a sure guide, the demand for higher wage is regarded as a mere expression of insubordination on the part of disaffected workers. So the fixation of Minimum Wage Act has to take note of all these points into consideration in fixing the wage.

15. Howard : "Labour in Agriculture", p. 204.

16. Ref. Chapter on Family Budgets.

The efficiency of the agricultural labour :— We shall now deal briefly with the economic condition of the agricultural labourers in the district. The recent war has increased the cost to the farmer and lead to changes in the modes of payment to agricultural workers, and also to a certain extent non-availability of labour owing to the recruitment for war. There has been a hectic rise in cash wages during 1942 to 1944. This fact is borne out by the following statement of wages paid in different parts of the district.

Taluk	Village	1938-39	1942-44	Kind or cash.
		Per day	Per day	
Cuddalore	Periperian-kuppam	2 annas	4 annas	Cash only
Villupuram	Pannampattu	4 annas	10 to 12 as.	Both
Vridhdachalam	Sattukudal	4 to 5 as	10 to 12 as.	Kind
Chidambaram	Parampattu	6 annas	12 to 14 as.	Both
Kallakurichi	Viracholapuram	4 annas	12 annas	Both
Tindivanam	Kondamur	5 annas	12 annas	Both
Tirukkcoilur	Vadagaraithayanoor	5 annas	10 annas	Both
Gingee	Pakkam	4 annas	8 to 10 as.	Both

The reason for low wages in Periperiankuppam is because of the low wage level being is still more depressed by the toyholdings in the village making the villagers too willing to work to supplement their meagre income from the land.

From the above statistics it is found that there is an increase of 100% in the wages in the last two years. The increase in money wages is only superficial, for, the articles of consumption have increased in prices by not less than 250%. (Refer Appendix). The increase in wages never meant a rise in the real wages of the labourers. The drink habit in the district is very common, and it has increased in the last three years. There is no question of high standard of living for the labourers on account of rise in wages. There are very few cases which had benefitted by the rise in wages. In the

study of eight villages there are only 17 cases who had bought land during the war i. e. landless becoming landed. In general, the condition of the agricultural labourers has not improved for better owing to the high cost of living. "The subsistence farmers and the entire group of agricultural labourers have suffered greatly by war." ¹⁷

If he was able to earn more by the rise in wages, he also spent more on such occasions as marriage or his favourite drinks of toddy and liquor.

The landlords begin to complain of inefficiency of agricultural labour. The author of the thesis received serious complaints on this subject in the course of his study. That the average labourer puts forth less work per day than he used to do formerly has been the cry of mirasdars. So far not much has been done in the way of enquiry into the efficiency of human labour in agriculture. As Dr. Slater has pointed out, this question of relative efficiency of Indian labour is a very difficult one. The more one enquires, the more puzzled one became." The problem of overpopulation turns out to be a problem of wasted labour. What is the alternative employment available? There are no rural industries of any kind in the district. There is an urgent need to trace the effects of a change in the economic and social environment of the labourer. The Mirasdars' Conference held recently at Tanjore rightly stressed the need of a commission to inquire into the relation between the labour in agriculture and landlords and other allied problems, which would put the rural economy on its strong foundation. In any scheme of national planning India's predominantly agricultural bias cannot be altogether ignored and that simultaneously with all schemes of industrialisation, schemes to improve the technique and methods of our agriculture which should ultimately aim at increasing agricultural efficiency and agricultural productivity should be carried on. It is a matter of common experience that increase in agricultural efficiency means the satisfaction of total demand for primary products by a relatively smaller proportion of population. Agricultural efficiency would be maintained only if the labour is diverted from farming to industry, public utilities and public works. There is reason to believe that the employment in industries like public utilities etc. will

17. Dr. P. S. Lokanathan: India's Post-War Reconstruction and its International Aspects, P. 34.

be sufficiently remunerative to attract the rural labour. But this alone will not suffice to overcome the inertia of rural labour and positive measures will have to be taken to offset the financial and social costs of movement. These measures may be in the form of non-farming occupation, financing the cost of movement, and last but not least adequate housing facilities. It might be noted in this connection that even in Australia and New Zealand where there is no rural problem of rural over population as such, smaller urban centres are showing a keen interest in planned regional development and encouragement of local industries.

The main problem of agricultural labour is the want of organised effective system of collective bargaining and enforcement of minimum standard. The low wage situation of our agricultural labour is mostly due to the general nature of the cost structure obtaining in agriculture. The cost structure in agricultural occupation is proverbially sluggish in its response to improvement in price situation, though it is relatively active in responding to a deterioration in prices. A considerable proportion of agricultural costs consists of overhead expenses and wages; and therefore the said sluggish response is reflected in the wages of agricultural labour. This fact of low wages has resulted in what is called the over extension of the margin of profitable cultivation. Existing wages, conditions regarding the labour supply and amenities provided to labour are some of the elements which go to determine the margin of cultivation. It will be seen that the margin of cultivation goes on being extended in proportion as the wages response is slow and sluggish. Obviously to stop the further process and if possible to bring it to a decent level and to raise the wage rate of agricultural labour the remedy is to make the position of farm labourers stronger particularly in collective bargaining. The farmer cannot pay higher wages, or cannot improve conditions of work, consistently with his competitive strength in the market either way. Therefore so far as agriculture is unable to offer labour conditions comparable with those in industry it is *prima facie* evidence of rural overpopulation and the over extension of the margin. As Prof. H. Belshaw remarks in his 'Foundation of Rural Welfare', this is a neglected point of fundamental importance to rural welfare and especially to condition of rural labour. Some sort of

controlling authority is necessary to ensure that the farm labour gets his due share in the increased prosperity of agriculture. It is refreshing to find that Madras Government is considering the question of enforcement of wages through Panchayats. The Government can utilise the village committees in this connection. While thus the problem of low wages of our agricultural labour demands our first attention, other factors such as hours of work, provision for holidays, provision against unemployment, sickness and accident, housing standards and education cannot stand criminally neglected any longer. There must be a comprehensive labour code not only for industrial labour but also for agricultural labour.

பதினொராந் திருமுறை

காரைக்காலம்மையார் அருளிச் செய்த

திருவாலங்காட்டு மூத்த திருப்பதிகங்கள்
(திரு. க. வெள்ளைவாரணன்)

துணைப்பேராசிரியர், தமிழாராய்ச்சித்துறை)

திருக்கயிலாயமலையில் அம்மையப்பராக வீற்றிருந்தருளும் சிவ பெருமானைக் காரைக்காலம்மையார் கண்ணூரக் கண்டு மகிழ்ந்த நிலையில் அவ்விறைவன் 'அம்மையே நீ தென்னாட்டிற் சிறந்து விளங்கும் திருவாலங்காட்டைந்து அங்கு யாம் ஆடியருளும் திருக்கூத்தினைக் கண்டு என்றும் எம்மைப்பாடிப் போற்றியிருப்பாயாக' எனப்பணித்த வண்ணம் திருவாலங்காட்டிற்குத் தலையால் நடந்து சென்று அங்கு அண்டமுற நிமிர்ந்தாடும் இறைவனது திருக்கோலத்தைக் கண்டு நெஞ்சம் நெக்குருகிப் பணிந்து 'கொங்கைதிரங்கி', 'எட்டியிலவம்' என்ற முதற் குறிப்புடைய மூத்த திருப்பதிகங்கள் இரண்டினையும் பாடிப் போற்றினார் என்பது வரலாறு.

அம்மையார் பாடிய இத்திருப்பதிகங்களுள் 'கொங்கைதிரங்கி' என்ற முதற்குறிப்புடைய திருப்பதிகம் நைவளம் என்ற நட்டபாடைப் பண்ணிலும், 'எட்டியிலவம்' என்ற முதற்குறிப்புடைய பதிகம் இந்தளப் பண்ணிலும் அமைந்துள்ளன. எனவே பண்சுமந்த பாடல்களாகிய இத்திருப்பதிகங்களைப் பாடியருளிய காரைக்காலம்மையார் இயற்றமிழிலும் இசைத் தமிழிலும் நிரம்பிய புலமையுடையார் என்பது நன்கு பெறப்படும். இச்செய்தி, 'கவுணியர் நாவுக்கரசர் பேயார் இம்முவர் கற்கும் இயல்இசை வல்லோர், என்னும் சேக்கிழார் புராணத்தொடரால் இனிது புலனாதல் காணலாம். திருஞான சம்பந்தர், திருநாவுக்கரசர், நம்பியாரூரர் ஆகிய தேவார ஆசிரியர்கள் மூவரும் இயலிசைத் தமிழ்ப் பாடல்களால் இயன்ற பதிகப் பெருவழியினை அமைத்து இறைவன் திருவருளை ஞால முழுவதும் பரப்புதற்கு முன்னரே பண்ணூரந்த பதிகங்களால் எல்லாம் வல்ல இறைவனைப் பாடிப் போற்றும் திருநெறிய தமிழ்நெறியை முதன் முதல் வகுத்துக் காட்டிய அருளாசிரியர் காரைக்காலம்மையாரே யாவர். எனவே அம்மையார் திருவாய் மலர்ந்தருளிய தொன்மை வாய்ந்த திருவாலங்காட்டுத் திருப்பதிகங்கள் இரண்டும் மூத்ததிருப்பதிகம் என வழங்கப் பெறுவனவாயின.

சிவபெருமானைப் போற்றும் நற்கணத்தில் ஒருவராகிய காரைக்கால் அம்மையார், ஆலங்காட்டிறைவன் ஈமம் இடு சுடுகாட்டகத்தே தாழ்சடை எட்டுத்திசையும் வீசி ஆடியருளும் திருக்கூத்தின் இயல்பினையும், அண்டமுற நிமிர்ந்தாடும் அப்பெருமானுக்கு ஆடரங்காகத் திகழும் பேரீமப் புறங்காட்டின் அமைதியையும், அங்கு வாழும் பேய்களின் வியக்கத்தக்க செய்கைகளையும் இத்திருப்பதிகங்களிற் சுவைபெற விரித்துரைக்கின்றார்.

திருவாலங்காட்டு மூத்த திருப்பதிகம்-1

பண் - நட்பாடை

திருச்சிற்றம்பலம்

கொங்கை திரங்கி நரம்பெழுந்து

குண்டுகண் வெண்பற் குழிவயிற்றுப்

பங்கி சிவந்திரு பற்கள்நீண்டு

பரடுயர் நீள்கணைக் காலொர்பெண்பேய்

தங்கி அலறி உலறுகாட்டில்

தாழ்சடை எட்டுத் திசையும்வீசி

அங்கங் குளிரந்தனல் ஆடும்எங்கள்

அப்பன் இடந்திரு வாலங்காடே.

(1)

1. இதன் பொருள் :

கொங்கைகள் வற்றிச் சுருங்கி நரம்புகள் வெளிப்பட்டு ஆழ்ந்த கண்களையும் வெள்ளிய பற்களையும் உட்குழிந்த வயிற்றினையும் (உடையதாய்த்) தலைமயிர் சிவந்து, (கடைவாய்ப்) பற்கள் இரண்டும் நீண்டு, பரடு என்னும் உறுப்பு உயர்ந்து தோன்றும் நீண்ட கணைக்காலையும் உடைய ஒரு பெண்பேயானது, தங்கியிருந்து கதறி (நீரின்மையால்) வாட்டமுற்றுச் சோரும் ஈமப்பெருங்காட்டிலே, தாழ்ந்து வீழும் சடையினை எட்டுத்திசைகளிலும் சென்று பரவும்படி விரித்து வீசி (உயிர் நீங்கிய உடம்புகளின்) எலும்பும் குளிரும்படி தீயின் நடுவே ஆடியருளும் எங்கள் தந்தையாகிய இறைவன் விரும்பியெழுந்தருளும் இடம் திருவாலங்காடாம் என்றவாறு.

திரங்குதல் — வற்றிச் சுருங்குதல். கு ண் டு க ண் — ஆழமானகண். பங்கி—தலைமயிர். பரடு—கணைக்காலிலுள்ள எலும்பின் முட்டு. எழுந்து, சிவந்து, நீண்டு என்னும் சினைவினைகள் தங்கி என்னும் முதல் வினை கொண்டு முடிந்தன அலறுதல்—கதறுதல். உலறுதல் — (உடல்) வற்றுதல். ‘அலறிடேன் உலறிடேன் ஆவிசோரேன்’ என்பது திருவாசகம். அங்கம்—எலும்பு. ‘அங்கமேபூண்டாய்’ என்பது திருத்தாண்டகம். அங்கமும் என உம்மை விரித்துரைக்க. குளிர என்னும் செயவென் எச்சம் குளிர்ந்து எனத் திரிந்து நின்றது.

களளிக் கவட்டிடைக் காலீரீட்டிக்

கடைக் கொள்ளிவாங்கி மசித்துமையை

விள்ள எழுதி வெடுவெடென்ன

நக்கு வெருண்டு விலங்குபார்த்துத்

துள்ளிச் சுடலைச் சுடுபிணத்தீச்

சுட்டிட முற்றுஞ் சுளிந்துபூழ்தி

அள்ளி அவிக்கநின் றுடும்எங்கள்

அப்ப னிடந்திரு வாலங்காடே.

(2)

வாகை விரிந்துவெண் ணெற்றெலிப்ப

மயங்கிருள் கூர்நடு நாளையாங்கே

கூகையொ டாண்டலை பாட ஆந்தை

கோடதன் மேற்குதித் தோடவீசி

2. இ-ள் : (மற்றொரு பேயானது) கள்ளி மரக்கிளைகளின் இடைவெளியிலே தன்காலை நீட்டி (அமர்ந்திருந்து) பிணஞ்சுடுதற்கு அடுக்கிய விறகடுக்கில் எரியும் கொள்ளிக்கட்டையை இழுத்து அதன் முனையிலுள்ள கரியை மசிய அரைத்ததனாலாகிய மையினைத் தன் கண்களில் விளங்க எழுதி வெடுவெடு என்று பேரொலியுண்டாகச் சிரித்து, (பின் தன் தனிமையினை எண்ணி) அச்சமுற்று முன்னும் பின்னும் திரும்பிப் பார்த்து (அவ்விடத்தை விட்டு ஓட நினைத்துத்) துள்ளிக்குதித்த நிலையில் அருகில் எரியும் ஈமத் தீக்கொழுந்தானது தன்னுடம்பினைச் சுட்டிட (அது கண்டு) வெகுண்டு (தரையிற்கிடந்த) மணற் புழுதியை வாரி அத் தீமுழுவதையும் அவித்து நிற்க (இங்ஙனம் அமைந்த) ஈமப்பெருங்காட்டிலே நின்று திருநடனஞ் செய்தருளும் எம் தந்தையாகிய இறைவன் எழுந்தருளிய இடம் திருவாலங்காடாம். எ-று.

கவடு—பலவகைகளாகப் பிரிந்தமைந்த கிளைப்பகுதி. கடைக்கொள்ளி நுனியில் நெருப்பினையுடைய கொள்ளிக்கட்டை, மசித்தல்—குழைவுபட அரைத்தல். விள்ள—விளங்க, வெடுவெடு—ஒலிக்குறிப்பு. நக்கு—சிரித்து. விலங்கு பார்த்தல்—இங்குமங்குமாகக் குறுக்கே நோக்குதல். விலங்கு காட்டில் என்றும் பாடம். சுளிந்து—வெகுண்டு. பூழ்தி—புழுதி. முற்றும் அவிக்க என இயைத்துரைக்க. ஈமம்—பிணம் சுடுதற்கு அடுக்கிய விறகின் அடுக்கு.

3. இ-ள் : வாகை மரங்கள் (பூத்துக் காய்த்து முற்றி) விரிந்தனவாகிய வெள்ளிய நெற்றுக்கள் (காற்றினால் ஒன்றோடொன்று மோதி) ஒலித்திட, மனமயங்கிக் கலங்குதற்கேதுவாகிய இருள்மிகுந்த நடுயாமப் பொழுதிலே கோட்டானுடன் ஆண்டலைப் புள்ளும் பாடவும் ஆந்தையானது அம்மரக்கிளையின் மேற்குதித்து (ச்சிறகினை விரித்து)ப் பறந்தோடவும் இண்டங்கொடி படர்ந்து ஏறித்

ஈகை படர் தொடர் கள்ளிநீழல்
 ஈமம் இடுசுடு காட்டகத்தே
 ஆகங் குளிர்ந்தனல் ஆடும்எங்கள்
 அப்ப னிடந்திரு வாலங்காடே.

(3)

குண்டிலோ மக்குழிச் சோற்றைவாங்கிக்
 குறுநரி தின்ன அதனைமுன்னே
 கண்டிலோம் என்று கனன்றுபேய்கள்
 கையடித் தோடிடு காடரங்கா
 மண்டலம் நின்றங் குளாளமிட்டு
 வாதித்து வீசி எடுத்தபாதம்
 அண்ட முற நிமிர்ந் தாடும்எங்கள்
 அப்ப னிடந்திரு வாலங்காடே.

(4)

தாவும் கள்ளியின் நிழலிலே பிணம் சுடுதற்கு அடுக்கிய விறகுகளையுடைய சுடு
 காட்டினிடத்தே இறந்த உயிர்களின் உடல் குளிர்ந்து உள்ளம் மகிழும் வண்ணம்
 தீயின் நடுவே ஆடியருளும் எங்கள் தந்தையாகிய இறைவன் மகிழ்ந்துறையும்
 இடம் திருவாலங்காடாம். எ-று.

வாகை, ஈகை, கள்ளி என்பன பாலைநிலக் கருப்பொருள்கள். நடுநாள்—
 நள்ளிரவு. கூகை—கோட்டான். ஆண்டலை—ஆண்மகன் தலைபோன்ற தலையும்
 புள்ளின் உடம்பும் அமைந்த பறவை.

4. இ-ள். ஆழ்ந்த ஓமகுண்டமாகிய குழியிலிடப்பெற்ற சோற்றை யெடுத்துக்
 குள்ளநரியானது தின்றிட, (அது கண்ட) பேய்கள் அச்சோற்றை யாங்கள்
 முன்னரே கண்டோமல்லமே என்று கூறி வெகுண்டு கைகளைத் தட்டிக் கொண்டு
 விரைந்தோடும் இடுகாட்டினையே திருக்கூத்தியற்றும் நாடகசாலையாகக் கொண்டு
 மண்டிலநிலை, உள்ளாளம் ஆகிய கூத்தின் விகற்பங்களை மேற்கொண்டு
 உறழ்ந்து வீசி மேல் நோக்கி உயர்த்திய திருவடியானது மேலே அண்டத்தின்
 முகட்டினைப்பொருந்திடத் தலைநிமிர்ந்து ஆடவல்ல எங்கள் தந்தை எழுந்தருளிய
 இடம் திருவாலங்காடாம். எ-று.

வாதித்து—(காளியுடன்) உறழ்ந்து; வாதினை மேற்கொண்டு. “ஆடினார்
 காளிகாண ஆலங்காட்டிகளாரே” என்பர் திருநாவுக்கரசர். இனி, ‘மட்டித்து
 வீசியெடுத்த பாதம்’ எனப்பாடங் கொண்டு, சுழன்று வீசியெடுத்த திருவடி எனப்
 பொருள் கூறலும் உண்டு.

விழுது நிணத்தை விழுங்கியிட்டு
 வெண்டலைமலை விரவப்பூட்டிக்
 கழுதுதன் பிள்ளையைக் காளியென்று
 பேரிட்டுச் சீருடைத் தாவளர்த்துப்
 புழுதி துடைத்து முலைகொடுத்துப்
 போயின தாயை வரவுகாணு
 தழுதுறங் கும்புறங் காட்டிலாடும்.
 அப்ப னிடந்திரு வாலங்காடே.

(5)

பட்டடி நெட்டுகிர்ப் பாறுகாற்பேய்
 பருந்தொடு கூகை பகண்டையாந்தை
 குட்டி யிடமுட்டை கூகைபேய்கள்
 குறுநரி சென்றணங் காடுகாட்டிற்
 பிட்டடித் துப்புறங் காட்டிலிட்ட
 பிணத்தினைப் பேரப் புரட்டியாங்கே
 அட்டமே பாயநின் றூடும் எங்கள்
 அப்ப னிடந்திரு வாலங்காடே.

(6)

5. இ—ள் : பேய், நெய்ப்பசையுடைய கொழுப்பமைந்த ஊனினை விழுங்கித் தன் பிள்ளைக்கு வெள்ளிய தலைகளை மாலையாகக் கோத்தணிந்து காளியென்று பெயரிட்டுச் சீராட்டி வளர்த்து அப்பிள்ளையின் உடம்பிற் படிந்த புழுதியினைத் துடைத்துப் பாலூட்டி வெளியே சென்றதாக, அங்ஙனம் சென்ற தன் தாயாகிய அப்பேயின் வரவினை எதிர்நோக்கிய பிள்ளையானது, தன்தாய் மீண்டு வருதலைக் காணாமல் நெடுநேரம் அழுத நிலையில் தன்னை மறந்து உறங்கிவிடும் இயல்பமைந்த புறங்காட்டிலே திருக்கூத்தியற்றும் எங்கள் தந்தையாகிய இறைவன் எழுந்தருளிய இடம் திருவாலங்காடாம். எ-று.

கழுது, தன்பிள்ளையைக் காளியென்று பேரிட்டுச் சீருடைத்தா வளர்த்து வெண்தலைமலை விரவப்பூட்டிப் போயினதாக, அத்தாயை வரவு காணாது (அதன்பிள்ளை) அழுது உறங்கும் புறங்காடு—என வேண்டும் சொற்களை வருவித்து இயைத்துரைக்க. கழுது—பேய். தனது குல தெய்வம் காளியாதலின் தன் பிள்ளைக்குக் காளியென்று பெயரிட்ட தென்றுணர்க.

6. இ—ள் : வறண்ட பாதமும் நீண்ட நகங்களும் பொருந்திய பிளவு பட்ட கால்களையுடைய பேய்கள் குட்டிகளை ஈனவும், பருந்துகளுடன் கோட்டான் சிவல், ஆந்தையென்ற பறவைகள் முட்டைகளையிடவும் அமைந்த அச்சம் பொருந்திய இடுகாட்டிலே வாழும் கோட்டான் முதலிய பறவைகளும் பேய்களும் குறிய நரிகளும் சென்று, புறங்காட்டிலே மண்ணைப் பிசைந்து இறுக அடித்து மூடப்பட்ட பிணத்தினை அவ்விடத்தை விட்டுப் பெயரும்படி புரட்டித் தள்ளி அங்குமிங்குமாகக் குறுக்கே ஓடித் திரியாநிற்க, அத்தகைய இடுகாட்டிலே நின்று ஆடல் புரியும் எங்கள் தந்தையாகிய இறைவன் எழுந்தருளிய இடம் திருவாலங்காடாம். எ-று.

சுழலும் அழல்விழிக் கொள்ளிவாய்ப்பேய்
 சூழ்ந்து துணங்கையிட் டோடியாடித்
 தழலுள் எரியும் பிணத்தைவாங்கித்
 தான்றடி தின்றணங் காடுகாட்டிற்
 கழலொலி யோசை சிலம்பொலிப்பக்
 காலுயர் வட்டனை யிட்டுநட்டம்
 அழலுமிழ்ந் தோரி கதிக்கஆடும்
 அப்ப னிடந்திரு வாலங்காடே.

(7)

நாடும் நகருந் திரிந்துசென்று
 நன்னெறி நாடி நயந்தவரை
 மூடி முதுபிணத் திட்டமாதே
 முன்னிய பேய்க்கணஞ் சூழச்சூழக்
 காடுங் கடலும் மலையும்மண்ணும்
 வீண்ணுஞ் சுழல அனல்கையேந்தி
 ஆடும் அரவப் புயங்கனெங்கள்
 அப்ப னிடந்திரு வாலங்காடே.

(8)

பட்ட அடி, பட்டடியென நின்றது. பேய் குட்டியிட, கூகை பகண்டை ஆந்தை முட்டையிட என 'இட' என்பதை ஈரிடத்தும் கூட்டுக. அணங்குஆடு— அச்சம் பொருந்திய, புறங்காட்டில் பிட்டு அடித்து இட்ட பிணத்தினை என இயைக்க. பிட்டு அடித்தல்—(மண்ணைப்) பிசைந்து அறைதல் (முடுதல்) அட்டமே பாய்தல்— குறுக்கே பாய்தல்.

7. இ—ள் : தீயினையுமிழ்ந்து சுழல்கின்ற கண்களையுடைய கொள்ளிவாய்ப் பேயானது. சுற்றிலும் ஓடித் துணங்கையென்னும் கூத்தினையாடி, ஈமத்துள்ளே யெரியும் பிணத்தினை யிழுத்து அதன் தசையினைத் தின்று கண்டாரை அச்சுறுத்தி வருத்தித் திரியும் இயல்பமைந்த இடுகாட்டிலே, கிழநரியானது அனலிற்பட்ட பிணத்தினைக் கவிப்பற்றி அதன் குட்டினைப் பொறுக்க இயலாமை யால் அதனை உமிழ்ந்து விட்டு ஓட, வீரக்கழல் ஒலிக்கும் ஓசையுடன் சிலம்பினது இனிய ஒலியும் கலந்திசைப்பக் காலினை யுயர்த்தி இடமும் வலமுமாகச் சுழன்று திருக்கூத்தியற்றி யருளும் எங்கள் தந்தையாகிய இறைவன் எழுந்தருளிய இடம் திருவாலங்காடாம். எ-று.

மாதொரு பாகனாகிய இறைவனது வலப்பக்கத்துத் திருவடியிற் கழலும் இடப்பக்கத்துத் திருவடியிற் சிலம்பும் அணியப் பெற்றன என்பார் 'கழலொலி யோசை சிலம்பொலிப்ப' என்றார். ஒரி—முதுநரி. அழல் உமிழ்ந்து—அழலிற் பட்டு வெந்து சூடாகிய பிணத்தினை உமிழ்ந்து. கதிக்க—விரைந்து ஓட.

8. இ—ள் : நாடுகளிலும் பேரூர்களிலும் சென்று சுற்றி (இவ்வுலகத் தில் வாழ்வாங்கு வாழும்) நல்லொழுக்க நெறி இதுவென ஆராய்ந்துணர்ந்து அந்

துத்தங் கைக்கிள்ளை விளரிதாரம்
 உழையிளி யோசைபண் கெழும்ப்பாடி
 சச்சரி கொக்கரை தக்கையோடு
 தகுணிதந் துந்துபி தாளம்வீணை
 மத்தளம் கரடிகை வன்கைமென்தோல்
 தமருகங் குடமுழா மொந்தைவாசித்
 தத்தனை விரவினோ டாடுமெங்கள்
 அப்ப னிடந்திரு வாலங்காடே.

(9)

புந்தி கலங்கி மதிமயங்கி
 இறந்தவ ரைப்புறங் காட்டிலிட்டுச்
 சந்தியில் வைத்துக் கடமைசெய்து
 தக்கவர் இட்டசெந் தீவிளக்கா

நெறியை விரும்பிக் கடைப்பிடித்தொழுகிய பெரியோர்களது உடம்பை மூடி முதிய
 பிணங்களுடன் ஒருங்கு வைத்துப் புதைத்த இடங்களின் அருகே, (அப்பிணங்
 களின் தசையினைத் தின்னக்) கருதிய பேய்க் கூட்டங்கள் சுற்றிச் சுற்றித் திரிய,
 காடு, கடல், மலை, மண் என்னும் நான்கு கூற்றதாகிய இந்நிலவுலகும் இதற்கு
 மேலதாகிய வானுலகும் சுழன்று அசையத் தீயினைக் கையிலேந்தி ஆட வல்ல
 அரவமாகிய பாம்பினையணிந்த எங்கள் அப்பனாகிய இறைவன் எழுந்தருளிய
 இடம் திருவாலங்காடாம் எ-று.

அரவம், புயங்கம் என்பன பாம்பு என்னும் ஒரு பொருள் குறித்த சொற்கள்.
 புயங்கள் — பாம்பினை அணிகலனாகக் கொண்டவன். நன்னெறியில் ஒழுகிய
 பெரியோர்களது உடம்பினைச் சுடாது புதைக்கும் வழக்கமுண்மை இத்திருப்
 பாடலாற் புலனாதலறிக.

9. இ-ள்: (குரல்) துத்தம், கைக்கிளை, உழை, இளி, விளரி, தாரம் என்னும்
 ஏழிசைகளும் பிறழாதமையப் பண்களை (இனிமை) பொருந்தப்பாடி, கஞ்ச
 தாளமும் வீணையென்னும் நரம்புக்கருவியும் சச்சரி, கொக்கரை, தகுணிதம்,
 துந்துபி, மத்தளம், கரடிகை, வன்கைமென்தோல், தமருகம், குடமுழா, மொந்தை
 ஆகிய பலவகைத் தோற்கருவிகளும் ஆகியவற்றை வாசித்து அவ்வளவு
 இன்னியங்களும் கலந்தொலிக்கும் தாள அறுதிக்கு ஏற்பத் திருக்கூத்தியற்றி
 யருளும் எங்கள் தந்தையாகிய இறைவன் எழுந்தருளிய இடம் திருவாலங்காடாம்.
 எ-று.

முந்தி அமரர் முழவினோசை

திசைகது வச்சிலம் பார்க்கஆர்க்க

அந்தியின் மாநடம் ஆடுமெங்கள்

அப்ப னிடந்திரு வாலங்காடே.

(10)

ஒப்பினை யில்லவன் பேய்கள்கூடி

ஒன்றினை யொன்றடித் தொக்கலித்துப்

பப்பினை யிட்டுப் பகண்டைபாடப்

பாடிருந் தந்நரி யாழமைப்ப

ஏழிசைகளுள் துத்தத்தை முதலிற் கூறவே அதன் முன்னர்த்தாகிய குரலும் உடன் கொள்ளப்பட்டது. கைக்கிள்ளை — கைக்கிளை; ளகரவொற்று செய்யுளிசை நோக்கிய விரித்தல் விகாரம். கெழும — பொருந்த. தக்கை தகுணிதம் என்பன அகப்புற முழவுகள். தகுணிதம் தகுணிச்சம் எனவும் வழங்கும். துந்துபி — பேரிகை. கரடிகை — கரடி கத்தினாற் போன்று ஒலிக்கும் ஒரு வகைப் பறை. வன்கை மென்தோல் — வலியகையினால் வாசித்தற்குரிய மெல்லிய தோற்கருவி. தமருகம் — உடுக்கை. மொந்தை — ஒருகட்பறை வகை.

10. இ-ள்: சிந்தை கலங்கி அறிவு மயங்கி இறந்தவர்களது உடம்பினை அவர்களுடன் தொடர்புடைய உறவின் முறையோர் தெருச்சந்திகளில் வைத்துச் செய்யும் சடங்குகளைச் செய்து (பின்பு சுடுகாட்டிற் கொண்டு சென்று) கொள்ளி வைத்து எரிய விட்ட சிவந்த தீயே விளக்காக அமையவும் இறவாதவராகிய தேவர்கள் வாசிக்கும் முழவினது இனிய ஓசையானது முற்பட்டுச் சென்று திசையிடங்களைக் கவர்ந்து பற்றிக்கொள்ளவும் (திருவடியில் அணியப்பெற்ற) சிலம்பானது இடைவிடாது ஒலிக்கவும் அந்திப் பொழுதிலே திருநடனஞ் செய்தருளும் எங்கள் பெருமானாகிய இறைவன் எழுந்தருளிய இடம் திருவாலங்காடாம் எ-று.

இறந்தவரை — இறந்தவரது உடம்பினை. கடமை ஈண்டு இறந்தவர் பொருட்டுச் செய்தற்குரிய ஈமச்சடங்கினை யுணர்த்தி நின்றது. தக்கவர் — சடங்கியற்றுந்த தகுதியுடைய உறவினர். கதுவ — பற்ற.

11. இ-ள் : (தமக்கு) ஒப்பில்லாதனவாகிய வலிமை மிக்க பேய்கள் ஒருங்குகூடி (மகிழ்ச்சி மிகுதியால்) ஒன்றையொன்று அடித்துக் கொண்டு ஒருங்கு ஆரவாரித்துப் பரவிநின்று விகடப்பாடல் பாட, (அதற்கேற்பப்) பக்கத்தேயிருந்த நரி யாழிசைத்தல் போன்று ஒலிக்க, எல்லாவுயிர்க்கும் தந்தையும் அழகிய திருவாலங்காட்டிற் கோயில் கொண்டருளிய அடிகளும் ஆகிய சிவபெருமானைப் புதர்போலப் படர்ந்து விரிந்த தலையிளையுடைய காரைக்காற் பேய்ப்பாடிய செந்தமிழ்த்

அப்பனை அணிதிரு வாலங்காட்டுள்

அடிகளைச் செடிதலைக் காரைக்காற்பேய்

செப்பிய செந்தமிழ் பத்துமவல்லார்


சிவகதி சேர்ந்தின்பம் எய்துவாரே.

திருச்சிற்றம்பலம்

(11)

திருப்பாடல்கள் பத்தினையும் பாடித் துதிக்க வல்லவர்கள் (எல்லாவற்றிற்கும்) மேலாகிய சிவபதத்தினை யடைந்து அழிவிலாப் பேரின்பத்தில் திளைத்து மகிழ்வார்கள்.

ஒக்கவித்தல் — ஒருங்கு கூடி ஆரவாரஞ் செய்தல். பப்பு — பரப்பு. பப்பினை யிட்டு — பரவி நின்று. பகண்டை — விகடப்பாடல். பாடு இருந்த — பக்கத்தில் இருந்த. இருந்த + நரி = இருந்தந்நரி எனச் சந்த இன்பம் நோக்கி ஒற்றுமிக்கது.



திருவாலங்காட்டு மூத்த திருப்பதிகம்-2

பண் — இந்தளம்

திருச்சிற்றம்பலம்

எட்டி யிலவம் ஈகை சூரை காரை படர்ந்தெங்கும்
சுட்ட சுடலை சூழ்ந்த கள்ளி சோர்ந்த குடர்கௌவப்
பட்ட பிணங்கள் பரந்த காட்டிற் பறைபோல் விழிகட்பேய்
கொட்ட முழுவங் கூளி பாடக் குழகனாடுமே. (1)

நிணந்தான் உருகி நிலந்தான் நனைப்ப நெடும்பற் குழிகட்பேய்
துணங்கை யெறிந்து சூழு நோக்கிச் சுடலை நவிழ்த்தெங்கும்,
கணங்கள் கூடிப் பிணங்கள் மாந்திக் களித்த மனத்தவாய்
அணங்கு காட்டில் அனல்கை யேந்தி யழகனாடுமே. (2)

1. இ-ள் : எட்டி, இலவம் என்னும் மரங்களும் இண்டங்கொடியும் சூரை, காரை என்னும் செடிகளும் எங்கும் பரவி வளர்ந்து, பிணங்களைச் சுட்ட ஈமச் சுடலையைச் சூழ்ந்துள்ள கள்ளிக் காட்டில் சரிந்த குடர்களை (ப்பேய் நரி முதலியன) கவ்வி யிழுத்துச் சிதைக்கப்பட்ட பிணங்கள் சிதறிப் பரவிய இடு காட்டிலே பறையினைப் போன்று வட்டமாக விழித்துப் பார்க்கும் கண்களையுடைய பேய்கள் மத்தளம் கொட்டவும் கூளிச் சுற்றங்கள் இசைபாடவும் அழகனாகிய நம் இறைவன் ஆடுகின்றான். எ-று.

பேய் முழுவம் கொட்ட, கூளி பாட, குழகன் ஆடும் என முடிக்க. கூளி — சிவகணமாகிய பூதம். குழகன் — இளமையும் அழகும் ஒருங்கமைந்தவன்.

2. இ-ள் : (பிணங்களின்) நிணமானது (தீயில் வெந்து) உருகி நிலத்தை நனைத்திட, (அதுகண்டு) நீண்ட பற்களையும் உட்குழிந்த கண்களையும் உடைய பேய்கள், (மகிழ்ச்சி மிகுதியால்) இருகைகளையும் விலாவின்புடையடித்துக் கொண்டு, (யாரேனும் அங்கு வருவார் உளரோ எனச்) சுற்றுமுற்றும் நோக்கி, எரியும் ஈமச்சுடலையை அவித்துக் கலைத்துக் கணங்களாய்க் கூடியிருந்து பிணங்களை வயிருரத்தின்று களிப்புற்ற மனத்தினையுடையவாய் ஆடித்திரியும் இடுகாட்டிலே அழகனாகிய நம் பெருமான் தீயினைக் கையிலேந்தி ஆடாநிற்பான். எ-று.

துணங்கை — இரண்டு கைகளையும் மடக்கி விலாவின்புடையடித்துக் கொண்டு ஆடும் ஒரு வகைக் கூத்து. நவிழ்த்தல் — அவிழ்த்தல். பா. வே. : சுணங்கை. 2பா. வே. : சுடரநவிததெங்கும்.

புட்கள் பொதுத்த புலால்வெண்டலையைப் புறமே நரிகவ்வ
அட்கென் றழைப்ப ஆந்தை வீச அருகே சிறுகூகை
உட்க விழிக்க ஊமன் வெருட்ட ஓரி கதித்தெங்கும்
பிட்க நட்டம் பேணு மிறைவன் பெயரும் பெருங்காடே. (3)

செத்த பிணத்தைத் தெளியா தொருபேய் சென்று விரல்சட்டிக்
கத்தி யுறுமிக் கனல்விட்டெறிந்து கடக்கப் பாய்ந்து போய்ப்
பத்தல் வயிற்றைப் பதைக்க மோதிப் பலபேய் இரிந்தோடப்
பித்த வேடங் கொண்டு நட்டம் பெருமா னுடுமே. (4)

3. இ-ள் : பறவைகள் (கொத்திப்) பொள்ளலாக்கிய புலால் நாற்றம்
வீசும் வெள்ளிய தலையை நரியானது புறத்தே நின்று கவ்வி யிழுக்க (அதனைக்
கண்ட) பேராந்தை 'அட்டுத்தின்பேன்' என்று ஓசைபட உரப்பி வீச, அருகே)
யுள்ள சிறிய கோட்டான் கண்டார் அஞ்சும்படி (உருத்து). விழித்துப் பார்க்க,
பெருங்கோட்டான் அச்சுறுத்தி விரட்ட, (அதுகண்டு) முதுநரி பெருங் குரலிட்
டெழுந்து (பிணத்தின் தசைப் பகுதிகளைப்) பிட்டு எவ்விடத்தும் இழுத்துச்
செல்ல (இங்ஙனம் அமைந்த) பெருங்காட்டிலே நம் பெருமானாகிய இறைவன்
திருநடஞ்செய்தலை விரும்பி இடம் பெயர்ந்து ஆடியருள்கின்றான் எ-று.

பொதுத்தல் — பொள்ளலாக்குதல். பேராந்தையின் உரப்புதல் 'அட்டு
தின்பேன்' என்று கூறுவது போன்று அமைந்ததென்பார் 'ஆந்தை அட்கு
என்று அழைப்ப' என்றார். அட்கு — அடுவேன். பிட்க — பிட்டுவைக்க.

4. ஒரு பேயானது உயிர் நீங்கிப் பிணமாய்க் கிடந்ததோர் உடம்பினை
(அதன்தோற்றத்தளவில்) பிணமென்று தெளிந்துகொள்ள இயலாமையால் (அதன்
கண் உயிரானது உண்டா இல்லையா என்பதைத் தெரிந்து கொள்ள விரும்பி
அதனருகே சென்று தன் விரலால் தொட்டுப் பார்த்தும் (அச்சமுற்று) அலறியும்
(சினங்கொண்டு, உரப்பியும் அதன்மேல் நெருப்பினை வாரியெறிந்துவிட்டு
நெடுந்தாரம் ஓடியும் (மேலும் ஓடமுடியாமையால்) நீரிறைக்கும் சால் போன்ற
தனது வயிற்றில் அடித்துக்கொண்டு அவலமுற (அத்துன்பநிலையினைக் கண்டு,
அங்குள்ள பல பேய்களும் தலைகெட்டு அஞ்சியோட (இங்ஙனம் அமைந்த இடு
காட்டிலே) நம் பெருமானாகிய இறைவன் பித்தர் போலும் வேடத்தினை மேற்
கொண்டு திருநடஞ் செய்தருள்கின்றான். எ-று.

பத்தல்—சால். மோதிப்பதைக்க என இயைக்க.

முள்ளி தீந்து முளரி கருகி மூளை சொரிந்துக்குக்
 கள்ளி வற்றி வெள்ளில் பிறங்கு கடுவெங் காட்டுள்ளே
 புள்ளி யுழைமான் தோலொன்றுடுத்துப் புலித்தோல் பியற்கிட்டுப்
 பள்ளி யிடமும் அதுவேயாகப் பரம னாடுமே. (5)

வானைக் கிளர வளைவா ளெயிற்று வண்ணச் சிறுகூகை
 மூளைத் தலையும் பிணமும் விழுங்கி முரலு முதுகாட்டில்
 தாளிப் பணையின் இலைபோல் மயிர்க்கட் டழல்வா யழல்கட்பேய்
 கூளிக் கணங்கள் குழலோ டியம்பக் குழகனாடுமே. (6)

5. இ-ள் : முள்ளி தீயவும் முளரி கருகவும் மூளைகள் உருகி நீராய் விழ
 வும் கள்ளி வற்றவும் விளாமரம் உருமாறிச் சிதைந்து காணப்படும் கடிய வெப்ப
 மிக்க இடுகாட்டினுள்ளே, புள்ளிகளையுடைய மான்தோலொன்றை அரையில்
 உடுத்துப் புலித்தோலைப் போர்வையாகத் தோள்மேற் கொண்டு, (ஆடல்புரியும்
 அரங்காதலையன்றி) இரவிற்பள்ளி கொள்ளுமிடமும் அச்சடுகாடேயாக
 மேலோனாகிய இறைவன் ஆடல் புரிந்தருள்கின்றான். எ-று.

முள்ளி, முளரி என்பன முள்ளுள்ள செடி வகைகள். மூளை—அங்கு
 அடக்கஞ் செய்யப்பட்ட பிணத்தின் தலையிலுள்ள மூளைப்பகுதி. வெள்ளில்—
 விளாமரம். பிறங்குதல்—உருமாறித் தோன்றுதல். தீந்து, கருகி, உக்கு, வற்றி
 எனவரும் செய்தென் எச்சங்கள் செயவென் எச்சங்களாகத் திரிக்கப்பட்டன.
 சுடுகாட்டின் கடிய வெம்மையினால் அங்குள்ள செடிகளும் மரங்களும் தீந்தும்
 கருகியும் வற்றியும் உருமாறியும் சிதைந்தன என்பது முன்னிரண்டடிகளின்
 கருத்தாகும். உழைமான்—உழையாகிய மான் என இருபெயரொட்டுப்
 பண்புத்தொகை.

6. இ-ள் : வானினை (யொத்து) மேற்பட வளைந்து தோன்றும் கூரிய
 வாயலகிளையுடைய நிறம்வாய்ந்த சிறியகோட்டான்கள் தலையிலுள்ள மூளையையும்
 பிணத்தின் ஏனைத் தசைப்பகுதிகளையும் தின்று விழுங்கி ஒலிக்கும் இடுகாட்டிலே
 கூந்தற்பணையின் ஒலைகளைப் போன்று விரிந்த தலைமயிரிடத்தே தீயின் நிறம்
 பெற்று விளங்கும் அழலுமிழும் கண்களையுடைய பேய்களும் கூளிக்கணங்களும்
 குழலிசையுடன் பாட அழகனாகிய நம்மிறைவன் ஆடல் புரிந்தருள்கின்றான். எ-று.

கிளர்தல்—மேலெழுதல், வளைவாள் எயிறு—வளைந்த கூரிய (வாயின்)
 அலகு, வண்ணம்—நிறம்.

நொந்திக் கிடந்த சுடலை தடவி நுகரும் புழுக்கின்றிச்
 சிந்தித் திருந்தங் குறங்குஞ் சிறுபேய் சிரமப் படுகாட்டின்
 முந்தி யமரர் முழவின் ஓசை முறைமை வழுவாமே
 அந்தி நிருத்தம் அனல்கை யேந்தி அழகன் ஆடுமே. (7)

வேய்கள் ஓங்கி வெண்முத் துதிர வெடிகொள் சுடலையுள்
 ஓயும் உருவில் உலறு கூந்தல் அலறு பகுவாய்
 பேய்கள் கூடிப் பிணங்கள் மாந்தி அணங்கும் பெருங்காட்டின்
 மாயன் ஆட மலையான் மகனும் மருண்டு நோக்குமே. (8)

கடுவன் உகளுங் கழை குழ் பொதும்பிற் கழுகும் பேயுமாய்
 இடுவெண் தலையும் ஈமப் புகையும் எழுந்த பெருங் காட்டிற்
 கொடுவெண் மழுவும் பிறையுந் ததும்பக் கொள்ளென் றிசைபாடப்
 படுவெண் துடியும் பறையுந் கறங்கப் பரமன் ஆடுமே. (9)

7. இ-ள் :— அவிந்து கிடந்த சுடலையைத் தடவிப்பார்த்து அங்கே நுகர்
 தற்குரிய உணவெதுவும் இல்லாமையால் (உணவு பெறும் வழியினை) நெடு
 நேரம் சிந்தித்தும் (வழியின்றி) அங்கிருந்தபடியே உறங்க முயலும் சிறிய
 பேயானது (பசியின் கொடுமையால்) உறக்கம் வராது, வருத்தமுறும் இடுகாட்
 டிலே, முற்பட வந்து வணங்கும் தேவர்கள் முழக்கும் மத்தள ஓசையின் தாள
 அறுதி தவருமல் அனலைக் கையிலேந்தி அந்திக் காலத்தே தான் இயற்றும் திருக்
 கூத்தினை அழகனாகிய நம் பெருமான் ஆடியருள்கின்றான். எ-று:

நொந்துதல் — அவிதல். ‘நொந்தா வொண்சுடரே’ என வரும் தேவாரத்
 தொடரிலும் ‘நொந்தா விளக்கு’ என வழங்கும் தொடரிலும் இச்சொல் இப்
 பொருள் படுதல் அதிக.

8. இ-ள் : மூங்கில்கள் உயர்ந்து (வளர்ந்து) அவற்றினின்றும் வெள்ளிய
 முத்துக்கள் உதிரும்படி வெடித்தலைக் கொண்ட இடமாகிய சுடுகாட்டிலே
 ஓய்ந்து சாம்பிய உடம்பினையும் வறண்ட கூந்தலையும் கதறும் பெரிய வாயினையும்
 உடைய பேய்கள் ஓருங்குகூடிப் பிணங்களை வயிரூரத் தின்று திரியும் பெரிய இடு
 காட்டிலே வியக்கத்தக்க மாயம் வல்லானாகிய இறைவன் ஆடாநிற்க மலை
 மகளாராகிய உமாதேவியாரும் வியந்து நோக்கி மகிழ்வர். எ-று.

மாயம்-வியக்கத்தக்க செய்கை.

9. இ-ள். ஆண்குரங்குகள் துள்ளித் திரியும் மூங்கில் செறிந்த மரச்
 செறிவிலே கழுகுகளும் பேய்களுமாய் (க்காணப்பட, தசையின்றி வெறுவியன
 வாக) விடப்பட்ட வெள்ளிய தலையோடுகளும் சுடலையின் புகையும் எங்கும் பரவி
 யெழுந்த பெரிய சுடுகாட்டிலே வளைந்த வெண்மையான மழுப்படையும் பிறை
 மதியும் மேலெழுந்து தோன்றக் ‘கொள்’ என்னும் ஒலிக்குறிப்புடன் (கூளிச்
 சுற்றங்கள்) இசை பாட, ஒலித்தல் வல்ல வெள்ளிய உடுக்கையும் (ஏனையோர்
 பூண்ட) பறையும் ஒலிக்க மேலோனாகிய இறைவன் ஆடா நிற்பன். எ-று.

குண்டை வயிற்றுக் குறியசிறிய நெடிய பிறங்கற்பேய்
 இண்டு படர்ந்த இருள்குழ் மயானத் தெரிவாய் எயிற்றுப்பேய்
 கொண்டு குழவி தடவி வெருட்டிக் கொள்ளென் றிசைபாட.
 மிண்டி மிளிர்ந்த சடைகள் தாழ் விமலன் ஆடுமே. (10)

குடு மதியஞ் சடைமேல் உடையார் சுழல்வார் திருநட்டம்
 ஆடும் அரவம் அரையில் ஆர்த்த அடிகள் அருளாலே
 காடு மலிந்த கனல்வாய் எயிற்றுக் காரைக்காற் பேய்தன்
 பாடல் பத்தும் பாடி யாடப் பாவ நாசமே. (11)

10. இ-ள்: உள்ளே ஆழ்ந்தகன்ற வயிற்றினையுடைய குறியனவும் நெடியனவும் திறம்பி வளைந்த உருவத்தனவும் ஆகிய பேய்களும் இண்டங்கொடி படர்ந்த இருள் சூழ்ந்த மயானத்திலே வாழும் தீயுமிழும் வாயினையும் பற்களையுமுடைய கொள்ளிவாய்ப் பேய்களும் (தத்தம்) குழந்தைகளைத் தூக்கிக் கொண்டு (அவற்றின் முதுகினைத்) தடவிக் கொடுத்தும் வெருட்டியும் 'கொள்' என்னும் ஒலிக்குறிப்புடன் இசை பாடத் தூயோனாகிய சிவபெருமான் செறிந்து ஒளி திகழும் தன் செஞ்சடைக் கற்றைகள் தாழ்ந்தசையத் திருநடஞ் செய்தருள்கின்றான் எ-று.

குண்டை வயிறு — உட்குழிந்து ஆழ்ந்த வயிறு. பிறங்கல் — திறம்பி வளைதல். இண்டு — இண்டங்கொடி. வெருட்டுதல் — அச்சுறுத்தி விளையாடுதல்.

11. இ-ள்: அணிகலனாகச் சூடுதற்கமைந்த பிறைமதியினைத் தமது சடையின் மேல் அணிந்தருளியவரும் எவ்விடத்தும் சுழன்று திரு நடஞ் செய்தருள் பவரும் படமெடுத்தாடும் பாம்பினை அரையிற் கச்சையாகக் கட்டியவரும் ஆகிய இறைவரது திருவருளாலே காட்டில் நிலைத்து வாழும் தீயுமிழும் வாயினையும் பற்களையுமுடைய காரைக்காற்பேய் பாடிய பத்துப் பாடல்களையும் பாடியாடிப் போற்றி வழிபட (அங்ஙனம் வழிபடுவாருடைய) பாவங்கள் அடியோடழிந்தொழிவன எ-று.

அடிகள் அருளாலே காரைக்காற்பேய் பாடிய பாடல் என இயையும்.

திருவிரட்டை மணிமாலை

சிவபெருமானை அன்பினால் அகலாது அணுகியிருந்து போற்றும் தகுதி வாய்ந்த 'நற்கணத்திலொன்றாய்' பேயுருவினை வேண்டிப் பெற்ற காரைக்காலம்மையார், திருக்கயிலாய மலையை அணுகிச் செல்லும் பொழுது திருவிரட்டை மணிமாலையாகிய இப் பிரபந்தத்தைப் பாடிப் போற்றினார் என்பது வரலாறு.

இரட்டை மணிமாலையென்பது, கட்டளைக் கலித்துறை முன்னும் வெண்பா அதன்பின்னும் ஆக இம்முறையே அந்தாதியாகத் தொடர்ந்து மாலை போன்று அமைய இருபது செய்யுட்களால் இயற்றப்பெறும் செந்தமிழ்ப் பிரபந்தமாகும். இப்பிரபந்தத்தை முதன் முதற் பாடியவர் காரைக்காலம்மையாராவார். அம்மையார் அருளிய இப்பனுவல், இறைவனது புகழ்த்திறத்தைப் போற்றும் திருவுடையதாதலின் திருவிரட்டைமணிமாலை யென வழங்கப் பெறுவதாயிற்று. இதனை "ஆய்ந்தசீர் இரட்டை மாலை அந்தாதி" எனச் சேக்கிழாரடிகள் சிறப்பித்துப் போற்றியுள்ளார்.

இப்பொழுது நமக்குக் கிடைத்துள்ள தமிழ் நூல்களில் கட்டளைக் கலித்துறையென்னும் பாவினத்துக்குரிய மூல இலக்கியமாக விளங்குவன திருவிரட்டை மணிமாலையாகிய இந்நூலிலுள்ள கட்டளைக் கலித்துறைச் செய்யுட்களேயாகும்.

திருவிரட்டை மணிமாலை

திருச்சிற்றம்பலம்

கிளர்ந்துந்து வெந்துயர் வந்தடும் போதஞ்சி நெஞ்சமென்பாய்
தளர்ந்திங் கிருத்தல் தவிர்தி கண் டாய்தள ராது வந்தி
வளர்ந்துந்து கங்கையும் வானத் திடைவளர் கோட்டுவெள்ளை
இளந்திங்கனும்மெருக் கும்மிருக் குஞ்சென்னி யீசனுக்கே. (1)

ஈசன் அவனல்லா தில்லை யெனநினைந்து
கூசி மனத்தகத்துக் கொண்டிருந்து — பேசி
மறவாது வாழ்வாரை மண்ணுலகத் தென்றும்
பிறவாமைக் காக்கும் பிரான். (2)

1. இ — ள் : (நினைத்தற்குரிய தகுதியினால்) சிறப்பித்துரைக்கப் பெறும் நெஞ்சமே, (முன்னை வினைகளால் தூண்டப்பட்டுப்) பொங்கி மேலெழும் கொடுந் துன்பங்கள் அடுத்து மேல் வந்து வருத்துங்காலத்து இங்கே சோர்வுற்றிருத் தலைத் தவிர்க. வளர்ந்து பெருகி அலையெறியும் கங்கைப் பெருவெள்ளமும் வானிடத்தே நாள்தோறும் வளரும் இயல்புடைய இரு பக்கங்களையுடைய இளைய பிறைமதியும் வெள்ளெருக்க மலரும் பொருந்தியிருக்கும் சென்னியினையுடைய சிவ பெருமானைத் தளர்வின்றி இடையருது நினைந்து வழிபட்டு உய்திபெறுக. எ-று.

ஈசனுக்கு — ஈசனை ; உருபு மயக்கம், நெஞ்சமென்பாய், துயர்வந்து அடும்போது இங்குத் தளர்ந்திருத்தல் தவிர்தி ; ஈசனுக்கே தளராது வந்தி என இயைத்துரைக்க. கண்டாய் — முன்னிலையசை.

2. இ-ள்: (எல்லா உலகங்களையும் தன் உடைமையாகக் கொண்டமையால்) ஈசன் எனப் போற்றப்பெறும் அவ்விறைவனையன்றி (மன்னுயிர்களுக்கு வேறு புகலிடம்) இல்லையென நினைந்து (அந்நினைவினை) மனத்துள் உறுதியாகக் கொண்டு (அவன் அருள் வழி அடங்கி) இருந்து, (அவனது உயர்வற வுயர்ந்த பெருமையையும் தமது சிறுமையையும் எண்ணி) உள்ளங் கூசியும் (அவனது புகழ்த் திறத்தை) வாயாரப் பேசியும் (அன்பினால் அவனை) மறவாது வாழ்கின்ற பெருமக்களை இறைவனாகிய அப்பெருமான் இவ்வுலகில் (மீளப்) பிறவா வண்ணம் (வீடு பேற்றினை நல்கிக்) காத்தருள்வான் எ-று.

நினைந்து, மனத்தகத்துக் கொண்டு இருந்து கூசி, பேசி, மறவாது வாழ் வாரைப் பிரான் பிறவாமைக் காக்கும் என இயைத்துப் பொருள் கொள்க.

பிரானென்று தன்னைப்பன் னுள்பரவித்தொழு வாரிடர்கண்
 டிரானென்ன நிற்கின்ற ஈசன்கண்டிரின வண்டுகிண்டிப்
 பொராரின்ற கொன்றைப் பொதும்பர்க்கிடந்துபொம் மென்றுரை
 வாய்
 அராரின் றிரைக்குஞ் சடைச்செம்பொ னீண்முடி யந்தணனே. (3)

அந்தணனைத் தஞ்சமென் றுட்பட்டார் ஆழாமே
 வந்தணைந்து காத்தளிக்கும் வல்லாளன் — கொந்தணைந்த
 பொன்கண்டாற் பூணாதே கோள்நாகம் பூண்டானே
 என்கண்டாய் நெஞ்சே யினி. (4)

3. இ-ள் : தன்னை (ஒப்பற்ற) முதல்வனாகத் தெளிந்து பல நாளும் (மறவாது) ஏத்தி வழிபடும் அடியார்களது துயரத்தைக் கண்டு தரித்திருக்க மாட்டான் என (அறிந்தோர்போற்ற) எக்காலத்தும் நிலைபெற்று விளங்கும் இறைவனாவான், கூட்டமாகிய வண்டுகள் (மகரந்தப் பொடியினைக்) கிளறி நெருங்கி மொய்க்கின்ற கொன்றை மலர்ச் செறிவிலே அடங்கிக் கிடந்து பொம்மென்று ஒலித்தலமைந்த வாயினையுடைய பாம்பானது (படம் விரித்து) நின்று சீறும் செம்பொன்மயமான நீண்ட சடைமுடியினையுடைய செந்தண்மை வாய்ந்த அந்தணனாகிய சிவபெருமானையெனத் தெளிவீராக. எ-று.

உரைவாய் அரா — ஒலித்துச் சீறும் வாயினையுடைய பாம்பு. இனி. உறைவாய் அரா எனப்படங் கொண்டு, நச்சுப்பையுடன் கூடிய வாயினையுடைய பாம்பு எனப் பொருள் கூறுவதும் உண்டு. ஈசன் அந்தணனே என முடியும்.

4. இ-ள் : நெஞ்சமே, அருட்கடலாகிய அந்தணனும் எமக்குப் புகலிடமாவாய் நீயே என்று கூறித் (தன்னைச் சரண்புகுந்து) ஆட்பட்ட அடியார்கள் (துயர்க்கடலில்) அழுந்தாவண்ணம் எளி வந்து பாதுகாத்தருளும் எல்லையற்ற பேராற்றலுடையவனும் ஆகிய சிவபெருமானே நீ இப்பொழுது காணப்பெறுவாயானால், கொத்துகளாகப் பொருந்திய பொன்மலர்களைப் பூணைல் (உயிரைக்) கவர்ந்து கொள்ளும் கொடிய பாம்பினைப் பூண்ட பெருமானே என அவ்விறைவனது அருள் திறத்தை நினைந்து போற்றுவாயாக எ-று.

நெஞ்சே, இனி வல்லாளன் (ஆகிய) அந்தணனைக் கண்டால் பொன் பூணாதே கோள்நாகம் பூண்டானே என்-என இயைத்துரைக்க. என் — என நினைந்து போற்றுக. கண்டாய் — அசை.

இனிவார் சடையினிற் கங்கையென் பானையங் கத்திருந்த
கனிவாய் மலைமங்கை காணிலென் செய்திகை யிற்சிலையான்
முனிவார் திரிபுர மூன்றும்வெந் தன்றுசெந் தீயின் மூழ்கத்
தனிவார் கணையொன்றி னான்மிகக் கோத்தளம் சங்கரனே. (5)

சங்கரனைத் தாழ்ந்த சடையானை யச்சடைமேற்
பொங்கரவம் வைத்துகந்த புண்ணியனை — அங்கொருநாள்
ஆவாவென் றுழாமைக் காப்பானை யெப்பொழுதும்
ஓவாது நெஞ்சே யுரை. (6)

இனி, ' வல்லாளனாகிய இறைவன் கொத்தாகத் திரண்ட பொன்னணிகளைப்
பூண்டு கொள்ளாது கோளிழைக்கும் நாகத்தைப் பூண்டனனே ! நெஞ்சமே, இனி
என்ன ஆகுமோ ' என அம்மையார் இரங்கிக் கூறியதாக இப்பாடலின் பின்னி
ரண்டடிகட்குப் பொருள் கூறுவதும் உண்டு.

5. இ-ள் : நினது கையில் ஏந்திய மலையாகிய வில்லினைக் கொண்டு,
சினந்து ஓறுக்கத்தக்கவர்களாகிய அவுணர்களுடைய திரியுமியல்பினவாகிய மும்
மதில்களும் முன்னொரு காலத்துச் சிவந்த தீயிற்பட்டு வெந்து சாம்பராய் அழியு
மாறு நீண்ட ஒரே அம்பினால் நன்கு கோத்து எய்த சங்கரனாகிய பெருமானே,
இனி நினது நீண்ட சடையிலமர்ந்திருக்கும் கங்கையாகிய நங்கையை நின்திரு
மேனியின் ஒருபாகத்தில் அமர்ந்திருக்கும் கொவ்வைக்கனிபோலும் சிவந்த
வாயினையுடைய மலைமகளாகிய உமாதேவியார் கண்டால் நினது கள்ளத்தை
எங்ஙனம் மறைப்பாய் ?

எவ்வுயிர்க்கும் இன்பம் அளிக்கவல்ல அருளாளனென்பார் ' சங்கரனே,
என அழைத்தார்.

' வங்க மலிகடல் நாகைக்கா ரோணத்தெம் வானவனே
எங்கள் பெருமான்ஓர் விண்ணப்ப முண்டது கேட்டருளீர்
கங்கை சடையிற் கரந்தாய்அக் கள்ளத்தை மெள்ளஉமை
நங்கை யறியிற் பொல்லாது கண்டாய் எங்கள் நாயகனே '

எனத் திருநாவுக்கரசர் பாடிய திருவிருத்தம் அம்மையார் பாடிய இத்திருப்பாடலை
அடியொற்றி யமைந்திருத்தல் காணலாம்.

6. இ-ள் : (எவ்வுயிர்க்கும் இன்பம் தருதலால்) சங்கரன் என்னும் திரு
நாமமுடையவனும் பின்னே தாழ்ந்து வீழும் சடையினையுடையவனும்
அவ்வழிகிய சடையின்மேல் பொங்கிச் சீறும் பாம்பினையணிந்த அறவுருவினனும்
(கூற்றுவன் உயிரைக் கவர்ந்து கொள்ளுதற் பொருட்டு வரும்) அவ்வொரு
நாளிலே அவ்விடர் நிலையில் ஐயோ எனக் கதறித் துயரத்தில் ஆழ்ந்து
வருந்தாவண்ணம் (அன்புடைய அடியார்களைக்) காத்து அருள்புரியவல்ல
அருளாளனும் ஆகிய சிவபெருமானே நெஞ்சமே நீ எக்காலத்தும் இடைவிடாது
நினைந்து போற்றுவாயாக. எ-று.

ஓஷதல் — இடையறவுபட்டு ஓழிதல். ஓவாது — அங்ஙனம் ஓழியாமல்.

உரைக்கப் படுவதும் ஒன்றுண்டு கேட்கிற்செவ் வான்றொடைமேல்
இரைக்கின்ற பாம்பினை யென்றுந் தொடேலிழிந் தோட்டந்தெங்கும்
திரைக்கின்ற கங்கையுந் தேனின்ற கொன்றையும் செஞ்சடைமேல்
விரைக்கின்ற வன்னியுஞ் சென்னித் தலைவைத்த வேதியனே, (7)

வேதியனை வேதப் பொருளானே வேதத்துக்
காதியனை ஆதிரைநன் னாளானைச் — சோதிப்பான்
வல்லேன மாய்ப்புக்கு மாலவனு மாட்டாது
கில்லேன மாவென்றான் கீழ். (8)

7. இ-ள் : (வானினின்றும்) இறங்கி எல்லாத்திசைகளிலும் விரைந்தோடி
அலை வீசும் பெருவெள்ளமாகிய கங்கையினையும் தேன் நிறைந்த கொன்றை மலர்
மாலையினையும் சிவந்த சடை முழுவதும் மணம் வீசுகின்ற வன்னித் தளிரையும்
சென்னியிடத்தே வைத்தருளிய வேத முதல்வனாகிய பெருமானே, (அடியார்களா
கிய எங்களாற்) சொல்லத்தக்கதோர் விண்ணப்பமும் ஒன்றுண்டு. அதனைக்
கேட்டருள்வாயாயின், செவ்வானத்தினையொத்து விளங்கும் நினது சடைக்கற்றை
யின் மேல் சீறியெழும் பாம்பினை எக்காலத்தும் தொடாதிருப்பாயாக. எ-று.

அம்மையார் அன்பின் மிகுதியால் இறைவனை நோக்கிக் கூறும் இவ்வேண்டு
கோள் அன்பிற் சிறந்த தாய், தன் குழந்தைக்கு இடர் நேரா வண்ணம் விரைந்து
கூறும் அறிவுரையை நினைவுபடுத்துவதாகும். இரைத்தல்—சீறுதல். ஓட்டந்து—
ஓடி; ஓட்டம் தந்து என்பது ஓட்டந்து என மருவியது. விரைக்கின்ற — மணம்
வீசுகின்ற; 'விரை' என்னும் பெயரடியாக பிறந்த வினைச்சொல். சென்னித்தலை—
சென்னியின் கண். தலை ஏழனுருபு.

8. இ-ள் : வேதத்தை ஓதியருள்பவனும் வேதத்தின் பொருளாக விளங்கு
பவனும் (பழையதாகிய) அவ்வேதத்துக்கும் நிமித்த காரணமாகி முன்னுள்ள
பழையோனும் நன்மை பொருந்திய திருவாதிரை நாளுக்கு உகந்த தலைவனும்
ஆகிய சிவபெருமானைத் திருமாலாகிய அப்பெருந்தகையும் ஆராய்ந்து தேடிக்
காணத்தொடங்கி வலிய பன்றியின் உருக்கொண்டு (நிலத்தினுள்ளே தோண்டிப்)
புகுந்து (இறைவனடியைக்) காணமாட்டாது, 'ஆற்றலுடையேனல்லேன் அம்மா'
என இரங்கிக் கீழே தளர்வுற்று வீழ்ந்தான். எ-று.

கில்லேன் — ஆற்றலுடையேனல்லேன். இரக்கக் குறிப்பாகிய அம்மா
என்ற சொல் 'அமா' என இடைக் குறைந்து நின்றது. இனி 'கில்லேன் நமா'
எனப் பிரித்து, 'அறியகில்லேன் போற்றி' எனப் பொருள் கூறுவாரும் உளர்.

கீழா யினதுன்ப வெள்ளக் கடற்றள்ளி யுள்ளுறப்போய்
வீழா திருந்தின்பம் வேண்டுமென் பீர்விர வார்புரங்கள்
பாழா யிடக்கண்ட கண்டனெண் தோளன்பைப் பொற்கழலே
தாழா திறைஞ்சிப் பணிந்துபன் னாளுந் தலைநின்மினே. (9)

தலையாய வைந்தினையுஞ் சாதித்துத் தாழ்ந்து
தலையா யினவுணர்ந்தோர் காண்பர் — தலையாய
அண்டத்தான் ஆதிரையான் ஆலாலம் உண்டிருண்ட
கண்டத்தான் செம்பொற் கழல். (10)

9. இ-ள். உயிருணர்வைக் கீழ்ப்படுத்தும் துன்ப வெள்ளமாகிய பிறவிப் பெருங்கடலில் தள்ளியலைக்கப்பட்டு வீழ்ந்து அதனுள்ளே யாழ்ந்து உழலாமல் (அழியா வியல்பினதாகிய மேல் நிலையில்) அமர்ந்திருந்து நுகரத்தக்க பேரின்பம் வேண்டுமென விரும்பி நிற்பவர்களே! பொருந்தாத அவுணர்களுடைய முப்புரங்களும் அழிந்து பாழாகும்படி செய்த திருநீலகண்டனும் எட்டுத்திருத் தோள்களையுடைய ஈசனும் ஆகிய இறைவனது பசியபொன்மயமான கழலணிந்த திருவடிகளையே காலந்தாழ்க்காது தலையினால் இறைஞ்சிப் பணிந்து போற்றிப் பலநாளும் இவ்வழிபாட்டில் முற்பட்டு உறைத்து நிற்பீராக எ-று.

தலைநிற்றல் — முற்பட்டு நின்றல். இறைவன் திருவடிகளை மறவாது வழிபடுவோர் பிறவிப்பெருங்கடலைக் கடந்து அழிவிலாப் பேரின்ப வாழ்வை எய்துவர் என்பது கருத்து.

10. இ-ள்: எல்லா மந்திரங்களினும் மேலான திருவைந் தெழுத்தினை ஓதி அதன்கண் நிலைத்து நின்று உள்ளத்தை ஒரு நெறிப்படுத்தித் தலைசிறந்தன வாகிய (சரியை, கிரியை, யோகம், ஞானம் என்னும் நால்வகை) நன்னெறிகளை மேற்கொண்டொழுகிய பெருமக்கள், மேலாய அண்டங்களுக்கு அப்பாற்பட்டு விளங்குபவனும், ஆதிரைநாளுக்கு உகந்தவனும் ஆலகால நஞ்சினையுண்டாக்கி இருள் நிறம் பெற்ற திருமிடற்றினையுடையவனும் ஆகிய சிவபெருமானுடைய செம்பொன்மயமான திருவடிகளைக் கண்டு மகிழ்வர். எ-று.

தலையாயின உணர்ந்தோர், ஆலாலம் உண்டிருண்ட கண்டத்தான் செம்பொற்கழல் காண்பர் என வினை முடிவு செய்க,

கழற்கொண்ட சேவடி. காணலுற்றூர்தம்மைப் பேணலுற்றூர்
 நிழற்கண்ட போழ்த்து நில்லா வினைநிக ரேதுமின்றித்
 தழற்கொண்ட சோதிச்செம் மேனியெம் மாணக்கைம் மாமலர் தூய்த்
 தொழக்கண்டு நிற்கிற்கு மோதுன்னி நம்மடுந் தொல்வினையே, (11)

தொல்லை வினைவந்து சூழாமுன் தாழாமே
 ஒல்லை வணங்கி யுமையென்னும் — மெல்லியலோர்
 கூற்றாளைக் கூற்றருவங் காய்ந்தாளை வாய்ந்திலங்கு
 நீற்றாளை நெஞ்சே நினை. (12)

11. இ-ள்: வீரக்கழலினைக் கொண்ட செம்மையான திருவடியைக் காண விரும்பி அன்பு செய்யும் அடியார்களைப் பேணி வழிபடுவாரது உடம்பின் நிழலைக் கண்டபோதே எத்தகைய தீவினைகளும் நில்லாதொழிவன; (அங்ஙனமாகவும்) தனக்கு ஒப்பாவது பிறிதின்றித் தீயினியல்பினைத் தன்பாற் கொண்டு விளங்கும் சோதிப் பிழம்பாகிய சிவந்த திருமேனியையுடைய எம் சிவபெருமானை கையினால் பெருமை மிக்க மலர்களைத் தூவி அருச்சித்து வழிபடுதலைக் கண்ட பின்னரும் நம்பால் நிற்கவல்லனவோ (முன்பெல்லாம்) நம்மையனுதி வருத்தும் இயல்பினவாகிய பழவினைகள். எ-று,

நிற்கிற்குமோ — நிற்கவல்லனவோ; நின்றலாற்றது அழிந்தொழிவன என்பதாம்.

12. இ-ள். நெஞ்சமே, (நாம்முன்செய்த) பழவினைப்பயனாகிய ஊழானது நம்மைச் சூழ்ந்து வருத்துதற்கு முன்னமே உமாதேவியாராகிய மெல்லியல் நங்கையைத் தனது ஒரு பாகத்திற் கொண்டவனும் (தன்னை வழிபடும் அடியவனது உயிரைக் கொள்ளவந்த) கூற்றுவனைச் சினந்து உதைத்தவனும் (திருமேனியிற்) பொருந்தி விளங்கும் திருநீற்றினை யணிந்தவனும் ஆகிய சிவபெருமானை நீ காலந்தாழ்த்தலின்றி விரைந்து வணங்கி இடைவிடாது தியானிப்பாயாக. எ-று.

நெஞ்சே, வினைவந்து சூழாமுன், மெல்லியலோர் கூற்றாளை, கூற்றருவங் காய்ந்தாளை, நீற்றாளை வணங்கி நினை என இயைத்துரைக்க.

நினையா தொழிதிகண் டாய்நெஞ்ச மேயிங்கோர் தஞ்சமென்று
மனையா னாயுமக்கள் தம்மையுந் தேறியொ ராறுபுக்கு
நனையாச் சடைமுடி நம்பனந் தாதைநொந் தாதசெந்தி
யனையான் அமரர் பிரானண்ட வாணன் அடித்தலமே. (13)

அடித்தலத்தின் அன்றரக்கன் ஐந்நான்கு தோளும்
முடித்தலமு நீமுரித்த வாறென் — முடித்தலத்தில்
ஆரூடி யாற அனலாடி யவ்வனலில்
நீரூடி நெய்யாடி நீ. (14)

13. இ-ள் : நெஞ்சமே, இவ்வுலகவாழ்வில் மனைவியையும் மக்களையும் ஒரு பற்றுக்கோடாக நம்பி, ஒப்பற்ற கங்கையாற்றின் வெள்ளம் புகுந்தும் (அதனாற் சிறிதும்) நனையாத சடைமுடியையுடைய நம்பனும் நம் தந்தையா வானும் என்றும் அவியாத செந்தீப் பிழம்பினையொத்த ஒளியமைந்த திருமேனியுடையவனும் தேவர்கள் போற்றும் பெருமானும் அண்டங்களெல்லாவற்றிலும் வீற்றிருந்தருள்பவனும் ஆகிய இறைவன் திருவடிகளை நினையாமல் விட்டு விடாதே. எ-று.

நெஞ்சமே, மனையாளையும் மக்களையும் இங்கு ஓர் தஞ்சமென்று தேறி அண்டவாணன் அடித்தலமே நினையாதொழிதி கண்டாய் என இயைத்துரைக்க. இவ்வுலகில் மனைவி மக்களைத் தஞ்சமென்றெண்ணாது இறைவன் திருவடிகளையே புகலிடமாகத் தெளிந்து வழிபடுக என அறிவுறுத்தவாறு. தஞ்சம்—புகலிடம், பற்றுக்கோடு. ‘ஒருவரைத் தஞ்சமென்றெண்ணா துன்பாத மிறைஞ்சுகின்றார் அருவினைச் சுற்றம் அகல்வி கண்டாய்’ எனவரும் திருநாவுக்கரசர் திருப்பாடலில் தஞ்சம் என்ற சொல் இப்பொருட்டாதல் காண்க. நினையாதொழிதி கண்டாய்—நினையாமல் விட்டுவிடப் போகிறாய்; ஈண்டு இத்தொடர், ‘விடையவனே விட்டிடுதி கண்டாய்’ என்பழிப்போல ‘நினையாமல் விட்டு விடாதே’ எனப் பொருள் தந்து நின்றது. இனி ‘நினையா தொழிதி’ எனப்பாடங்கொண்டு, மனைவி மக்களை அற்பமாகத் தெளிந்து அண்டவாணன் அடித்தலத்தையே நினைந்து வணங்குவாயாக எனப் பொருள் கூறுவதும் உண்டு. இங்ஙனங் கூறுங்கால், தஞ்சம் என்ற சொல், எளிமை (அற்பம்) என்ற பொருளில் வந்ததாகக் கொள்ளுதல் வேண்டும்.

14 இ-ள் : முடியினிடத்தே கங்கையாற்றினைக் கொண்டவனும் அனையாத தீயின் நடுவே நின்று ஆடுபவனும் அத்தீயின்மேல் பூத்து விளங்குவது போன்று திருநீற்றினைப் பூசியவனும் நெய்யினைத் திருமஞ்சனப் பொருளாகக் கொண்டவனும் ஆகிய எல்லாம் வல்ல பெருமானாகிய நீ, அன்றொருநாள் (கயிலை மலையைப் பெயர்த்தெடுத்த) அரக்கனாகிய இராவணனுடைய இருபது தோள்களையும் (பத்துத்) தலைகளையும் நின் திருவடியினால் மிதித்து முறிக்க வேண்டிய இன்றியமையாமை என்னையோ? எ-று.

நீரின்று தானவர் மாமதின் மூன்று நிரந்துடனே
 தின்று வேவச் சிலைதொட்ட வாறென் திரங்கு வல்வாய்ப்
 பேய்ரின்று பாடப் பெருங்கா டரங்காப் பெயர்ந்து நடட்ம்
 போய்ரின்று பூதந் தொழச்செய்யு மொய்கழற் புண்ணியனே. (15)

புண்ணியங்கள் செய்தனவும் பொய்நெறிக்கட் சாராமே
 எண்ணியோ ரைந்து மிசைந்தனவால் — திண்ணிய
 கைம்மாவி னீருரிவை மூவுருவும் போர்த்துகந்த
 அம்மானுக் காட்பட்ட அன்பு. (16)

நினைவளவானே ஐந்தொழில்களையும் இயற்ற வல்ல முதல்வனாகிய நீ
 இராவணனைத் திருவடி விரலொன்றினால் அடர்த்தடக்கியது, அவனது வழிபாட்
 டிற்குத் திருவுளமிரங்கி எளிவந்து அருள்செய்தற் பொருட்டேயாம் என்பது
 குறிப்பு.

15- இ-ள்: (தசையுலர்ந்து) திரைந்த வலிய வாயினையுடைய பேய்கள்
 நின்று இசைபாடவும் பூதங்கள் அருகே நின்று வணங்கவும் பெரிய சுடுகாட்
 டினையே ஆடும் அரங்காகக் கருதியடைந்து எல்லாத் திசைகளிலும் இடம்
 பெயர்ந்து திருக்கூத்தியற்றியருளும் வீரக்கழலணிந்த திருவடியினையுடைய அற
 வுருவாகிய பெருமானே! (மூழுமுதற் கடவுளாகிய) நீயே வெளிப்பட்டு நின்று
 அவுணர்களுடைய முப்புரங்களும் ஒருசேரத் தீயுட்பட்டு வெந்து நீருகும்படி
 வில்லில் அம்பினைத் தொடுத்து எய்ய முற்பட்டவாறு என்னையோ? எ-று.

என்றது, தன்திருவுள்ளக்குறிப்பளவானே எவற்றையும் ஆக்கவும் அளிக்க
 வும் வல்ல தனிமுதல்வனாகிய இறைவன், தன் ஆணைவழி யடங்காதாரை ஒறுத்த
 லும் அவர் தம் கட்புலனாகத் தோன்றி அன்றோரை ஆட்கொண்டருளும் பெருங்
 கருணைத் திறமேயாம் என அறிவுறுத்தியபடியாம்.

16. இ-ள்: திட்பம் வாய்ந்த யானையினைப் பிளந்து உரித்த தோலினை
 மூன்றுருவினதாகிய தனது திருமேனியின்மேல் விரும்பிப் போர்த்த இறைவனுக்கு
 ஆட்பட்ட அன்பின் திறத்தால், முன்னைப் பிறப்பிற் செய்தனவாகிய நல்வினை
 பேறுகளும் தடையின்றி வந்து பொருந்தின; மனத்தின்வழி எண்ணப் பெற்று
 இயங்கும் ஐம்புலன்களும் பொய்யான தீநெறிக்கட் செல்லாமல் நன்னெறிக்
 கண்ணே பொருந்தின. எ-று.

அம்மானுக்கு ஆட்பட்ட அன்பினால் (முன்) செய்தனவாகிய புண்ணியங்
 களும் இசைந்தன; ஓர் ஐந்தும் பொய்நெறிக்கண் சாராமே இசைந்தன எனத்
 தனித்தனி கூட்டுக. கைம்மா—கையினையுடைய விலங்கு; யானை. மூவுருவாவது
 அயன் அரி அரன் என்னும் மூவர் உருவும் ஒன்றையெனத் திகழும் திருமேனி
 “மூவருருத்தனதாம் மூல முதற்கருவை” என்பர் நம்பியாரூரர். இனி இறைவனது
 வலப்பக்கத்தே திருமாலும் இடப்பக்கத்தே உமையும் என இவ்வாறு மூன்றுய்த்
 திகழும் வடிவெனவும் அம்மை அப்பன் நடுவே முருகன் என மூன்றுய் விளங்கும்
 வடிவெனவும் வேறுவேறு கூறுதலும் உண்டு.

அன்பா லடைவதெவ் வாறுகொல் மேலதோ ராடரவம்
தன்பா லொருவரைச் சாரவொட் டாதது வேயுமன்றி
முன்பா யினதலை யோடுகள் கோத்தவை யார்த்துவெள்ளை
என்பா யினவு மணிந்தங்கொ ரேறுகந் தேறுவதே. (17)

ஏறலா லேறுமற் றில்லையே யெம்பெருமான்
ஆறெலாம் பாயும் அவிர்சடையார்—வேறோர்
படங்குலவு நாகமுமிழ் பண்டமரர் சூழ்ந்த
தடங்கடல்நஞ் சுண்டார் தமக்கு. (18)

17. இ-ள் : எம்பெருமானே, படம் விரித்து ஆடும் பாம்பானது நினது திருமேனியின் மேலதாய் நிற்பால் ஒருவரையும் சாரவொட்டாது சீறுகின்றது. அதுவேயன்றி மாலையாகக் கோக்கப்பெற்றனவாகிய வெண்டலைகள் நினது திருமார்பின் கண்ணே அணியப்பெற்று முற்பட்டுத் தோன்றுகின்றன. அவற்றின் மேலும் வெள்ளை நிறம் வாய்ந்த எனும்புகளையும் மாலையாக அணிந்து அங்கு ஓர் எருதினை ஊர்தியாக விரும்பி யேறுவதாக நினது செயல்முறை அமைந்துள்ளது. இந்நிலையில் அன்பினால் (அடியார்கள் அச்சமின்றி) நின்னை யணுகித் தொண்டு புரிதல் எங்ஙனம் இயலும்? எ-று.

இறைவன் உலகம் உய்யக் கொண்ட திருக்கோலப் பொலிவினை விளக்குமுசமாக மக்கள் அவ்விறைவனுக்குத் தொண்டு புரிதலின் அருமையினை அப்மையார் குறிப்பால் அறிவுறுத்தவாறறிக. இறைவனுக்கு ஆடச் செய்தலின் அருமையினை நம்பியாரூரர் தாம் பாடிய திருப்பரங்குன்றத் திருப்பதிகத்தில் 'அடிகேள் உமக்காட்செய அஞ்சுதுமே' எனப்பாடல் தோறும் விரித்துரைத்தமை காணலாம்.

18. இ-ள் : கங்கையாற்று நீர் முழுவதும் பாய்ந்து தன்கண் சுவறிப் போதற்கேற்ற ஒளி விளங்கு சடையினையுடையவரும் முற்காலத்தில் (அமுதினைப் பெறுதல் வேண்டித்) தேவர்கள் கூடிக் கடைந்த பெருங் கடலினிடத்தே (அவர்கள் விரும்பிய அமுதுக்கு மாருகப்) படம் பொருந்திய பாம்பினால் உமிழப்பட்ட ஆலகால நஞ்சினையுண்டவரும் எம்பெருமானும் ஆகிய தமக்கு ஊர்ந்து செல்லுதற்கு ஏற்ற ஊர்தியாக எருதினைத் தவிர வேறென்றும் கிடைக்கவில்லையோ? எ-று.

இல்லையே என்புழி ஏகாரம் வினா. எல்லா வுலகங்களையும் தனது உடைமையாகக் கொண்ட இறைவனுக்கு அயிராவணமாகிய வெள்ளையானை முதலாக எத்தனையோ ஊர்திகள் உள்ளன, எனினும் அப்பெருமான் ஞானமாகிய இடபத்தினை ஊர்தியாகக் கொண்டு இங்கே எழுந்தருளுதல் மக்களாகிய நம்பால் வைத்த பெருங்கருணையால் என்பது குறிப்பு. 'அயிராவணமேருது ஆனேறேறி அமரர் நாடாளாதே ஆரூராண்ட அயிராவணமே' என வரும் திருத்தாண்டகத் தொடர் இக்குறிப்பினை நன்கு புலப்படுத்தல் காண்க.

இனி, 'படங்குவனை நாகம் வளாய்' எனப் பாடங்கொண்டு, 'படத்தால், உலகத்தை வளைக்கும் பாம்பை வளைத்து' எனப் பொருள் கூறுதலும் உண்டு.

தமக்கென்று மின்பணி செய்திருப் பேழுக்குத் தாமொருநாள்
எமக்கொன்று சொன்னால் அருளுங்கொலாம் இணை யாதுமின்றிச்
சுமக்கின்ற பிள்ளைவெள் ளேறொப்ப தொன்றுதொண்டைக்கனிவாய்
உமைக்கென்று தேடிப் பெறுதுட னேகொண்ட உத்தமரே. (19)

உத்தமராய் வாழ்வார் உலந்தக்கால் உற்றார்கள்
செத்த மரமடுக்கித் தியாமுன் — உத்தமனாய்
நீளாழி நஞ்சுண்ட நெய்யாடி தன்றிறமே
கேளாழி நெஞ்சே கிளர்ந்து. (20)

19, இ-ள் : தன்னையொப்பது பிறிதொன்றுமின்றித் தம்மைச் சுமந்து
திரியும் இளமைவாய்ந்த வெள்ளிய விடையினைப் போன்று மற்றோர் எருதினைத்
தம் தேவியாராகிய உமை நங்கையார்க்கெனத் தேடிப்பெறாமல் அவ்வம்மை
யாரையும் தமது திருமேனியின் ஒருபாகத்திலே அமர்த்திக்கொண்ட உத்தம
ராகிய இறைவர், இன்பம் பெருகுந் திருத்தொண்டினைத் தமக்கு எப்பொழுதும்
செய்து அமைதியுற்றிருக்கும் அடியார்களாகிய எங்களுக்கு (இன்னது வேண்டும்
என ஏதேனும்) ஒன்றைக் கேட்போமானால் நல்கியருள்வாரோ. என்று.

‘இணை யாதுமின்றிச் சுமக்கின்ற பிள்ளை வெள்ளோறு’ எனவே, மெய்ஞ்
ஞானத்தின் உருவாகிய அதனையொத்த வேறோர் ஊர்தியைத் தேடிப்பெறுதல்
இயலாதென்பதும், தம் தேவியார் பொருட்டு வேறோர் ஊர்தியைத் தேடாது
அவரைத் தம்முடன் வைத்தவர் எனவே சென்றடையாத திருவுடையார்
அவர் என்பதும், ‘எமக்கு ஒன்று ‘சொன்னால்’ எனவே பணி செய்திருப்போ
மாகிய எமக்கு அப்பணியே பேரின்பத் தருவதாதலின் அதனின் மிக்கதொன்று
வேண்டிப் பெறுதல் அடியார்களாகிய எம்மனோர்க்கு உடன்பாடன்றென்பதும்,
யாம் வேண்டத்தக்கது இதுவென அறிந்து அருள் செய்யும் கடமை இறைவ
ராகிய தமக்குரியதாதலின் தாம் நன்றெனக் கருதியதனை எமக்கு நல்குவதன்றி
யாம் அறியாமையால் விரும்பிய சிறுபொருளைத் தந்து எங்களைத் தவருள
நெறியிற் செல்லவொட்டா ரென்பதும் விளக்கியவாறு.

20. இ-ள் : எப்பொருளையும் ஆழ்ந்து உணரவல்ல நல்ல நெஞ்சமே,
உலகில் உயர்ந்தோராக வாழ்வார்கள் இறந்துபோனால் அவருடைய உடம்பினைச்
சுட்டெரித்தல் இயல்பு. அத்தகைய துன்பநிலை நமக்கு வருதற்குமுன்
எல்லோர்க்கும் மேலோனாய் விளங்கி நீண்டு ஆழ்ந்த பெருங்கடலில் தோன்றிய
நஞ்சினை உண்டடக்கிய நெய்யாடியாகிய சிவபெருமானது புகழ்த்திறத்தைக்
கிளர்ச்சியுடையாய் விரும்பிக் கேட்பாயாக என்று.

‘உத்தமராய் வாழ்வார் உலந்தக்கால் உற்றார்கள் செத்தமரம்
அடுக்கித் தீழட்டுவர். அந்நிலை நமக்கு வருவதற்குமுன் நெய்யாடி தன் திறம்
கிளர்ந்துகேள்’ என வேண்டும் சொற்களைப் பெய்துரைக்க. செத்தமரம்—பட்ட
மரம்; விறகு. ஆழிநெஞ்சு—எப்பொருளையும் ஆழ்ந்து உணரவல்ல நெஞ்சம்.
உலகில் ஈடும் எடுப்புமின்றி உயர்ந்தோர் என மதிக்கப்படுபவர்களும் குறித்த
காலம் வந்தால் இறந்தொழிவர், நஞ்சினையுண்டும் என்றும் இறவாத தனிமுதல்
வனாகத் திகழ்வோன் இறைவ னொருவனேயாதலின் அவனது புகழ்த்திறத்தைக்
கேட்டலால் பிறப்பிறப்பில்லாம் பேரின்ப வாழ்வைப் பெறலாம் என அம்மையார்
அறிவுறுத்தருளின ராயிற்று.

NYAYAPARISUDDHI

By

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of

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तु न पुनः स्वपक्षनिरूपणम् ; तेनैव तत्फलस्यापि सिद्धेः । न हि पुनस्तस्यैव प्रमाणस्य पाठे प्रयोजनम् । न च स्थापितस्वरूपादिमत् प्रमाणमनादृत्य मानान्तरमन्वेषणीयम् । न च नैरपेक्ष्येणोपरमाद्वितण्डात्वम् ; अपेक्षायां सत्यां प्रतिवादिना^१ स्वपक्षस्थापनस्यापि कर्तव्यत्वेन वैषम्यात् । जल्पे तूक्तिगुणदोषाभ्यामपि जयपराजयौ^२ स्यातामिति कालात्ययापदेशयोपन्यस्तस्यापि प्रमाणस्य पुनः पाठाद्युपपत्तिः^३ । आगमसिद्धा चेयं कथात्रयव्यवस्था, 'वादजल्पवितण्डाभिः' इत्यादिवचनात् ॥

केचित्तु — वितण्डाद्वयमेव व्यत्यस्तं जल्प इति वदन्ति ; तथापि तथैव नियमात् कथात्रयगणनं नानुपपन्नम् । उक्तं च जल्पवितण्डयोरपि लक्षणं

बाधः । ननु प्रमाणान्तरेण स्वपक्षस्थापनार्थं तदुपन्यासः स्यादत आह — न च स्थापितेति । ननु यथातथा वापि भवतु ; स्वपक्षस्थापनविरहात् वितण्डात्वं स्यादत आह — न च नैरपेक्ष्येणेति । अपेक्षायां सत्यामित्यादि । सत्यामप्यपेक्षायां यत्र प्रतिवादिपक्षस्थापनमनावश्यकं सैव वितण्डा । प्रतिवादिपक्षज्ञाननिरपेक्षकथेति यावत् । वीतरागकथा तु न तादृशी भवितुमर्हति ; प्रतिवादिपक्षोपन्यासतन्निरसने अन्तरा तत्त्वनिर्णयासम्भवादिति भावः । ननु तर्हि जल्पोऽपि क्वचित्तथा स्यादित्यत आह — जल्पे त्विति । व्यत्यस्तमिति । यदा वादिनः स्थापकता तदा प्रतिवादिनो दूषकता, यदा प्रतिवादिनः स्थापकता, तदा वादिनो दूषकता इत्येवंरूपमित्यर्थः । तथैव नियमादिति । जल्पे व्यत्यस्तवितण्डाद्वयरूपता, अन्यत्र न तथात्वमित्येवमेव नियमादित्यर्थः । कथात्रयगणनं नानुपपन्नमिति । तत्त्वबुभुत्सुकथाया वादत्वेन व्यत्यस्तवितण्डाद्वयस्य जल्पत्वेनातादृशवितण्डायाः वितण्डात्वेन कथायास्त्रेधा गणनमित्यर्थः ।

1. प्रतिवादिपक्षस्थापनस्यापि
2. जयापजयौ
3. पाठाद्युपपत्तेः

संयोगाधिकरणे — 'स्वयक्षप्रामाण्यप्रतिपक्षाप्रामाण्यनिश्चयार्थो व्यवहारो जल्पः । प्रतिपक्षाप्रामाण्यमात्रनिश्चयार्थव्यवहारो वितण्डा' इति । श्रीमद्गीताभाष्येऽपि 'वादः प्रवदतामहम्' इत्यत्र 'जल्पवितण्डादि कुर्वतां तत्त्वनिर्णयाय प्रवृत्तो वादो यः, सोऽहम्' इति व्याख्यानात् कथात्वयं दर्शितम् । एतेन 'विप्रं निर्जित्य वादतः' 'न विगृह्य कथां कुर्यात्' इत्यादिभिर्जल्पवितण्डयोर्निषेधो विशिष्टविषय इति दर्शितम् ; कदाचित् बाह्यकुट्टिभङ्गाय द्वयोरपि कार्यत्वात् । तथा चाक्षपादसूत्रम् — 'तत्राध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टकशाखावरणवत्' इति ॥

॥ कथाङ्गनिरूपणम् ॥

अथ कथाङ्गानि — सभ्यानुविधेयसंवरणम्, वादिप्रतिवादिनियमः, कथाविशेषव्यवस्था, निरूप्यनिर्णय इति चत्वार्येव । वरदविष्णुमिश्रैस्तु —

एतेनेति । श्रीमन्नाथमुनिप्रभृतिभिरपि जल्पवितण्डयोः कथात्वाङ्गीकारेणेत्यर्थः । विशिष्ट-विषय इति । बाह्यकुट्टिव्यतिरिक्तविषय इत्यर्थः । बाह्यकुट्टिव्यतिरिक्तैः जल्पवितण्डे न कार्ये इति निषेधार्थं इति यावत् । कथं सामान्यनिषेधस्य सङ्कुचितविषयत्वमित्यत आह — कदाचिदिति कार्यत्वादिति : न हिंस्यादिति निषेधस्य अग्नीषोमीयादिविहितव्यतिरिक्तविषयत्ववदिति भावः । सभ्यानुविधेयसंवरणमिति —

रागद्वेषविनिर्मुक्ताः सप्त पञ्च त्रयोऽपि वा ।

यत्नोपविष्टा विप्राः स्युः सा यज्ञसदृशी सभा ॥

इति स्मृत्युक्तलक्षणाः प्राज्ञाः सभ्याः । अनुविधेयः सभापतिः । अनु-पश्चात् वादसमाप्त्यनन्तरं विधेयं जयपराजयफलं यस्येति व्युत्पत्तेः ; तेषां सम्यग्वरणम् - एते सभ्याः, अयं च सभापतिरिति परिग्रहः । वादिप्रतिवादिनियम इति । अयमस्य प्रमेयस्य साधको वादी, अयं तु तद्दूषकः प्रतिवादीति व्यवस्था । कथाविशेष-व्यवस्थेति । प्रागुक्तत्रिविधकथासु अनया कथया भवितव्यमिति नियमः । निरूप्य —

‘जल्पश्चतुरङ्गः; अङ्गानि वादिप्रतिवादिसभापतिप्राशिकाः’ इत्युक्तम् । वादे तु न सभ्यादिसंवरणानिर्वन्धोऽस्ति, अपलापादीनां प्रायशस्तत्रासंभवात्; वीतरागाः शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिशिष्टश्रोत्रियश्रेयोऽर्थिनो हि तदधिकारिणः । सभ्यानां दैवादागतानां त्ववर्जनम् । अनुविधेयसंवरणं तु सर्वथानपेक्षितमेव; विजयफल

निर्णयः — अत्र कथायामिदं प्रमेयं निरूप्यमित्येवंविधो निर्णयः । वादिप्रतिवादि-सभापतिप्राशिका इति । प्राशिकाः - सभ्याः । अत्र पक्षे कथाविशेषव्यवस्थया निरूप्यनिर्णयस्य वादिनियम एवान्तर्भावः । अत्र कथाविशेषे अस्य प्रमेयविशेषस्य अयं साधको वादी, अयं च तद्दूषकः प्रतिवादीत्येवंविधव्यवस्थाविषयभूतौ द्वयं वादिप्रतिवादिशब्दविवक्षितौ । अपलापादीनां प्रायशस्तत्रासंभवमिति । वादे तत्त्वनिर्णयस्यैव प्रयोजनतया न तत्रापलापाद्यवकाशः । कचिद्रमसादिवशेन कथंचित् संभवेऽपि तन्निराकरणाय न सभ्याद्यपेक्षा । तत्त्वनिर्णयार्थेऽस्मिन्वादे नैवमपलापादिकमुचितमिति वादिप्रतिवाद्यन्यतरोक्तिमात्रेणैव तन्निराकरणसंभवमिति भावः । इममेवार्थमाधिकारिप्रदर्शनेन स्पष्टयति — वीतरागा इति । परस्परविजिगीषारहिता इत्यर्थः । शिष्टाः —

‘धर्मेणाधिगतो यैस्तु वेदः सपरिवृंहणः ।

ते शिष्टा ब्राह्मणा ज्ञेयाः श्रुतिप्रत्यक्षहेतवः ॥’

इत्यादिभिर्मन्वाद्युक्तलक्षणाः । श्रोत्रियाः श्रुतवेदान्ताः । ‘समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठं इत्यत्र ‘श्रोत्रियं वेदान्तवेदिनं’ इति हि भगवान्निः । श्रीभाष्यकारैः वेदान्तसारेऽनुगृहीतम् । ‘श्रोत्रियं श्रुतवेदान्तं’ इति च श्रुतप्रकाशिकायां व्यासार्थाः । श्रेयोऽर्थिनः - मोक्षाद्यर्थिनः । अत्र ‘तं शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिशिष्टश्रेयोऽर्थिभिरनसूयुभिरभ्युपेयात्’ इति अक्षपादसूत्रमनुसन्धेयम् । तं - वादं । तत्र शिष्यगुरुभ्यां क्रियमाणस्य वादस्य शिष्यगतमज्ञातार्थस्य ज्ञानं फलम् । सब्रह्मचारिभ्यां क्रियमाणस्य तस्य ज्ञातस्थिरीकरणं उभयगतं प्रयोजनम् । एवं शिष्यादिभिः क्रियमाणस्यापि तस्य ज्ञातस्थिरीकरणसंशयनिवृत्त्यादिकं

प्रतिपादनाद्यर्थत्वादनुविधेयस्य । रागद्वेषरहिताः त्र्यवरा विषमसंख्याः सभ्याः स्युः, द्वैधे अधिकानां वचनस्य ग्राह्यत्वात् । एकोऽपि वा प्राज्ञतमः । ननु सिद्धान्तनियमोऽप्यवश्यापेक्षितः ; तत् कथं चतुष्टयम् ? सत्यम् ; निरूप्यनियम एव तस्यान्तर्भावादनुक्तिः । न हि तमन्तरेण स उपपद्यते । यत्र तु नाना-सिद्धान्तानुमतार्थो निरूप्यते, तत्र व्यवहारविशेषनियमार्थं सिद्धान्तविशेषनियमोऽप्यस्तु ॥

केचित्तु — निग्रहसामस्त्यासामस्त्योद्भावनप्रतिज्ञानकथापर्यवसाननियमाभ्यां सह षडङ्गान्याहुः ; तदयुक्तम्, इच्छाकल्पितत्वेनावश्यापेक्षितत्वाभावात्, अनित्यस्य चाङ्गत्वायोगात् ; अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात् ॥

यथासंभवं प्रयोजनं बोध्यम् । त्र्यवरा इति - त्रयोऽवराः न्यूनसंख्याकाः येष्विति बहुव्रीहिः । त्रिभ्यो न्यूनाः सभ्या न कर्तव्या इत्युक्तं भवति । विषमसंख्याफलमाह द्वैध इति । तमन्तरेणेति । सिद्धान्तनियममन्तरेणेत्यर्थः । स इति । निरूप्यनियम इत्यर्थः । नानासिद्धान्तानुमतोऽर्थ इति । वेदप्रामाण्यादिरूप इत्यभिप्रायः । व्यवहारविशेषनियमार्थमिति । प्रमाणाद्यवान्तरार्थविशेषव्यवहारार्थमित्यर्थः । निग्रह-सामस्त्येत्यादि । निग्रहस्थानानि सर्वाण्युद्भावनीयानि अथवा एतान्येव निग्रहस्थाना-न्युद्भावनीयानि नत्वन्यानीत्येवं नियमकरणं, अत्र कथापर्यवसानं कार्यमित्येवंविधनियम-श्चावश्यक इति षडङ्गत्वमित्यभिप्रायः । इच्छा कल्पितत्वेनेति । वादिप्रतिवादिनोः सभ्यानां च इच्छाधीनत्वेनेत्यर्थः । अन्यथेति । अनियतस्याप्यङ्गत्व इत्यर्थः । अति-प्रसङ्गादिति । अवलेपानुगुणतया परिग्राह्यत्वेन वक्ष्यमाणनियमान्तरस्याप्यङ्गत्वप्रसङ्गा-दित्यर्थः ॥

वादे तावत् कथा हि तच्चनिर्णयपर्यन्ता वा स्यात् अशक्तिपर्यन्ता वा ; न तत्र नियमकृत्यम् ; द्वयोः संप्रतिपत्तेरेव पर्यसानमित्युक्तं भवति । जल्पवितण्डयोरपि निग्रहपर्यन्ता । अतस्तत्रापि किं नियमेन ? उक्तं हि प्रज्ञापरित्राणे —

‘ निग्रहस्थानपर्यन्ता विजिगीषुकथा मता ।

तच्चनिर्णयपर्यन्तो वादः स्याच्च पुनः पुनः ॥

हेत्वाभासापसिद्धान्ताननुयोज्यानुयुक्तयः ।

दृश्यन्ते यत्र तत्रैव वादोऽवसितिमान् भवेत् ॥’ इति ॥

यदि त्वेकस्मिन्नेव निग्रहे कथापर्यवसानमिति नियमो जल्पवितण्डाङ्गमङ्गीक्रियते, तदा एतयैव भाषया भाषितव्यम्, पद्यादिनियमेनाभिधेयम्, एतत्प्रमाणजातीयं वाच्यम् । महाविद्यादिरीतिरपि ग्राह्या, लिखित्वैव निरूप्यम्, गगनसूचन - भूतलविलेखनादिविकाराः परिहार्याः, मध्ये नान्येन संलपनीयमित्यादिनियमानामप्यङ्गत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

॥ निग्रहस्थाननियमः ॥

स्वारसिकस्तु कथासु निग्रहस्थाननियम उच्यते । वादे तावत् — अपलापादिकं प्रायशो न संभवति । संभवदपि प्रतिज्ञान्तराज्ञानादिकमनुद्धाव्यम्, उद्धाव्यमप्यवाचकादि न कथाविच्छेदकम् । संप्रतिपत्त्या अनेकहेतुदृष्टान्तदूषणाद्यभिधानेऽपि न दोष इति । जल्पवितण्डयोस्तु — यथाभ्युपगतं सर्वे निग्रहाः ॥

॥ कथास्वरूपविवेकः ॥

तदेवमङ्गेषु चतुर्षु पञ्चसु वा सिद्धेषु, यथावलेपं नियमान्तरेषु कृतेषु अवहितेषु च सभ्यप्रतिवादिषु, तदभ्यनुज्ञातेन वादिना प्रथमं स्वसाध्यमुद्दिश्य तत्र विवक्षितः प्रत्यक्षादिरूपः प्रमाणविशेषो वाच्यः । प्रतिवाद्यापादितश्चाभास उद्धरणीयः । विपक्षे बाधकाभावादप्रसङ्गे च तर्को वाच्यः । ये पुनः संक्षेपतो विस्तरतो वा आभासोद्धारं तर्कप्रयोगं चावश्यंभाविनमाहुः,

कथासामान्यपर्यवसानहेतुं स्वयमाह — हेत्वाभासेति । वादः - कथा । पञ्चसु वेति । नानासिद्धान्तानुमते निरूप्ये सिद्धान्तनियमस्यापि अङ्गीकृतत्वादिति भावः । आभासोद्धारमिति । वादिना स्वाभिमतप्रमाणोपन्यासानन्तरं नायमाभास इत्यादिरूपेण आभासनिराकरणमित्यर्थः । तर्कप्रयोगमिति । विपक्षे बाधकतर्कप्रदर्शनमित्यर्थः ।

तेनूनम् 'अस्मद्वकरे' कांस्यं नास्ति' इति लोकवादोऽनुसृतः ; अनिष्टप्रसङ्गश्च ; आभासोद्धारतर्कप्रयोगवाक्ययोरपि स्वयमेव दूषणोद्धारोदेः कर्तव्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । एवं तदुपर्यपीत्यनवस्था । प्रतिवादिनापि तत्तदनुभाषणपूर्वकं तत्र दूषणं वाच्यम् । ततश्चैवं परस्परवाक्यानुभाषणप्रतिक्षेपाभ्यामुक्तिपरम्परासिद्धेः ॥

अत्र व्यवहारस्य प्रतिज्ञासाधनदूषणनिर्णयरूपेण चतुष्पात्त्वम्, प्रथम-द्वितीययोर्वादिनिष्पाद्यत्वम्, तृतीयस्य प्रतिवादिनिष्पाद्यत्वम्, तस्य च कदाचित् संप्रतिपत्त्यात्मकत्वम्, चतुर्थस्यापि वादिभ्यां सभ्यैर्वा कार्यत्वम्, प्रतिज्ञातविषये प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमेषु मनीषितस्य यथोचितमुपन्यासप्रकारः, प्रत्यक्षस्यासिद्ध्या दूषणे सदस्यैरेव निर्णयत्वम्, लैङ्गिकस्यासिद्ध्या दूषणे तस्याप्यंशस्य प्रतिज्ञा-पूर्वकं साध्यत्वम्, प्रतिवादिना वा अनैकान्तिकत्वाद्युद्भावेन कृते तेनैव तत्साध्यत्वम्, प्रत्यनुमाने समबलतया निरूपिते सति द्वयोरपि विजयाभावः, वैतण्डिकस्य तु तावतापि विजयः, प्रतिकक्ष्यं च वादिप्रतिवादिवचनयोर्लेखनीयत्वम्

तदिदमप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधरूपतया वक्ष्यमाणलोकवादरीत्या दोषसंशयहेतुतया चानुचितमिति सोपहासं दूषयति — तैरिति । अवकरः-सङ्करः । 'सङ्करोऽवकरस्तथा' इत्यमरः । लोक-वादोऽनुसृत इति । तस्याप्रसक्तचौर्यदोषपरिहाररूपत्वात् चौर्यसंशये हेतुत्वाच्चेति भावः । दोषान्तरमप्याह अनिष्टप्रसङ्गश्चेति । प्रथमद्वितीययोरिति । प्रतिज्ञासाधनयोरित्यर्थः । तृतीयस्येति । दूषणस्येत्यर्थः । तस्येति । तृतीयवादस्येत्यर्थः । संप्रतिपत्त्यात्मकत्वमिति । वाद्युक्तसाधनाभ्युपगमरूपत्वमित्यर्थः । तथा च दूषणसंप्रतिपत्त्यन्यतररूप एव तृतीयवाद इति भावः । चतुर्थस्येति । निर्णयस्येत्यर्थः । वादिभ्यामिति । इदं वादविषयम् । सभ्यैरेवेति । इदं तु जल्पवितण्डाविषयम् । एवं व्यवस्थितविकल्पपरो वा शब्दः । वैतण्डिकस्य तु तावतापि विजय इति । परपक्षनिराकरणमात्रस्यैव तत्कृततया तस्य तावतैव निर्वाहादित्यर्थः । लेखनीयत्वमिति । अन्यथा अपलापादिसंभवेन सभ्याना-मपि कदाचिदुक्त्यनुक्तिसंशयप्रसङ्गेन तत्कर्तव्यजयपराजयव्यवस्थाया अनुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गादिति

छलजात्योरेकान्तविजयाभावेन त्याज्यत्वम्, कदाचिदवष्टम्भविजयावहत्वमात्रेण तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षकत्वम्, अन्यदन्यदपि विस्तरेण तत्त्वरत्नाकरे प्रत्यपादि । तदेवंविधेऽस्मिन् व्यवहारे निग्रहस्थानानि यथासंभवमाविर्भवन्ति । तानि च स्वनामधेयेन अर्थतो वा यथानियममुद्भाव्यानि ॥

॥ निग्रहस्थानसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥

कथायां स्वाश्रयस्य पराजयनिमित्तं निग्रहस्थानम् । तस्य तन्निमित्तत्वं

भावः । एकान्तविजयाभावेनेति । नियमेन प्रयोक्तुर्विजयसंपादकत्वाभावेनेत्यर्थः । परस्य छलत्वजातित्वपरिज्ञाने प्रयोक्तुरेवापजयप्रसङ्गादिति भावः । ननु तर्हि तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षकत्वविरहात् छलजातिनिरूपणमनर्थकं स्यादित्यत आह — कदाचिदिति । परेण छलजातिप्रयोगदशायामित्यर्थः । अवष्टम्भविजयावहत्वमात्रेणेति । तदुद्भावेन वादिनो विजयसंपादकत्वमात्रेणेत्यर्थः । मात्रपदेन प्रयोगसंपादकत्वं व्यवच्छिद्यते । तथा च हेत्वाभासानामिव स्वयं त्याज्यतया परं प्रत्युद्भावेन च तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षकत्वं छलजात्योरप्यस्तीति न तन्निरूपणानुपपत्तिरिति भावः । अन्ये तु परस्य छलत्वजातित्वापरिज्ञानस्यापि संभवात् मया जातिः प्रयुक्ता छलं प्रयुक्तं तच्च त्वया न ज्ञातमित्यज्ञानापादनसंभवेन तदवष्टम्भेन जयोऽपि स्यादिति छलजातिप्रयोगोऽपि संभवात् । तेन तत्त्वशोभोऽपि निवारितः स्यादिति भाव इति व्याचक्षते । अन्यदपीति । कथोपयुक्तविषयान्तरमपीत्यर्थः । स्वनामधेयेनेति । उक्तशान्यादिपदेनेत्यर्थः । अर्थतो वेति । स्वोक्तार्थः स्वनैव परित्यक्तः इत्यादिरूपेण वेत्यर्थः । यथानियममिति । समयबन्धदशायां यथोद्भावननियमः कृतः तथेत्यर्थः ॥

॥ निग्रहस्थानसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥

निग्रहस्थानलक्षणमाह — कथायामिति । वादिप्रयुक्तायाः समीचीनप्रमाणाद्युक्तेः प्रतिवादिपराजयहेतुत्वात् तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय स्वाश्रयेत्युक्तम् । कथावहिर्भूतस्थले

तच्चाप्रतिपत्तिस्त्वनेन । तच्चाप्रतिपत्तिश्च अप्रतिपत्तिविप्रतिपत्तिप्रकारा, प्रतिपत्त्यभावे
विपरीतप्रतिपत्तौ च तच्चाप्रतिपत्तेरविशिष्टत्वात् । ततश्च तदुभयसूचनान्निग्रह-
स्थानद्वैविध्यम् । कर्तव्याकरणमकर्तव्यकरणमिति वा । त्रेधा च कश्चित्
संग्रहः — वक्तव्यनुक्तिः, उक्तिदूषणम्, उक्तार्थदूषणं चेति । एतद्वान्तर-
भेदान्निग्रहस्थानवैचित्र्यम् । तथाहि — उक्तहानिः, उक्तविशेषणम्, उक्ताप-
लापः, उक्तविरोधः, अपसिद्धान्तः, अवाचकम्, अनन्वितम्, पुनरुक्तम्,
अप्राप्तकालम्, अविज्ञातार्थम्, अर्थान्तरम्, न्यूनम्, अधिकम्, अननुभाषणम्,
अज्ञानम्, अप्रतिभा, विक्षेपः, मतानुज्ञा, पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम्, निरनुयोज्यानु-
योगः, प्रमाणाभासाश्च बहुविधाः प्रत्येकं निग्रहस्थानानीति ॥

अवाचकादिप्रयोगे तत्र निग्रहस्थानत्वव्यवहारविरहात् तत्र तद्वारणाय कथायामिति ।
तस्य - निग्रहस्थानस्य । तन्निमित्तत्वं । पराजयनिमित्तत्वम् । अप्रतिपत्तिविप्रतिपत्ति-
प्रकारेति । अप्रतिपत्तित्वविप्रतिपत्तित्वरूपप्रकारवतीत्यर्थः । ननु विप्रतिपत्तेः कथं तच्चा-
प्रतिपत्तिरूपत्वमत आह । प्रतिपत्त्यभाव इति । धर्मिस्वरूपज्ञानस्यैवाभाव इत्यर्थः । विपरीत-
प्रतिपत्ताविति । धर्म्यवृत्तिधर्मप्रकारकधर्मिप्रतिपत्तावित्यर्थः । तच्चाप्रतिपत्तेरिति । अना-
रोपितधर्मप्रकारकधर्मिविशेष्यकज्ञानाभावस्येत्यर्थः । भ्रमभिन्नधर्मज्ञानाभावस्येति यावत् ।
अविशिष्टत्वात् - आवश्यकत्वात् । अयं भावः - तच्चाप्रतिपत्तिशब्दे नञो विरोधार्थ-
कतया तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तिविरोधेयव तच्चाप्रतिपत्तिशब्दार्थः । तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तिविरोधित्वं च
तत्त्वप्रतिपत्त्यभावव्याप्यत्वम्; तच्चाप्रतिपत्तौ विप्रतिपत्तौ चास्त्येवेति । कर्तव्याकरण-
मकर्तव्यकरणमिति । वक्तव्यानुक्तेः कर्तव्याकरणे, उक्तिदूषणोक्तार्थदूषणयोर्दुष्टशब्द-
दुष्टार्थकशब्दप्रयोगरूपयोरकर्तव्यकरणे चान्तर्भाव इति भावः । प्रत्येकं निग्रहस्थानानीति ।
एष्वेकेनापि वादिपराजयः स्यादिति भावः ॥

॥ उक्तहानिः ॥

कथायां स्रोक्ते परेण दूषिते स्वनैव तत्परित्याग उक्तहानिः । सा द्विविधा — शब्दतोऽर्थतश्च । यद्येतद्दृष्टम्, तर्हि त्यक्तमिदं मया इत्यादिः शब्दतः, अन्यत् तर्ह्युपादीयते इत्यादिस्त्वर्थतः । एषा च प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्त-प्रत्यक्षागमादित्याज्यभेदात् प्रतिज्ञाहानिहेतुहान्यादिभेदं भजते । तत्र प्रतिज्ञा-हानिर्यथा — नित्यः शब्द इति कैवल्यकथकेनोक्ते अपसिद्धान्तेन दूषिते, तर्हि अनित्योऽस्त्वित्यादि । हेतुहानिर्यथा — अनित्यः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षत्वादित्युक्ते अनैकान्तिकत्वेन प्रत्युक्ते, तर्हि त्यक्तम् ; अस्तु कृतकत्वादित्यादि । तत्रैव अस्तु सामान्यतोऽप्यन्यद्वापकं साधनमित्यादिवचने प्रतिज्ञाहान्यादि । दृष्टान्त-हानिर्यथा — तत्रैव सामान्यवादित्युक्ते साध्यसाधनविकलतया दूषिते, तर्हि घटो दृष्टान्त इत्यादि । एवं धर्मविशेषणहेतुविशेषणदृष्टान्तविशेषणादेरपि हानिरूढ्या । प्रत्यक्षहानिर्यथा — स्थिरः शब्दः प्रत्यभिज्ञानादित्युक्ते भ्रान्ततुल्यत्वेन प्रत्युक्ते, अस्तु तर्हि अनुमानेन आगमेन वेत्यादि । आगमहानिर्यथा — सर्वं क्षणिकं सर्वज्ञेन तथाभिधानादिति सौगतेनोक्ते बुद्धस्यानाप्तत्वेन प्रत्युक्ते, अस्तु तर्हि सच्चानु-मानादित्यादि । एवं हान्यन्तराण्यपि चिन्तनीयानि । वादे तु सदुक्तं निर्वाह्यम् । असदुक्तं तु त्याज्यमेव, तन्निर्वहणस्य तच्चनिर्णयानङ्गत्वात्,

॥ उक्तहानिः ॥

आगमादीत्यादिपदेन तत्तद्वाद्यभ्युपगताथार्थपत्त्यादिग्रहणम् । साध्यसाधन-विकलतयेति । साध्यं अनित्यत्वं, साधनं कृतकत्वमिति भावः । एवमित्यादि । धर्मविशेषणहानिः यथा - ऐन्द्रियकः शब्दः अनित्यः कार्यत्वादित्युक्ते ऐन्द्रियकत्व-विशेषणे वैयर्थ्येन दूषिते तत्परित्यागः । हेतुविशेषणहानिः यथा - शब्दः अनित्यः प्रयत्न-कार्यत्वादित्यत्र प्रयत्नेत्यनर्थकमित्युक्ते तत्परित्यागः । दृष्टान्तविशेषणहानिः यथा - तत्रैव कार्यत्वहेतौ स्थूलघटस्य दृष्टान्तत्वेनोपादाने स्थौल्यविशेषणवैयर्थ्योद्भावने तत्परित्यागः । आदिपदेन साध्यविशेषणपरिग्रहः । साध्यविशेषणहानिः यथा - पर्वतः प्रमेयवद्भिमानित्यत्र

तद्विपर्ययस्य तु तादर्थ्यादिति । दुष्टस्य त्यागान्निर्दोषः स्यामिति सङ्कल्पादुक्त-
हानिसंभवः । निर्वाह्यमेव वदेत् । जल्पवितण्डयोस्तु उक्तं च निर्वहेदिति
रहस्यम् ॥

॥ उक्तविशेषणम् ॥

अविशेषितपूर्वोक्ते दूषिते, तद्विशेषणनिक्षेप उक्तविशेषणम् । अविशिष्ट-
परित्यागादेतदपि हानिरेवेति चेन्न; अविशिष्टत्वस्यानुक्तत्वात्, उक्तमात्रस्य
चापरित्यागात् । साध्यसाधकांशविशेषणभेदादेतत् प्रतिज्ञान्तरहेत्वन्तरसंज्ञं
निग्रहस्थानद्वयमक्षपादेन पठितम्; तदयुक्तम्; सामान्यसंग्रहस्य दृष्टत्वात् ।

प्रमेयत्वविशेषणवैयर्थ्योद्भावने तत्परित्यागः । तद्विपर्ययस्येति । असदुक्तिनिर्वहणाभाव-
स्येत्यर्थः । तादर्थ्यादिति । तत्त्वनिर्णयार्थत्वादित्यर्थः । ननु कथासु उक्तनिर्वहणा-
भिमान एव स्यात्, न तु तत्परित्यागः । अतः कथमुक्तहानिसंभवः अत आह
दुष्टस्येति । निर्दोषः स्यामिति सङ्कल्पादिति । अयं च सङ्कल्पः उक्तहाने-
र्दोषत्वाज्ञानमूलः । निर्वाह्यमेव वदेदिति । कथासु सर्वास्वित्यभिप्रायः । उक्तं च
निर्वहेदिति । चकारः निर्वाह्यमेवेत्येतत्समुच्चायकः ॥

॥ उक्तविशेषणम् ॥

उक्तविशेषणलक्षणमाह — अविशेषितेति । उक्तविशेषणस्यापि उक्तहानावेवान्त-
र्भावात् न पृथक् परिगणनं युक्तमिति शङ्कते अविशिष्टेति । अविशिष्टत्वस्य-
विशेषणराहित्यस्येत्यर्थः । उक्तमात्रस्येति — यावत् स्वेनोक्तं तावदंशस्येत्यर्थः ।
अक्षपादेन पठितमिति । तथा च सूत्रं 'प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे धर्मविकल्पात् तदर्थ-
निर्देशः प्रतिज्ञान्तरम्' इति । 'अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिषिद्धे विशेषमिच्छतो
हेत्वन्तरम्' इति च । सामान्यसंग्रहस्य दृष्टत्वादिति । 'प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्माभ्यनुज्ञा
स्वदृष्टान्ते प्रतिज्ञाहानिः' इति गौतमेनैव पक्षहान्यादीनां उक्तहानित्वेन सामान्यरूपेण
संग्रहणस्य दर्शनादित्यर्थः । अयमत्र सूत्रार्थः — प्रतिकूलो दृष्टान्तो यत्र स

अन्यथा हानिरपि तथैव प्रतिज्ञाहानिर्हेतुहानिरिति निग्रहस्थानद्वयं स्यात्, अविशेषात् । उक्तं च हेत्वन्तरं पृथगभिधानैरपि वरदविष्णुमिश्रैः —

‘पक्षदृष्टान्तहेत्वादिदूषणे कथिते सति ।

पुनर्विशेषणादानं प्रतिज्ञान्तरमिष्यते ॥’ इति ।

द्विविधं चैतत् — सामान्यतो विशेषतश्चेति ; यथा - अनित्यः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षत्वादिति वैशेषिकेण प्रयुक्ते, सामान्यादिभिरनैकान्तिकत्वे मीमांसकेनोद्धाविते, अस्तु तर्हि यत्किंचिद्विपक्षव्यावर्तकं विशेषणमिति सामान्यतः ; अस्तु तर्हि जातिमत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वादिति विशेषतः । इदमपि पक्षसाध्यहेतु-दृष्टान्तप्रत्यक्षागमादिरूपविशेष्यभेदाद्बहुविधम् । तत्र पक्षविशेषणं यथा — अनित्यः शब्द इत्युक्ते मीमांसकेन अंशतः सिद्धसाधनत्वाभिधाने, तर्हि

प्रतिदृष्टान्तः परपक्षः । स्वीयो दृष्टान्तो यत्र स स्वदृष्टान्तः स्वपक्षः । तथा च स्वपक्षे परपक्षधर्मस्याभ्यनुज्ञा प्रतिज्ञाहानिः । स्वयं विशिष्याभिहितपरित्याग इति फलितम् । अनेन ह्युक्तहानित्वेन सर्वासामपि हानीनां सङ्ग्रहः कृत इति स्पष्टं सूत्रवृत्त्यादिषु । अनेन प्रतिज्ञाहानिरिति निग्रहस्थाननामधेये प्रतिज्ञाशब्द उक्तपर्यायः ; प्रतिज्ञायते उच्यते इति प्रतिज्ञेति व्युत्पत्तेरित्युक्तं भवति । अन्यथेति । विशिष्यैव संग्रहस्याभिमतत्व इत्यर्थः । हानिरपीति । उक्तहानिरपीत्यर्थः । प्रतिज्ञेति । इह प्रतिज्ञाशब्देन साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनमेव विवक्षितम् । उक्तं चेत्यादि । हेत्वन्तरस्य पृथगुद्दिष्ट(गनिर्दिष्ट)-त्वेऽपि लक्षणस्य साधारण्येनैवाभिधानात् प्रतिज्ञान्तरत्वेनैव हेत्वन्तरस्यापि संग्रहोऽभिप्रेत इत्यर्थः । सामान्यादिभिः इति । आदिना मानसप्रत्यक्षविषया आत्मानो गृह्यन्ते । योगि-प्रत्यक्षगम्यनित्यकालादिग्रहणं तु न युक्तम् । मीमांसकेन योगिप्रत्यक्षानुपगमात् । उत्तरत्र अस्मदादि इति विशेषणं तु नैयायिकमतरीत्या प्रसक्तानैकान्त्यपरिहारायैव । तदपि हि अन्यतरानैकान्तरूपं परिहरणीयमेव । अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वादिति । प्रत्यक्षनिरूपितलौकिकविषयताश्रयत्वादित्यर्थः । अंशतः सिद्धसाधनत्वाभिधान इति ।

वर्णात्मकः शब्द इत्यादि । साध्यविशेषणं यथा — क्षित्यादिकं प्रयत्नवत्पूर्वक-
मित्युक्ते प्राचीनादृष्टसाधकप्रयत्नवज्जीवपूर्वकतामात्रेण सिद्धसाधनत्वेऽभिहिते,
अस्तु तर्हि साक्षादुपादानादिगोचरज्ञानचिकीर्षाप्रयत्नवत्पूर्वकमिति । हेतुविशेषणं
प्रागुदाहृतम् । दृष्टान्तविशेषणं यथा — यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम्; यथा —
घट इति बौद्धेनोक्ते साध्यविकलतया प्रत्युक्ते, अस्तु तर्हि कुर्वत्क्षणाव-
च्छिन्नो घट इति । प्रत्यक्षविशेषणं यथा — भावरूपाज्ञानं अन्धकारादिवत्
सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षमित्यद्वैतिनोक्ते बाह्यान्तरप्रत्यक्षविकल्पानुपपत्त्या दूषिते, अस्तु
तर्हि साक्षिप्रत्यक्षमन्यदेवात्र प्रमाणमित्यादि । एवमुदाहरणान्तराण्यपि चिन्त्यानि ।
निर्विशेषणस्यैव दोषः, विशिष्टे तु स नापततीति व्यवसायादुक्तविशेषणसंभवः ।
प्रागेव पुष्कलं वदेत् । अपुष्कलोक्तं तु जल्पवितण्डयोस्तात्पर्यभेदादिना निर्वहेत्,
न तु विशेषयेदिति रहस्यम् । सतो हानौ विशेषणे च पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणसध्री-
चीनमिदं निग्रहस्थानद्वयमुद्भाव्यम् ॥

ध्वन्यात्मकशब्दस्य मीमांसकमतेऽप्यनित्यत्वसंप्रतिपत्तेरिति भावः । हेतुविशेषणं प्रागुदा-
हृतमिति । जातिमत्त्वे सति इत्युदाहृतमित्यर्थः । कुर्वत्क्षणावच्छिन्नो घट इति ।
उत्पत्तिक्षणमात्रावच्छिन्नो घट इत्यर्थः । उत्पन्नविनष्टघट इत्यभिप्रायः । साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष-
मिति । अन्तःकरणोपहितचैतन्यरूपं प्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः । अन्यदेवेति । प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानादन्य-
देवेत्यर्थः । चिन्त्यानीति । यथा अनुभूतेरननुभाव्यत्वे अनुमानं प्रमाणमित्यद्वैतिनोक्ते
साध्याप्रसिद्ध्या दृष्टान्तविरहाच्चानुमानं न संभवतीति सिद्धान्तिना दूषिते, अस्तु
केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमानमेव प्रमाणमिति । एतन्निग्रहस्थानसम्भवे हेतुमाह निर्विशेषणस्येति ।
तात्पर्यभेदादिना इत्यादिना अर्थभेदादिकं गृह्यते । ननु दुष्टस्य पक्षादेः त्यागे
विशेषणे च उक्तनिग्रहस्थानद्वयसंभवेऽपि अदुष्टस्य पक्षादेर्दोषे परेणाभिहिते तस्य
दुष्टत्वभ्रमेण वादिना त्यागे विशेषणे वा तत्र परेण निग्रहस्थानोद्भावनमेव न
संभवति । तत्र हि उक्तहान्यादिना सह पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणमप्यस्ति । ततश्चैक-
मात्रोद्भावेन पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणप्रसङ्गः । अत आह — सत इति । समीचीनस्येत्यर्थः ।
अदुष्टस्येति यावत् । सध्रीचीनं - सहितम् । उद्भाव्यमिति । ईदृशस्थले

न च तथा सति स्वदोषोद्भावनं दोषः, व्यामोहनार्थं प्रयुक्तमसदप्यनेन न ज्ञातमित्यवष्टम्भविजयावहत्वात् । दूषणाधिक्यं तु न सर्वदा दोष इति ॥

॥ उक्तापलापः ॥

स्वयमुक्तस्य सभ्यादिविदितस्य परेण दूषितस्य निगूहनमुक्तापलापः । स च बहुविधः — न मयैवमुक्तमिति वा, अन्यदेव मयोक्तमिति वा, त्वमेवोक्त्वा मय्यारोपयसीति वा, त्वदुक्तमन्योक्तं वा मयानूदितमिति वा, पार्श्वस्थेनैवमुक्तमिति वा, अनुक्तमप्रकान्तमेव त्वया भ्रान्तिवशादवगतमिति वा, अशरीरिवाक्यमिति वा । ईदृशस्यापलापस्य संभवेहेतुः पश्यतोहरेषु शिक्षणीयः । प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तप्रत्यक्षागमाद्यपलपनीयभेदादयमपि बहुविषयः पूर्ववदुदाहरणीयः । नियमपरिहरणीयहस्तचेष्टाद्यपह्नवसंग्रहाय कृतापलाप इति लक्ष्यलक्षणसिद्धिः । स्पष्टानिष्ठितनिह्वे च समर्थनीयान्तराभावात् परिषदनुविधेयावेव स्थेयतया

दूषणाधिक्यं न दोष इत्यभिप्रायः । ननु दोषविरहेऽपि मया दोषोद्भावनं कृतम्; तत्र च न त्वया पर्यनुयोगः कृत इति पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणोद्भावने स्वदोषोद्भावनप्रसङ्गः, अत आह — न चेति । अवष्टम्भविजयः - निर्णयात्प्रागेव यत्किञ्चिदवलम्बेन विजयः अवष्टम्भविजय इत्याचक्षते । ननु कथं दूषणाधिक्यं न दोषोऽत आह दूषणेति । सर्वदा न दोष इति । दोषत्वं न सार्वत्रिकमित्यर्थः । अधिको दोषो न वक्तव्य इति नियमकथायामेव तस्य दोषत्वादिति भावः ॥

॥ उक्तापलापः ॥

निगूहनं - अपोहः । शिक्षणीयः अभ्यसनीयः । कृतापलाप इति । हस्तचेष्टादीनां वाग्व्यापारत्वाभावेऽपि कृतिजन्यत्वानपायादिति भावः । लक्ष्यलक्षणसिद्धिरिति । कृतापलापो निग्रहस्थानं तदेव लक्ष्यं; कृतस्य निगूहनमिति लक्षणं; तच्च स्वयमेवाकृतत्वप्रतिपादनम् । उक्तार्थस्य कृतार्थत्वासंभवेऽपि उक्तेः कृतायाः अकृतत्वप्रतिपादनमादाय लक्षणसमन्वयो बोद्धव्यः । स्पष्टानिष्ठितनिह्व इति ।

शरणम्, विश्वसाक्षिणां चतुर्दशानामपि तूष्णींभावात् । एवं सार्वलौकिकप्रती-
त्यपह्वेऽपि । उक्तं च नारायणार्यैर्भगवद्गीताव्याख्याने —

‘प्रसिद्धमपि विज्ञानं वादे यो नाम निहनुते ।

स सदस्यैर्नियन्तव्यो व्यवस्था नान्यथा यतः ॥’ इति ।

सभ्यादिविदितमुक्तं कृतं वा नापलपेदिति रहस्यम् । अपलापमेव
प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासशब्देनाक्षपाद उपचचार ; तदिह हानिसंन्यासशब्दयोरैकार्थ्यभ्रम-
हेतुतया नाद्रियामहे । अत्रापि सदपलापे पूर्ववत् पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणसन्धीचनता ।
एतानि त्रीण्यपि निग्रहस्थानानि तृतीयादिकक्ष्याभावीनि तदुत्तरकक्ष्योद्भाव्यानि ॥

स्पष्टस्य दोषस्यापर्यवसितनिहव इत्यर्थः । अपलापस्त्वया क्रियत इत्युद्भावनानन्तरं न
मयाऽपलापः क्रियत इति वादिनाऽभिधानेऽपलापो न निश्चितो भवति ; तादृशविषय
इति यावत् । स्थेयतया - विवादपदनिर्णेतृतया । विश्वसाक्षिणां चतुर्दशानामिति ।
अत्र मनुः —

‘मन्यन्ते वै पापकृतो न कश्चित्पश्यतीति नः ।

तांश्च देवाः प्रपश्यन्ति स्वश्चैवान्तरपूरुषः ॥

द्यौर्भूमिरापो हृदयं चन्द्रार्काम्रियमानिलाः ।

रात्रिः सन्ध्ये च धर्मश्च वृत्तज्ञाः सर्वदेहिनाम्’ ॥ इति

ननु प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासाभिधानं निग्रहस्थानान्तरमक्षपादेन उक्तम् । तत्कुतो
भवद्विर्नोच्यते । अत आह — अपलापमेवेति । ‘पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रतिज्ञातार्थापनयनं
प्रतिज्ञासंन्यास’ इति लक्षणसूत्रेण तथैवावगमादिति भावः । पक्षस्य स्वाभिहितस्य
परेण प्रतिषेधे कृते सति तत्परिजिहीर्षया प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्यापनयनमपलाप इति हि सूत्रार्थः ।
उपचारेण संन्यासशब्दस्यापलापवाचकत्वादिति भावः । तर्हि भवद्विस्तथैव कुतो
नोक्तमित्यत आह — तदिति । तस्मात्संन्यासशब्दस्यापलापे औपचारिकत्वादित्यर्थः ।
तृतीयादिकक्ष्याभावीनीति । द्वितीयकक्ष्यायां परेण दूषणाभिधानानन्तरमेव एतत्संभवा-
दिति भावः ॥

॥ उक्तविरोधः ॥

स्वोक्तस्य स्वेनैव विरुद्धकरणमुक्तविरोधः । स द्विधा — पदवाक्य-
भेदात् । पदविरोधो यथा — ईश्वरोऽनीश्वर इत्यादि । वाक्यविरोधो यथा —
ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञ एव; तथापि स्वज्ञानमेकं न जानातीत्यादि । स चायमवान्तर-
भेदाद्बहुविधः । तत्र प्रतिज्ञापदद्वयविरोधो यथा — ईश्वरो न सर्वज्ञ इत्यादि ।
पक्षहेतुविरोधो यथा — ईश्वरः कर्मवश्यः, जीवत्वादित्यादि । साध्यहेतुविरोधो
यथा — क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकम्, अकर्तृकत्वादित्यादि । स्ववचनविरोधो यथा —
यावज्जीवमहं मौनी मूको वेत्यादि । स्वक्रियाविरोधो यथा — सर्वदा निर्व्या-
पारोऽहमित्यादि । एवम् — न किञ्चिदहं याचे, अतो मेऽर्था दीयन्ताम्; अमृतं
पीतवानहम्, तथापि मे तद्वर्णतः पलितमासीत्; न कश्चिन्मे सिद्धान्तः, तथापि
शून्यं चिन्मात्रं वा तत्त्वम्; अवेद्यं ब्रह्म, तथापि तज्ज्ञानान्मोक्षः; न किञ्चित्
कारणं कार्यं वा, तथापि भूतपरेणतिविशेषाच्चैतन्यमित्यादीनि तत्तत्सैद्धान्तिकानां
व्याहतभाषितान्यवगन्तव्यानि । एषु चोक्तस्य क्वचिच्छाब्दो विरोधः, क्वचि-
दार्थः । अभ्युपगतनियमविरुद्धाचरणमप्यत्रैवान्तर्भवति; तद्यथा — संस्कृतमभ्यु-
पगम्य अपभ्रंशेन भाषणम्; कृत्स्नानुभाषणाद्यभ्युपगमे दृष्यमात्रानुभाषणादिकम्;

॥ उक्तविरोधः ॥

स्ववचनविरोध इति - स्वीयशब्दोच्चारणेन सह विरोध इत्यर्थः ।
मौनित्वमूकत्वयोर्हि पदोच्चारणेनैव विरोधः । स्वक्रियाविरोधः - स्वीयव्यापारेण सह
विरोधः । तद्वर्णत इति । अमृतवर्णत्वेन प्रसिद्धात् शौकल्यादित्यर्थः । अमृतपाने
जराया असंभवात् जरसा शौक्यरूपं पलितं न संभवतीति भावः । शाब्द इति ।
शब्दोच्चारणनिबन्धन इत्यर्थः । यथा - यावज्जीवमहं मौनी इत्यादौ । आर्थ इति ।

हस्तचेष्टादिवर्जनमभ्युपगम्य तत्करणमित्यादि । एवं शास्त्रान्तरपठितानि विसन्धयति भङ्गभिन्नवृत्तनेयार्थत्वादीन्यपि तत्तन्नियमापेक्षया दूषणान्यत्रैवान्तर्भवन्ति ।

अर्थविरोधनिबन्धन इत्यर्थः । यथा - ईश्वरे नेश्वरः न सर्वज्ञ इत्यादौ । शास्त्रान्तरपठितानीति । अलंकारशास्त्रपठितानीत्यर्थः । यथा काव्यप्रकाशे —

‘दुष्टं पदं श्रुतिकटु च्युतसंस्कृत्यप्रयुक्तमसमर्थम् ।
निहतार्थमनुचितार्थं निरर्थकमवाचकं त्रिधाऽश्लीलम्’ ॥

इत्यादीनि पददूषणानि,

‘प्रतिकूलवर्णमुपहतलुप्तविसर्गं विसन्धि हतवृत्तम् ।
न्यूनाधिककथितपदं पतत्प्रकर्षं समाप्तपुनरात्तम् ॥’

इत्यादीनि वाक्यदूषणानि च पठित्वा लक्षणोदाहरणान्यभिहितानि । विसन्धीत्यादि - विसन्धि - शास्त्रीयसन्धेरकरणम् यथा,

‘राजन् विभान्ति भवतश्चरितानि तानि इन्दोश्च्युतिं दधति यानि रसातलेऽन्तः’ ॥

इति । यतिभङ्गः - वृत्तशास्त्रसिद्धपदच्छेदनियमस्य भङ्गः - यथा,

‘वदतु यदिहान्यत् स्वादु स्यात् प्रियारदनच्छदात्’ इति ।

अत्र हि, ‘रसयुगहयैः न्सौ भ्रौ स्लौ गो यदा हरिणी तथा’ ।

इति वृत्तलक्षणानुसारात् षट्सु पदच्छेदः कार्यः । स च न कृतः । भिन्नवृत्तम् - पादभेदेन विभिन्नच्छन्दस्कत्वं यतिव्यतिरिक्तवृत्तलक्षणहानिर्वा । यथा,

‘क्षीराभोधित्रिदशतटिनीकुन्दमन्दारपुण्य-

ताराहारप्रविमलयशःपूरसंपूरिताशः ।

श्रीमान् राजति विजितसुपर्वद्भुमत्यागलीलावलोकः

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